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JUDGE DELMAS C. HILL
The federal judges of the Tenth Circuit are grateful to the Denver
University Law Review for this issue memorializing our esteemed col-
league, the late Judge Delmas C. Hill.
Of the many respected and learned judges who have graced the trial
and appellate benches of the Tenth Circuit, Judge Hill personified what
a judge should be. Born in the small town of Wamego, Kansas, Judge
Hill was the son of a country doctor who ministered to his patients re-
gardless of their ability to pay. Judge Hill early acquired a similar devo-
tion to duty and desire to help his fellow man. He graduated from
Washburn Law School in Topeka, Kansas, a prestigious smaller institu-
tion which intensively trained many outstanding lawyers around the na-
tion in both legal theory and practice. Judge Hill then rapidly attained
success in the public and private sectors. He practiced law in Wamego
with Robert Kaul, who later became a Justice on the Kansas Supreme
Court. During the course of his career, Judge Hill served as a County
Attorney, a City Attorney, School Board Counsel, an Assistant United
States Attorney, and Chief Counsel for the Kansas Tax Commission.
While in the United States Attorney's office, he attracted the favorable
attention of Tom Clark, then an Assistant United States Attorney Gen-
eral under President Roosevelt, who later became a United States
Supreme Court Justice under President Truman.
Like many young lawyers who later attain fame, Judge Hill was as-
tute in politics and a nationally recognized leader of his political party in
Kansas. He volunteered for military duty in World War II as a private,
rising to prominence in the J.A.G. Corps as a member of General Mac-
Arthur's staff in the Pacific. As Major Hill, he was one of the principal
attorneys assigned to the successful prosecution of Japan's General
Yamashita. After the war, he returned to Kansas and to private practice,
turning down the opportunity to be the Democratic nominee for gover-
nor. In 1949, President Truman selected him to be a federal district
judge.
As a federal district judge, Judge Hill significantly changed the way
in which the federal judiciary was perceived in Kansas. In 1950, the fed-
eral court in Kansas catered only to a very small segment of the bar, and
was as remote as the moon to most Kansans. The judges who presided,
while competent jurists, were idiosyncratic. Some were believed to be
tyrannical; some were autocratic and aloof; some were overworked and
plagued by bad health.
It is recognized that Judge Hill did more than others to popularize
the federal judiciary in Kansas, and to "humanize" the federal court as
an institution ofjustice. He brought legal scholarship and extensive trial
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experience to the bench, and zealously worked to correctly decide the
large volume of cases filed after the war. His legal and political experi-
ence also gave Judge Hill a respect for practicing attorneys, as well as a
feeling for people. All of these qualities produced a judge who was con-
siderate of lawyers, litigants, jurors and witnesses alike, yet who was firm
and prompt in his decisions. Soon after President Kennedy was inau-
gurated in 1961, Judge Hill was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He served the Tenth Circuit with national distinction from
1961 until 1977, when he took senior status and retired. His wise coun-
sel continued to be sought by, and was generously given to, both dis-
trict and circuit judges until his death on December 2, 1989.
Judge Hill's appellate service was characterized by opinions which
were scholarly and concisely written, combining a proper regard for pre-
cedent with an openmindedness towards changes in both constitutional
and statutory law. Judge Hill was especially revered by the trial judges
of this circuit. As an appellate judge he never countenanced trial error.
However, he innately understood the difficult position of the federal
trial judge who must make decisions instantly, be persuasive in welding
the interests of litigants and lawyers to produce justice, and who must
have the stamina to overcome the many pressures inherent in decision-
making. Judge Hill also respected the rule that factual decisions are not
to be upset absent clear error or an abuse of discretion - a rule of ap-
pellate review sometimes difficult to follow when only a cold record of
the trial proceedings is presented to the court on appeal.
Judge Hill has been deservedly praised by lawyers and judges
throughout the nation as an outstanding judge. As the late Kansas
United States Senator Harry Darby aptly said of Judge Hill: "Guilt
never escaped, and innocence never suffered in his courts."
The Honorable Frank G. Theis
Chief Judge Emeritus
United States District Court
District of Kansas
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CHIEF JUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to
Oklahoma City in 1927. During World
War II, he served as a First Lieutenant in
the Army. After the war, Judge Holloway
returned to complete his undergraduate
studies at the University of Oklahoma, re-
ceiving his B.A. in 1947. Judge Holloway
then attended Harvard Law School, where
he graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department of Justice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and
became ChiefJudge in 1984. He is a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Gamma
Delta.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brig-
ham Young University in 1957 with high
honors. Judge McKay then received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1960
and was the law clerk for Justice Jesse A.
Udall of the Arizona Supreme Court for the
1960-61 term. From 1961 to 1974, Judge
McKay practiced with the law firm of Lewis
and Roca in Phoenix, Arizona; however, he
did take a two year leave to serve as Direc-
tor of the United States Peace Corps in
Malawi, Africa. Judge McKay was a law
professor at Brigham Young University
from 1974 until 1977. In 1977, he was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge McKay
currently resides in Provo, Utah.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna curm laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huxman and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profes-
sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected the same year as
Dean of that school. He served in that ca-
pacity until 1968. Since 1961,Judge Logan
has been a visiting professor at Harvard
Law School, the University of Texas Law
School, Stanford University School of Law,
and the University of Michigan Law School.
He also has a series of lectures at Duke Uni-
versity Law School. He was a special com-
missioner for the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas from 1964
until 1967 and was a candidate for the
United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate
planning, administration and corporate
law. In 1977, he was appointed to the




Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Smith College in
1962, and from Harvard Law School in
1965. After graduating from law school,
Judge Seymour practiced law in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1965 until 1966, in
Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston,
Texas from 1968 until 1969. From 1971 to
1979 she practiced with the Tulsa law firm
of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & An-
derson. In 1979, she was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa
and the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa
County Bar Associations. Additionally,
Judge Seymour served as a bar examiner
from 1973 through 1979.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934. He received his B.A. from
the University of Denver in 1956 and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of
Denver College of Law in 1959. Judge
Moore then practiced law with the Denver
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 until 1975, he worked in the
Colorado Attorney General's Office. Spe-
cifically, Judge Moore served as Assistant
Attorney General from 1962 until 1967, as
Deputy Attorney General from 1967 to
1972, and as Attorney General for the State
of Colorado from 1972 until 1975.
In January, 1975,Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from
1949 to 1951, and Brigham Young Univer-
sity from 1955 to 1956 when he graduated.
Judge Anderson then attended the Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law where he re-
ceived his LL.B. degree in 1960. He was
Editor in Chief of the Utah Law Review,
Order of the Coif, and Phi Kappa Phi. He
then served as a trial attorney in the tax di-
vision of the United States Department of
Justice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Webeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen
states, and in the United States Supreme
Court. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. Addi-
tionally, Judge Anderson has been a mem-
ber of the Utah Judicial Counsel and the
Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, and he
has served as Chairman of the Utah Law
and Justice Center Committee. Judge An-
derson's civic activities include lectures at
the University of Utah College of Law,
member of the Executive Committee of the
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, and
director of numerous corporations. He is a
Master of the Bench, American Inn of
Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia,
Kansas. She received her B.A. in American
Studies from the University of Kansas in
1968 and was a miember of Mortar Board
and Phi Beta Kappa. Judge Tacha then
attended law school and received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow, Judge Tacha was sent on
official trips to southeast Asia, east and
central Africa, and the European Economic
Community. After her fellowship, Judge
Tacha was an associate with the law firm of
Hogan and Hartson in Washington, D.C.
In 1973, she returned to Kansas and
entered private practice in Concordia,
Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
faculty of the University of Kansas Law
School in 1974. In 1979, she became
associate Vice Chancellor of Academic
Affairs, and in 1981, she became the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky,
Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.
Judge Baldock attended the New Mexico
Military Institute, where he graduated in
1956. He received his J.D. from the Uni-
versity of Arizona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983,
he became a federal district judge in Albu-
querque, New Mexico and was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1985. In 1988, Judge
Baldock received an Outstanding Judge
Award from the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934
in Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in
Upton and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge
Brorby attended the University of Wyo-
ming and received a B.S. in Business. He
graduated with aJ.D. with Honor from the
University of Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He
engaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.
Judge Brorby was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commis-
sion. He has served on numerous Bar
committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas.
He received his B.A. in economics from
Northwestern University in 1962 and re-
ceived hisJ.D. from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1965, where he
graduated first in his class. While at the
University of Michigan Law School, he was
elected to the Order of Coif, the Barrister
Society, and he was Editor-in-Chief of the
Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked for Justice By-
ron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court during the 1965-1966 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct pro-
fessor at the University of Denver College
of Law, teaching the confirmation class at
the St. James Presbyterian Church and par-
ticipating in numerous Bar Association ac-
tivities. He has served as vice-president of
the Colorado Bar Association and is a fel-
low of the American College of Trial Law-
yers, a senior judge of the Doyle Inns of
Court, and a member of the Town & Gown
Society.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He served
as Chief Judge from 1977 until 1984. In
1984, Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of
the Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of
the Legal Committee of the New Mexico
Cattlegrowers' Association, Regent of the
Museum of New Mexico and as a director
of the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIOR JUDGE
ROBERT H. MCWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded
an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from
the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attorney
and as a Colorado District Court Judge. In
1961, Judge McWilliams was elected to the
Colorado Supreme Court where he served
until he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1970. In 1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late
Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's
Congressman, Governor and United States
Senator. Judge Barrett attended the Uni-
versity of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War
II. Following the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and Catholic University of America and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of Wy-
oming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he
received the Distinguished Alumni Award
from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for
the towns of Lusk and Manville and attor-
ney for the Niobrara County Consolidated
School District. From 1967 until 1971,
Judge Barrett served as Attorney General
for the State of Wyoming. In 1971, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In 1987, he
assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of the Ju-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
and was a trustee of Saint Joseph's Chil-
dren's Home.
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THE TIME-EXPIRED CIVIL RICO CLAIM AND
SUBSEQUENT PREDICATE ACTS
RICHARD P. SALGADO*
The expansive language and alluring remedies of the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),' have made RICO a
seductive statute under which to sue. RICO is not, as its name would
imply, limited to traditional concepts of racketeering and organized
crime. 2 Through the liberal interpretation courts have given RICO,3 it
has made a foray into otherwise common disputes. 4 Although courts
have cultivated a generous body of law interpreting RICO, 5 fundamen-
tal issues remain unresolved regarding the point at which a civil RICO
claim accrues for the purpose of the statute of limitations and the reper-
cussions of continued racketeering activity.
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,6 the United States
Supreme Court held that a civil RICO claim must be brought within four
years after the cause of action accrues. The Court expressly declined,
however, to determine when a RICO claim accrues so as to begin the
running of the four-year limitation period. 7 Consequently, many ques-
tions remain. This Article focuses on one such question: once the four-
year statute of limitations on an accrued RICO claim has run, of what
significance is a subsequent "predicate act" 8 in the same pattern of rack-
eteering activity?
* Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, United States District Court
Judge for the District of Colorado (1989-91); Yale Law School, J.D. (1989); University of
New Mexico, B.A. (1986).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987);
Melly, Stretching Civil RICO: Pro-life demonstrators are racketeers, 56 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 287
(1988); Comment, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual of Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. REv. 1411, 1413 n.13 (1988).
3. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
4. See Note, RICO and a Uniform Rule of Accrual, 99 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399 n.5 (1990).
5. For a quantitative review of the use of RICO, see Task Force Report on Civil RICO,
A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE (1984).
6. 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
7. Id. at 156-57; Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 n.12 (10th
Cir. 1989).
8. In this Article, I use the term "predicate act," to refer to an instance of conduct
which, when coupled with a second "predicate act," constitutes a RICO "pattern of racke-
teering activity." Under RICO, a pattern comprises two predicate acts committed no more
than ten years apart. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Although injury is not a necessary in-
gredient under all definitions of predicate act, in this Article, unless otherwise expressed, I
assume that for each predicate act there is an accompanying and contemporaneous injury,
and that the predicate acts are related and amount to or pose a threat of continued racke-
teering activity. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239
(1989); Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1273. See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.Johnson &Johnson, No. 87
CIV 6125 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS Genfed library, Dist file) (addressing
causation).
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There are many possible answers to that query. At one extreme, for
example, a predicate act committed after the statute of limitations has
run on prior predicate acts may save an otherwise barred claim and al-
low a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained as a result of all previous
predicate acts. At the other extreme, a plaintiff may lose all hope of
recovering for the injuries incurred as a result of the previous predicate
acts. The Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to address this question in
Bath v. Bushkin, Gainu, Gaines &Jonas.9 The Tenth Circuit, however, gave
only a glimpse of what may be.
This Article looks at the possible rules and concludes that the best
approach lies between the extremes of resurrecting the entire cause of
action (including expired predicate acts), and banishing the claim alto-
gether. I begin with a brief analysis of the competing RICO claim ac-
crual rules and the Tenth Circuit's selection among them. Although
more may be said on the virtues and evils inherent in each of the differ-
ing approaches to accrual.' 0 I focus on the rule selected by the Tenth
Circuit, and the unaddressed issue of the subsequent predicate act and
its impact on the time-barred RICO claim.
I. THE COMPETING APPROACHES TO RICO CLAIM ACCRUAL
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Malley-Duff, many federal cir-
cuit courts have crafted methods to determine when a RICO claim ac-
crues,' I including the Tenth Circuit in Bath. Typically, a cause of action
accrues when a plaintiff knows or should know of the existence of the
elements of the claim.' 2 The elements of a RICO claim' 3 are: (1) con-
duct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity,
(4) which injures plaintiff's business or property.14 The awkward nature
9. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversed in part on other grounds in Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), as stated in Anixter v.
Home-stake Prod. Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,128 (10th Cir. July 22, 1991)).
Before Bath, one district court within the Tenth Circuit confronted the RICO accrual ques-
tion. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1406, 1408-10 (D. Colo. 1990) (civil RICO claim accrues when plaintiff knows or should
know of existence of all elements including pattern).
10. For a more complete comparison of the rules and their variations, see Note, supra
note 4, at 1409-17; Comment, supra note 2, at 1413-21; Note, "Mother of Mercy, is this the
Beginning of RICO: The Proper Point of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 172
(1990).
11. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
grappled with the issue. Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 665-68 (1st Cir.
1990); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102-05 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988);
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 220 (4th Cir.
1987); La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986);
Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 152-55 (8th Cir. 1991); Compton v. Ide,
732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178
(1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986).
12. Indianapolis Hotel, 733 F. Supp. at 1409. The plaintiff need not comprehend the
legal implications, however. See Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1128.
13. These are the elements of the vast majority of RICO actions. See Note, supra note
4 at 1400 & n.8.
14. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); Bivens Gardens Office
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of a RICO claim, specifically the requirements of pattern and injury, is
the source of difficulty that courts have had with delineating the point of
accrual. 15
Courts have developed essentially three distinct accrual rules. 16
The first and most common approach among the circuits is the "discov-
ery" rule.17 This rule provides that a civil RICO claim accrues when a
plaintiff knows or should know of the injury resulting from the defend-
ant's conduct. This is the default approach used in federal actions
where Congress has not designated an alternative rule.' 8
The second approach is termed the "last injury" rule. 19 This rule
provides that each time a plaintiff suffers an injury caused by a predicate
act, a new cause of action accrues as to that injury when the plaintiff
knows or should have known of that injury. The analysis behind this
rule is enticing because it flows from the Clayton Act,20 which is the
source for the four-year statute of limitations.2 ' The heart of the last
injury rule, like the discovery rule, is in the discovery of injury.
The third approach is called the "last predicate act" rule. 22 Under
this rule, a RICO claim accrues upon the commission of the latest predi-
Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1553 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1695 (1991); Phelps v. Witchita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989).
15. See Note, supra note 4, at 1400 ("[oln the face of [RICO], it is unclear whether
plaintiff's cause of action accrues upon injury resulting from one act of such pattern or
whether the claim accrues after plaintiff can allege a pattern of racketeering activity.").
16. Some commentators purport to have identified more than three. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 4, at 1409 (defining 5 approaches); Comment, supra note 2, at 1413 (4 ap-
proaches). Except for the so-called "Clayton Act" rule, all the approaches identified are
variations of the discovery, last injury and last predicate act rules. The Clayton Act rule
has found a home in only a few courts, see, e.g., Gilbert Family Partnership v. Nido Corp.,
679 F. Supp. 679, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Armbrister v. Roland Int'l Corp., 667 F. Supp.
802 ( M.D. Fla. 1987), and has been criticized. Note, supra note 4, at 1416-17; Comment,
supra note 2, at 1427. Furthermore, the Clayton Act rule, in practice, may function the
same as the discovery rule. See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 666 (lst Cir.
1990); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1988); cf. Comment,
supra note 2, at 1421. For a more detailed review of the Clayton Act rule, see Bivens Gar-
dens, 906 F.2d at 1551 & n.9 (and cases cited therein).
17. See, e.g., Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271,274-76 (9th Cir. 1988); Poca-
hontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211,220 (4th Cir. 1987); La
Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowling v.
Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109
(1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1984); Compton
v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Zablocki v. Huber, 743 F. Supp. 626,
628 (E.D. Wis. 1990); Coal-Mac, Inc. v. JRM Coal, Co., 743 F. Supp. 499, 500 (E.D. Ky.
1990).
18. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-23 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102-05 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (current version at -).
21. In adopting the statute of limitations period applicable to Clayton Act actions, the
Supreme Court in Malley-Duff concluded that the Clayton Act "offers a far closer analogy
to RICO than any state law alternative." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987). See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111
S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (adopting uniform federal statutory limitations period for actions under
section 10(b) of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Se-
curity Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990)).
22. See, e.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130-35 (3d Cir. 1988).
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cate act in the pattern of racketeering. The statute of limitations begins
to run from the date plaintiff knew or should have known of the facts
that comprise the elements of a civil RICO cause of action. The clock is
reset, however, if a later predicate act is committed within ten years of a
previous predicate act and the later predicate act is part of the same
racketeering pattern. 23
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In Bath, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's use of the dis-
covery rule, concluding that the discovery rule and the last injury rules
were incomplete. Because both rules emphasize knowledge of injury to
the exclusion of pattern, 24 the court adopted the Eleventh Circuit rule
"that with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil
RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers,
or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of
his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern."
'25
Although Bath makes it clear that the plaintiff must have known or
should have known of the injury as well as the pattern before the statute
of limitations will begin to run on a RICO claim, Bath fails to articulate
how or when a RICO claim expires when there are three or more predi-
cate acts. The ambiguity of Bath is best illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 of
the appendix.
Figure 1 provides a time-line scenario of four RICO predicate acts
and injuries (PA I through PA IV). Figure 2 provides a matrix summa-
rizing the different results of each rule discussed in this Article. The
conclusions drawn in Figure 2 from the time-line scenario in Figure 1
rely on the following postulates:
(1) at the time of each predicate act and accompanying injury,
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the predicate act
and accompanying injury;
(2) at the time of each predicate act and accompanying injury,
the plaintiff had not brought a RICO action on any previous
predicate act and accompanying injury.
Referring to Figure 1, Bath makes it clear that if, in Year 1, the
plaintiff knows of Predicate Act I, he still has no RICO claim. This is
because there is no pattern, only a single predicate act. If, in Year 9,
however, the plaintiff learns or should have learned of Predicate Act II,
he has a RICO claim in Year 9 and must bring an action in four years. If,
by Year 14, the plaintiff still has not brought the RICO claim based on
Predicate Acts I & II, then that claim is barred.
The ambiguity in Bath arises if, in Year 15, the plaintiff discovers or
23. See Note, supra note 4, at 1413-14.
24. Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (11 th
Cir. 1990). The last predicate act rule was first adopted within the Tenth Circuit in Indian-
apolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-10
(D. Colo. 1990).
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should have discovered Predicate Act III. It may be that the plaintiff has
a RICO claim based on all three predicate acts. Alternatively, he may be
able to premise the claim on only the second and third predicate acts.
Perhaps the plaintiff would have a cause of action, but would be able to
recover for the injuries resulting from only certain predicate acts. It may
also be that there would be no RICO cause of action for any of the inju-
ries or predicate acts. The number of possible outcomes is limited only
by the number of predicate acts and resulting injuries.
26
Bath provides district courts and the bar little guidance as to which
of the myriad of possible outcomes is proper. The decision does not
address this important yet subtle RICO claim accrual issue except in a
footnote. 2 7 There, the panel in Bath quotes from the Third Circuit's
opinion in Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton.28 In Keystone the Third Circuit
held:
The rule which we announce provides that the limitations
period for a civil RICO claim runs from the date the plaintiff
knew or should have known that the elements of the civil RICO
cause of action existed unless, as a part of the same pattern of
racketeering activity, there is further injury to the plaintiff or
further predicate acts occur, in which case the accrual period
shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part of
the same pattern of racketeering activity. The last predicate act
need not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part
of the same pattern. If the complaint was filed within four years
of the last injury or the last predicate act, the plaintiff may re-
cover for injuries caused by other predicate acts which oc-
curred outside an earlier limitations period but which are part
of the same "pattern."
2 9
It is premature to assume, however, that the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded more than that trial courts within the Circuit are to apply the last
predicate act rule. First, the issue of whether a third predicate act may
give rise to a RICO claim otherwise barred by the four-year limitations
period was not before the court. Second, except for the footnote, the
court never discussed the issue. Finally, the court quoted Keystone only
as a summarization of the holding in Bivens Garden, which the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted. Consequently, based solely on Bath, it is impossible to
draw any conclusion beyond the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the discov-
ery and last injury rules.
To the extent, however, that Bath does adopt the Keystone approach,
the Tenth Circuit should repudiate that decision. By allowing a subse-
quent predicate act to resurrect recovery for otherwise time-barred
predicate acts, Keystone protracts the four-year limitations period of Mal-
26. For each predicate act, the court is presented with the choice of either allowing or
barring recovery for the accompanying injury. In addition, for each predicate act, the
court must decide whether that act is within the pattern of racketeering.
27. Bath, 913 F.2d at 820 n.2.
28. 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988).
29. Id. at 1130-31.
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ley-Duff, stretches further the already strained reach of RICO, and dis-
torts the point of accrual, rather than promoting certainty. The better
approach is to preclude recovery for the injuries arising from the predi-
cate acts for which the plaintiff failed to sue timely, but allow recovery
for the injuries incurred as a result of any subsequent predicate acts.
111. RESOLTION
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a RICO claim will not accrue
unless the plaintiff knew or should have known not only of his injury, but
also of a pattern of predicate acts, is well reasoned.3 0 The conclusion
left the accrual puzzle incomplete, however, by failing to determine how
a time-barred RICO claim interacts with a subsequent predicate act in
the same pattern of racketeering.
I undertake that task by first looking to the possible rules governing
the impact of the hypothetical Predicate Acts III & IV. I then conclude
that a predicate act should not resurrect a time-barred RICO claim and
allow a slothful plaintiff to recover for the injuries arising from the pred-
icate acts that form the otherwise expired RICO claim. The harshness
of this result is tempered because a plaintiff may recover under RICO
for the injury sustained as a result of the last predicate act.
A. Managing Predicate Acts Committed after the Statute of Limitations has
Run
Although the number of methods to manage predicate acts commit-
ted subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations depends on
the number of predicate acts involved, 3 l there are four fundamental ap-
proaches. Under the Third Circuit's analysis in Keystone, the plaintiff
would be able to bring a RICO claim even after the limitations period
has run as to Predicate Acts I & II, so long as he sued no more than four
years after he learned or should have learned of Predicate Act III. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff may recover for his injuries sustained from Predi-
cate Acts I & II, and need not have suffered injury from Predicate Act
III. Likewise, he could sue on Predicate Act IV and recover for all predi-
cate acts even though the statutory period ran on a suit relying solely on
Predicate Acts I, II & III, so long as he sued within four years of Predi-
cate Act IV. I refer to this as "Keystone Resurrection."
A second technique is to divest the predicate acts upon which the
plaintiff could have sued, but did not, of any legal significance. The the-
ory is that, because the plaintiff failed to sue on Predicate Acts I & II,
they no longer function as predicate acts in the pattern. Thus, the pass-
ing of the time limitations for the RICO action based on Predicate Acts I
& II not only precludes the plaintiff from recovering under RICO for
those acts, but those acts actually lose their status as predicate acts. The
30. See Note, supra note 4, at 1418 (concluding RICO statute of limitations should run
"from the discovery of the last predicate act of the defendant .....
31. See supra note 26.
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consequence of this approach can be severe. If there is no Predicate Act
IV, the plaintiff will have no RICO claim at all. This is because the time-
barred predicate acts have lost their status as part of a RICO pattern
and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the previous predi-
cate acts to establish a pattern.3 2 Under this theory, Predicate Act III is
essentially the first predicate act in a new pattern of racketeering activity
and a new RICO claim will accrue only if there is a Predicate Act IV. I
refer to this as "Complete Expiration."
A third rule is that the plaintiff may recover for Predicate Act III and
any predicate acts committed ten or fewer years before Predicate Act III,
if suit is brought within four years of Predicate Act III. This approach
turns on the fact that Congress has chosen to define "pattern" as two
predicate acts committed within ten years of each other. Congress has
thus concluded that an act committed more than ten years before other
predicate acts is too stale to be considered part of a pattern. Likewise, it
may be that a predicate act committed more than ten years before the
most recent predicate act is too stale for the purposes of recovery. If this
approach were adopted, the plaintiff could recover not only for the in-
jury incurred as a result of Predicate Act III, but also for the injury aris-
ing from Predicate Act II, which would only be five years old at the time
of Predicate Act III. He could not, however, recover for the injury in-
curred as a result of Predicate Act I, which would be thirteen years old at
the time of Predicate Act III. Likewise, if suit were brought within four
years of Predicate Act IV, the plaintiff could recover for Predicate Acts II
& III in addition to Predicate Act IV. I refer to this as the "Ten-Year
Radius."
This rule functions exactly the same as the Keystone Resurrection
rule if one accepts the contention that Congress created a statute of re-
pose by defining "pattern" as two predicate acts committed within ten
years of each other. It may be, as one commentator implies,3 3 that a
plaintiff may never recover for any predicate act and its attendant injury
if ten years have passed since it was or should have been discovered.
This problem could arise in certain cases. Figure 1 provides an example
where:
(1) Predicate Acts I & II are less than ten years apart;
(2) Predicate Acts II & III are less than ten years apart; and
(3) Predicate Acts III & IV are less than ten years apart.
If a pattern comprises only acts committed no more than ten years from
the most recent predicate act, then:
(1) At the time of Predicate Act III, Predicate Act I has no
legal significance for the purposes of RICO (only Predi-
cate Acts II & III comprise a pattern); and
(2) At the time of Predicate Act IV, Predicate Act I has no
32. Plaintiff may, of course, have legal theories other than RICO on which to recover
for the predicate acts.
33. Comment, supra note 2, at 1423.
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legal significance for the purpose of RICO (only Predicate
Acts II, III & IV comprise the pattern).
Predicate Act I is omitted from the pattern because it was committed
more than ten years before Predicate Acts III & IV.
This interpretation of the definition of pattern imposes what is es-
sentially a ten-year statute of repose on each predicate act; after ten
years, a predicate act of which plaintiff knows or should know loses all
RICO significance. This interpretation also converts the Keystone Resur-
rection rule into the Ten-Year Radius rule because, after ten years, a
predicate act is not related to the pattern. To fully develop the different
possible rules to deal with subsequent predicate acts here, it is assumed
that there is no ten-year statute of repose. This assumption is not with-
out basis.
First, the language of RICO does not require the imposition of a
ten-year statute of repose. The definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity" is two specified acts "the last of which occurred within ten years
... after the commission of a prior act."' 34 This definition, however, in
no way ordains that a "pattern" could not comprise three predicate acts,
the last of which is more than ten years apart from the first, so long as
the second predicate act is no more than ten years from both the first
and third predicate acts. 35 Second, even assuming that one could strain
to construe RICO to impose a statute of repose, such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the liberal reading mandated by "Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach .... ,36
A fourth rule is that Predicate Act III will not allow the plaintiff to
recover for the injuries incurred as a result of Predicate Acts I & II.
Predicate Acts I & II will, however, serve as predicate acts for the pur-
pose of establishing that Predicate Act III was part of a pattern. As one
district court has concluded:
The rule I adopt closely follows that of Keystone Ins. Co., except
that once the claim accrues, a plaintiff must bring an action in
four years. A subsequent violation, beyond the four year time
period, will not resurrect a RICO cause of action for the previ-
ous violations even if in the same pattern of racketeering activ-
ity and even if a plaintiff is thereby injured. The rule is liberal
in that a defendant must show that a plaintiff knew or should
have known of the existence of each element of the RICO
claim, not simply injury. On the other hand, the rule is consis-
tent with the underlying purpose of a statute of limitation be-
cause it promotes certainty and does not encourage a plaintiff
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
35. See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1990) (hypothesiz-
ing that series of predicate acts two years apart may create pattern for "thirty or forty
years" under last predicate act accrual rule).
36. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985). See Pub. L. No. 91-
452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942,947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)) (congressional
instruction to judiciary that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1555 n.l I
(llth Cir. 1990).
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to sleep on an accrued right to bring an action. Consequently,
under the rule adopted here, a subsequent predicate act after
expiration of the statute of limitations will not save a slothful
claimant by reviving the claim.
3 7
Under this formulation, the plaintiff, injured as a result of Predicate
Act III, may recover under RICO for that injury if he brings suit within
four years of Predicate Act III. He would not, however, recover for the
injuries incurred as a result of Predicate Acts I & 11.38 Furthermore, if
he failed to bring an action on Predicate Act III within four years of that
act, he would not recover under RICO for the injury incurred as a result
of Predicate Act III, even if there is a subsequent Predicate Act IV. The
plaintiff would, of course, be able to recover for the injury sustained as a
result of Predicate Act IV if he brought suit within four years of that act,
although he would not recover for any of the prior acts. Thus, a predi-
cate act on which the limitations period has run retains its utility as an
act to define a pattern, but has no value in calculating damages or estab-
lishing injury. I refer to this as "Injury Expiration."
B. Recommendation
Of the four approaches, the Injury Expiration rule functions con-
sistently with the goals of RICO and the principles of time limitation.
The four-year limitations period set forth in Malley-Duff is left hollow
under the Keystone Resurrection rule. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate,
under Keystone Resurrection, if a slothful plaintiff knowingly allows the
RICO claim based on Predicate Acts I & II to expire, he is still granted a
fresh four-year period in which to sue by Predicate Act III, and again by
Predicate Act IV. Consequently, he could recover for Predicate Acts I &
II even though the statute of limitations ran twice. 39
Arguably, the expansive language of RICO should save the claim of
a delinquent plaintiff. After all, if a defendant maintains a course of
racketeering activity, justice may demand payment for the totality of ille-
gal conduct. Keystone Resurrection, however, conflicts directly with the
objective of Malley-Duff to provide a certain and uniform expiration pe-
riod. By reviving a claim otherwise barred, Keystone Resurrection in-
troduces further disarray and speculation.
Complete Expiration, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the
remedial purposes of RICO. Its main flaw is that it deprives predicate
acts of their function as elements of a pattern. A plaintiff may not wish
to bring suit on Predicate Acts I & II, but, upon discovery of Predicate
Act III, decide that suit is appropriate. Complete Expiration would de-
prive him of that option unless a fourth predicate act was committed.
37. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1406, 1409 (D. Colo. 1990).
38. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1415-16.
39. It first ran four years after Predicate Act II and again four years after Predicate Act
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There is no corresponding benefit to public policy or to the purposes of
RICO in refusing the plaintiff this choice.
Indeed, Complete Expiration is a catalyst for law suits. A plaintiff
would be well advised to bring an action on Predicate Acts I & II, rather
than choose an alternate course, for fear that if the racketeering conduct
continues, he would be barred from a later RICO suit until he suffers
through two additional predicate acts committed within ten years of
each other. In addition, after the limitations period runs on Predicate
Acts I & II, under Complete Expiration, a defendant would be free to
commit Predicate Act III without fear of RICO liability.40 Indeed, the
defendant could commit a new predicate act each time the four-year lim-
itations period ran on prior predicate acts.
The Ten-Year Radius rule is infected by the same malady as that of
Keystone Resurrection, but suffers to a lesser degree. As Figures 1 and 2
illustrate, under the Ten-Year Radius rule, a slothful plaintiff may know-
ingly allow the RICO claim based on Predicate Acts I & II to expire, yet
is granted a fresh four-year period in which to sue and recover on Predi-
cate Act II by Predicate Act III, and again by Predicate Act IV. Conse-
quently, he could recover for Predicate Act II even though the statute of
limitations ran twice.41 This renders the four-year limitations period as
speculative as does Keystone Resurrection and thwarts the aims of Malley-
Duff.
4 2
The Injury Expiration rule strikes a balance between the purposes
of RICO and the goals of the statute of limitations. Under this rule, a
plaintiff has four years to bring suit on Predicate Acts I & II, or lose the
right to recover for the injuries incurred from those predicate acts.
Consequently, the rule does not suffer, as does Keystone Resurrection
and the Ten-Year Radius rule, from the defect that the limitations pe-
riod is uncertain. Plaintiffs must sue within four years of when they dis-
covered or should have discovered the pattern or forever lose the right
to recover for the injuries accompanying the predicate acts comprising
the pattern. A subsequent predicate act will not nullify the legal force of
an expired limitations period by bestowing a new four-year period to
recover for otherwise time-barred predicate acts.
Unlike the Complete Expiration rule, however, the predicate acts
upon which a plaintiff could have sued do not lose their status as predi-
cate acts for future suits. Rather, those predicate acts expire only to the
extent that a plaintiff may not recover for the accompanying injuries.
Thus, a plaintiff who chooses not to sue and recover on Predicate Acts I
& II cannot change his mind and sue in Year 14. He may, however, use
Predicate Acts I & II to show a pattern and recover for Predicate Act III
if suit is brought within four years of that act. He may also use Predicate
40. Like the dog of classic tort law, the defendant would be entitled to one free bite
for each time the four-year limitations period ran on prior predicate acts. See LAZAR,
ANIMAL CONTROL LAW: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE MISDEEDS OF ANIMALS 2-3 (Supp. 1988).
41. It first ran four years after Predicate Act II and again four years after Predicate Act
III.
42. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Acts I, II & III to show a pattern and recover for Predicate Act IV if suit
is brought within four years of that act. The plaintiff need not fear that,
by declining to sue on a pattern of predicate acts, he has surrendered a
later RICO claim on a subsequent predicate act in the same pattern. If
the plaintiff elects to delay bringing suit, however, he does so knowing
that he loses his ability to recover for injuries sustained from the predi-
cate acts on which he did not sue timely.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff chooses to -bring: an action based on
Predicate Acts I & II, the predicate acts do not lose their stature as acts
within a pattern if he later attempts to recover for Predicate Act III. He
will not, of course, recover for the injuries sustained as a result of Predi-
cate Acts I & II, and may recover only for the injury incurred as a result
of Predicate Act III. 4 3 The plaintiff may still use Predicate Acts I & II to
define the pattern of racketeering. Likewise, if after recovering for Pred-
icate Acts I, II & III, he sued on Predicate Act IV, the plaintiff will re-
cover only for the Predicate Act IV injury.
The Injury Expiration rule may create an incentive to pursue what
appears at first blush to be a peculiar defense strategy. In some circum-
stances, Injury Expiration may prompt a defendant to argue that he
committed more acts of racketeering than the plaintiff alleged. This cu-
rious tactic can be completely rational and is easily explicable on eco-
nomic grounds.
For example, if the defendant was faced with allegations that he vio-
lated RICO through a pattern of racketeering comprising Predicate Acts
II & III, on a summary judgment motion 4 4 he may wish to affirmatively
and unilaterally prove that Predicate Act I was also part of the pattern.
The defendant may opt to establish the existence of Predicate Act I even
if the plaintiff does not seek recovery for Predicate Act I and never al-
leged the act in the complaint. By doing so, the defendant would show
that a RICO claim accrued from Predicate Acts I & II and that the limita-
tions period has run on those acts by the time of Predicate Act III. The
defendant would thus reveal that RICO recovery is unavailable on Predi-
cate Act 11.
4 5
43. This is because the plaintiff would enjoy duplicative recovery. He would have
recovered for the injuries sustained from Predicate Acts I & II both on the initial suit and
again when he sued on Predicate Act III.
44. Because of the predictably negative effects such an argument would have on the
jury's opinion of the defendant, it is doubtful the defendant would wish to raise this at trial
in front of the jury.
45. The prudence of this strategy depends on the ancillary effects of admitting to pre-
vious misconduct and requires risk analysis. Assuming the plaintiff did not know of Predi-
cate Act I because of lack of reasonable diligence, upon learning of Predicate Act I he may
be able to pursue other legal theories to recover for that act. Accordingly, before affirma-
tively admitting to Predicate Act I, the litigation-rational defendant should compare the
chance of his being found liable on a non-RICO theory for Predicate Act I (multiplied by
the damages inflicted on the plaintiff by Predicate Act I), with the risk that he will face
RICO liability on Predicate Act II (multiplied by the damages inflicted on the plaintiff by
Predicate Act II and trebled). Cf C. Andrew & R. Tavi, Dancing into the Tempting Ocean:
Costs of Confessional Offerings 7 (final ed. Feb. 23, 1991) (unpublished manuscript).
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CONCLUSION
The Injury Expiration rule provides for both a meaningful statutory
limitations period and continued liberal RICO recovery. It supplies
much needed certainty, 4 6 without judicial rewriting or strained interpre-
tation of RICO. At the same time, the rule avoids creating incentives to
bring suit rather than seek alternative redress and does not allow de-
fendants to freely commit additional predicate acts each time the four-
year period expires on previous predicate acts. In the absence of clarifi-
cation by Congress, the Injury Expiration rule is the best technique to
manage predicate acts committed after the statute of limitations has run.
46. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
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PROVING FACTS IN AN ANTITRUST STORY
ALEXANDER KOGAN*
To invoke the power of the judiciary, an injured person must state a
claim on which relief may be granted. Such a person must describe his
injury to the court, must name the defendant and must allege facts es-
tablishing the defendant's legal responsibility for the injury. Typically,
the claimant's story of woe consists of two parts, which I will call descrip-
tive and probative. The descriptive portion includes events that caused
the injury and the defendant's conduct leading to those events. For ex-
ample, a victim of a car accident might tell how the defendant driver
negligently drove on the wrong side of the street and hit the victim's
oncoming car.
The claimant's story is incomplete with solely a description of the
events that are alleged to have led to the injury, however, if the defend-
ant disputes this description's accuracy. The claimant must then con-
vince the trier of fact of the veracity of this factual scenario. In order to
do that, he will include certain probative allegations that by themselves
do not give rise to liability, but rather lend support to the descriptive
theory on which the plaintiff has predicated his claim. For example,
people generally do not drive on the wrong side of the street, because
that violates the law and endangers their own lives. To convince the
trier of fact that the defendant did, in this particular instance, drive on
the wrong side of the street (a description that would give rise to liabil-
ity), the plaintiff must include some probative allegations that persuade
the court that his story is true. Proof, then, is the second part of a claim-
ant's story.
This Article discusses the nature of probative evidence that courts
should demand from antitrust claimants and argues that an antitrust
claim should contain an analytical theory that rationally explains the
conduct of all market participants.'
The Article first contrasts analytical-type proof with eyewitness-tes-
timony proof, which I argue is less useful in antitrust claims. The Article
then illustrates the need for the kind of analytical proof that explains why
defendants and other actors whose conduct precipitated the claim would
behave in the manner alleged by the plaintiff. A recent Tenth Circuit
* Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1989. I am grateful to Richard Salgado, Richard Harris, Paul Scott, and
Edward Gaedel for their comments. The views expressed in this Article are solely my own
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Justice.
1. I do not talk about the elements of particular antitrust offenses, a matter of some
controversy that has been extensively addressed by courts and scholars alike. I do assume,
however, that one element of many antitrust claims, on the proof of which a claim's suc-
cess often hinges, is harm to consumer welfare.
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decision, Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas,2 supplies the fac-
tual framework for the illustration. In Reazin, analysis of factors that mo-
tivated market participants to engage in certain allegedly illegal conduct
throws substantial doubt on whether that conduct was, in fact, illegal.
TYPES OF PROOF
To be persuasive, a story underlying a claim must contain elements
that make it believable. The story's authenticity depends on the credi-
bility of the storytellers, the party's witnesses, and on its intrinsic plausi-
bility. One type of proof designed to convince the trier of fact of the
descriptive fact's plausibility requires a rational explanation of the de-
fendant's conduct. The plaintiff in the car crash example above may in-
clude in his story testimony or physical evidence to the effect that the
defendant's diminished mental capacity at the time of the accident
caused him to choose to drive on the wrong side of the street.
Alternatively, rather than explaining the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff may simply bring a sufficient number of eyewitnesses to testify
that they personally observed the defendant driving on the wrong side
of the road and smashing into the plaintiff's car. With this kind of
proof, lack of a sensible explanation for the defendant's conduct does
not by itself preclude a finding of liability. The claimant is only required
to convince the trier of fact that the defendant negligently3 engaged in
conduct actually and proximately causing a legally cognizable injury to
the plaintiff; an inquiry into the etiology of the defendant's conduct may
help persuade the trier of fact of the veracity of the allegations, but is
not essential. The victim in this hypothetical may use the defendant's
inebriation to prove the facts in his story, but he may also rely exclu-
sively on the accounts of people who witnessed the accident.
Thus, a story in a typical non-antitrust case often does not require
any plausible explanation of the person's conduct as a prerequisite for
the finding of liability. An allegation of injurious conduct, even if osten-
sibly implausible, if proved to the required standard of certainty and not
otherwise excusable, is sufficient for a finding of liability.
An antitrust complaint is different. An antitrust offense is commit-
ted usually by a business person or entity in pursuit of some form of
commercial advantage. 4 Courts have made clear through their interpre-
tations of antitrust statutes over the years that, at least in cases where the
2. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
3. I am not discussing negligence in this example. It is possible for the defendant to
come back with his own story that, while admitting the factual scenario alleged by the
claimant, offers a rational explanation for the defendant's conduct, and argues that the
conduct was justified and not negligent. The point, however, is that the plaintiff's failure
to explain why the defendant would behave in a way that does not make much sense, does
not negate the presumption of liability, once it is otherwise established.
4. Most of the federal antitrust law is codified in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988), and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1988). Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12, and Section
4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, provide formal definitions of
"Antitrust Laws" and "Antitrust Acts" respectively.
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rule of reason applies, they can remedy an injury under the antitrust
laws only when the defendant's conduct has, on balance, harmed con-
sumers. 5 Where the complainant is the defendant's competitor,6 merely
showing that the defendant caused damage to the plaintiff is generally
insufficient when antitrust laws are the authority for the requested rem-
edy. In addition to linking his own injury with the defendant's actions,
the plaintiff must also demonstrate that people other than himself have
been harmed by the defendant's conduct.
The requirement of consumer harm in a particular product and ge-
ographic market creates a peculiar problem of proof in antitrust cases,
since eyewitness-type accounts by themselves are never sufficient to
prove allegations of harm to consumer interests.
First, injury to a large class of consumers may be imperceptible
even to the consumers themselves. For example, an anticompetitive
merger of two soft-drink concentrate manufacturers 7 could cause a re-
duction in the production of soft drinks accompanied by an increase in
their price. Many consumers, however, might remain blissfully unaware
of the harm they suffer, since a few cents' increase in the price of a six-
pack of soda would not significantly dent anyone's budget.
8
Second, no matter how many individual consumers testify about the
perceived harm to them personally, this is inadequate to prove a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. Such testimony is insufficient to establish lia-
bility unless it supports a broader theory that demonstrates the
likelihood of harm to all consumers of the particular product, most of
whom are unavailable to the court.
Finally, consumer testimony regarding higher prices does not estab-
lish a causal link between the price increase and the defendant's con-
duct. Legitimate market forces, rather than the defendant, could be
responsible for the increase. Analogously, prices may remain un-
changed even when the defendant acts to suppress competition; this
would happen when market forces exert a downward pressure on price,
5. Under that approach, a "restraint of trade" must be unreasonable to be illegal.
The Supreme Court's often repeated admonition that "[a]ntitrust laws are designed for
the protection of competition, not competitors," Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962) (emphasis in original), elegantly encapsulates what has by now become almost
a truism to an antitrust lawyer.
This Article does not address per se restraints of trade, such as collective price setting
by competitors, and this discussion does not apply to such cases.
6. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, authorizes any person to sue for
three times the damages sustained as a result of the defendant's violation of antitrust laws.
7. See FTC v. Coca-Cola, 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986) (preliminary injunction
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act against acquisition of Dr. Pepper Company by Coca-
Cola). For an extensive discussion of the FTC's successful challenges to abortive attempts
at consolidation in the soft-drink industry (Coke/Dr. Pepper and Pepsi/Seven-Up), see
White, Application of Merger Guidelines: The Proposed Merger of Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, THE
ANTITRUST REvoLtrIoN (. Kwoka & L. White eds. 1989).
8. The aggregate harm obviously is significant. This is a classic example of a collec-
tive action problem which shows the need for government enforcement of antitrust laws.
The Clayton Act authorizes the Attorney General to sue on behalf of the United States to
enjoin anticompetitive mergers. 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1988). The Federal Trade Commission
also possesses that authority. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988).
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but the defendant's anticompetitive conduct prevents the market from
working and keeps the price higher than it should be.
The need to demonstrate consumer harm thus requires that the
probative aspects of any story of antitrust injury, whether told by a pub-
lic or a private plaintiff, contain a logical, inductive interpretation of the
injurious conduct. Analysis of the market participants' motives explains
their actions and clarifies the effects of those actions on consumer wel-
fare. "[I]f the factual context renders [an antitrust] . . .claim implausi-
ble - if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense . .. -9
then the plaintiff's burden in proving consumer harm is almost hope-
lessly heavy.
WESLEY'S STORY
When Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), a health care fi-
nancing company, acquired Wesley Medical Center, a large hospital in
Wichita, Kansas, Wesley suddenly found itself in the middle of a dispute
between the area's two large health insurers.' 0 HCA (Wesley's new
owner) sold a variety of medical insurance products, including HMO
memberships, which placed it in direct competition with Wichita's larg-
est health insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, the recipient of
some sixty-two percent of the total insurance premiums in the area."
Blue Cross, understandably unhappy about the entry of a new competi-
tor, publicly announced its intention to terminate its contracting pro-
vider agreement with Wesley. Under the contracting provider
agreements Blue Cross had with all major hospitals in the area, partici-
pating hospitals agreed to accept from Blue Cross payment rates set out
in the Blue Cross schedule for the Wichita area as payment in full. In
return, hospital patients benefitted from direct submission and payment
of hospital claims, as well as from the predictability of costs and the as-
surance of the hold-harmless provisions. In short, Wesley's status as a
Blue Cross contracting provider was valuable to hospitals interested in
doing business in Wichita, and lack of such status would leave Wesley at
a significant competitive disadvantage by increasing its costs of doing
business.
Simultaneous with Blue Cross' termination of Wesley, the insurer
obtained an agreement from two of Wesley's chief competitors to lower
the rate schedule which those competitors had to follow for all Blue
Cross patients, as contracting providers. The court found "ample evi-
dence" that Wesley's competitors' acquiescence to lower rates had been
9. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
10. See Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied 110 S.Ct. 3241 (1990). Discussion that follows draws on this opinion and on two
published trial court decisions, Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 635
F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986) (pre-trial motions), and Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Kansas, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987) (post-trial motions). All three
opinions address a large number of significant issues and contain many factual details that
are not essential to the argument in this Article.
11. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 969 n.26.
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conditioned on Wesley's termination. 12 These competitors, according
to the court's findings, expected that they would gain some of Wesley's
patients as Wesley's costs of doing business increased (i.e., Wesley had
to make an extra effort in order to retain patients who were inconve-
nienced by Wesley's loss of preferred provider status). For the promise
of such additional patients, they had been willing to accept lower prices
for their services from Blue Cross. '
3
The principal element in Wesley's story was the alleged agreement
between Blue Cross and the two hospitals competing with Wesley. First,
Wesley asserted that it was a victim of that agreement. As a result of the
agreement, Wesley sustained financial losses, and the causal linkage that
existed between those losses and Blue Cross' actions was legally suffi-
cient in its directness and proximity.14 Second, attempting to meet the
rule of reason requirements, Wesley insisted that it was not the only
victim of Blue Cross' conduct, but also that Blue Cross' actions had hurt
consumers as well. Blue Cross' liability for Wesley's injuries hinged on
this allegation. As in most antitrust cases, it is this accusation that was
most disputed and most controversial.
WESLEY'S PROOF
Wesley's story thus consisted of two parts. The first part had to do
with harm to Wesley, while the second part was about harm to
consumers.
The descriptive aspect of the first half of the story, which involves
the showing of harm to Wesley, is fairly straightforward. It focuses on
the existence of an agreement between Blue Cross and Wesley's hospital
competitors, the harm that Wesley sustained, and the causal link be-
tween the agreement and the harm. The probative requirements of the
personal harm story can be satisfied without having to answer the "why"
question. Wesley could prove each element of this part of its story
through eyewitness-type evidence and did not have to supply a plausible
rationale for Blue Cross' and competing hospitals' actions. The evi-
dence of an agreement between Blue Cross and Wesley's competitors,
and the evidence of a financial loss sustained by Wesley could stand on
their own and do not require an explanation of how the parties to the
agreement benefitted from it. If the first part of Wesley's story
amounted to a per se antitrust offense and constituted the whole story,
the probative aspect of that story would not be particularly noteworthy.
12. Id. at 964.
13. Id. at 964 n.18.
14. This is a familiar requirement originating in the common law, a historic source of
modem antitrust statutes. Among the most frequently cited common law antitrust deci-
sions are Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711) and Darcy v. Allein (Case of
Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602). As in the law of torts, defendant's conduct
must be both the direct cause of the alleged antitrust injury, but for which the injury would
not have occurred, and also a proximate cause of such injury, meaning, essentially that
defendant's conduct in a particular situation is inherently prone to result in an antitrust
injury.
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In fact, the trial judge apparently did have a great deal of evidence of the
agreement, the injury, and the link between the two.
The second part of Wesley's story is particularly difficult to convey,
however. On the descriptive side, there were allegations that consum-
ers-Wichita residents who bought medical insurance-had been
harmed by Blue Cross' conduct, because Blue Cross' actions would lead
to higher medical insurance costs to consumers. Blue Cross vigorously
denied that such an outcome was likely. What type of probative evi-
dence should the court have found persuasive?
PROBATIVE EVIDENCE OF HARM TO CONSUMERS
Testimony from a small sample of consumers who expected their
overall medical costs to rise was unlikely to help the court with either
translating such an expectation of a price hike into an actual increase in
prices or with directly linking the perceived increase to Blue Cross' past
conduct. Testimony from officials of Blue Cross, or from the two hospi-
tals with which it entered into an agreement, to show they had never
intended to accomplish the anticompetitive goals ascribed to them
would similarly be insufficiently persuasive. This is not because an anti-
trust defendant's motives do not matter, but rather because the source
of the evidence concerning the parties' true intentions must be in-
dependent and objective.' 5 For obvious reasons, testimony from the
parties to an allegedly illegal agreement does not meet that test, and
other evidence is necessary in order to establish what the parties' rea-
sons really were for entering into the agreement.
Before considering what alternative evidence there might be and
what that evidence should have told the court, the threshold objection
to the actual relevance of Blue Cross' and the hospitals' "true" inten-
tions must be resolved. For antitrust liability to exist, there is no re-
quirement that the defendant has either planned or predicted the
negative external effects of its actions on competition in any particular
market. As a practical matter, sophisticated antitrust defendants, such
as Blue Cross, are unlikely to argue as a bona fide defense that they were
not aware of the effects of their conduct on competition. It is safe to
assume that Blue Cross, as well as Wesley's hospital competitors, all
carefully considered the costs and benefits of terminating Wesley. This
was not a decision made in blind rage by Blue Cross and the two hospi-
tals, without regard for the ultimate costs involved. Rather, it was a
move carefully calculated to reduce their costs and increase revenues,
taking both the short- and long-run consequences into account. The
question of why Blue Cross terminated Wesley and why Wesley's com-
petitors acquiesced to lower rates can be restated as how their agree-
ment would improve their profitability. If the increase in Blue Cross'
net revenue came ultimately at the expense of the consumer, then Blue
15. Just like in the car wreck hypothetical discussed above, why Blue Cross acted the
way it did must be answered from the evidence not subject to manipulation by either party.
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Cross acted unlawfully. Alternatively, if termination of Wesley helps
Blue Cross without hurting consumers, then Blue Cross might not have
to compensate Wesley for its losses.
16
Analogously, Wesley's rivals could have only agreed to lower rates
if that led to greater earnings for them. If lower rates and greater earn-
ings for other hospitals did not ultimately harm consumers, then Wesley
probably did not sustain a remediable antitrust injury.
Wesley alleged that Blue Cross benefitted in two ways from the ter-
mination. First, it obtained an agreement from Wesley's competitors to
charge lower rates in return for the promise of additional patients. Sec-
ond, it sent a message to other hospitals that they too could be termi-
nated if they should become Blue Cross' direct competitors in the health
insurance business.
Why would Wesley's competitors enter into the agreement with
Blue Cross? Increasing marginal costs is a standard assumption of
microeconomic theory. Assuming that Wesley's competitors' marginal
costs rose above the relevant range of hospital services, those competi-
tors would inevitably lose money, at least in the short run, as a result of
the agreement. Not only would their costs per patient increase due to
the influx of patients newly lured away from Wesley, but also their re-
ceipts per patient would decrease, pursuant to the agreement with Blue
Cross.
As in any predatory pricing case, one must consider the magnitude
of the short-term losses and the ability of the defendant to recoup such
losses in the long run. A predatory pricing argument focuses on the
ability of the defendant to sustain short-term losses to exclude a compet 7
itor from the market for a long enough period of time to recover those
losses and to make a profit.
17
There is no evidence that Wesley's competitors had the ability to
shut Wesley out completely and then keep it out long enough to allow
them to profit from the scheme. While Wesley's receipts per patient
would decrease by an even greater amount than those of its competitors
(reduced payments from Blue Cross plus the added costs from not being
a preferred provider), Wesley's costs per patient would also fall (assum-
ing increasing marginal costs, fewer patients mean lower costs per pa-
16. This could be essentially a Kaldor-Hicks superior move. If we were concerned
with welfare effects only on Blue Cross and consumers, the move as a result of which Blue
Cross is better off while consumers are either as well off as or better off than they were
originally is Pareto-efficient. With Wesley in the picture, the consequences are more am-
biguous. The total size of welfare improvement to Blue Cross and consumers must exceed
the harm suffered by Wesley in order for Blue Cross' actions to be societally efficient.
Antitrust law generally assumes Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in cases when there is any percepti-
ble benefit to a large group of consumers, since in the aggregate such benefits are always
expected to outweigh the harm to a single competitor.
17. The seminal article on predatory pricing is Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). It has given
rise to a wave of critical literature on the subject, see, e.g., Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the
Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Stra-
tegic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
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tient), unlike the average costs of its competitors, which would go up.
Thus, it seems likely that if we assume rising marginal costs of providing
hospital services, Wesley's competitors would sustain greater losses than
Wesley itself. Under this assumption, it is unclear how Wesley's com-
petitors could expect to outlast Wesley in the market.
The second objection is more peculiar to the present situation.
Wesley alleged, and the court agreed, that Blue Cross had substantial
market power in Wichita. Assuming the court's finding to be correct, it
is unclear how Wesley's competitors could hope to recoup their losses
even if they did manage to drive Wesley permanently out of the market.
By exercising its monopsonistic market power over hospitals, Blue Cross
would always have the ability to prevent them from charging supra-com-
petitive prices (i.e., prices above marginal cost). Again, assuming rising
marginal costs, despite the short-term losses that Wesley's competitors
would sustain, there is no realistic hope for them to recover their losses
in the future.
Consequently, if there was an agreement of the kind alleged by
Wesley between Blue Cross and Wesley's competitors, the assumption
of increasing marginal costs would be inappropriate. If maximizing
profits were the chief objective of Wesley's competitors,' 8 and if the cost
to them of treating each additional patient was higher than the cost of
treating the preceding patient, then their agreement with Blue Cross
would be completely nonsensical. Why would they want to attract addi-
tional patients when the cost of serving them exceeded the additional
revenue they brought in?
Resolution of this paradox is the key to understanding this case.
The agreement can only make sense if the assumption of increasing
marginal costs is abandoned. If the hospitals competing with Wesley for
patients are rational economic actors, then excess capacity and resulting
scale economies are the only logical explanation for their actions. Sup-
pose that a miscalculation many years ago in the extent of demand for
hospital services led to an overbuilding of hospitals. There could have
been many reasons for such a miscalculation, ranging from unpredicted
population shifts, to improvements in outpatient treatment and shorten-
ing of required lengths of hospital stays, to effectiveness of preventive
medicine. Most significantly, improvements in medical technology may
now lead to speedier recovery, again resulting in overcapacity.
Under these circumstances, hospitals would be expected to react to
decreasing marginal costs by reducing their prices and expanding out-
put. The complicating factor here, however, is that Blue Cross acts as a
monopsonistic and- monopolistic intermediary between hospitals and
I
18. Some of Wesley's competitors may be non-profit organizations. That, however,
does not affect this analysis: while a not-for-profit hospital may have goals other than
profit maximization, reduction of costs and increase of revenues is always an essential con-
cern. A non-profit hospital may be willing to treat certain indigent patients at below mar-
ginal cost, foregoing some revenue in pursuit of its non-profit imperatives. Such a hospital
is unlikely, however, to posit sheer bigness as an imperative and to be willing to lose
money simply in order to exclude a competitor.
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their ultimate consumers-patients. If any one hospital unilaterally low-
ered the rates it charged Blue Cross, additional patients would not nec-
essarily flock to that hospital. A hospital cannot compete with other
hospitals based on price, and thus cannot attract additional patients by
lowering its prices.
Let us now consider the dynamics of the process by which Wichita
hospitals can actually adjust to the emergence of excess capacity and
bring their prices and output into equilibrium. Suppose a hospital had
lowered its Blue Cross rates. Since patients pay a fixed amount to Blue
Cross, they would not shift their consumption to the lower priced facility
without some type of prodding from Blue Cross. As a result, the hospi-
tal that lowered its rates would merely lose revenue, with no compensa-
tory savings from additional patients or a decrease in per-patient costs.
Blue Cross might lower the rates it charged its current subscribers
and try luring new subscribers from other medical insurers in the area.
This reshuffling of insureds to Blue Cross from other insurance compa-
nies, however, would be of little consequence to the actual providers of
medical services-the hospitals. Even after Blue Cross obtains addi-
tional subscribers, the one hospital that had lowered its rates might
never see a sufficient increase in the number of patients that it treats.
More fundamentally, Wichita may already have more hospital beds
than its residents could use at any price that is at or over the cost of
providing them.' 9 Even if all Wichita hospitals lowered the rates they
charged all their patients and insurers, none of the hospitals would nec-
essarily enjoy a sufficient output increase to offset the lower rates. In an
unconcentrated market saddled with overcapacity, such as the Wichita
hospital market, a supplier could not lower its prices without an assur-
ance that elimination of some of its extra capacity would accompany this
price reduction and allow it to expand output.
Blue Cross attempted to provide precisely the mechanism that
Wichita consumers needed. By imposing new costs on Wesley, causing
a reduction in Wesley's market share, Blue Cross tried to guarantee
Wesley's competitors at least some new patients. Patients would have
had the incentive to leave Wesley for one of its preferred-provider com-
petitors, which, in turn, would have either reduced or eliminated these
competitors' extra capacity. By reducing the number of hospital options
for its insureds, Blue Cross decreased the cost of treatment at remaining
hospitals. Some of the reduction in cost would have been passed to the
consumers in the form of lower health insurance premiums, possibly
strengthening Blue Cross' market power in the health financing market.
Since a decrease in the number of hospitals an insurer has to deal with
lowers the insurer's costs, some increase in concentration in both the
financing and hospital markets would have been the longer term
prospect.
19. In addition to hospital expenses, a patient incurs other costs by being hospital-
ized. Even if hospitals treated patients for free, patients would limit their consumption of
hospital services because of the value of time they would have to spend in treatment.
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Greater market concentration, however, was unlikely to cause either
an actual monopolization of both markets or a significant increase in
consumer prices, as alleged by Wesley. Once unneeded hospital beds
were permanently eliminated, remaining hospitals would function at
more efficient levels, presumably nearer to capacity. Competition in the
health financing market could then pick up, since hospitals would no
longer have to fear Blue Cross' retaliation for doing business with its
competitors. Blue Cross found a way to reduce its costs by bringing the
number of hospital beds down to an efficient level. Although in the
short run, Blue Cross' conduct might chill competition in the insurance
market, in the long run, assuming no other inordinate entry barriers,
competition would regain its vigor, and consumers would enjoy lower
insurance premiums.
THE MORAL OF THE STORY
Wesley told the court a convincing story about the harm Blue Cross
had inflicted upon it. The trial court ordered Blue Cross to pay Wes-
ley's damages and the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed. Whether "fairness"
and "justice" have been served by the outcome of this case is not this
Article's concern, for this all depends on one's understanding of those
exalted concepts. Have the courts applied the antitrust laws correctly in
order to justify their decision? Can Blue Cross' liability be legitimately
predicated on the Sherman Act?
To answer this question properly, in this case and in most other
antitrust cases, courts must recognize the special requirements of proof
that antitrust claimants must meet. Whenever the law requires proof of
injury to consumer welfare, courts should seek the most rational expla-
nation for the conduct of all market participants. Angry testimony from
injured representatives of the "consuming public" cannot be sufficient;
someone should have to explain why the defendant acted in a certain
way and why the defendant's ultimate objectives were incompatible with
maximizing consumer welfare.
In Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the probative evidence needed
to support the allegation of consumer harm actually points the other
way.20 The objective served by the alleged agreement between Blue
Cross and the hospitals was not incompatible with the consumers' inter-
est in lower hospital prices and lower health insurance premiums.
20. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 960-66.
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PRISONER AIDS TESTING: A COMMENT
ON DUNN V. WHITE
Given the magnitude and complexity of the AIDS problem, prison
systems must devise careful practices and policies both to protect
against the spread of the virus, and to treat those already infected. Dunn
v. White' raises concerns with the balance between judicial deference to
administrative penological decisionmaking and the court's responsibility
to protect the constitutional rights of incarcerated individuals. A case of
first impression specifically holding that the fourth amendment does not
protect prisoners from nonconsensual AIDS testing, Dunn fails to qualify
its sweeping rule with any procedural requirements. After Dunn, the
state need not put forth even a small measure of evidence that either the
nonconsensual testing is being performed pursuant to some plan for us-
ing the information, or that such a plan furthers an actual state interest
in performing the test. While fourth amendment analysis does not nec-
essarily preclude a state from forcing a prisoner to undergo an AIDS
test, Dunn opens the door to state abuse of prisoners by failing to re-
quire that state testing programs meet constitutional standards.
This note discusses recent fourth amendment analytical trends of
the United States Supreme Court as background for the case and ex-
plains the basic rationales supporting the limitation of prisoners' consti-
tutional rights. It presents the proposition that even despite the usual
lower level of constitutional guarantees afforded to prisoners, the Dunn
court gave constitutionally inadequate treatment to the plaintiff's
claims. First, the court failed to thoroughly analogize this case with the
cases it purported to follow. Second, it reached conclusions based upon
assumption rather than evidence. Third, Dunn's claim was dismissed
although clearly not ripe for dismissal under appropriate Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) standards. This note also questions whether
the broad holding of Dunn represents an open invitation for state abuses
to prisoners' fourth amendment rights.
I. AIDS AND PRISONS
The incidence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome in prison is
widely believed by inmate advocacy organizations to be much higher
than that in the general population for several reasons.2 According to
the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, 74% of all AIDS infections
are transmitted by unprotected homosexual activity and 17% by the
sharing of needles by intravenous drug users. 3 Unprotected homosex-
ual activity in prison, although undocumented, is believed to be rela-
1. 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989).
2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, (N.J. ed.) at I, col. 4.
3. Id.
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tively common. Because of the scarcity of needles and the resultant
likelihood that an infected needle might be shared often, intravenous
drug use is more insidious in prison than on the outside. 4 More than
5,400 confirmed AIDS cases were reported through October 1989 by
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, state prison systems, and a sample of 38
local jail systems. This constituted a 606% increase from 1985 figures.
5
At the National Commission on AIDS meeting in New York in August,
1990, several doctors, 6 citing the "failure of prohibition," urged the
Commission to support decriminalization of drug use because, in their
view, relieving the AIDS epidemic in prisons will remain difficult as long
as the nation persists in imprisoning drug users.
7
While it would seem that testing and segregating inmates might be
logical solutions, the following problems have been identified. Tests for
AIDS are not reliable because they identify only the presence of antibo-
dies, not the presence of the infectious HIV virus which causes AIDS.8
This means that an inmate testing negative for HIV could actually be an
infectious carrier of the disease for a period of years before his body
enters the second stage of the disease, seroconversion, and begins to
produce detectable antibodies. 9 One administrator believes that during
this undetected-yet-infectious period, prisoners having a false sense of
security from negative tests might decide to ignore health care prevent-
ative measures and engage in high risk activities.' 0 In addition, most
prisons in the United States refuse to distribute condoms and clean
needles because to do so would admit that rules are being broken."I
Segregating HIV-positive inmates is counterproductive for both
healthy and infected inmates, according to the chief of HIV services at
the Vacaville, California prison, where segregation was implemented in
1985. "Segregating HIV positives creates the myth and feeling that
other inmates don't have to worry about getting infected."' 12 Segre-
gated HIV-positive prisoners at Vacaville brought a class action suit for
constitutional violations and entered into a consent decree with the state
allowing them to desegregate, at least during the day to participate in
educational activities, job training, recreation, and use of the library.'
3
4. Id.
5. Prisons' Care Systems Swamped by Aids Epidemic, 5 AIDS Policy & L. (BNA) No. 16, at 3
(September 5, 1990)[hereinafter Prisons' Care Systems].
6. Robert L. Cohen, medical director of St. Vincent Hospital's AIDS Center in New
York City and National Commission members Drs. Don C. Des Jarlais and Harlon Dalton,
Id.
7. Id.
8. Note, In Prison with AIDS: The Constitutionality of Mass Screening and Segregation Poli-
cies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 155, 167.
9. Id. at 154.
10. Sampson, Letter to Editor, The Independent, May 29, 1990, at 16.
11. Prisons' Care Systems, supra note 5, at 4.
12. Id.
13. Gates v. Duekmejian, No. Civ S-87-1636 LKKJFM (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 1989). See




II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Background
The fourth amendment protects a citizen's reasonable expectations
of privacy 14 against intrusions by the government. Justice Brandeis has
called the "right to be let alone [ ] the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." 1 5 The amendment declares:
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 6
B. Traditional Analysis
Under older traditional fourth amendment analysis, the constitu-
tionality of the search or seizure typically turned upon such paramount
issues as whether the activity constituted a search or seizure, whether
probable cause' 7 existed to justify the state's activity, or whether a war-
rant was necessary. Typically, courts determined: 18 1) whether a search
has taken place and was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant or was
conducted pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant require-
ment; 2) whether the search was based upon probable cause (or lesser
suspicion because it was minimally intrusive); and 3) whether the search
was conducted in a reasonable manner.
C. One Category of Modern Analysis: Special Governmental Needs
Justice Thurgood Marshall first used the term "special needs" cases
in referring to a recently-evolved category of fourth amendment opin-
ions of the Supreme Court. These cases upholding searches and
seizures despite the absence of probable cause or, in some cases even
suspicion, make use of an analysis that balances "special" governmental
need against the privacy interest of the individual.' 9 The Court first
moved away from the strict probable cause standard, allowing a search
despite the lack of any individualized suspicion, in an administrative in-
spection case, Camara v. Municipal Court.2 0 Although there the Court re-
quired an administrative warrant to prove the search was performed
pursuant to a fair and impartial plan, it considered the governmental
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)(overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
16. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Probable cause may relate to the belief a crime was committed, a particular person
is an offender, whether a search will be fruitful, or whether an item taken is evidence of an
offense.
18. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641-42 (1989)(Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 641.
20. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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intrusion less than a full-blown search. 2 1 Further, the Court justified the
search by balancing society's interest in conducting health, safety or fire
inspections against the individual's interest in resisting intrusion. 22 The
following year, the Court used the balancing test to hold that police of-
ficers could "stop and frisk" with less than probable cause because this
intrusion was likewise considered less than a full-blown search.23 In re-
cent years the Court has departed further from the probable cause stan-
dard, frequently finding governmental intrusions constitutional despite
a lack of probable cause or individualized suspicion. 24 In cases where
the Court has permitted governmental searches and seizures absent
some measure of suspicion, it has required that the governmental activ-
ity be pursuant to some recognized fair and impartial plan benefiting a
legitimate state interest.25 Balancing, with or without probable cause,
has now become the norm in fourth amendment analysis.2 6 It is clear
that in either a civil or criminal context, the greater the level of govern-
mental intrusion upon the person or property of the individual, the
greater the justification and stricter the controls for search or seizure
must be.
2 7
The new "special needs" analysis considers these issues: 1)
21. Id. at 537.
22. Id. at 534-39.
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(holding that reason to suspect, rather than prob-
able cause, justified the intrusion).
24. Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)(no probable cause neces-
sary to justify "sobriety checkpoint" stops to further governmental interest in highway
safety, so long as pursuant to fair and impartial plan where all drivers are stopped); Colo-
rado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)(inventory search of vehicle absent individualized sus-
picion permissible under the fourth amendment if pursuant to standardized procedures);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)(police officers may not stop drivers randomly
without reason to suspect); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)(per-
mitting routine, non-probable cause searches of baggage, vehicles and persons at the bor-
ders to further government interest in protecting against illegal aliens; however, the
government, in protecting against smuggling activity, must meet a reason to believe stan-
dard in order to justify deeply intrusive personal searches); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967)(no probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant for a particular
dwelling, but warrant requirement eliminates inspector's untrammeled discretion, by re-
quiring him to show the inspection is part of an impartial administrative plan to further
interest of government in health, safety and fire code inspections).
25. Supra note 24.
26. "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment... requires a balanc-
ing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 725 (1987)(balancing the need for "the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace"); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987)(balancing need to preserve
"the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement" of probation); New Jersey v. T. L.
0., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)(balancing "the substantial need of teachers and administra-
tors for freedom to maintain order in the schools"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (balancing the probable cause that evidence of a crime could be found against indi-
vidual's interest in avoiding surgical intrusion to remove the bullet).
27. Gooding v. U.S., 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974)(Marshall, J., dissenting); Blackburn v.
Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 565 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1328
(5th Cir. 1978). See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(intrusion into a
DUI suspect's body for blood testing requires both probable cause and a warrant, unless
delay would threaten the loss or destruction of the evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925)(search of a car requires only probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I
(1968) (a police officer's stop and frisk of a citizen is justified by reason to suspect).
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whether the governmental action infringed upon the fourth amendment
rights of the individual; 2) the governmental interest being addressed by
the search or seizure;28 3) whether a logical nexus exists between the
search or seizure activity and the governmental interest pursued;29 4)
whether the governmental activity was conducted in a reasonable man-
ner,30 and, in the absence of any individualized suspicion, pursuant to a
fair procedure;3 ' and 5) whether the government has demonstrated that
its interests outweigh the privacy expectations of the individual.
3 2
1. Warrants and Probable Cause: Substitution of "Nexus" and
"Fair Procedure"
It appears that the warrant requirement has been virtually elimi-
nated from cases falling within the "special needs" category,3 3 most
likely because search warrants require a showing of probable cause, no
longer a constitutional requisite under the new "special needs" category
of cases.
34
Under the more traditional fourth amendment model, the nexus re-
quirement used in the "special needs" analysis is totally unnecessary be-
cause probable cause establishes the requisite reasonableness linking
the governmental interest and the search and seizure activity. Likewise,
the requirement for an equitable and fair procedure by officials in deter-
mining who shall be searched or seized,33 while essential to the "special
needs" analysis, is superfluous under the established form because the
question of who shall be searched or seized is answered automatically by
the probable cause requirement. If, indeed, there is a true balancing of
interests under the traditional model, that element of individualized sus-
picion acts as a stabilizer on behalf of the individual. Under fourth
amendment analysis in the "special needs" category, if no individualized
28. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1979).
29. NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)("One must determine whether the
search.., was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place."); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)("The search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objec-
tives of the search and not excessively intrusive..."); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90
(1987)(referring to constitutional rights in general, including fourth amendment rights,
the court states "[Tihere must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regula-
tion and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, a regulation
cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted
goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.").
30. NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)(the Court's analysis for reasonableness
under the fourth amendment included examination of the manner in which Mr. Choplick
conducted the search of T.L.O.'s purse; the requirement that the manner of search be
reasonable is implicit in the opinion.).
31. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
32. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
33. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985).
34. Id.
35. See Michigan Dep't of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990).
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suspicion is involved, the elements of fair procedure and nexus appear to
furnish the reasonableness automatically supplied by probable cause
under the traditional model.
2. Special Needs Analysis in the Prison Context
"Special needs" analysis in the prison context is somewhat skewed.
Prisoners' privacy interests are given less weight for two reasons: the
need for preserving institutional security,3 6 and the notion that prison-
ers generally retain a lower level of constitutional rights.3 7 While hon-
oring the policy of judicial deference to prison decisionmaking, 38 the
Court requires prison officials to "put forward" a legitimate penological
interest to justify the regulation.39  However, the level of evidence
needed to "put forward" a state interest has never been specified. In-
stead, it is only clear that some evidence is necessary. 40 Additionally,
the impact of the constitutional accommodation on prison guards, in-
mates and resources must be evaluated, as well as whether an alternate
means of accomplishing the penological goal could be employed, to in-
sure that a regulation is not an exaggerated response to a perceived
need.
4 '
III. FACTS OF DUNN V. WHITE
Prisoner Terry Dunn filed a pro se civil rights action4 2 in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging
that state prison officials had both assaulted him and, by threatening
disciplinary segregation, forced him to submit to an AIDS test despite
his religious objections and without benefit of a hearing. Dunn's com-
36. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
37. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984)(prisoners retain those rights not
inconsistent with imprisonment or the objectives of incarceration).
38. Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
39. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
40. Id.; Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990)("Prison officials must
'put forward' a legitimate governmental interest to justify their regulation . . . and must
provide evidence that the interest proffered is the reason why the regulation was adopted or
enforced."). See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 578 n.1, and 579 (1984)(demonstrat-
ing state interest by showing of evidence); Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.
1990)("prison officials must at least produce some evidence that their policies are based
on legitimate penological justifications"). Accord Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598-600
(7th Cir. 1986)(it is only after prison officials have put forth such evidence that courts
defer to the officials'judgment); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921, 925 (3rd Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986).
41. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states "[elvery person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." A governmental agency (for exam-
ple, a state department of corrections) can be a "person" acting under color of law if it
implements a decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers, or "vis-
ited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received for-
mal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." Monell v. Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978).
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plaint was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim and
the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Although the court of appeals failed to rec-
ognize any valid procedural due process claim raised by the plaintiff re-
garding a hearing, 43 the court believed his allegations supported claims
under the first and fourth amendments, as incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment. 44 This case discussion is limited to only those
facially-supported claims.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN DUNN V. WHITE
After briefly summarizing Supreme Court rationales regarding
prison cell and body cavity searches, the court turned to address the
elevated level of intrusion represented by governmental search and
seizure of bodily fluids. Because the question of forced AIDS testing
was one of first impression, the court relied on analyses from four search
and seizure cases that involved testing the plaintiffs' bodily fluids for
evidence of drug use.45 Drug testing was found to be unconstitutional
in only one of the four cases, Berry v. District of Columbia.4 6 A "special
needs" balancing analysis was used in each of the four cases. After first
deciding that removal of bodily fluids constitutes a search for fourth
amendment purposes, each court considered the following factors in
varying degrees: 1) the nature and scope of the governmental interest
in the testing; 2) an examination of the governmental interest for proce-
dural safeguards used to choose who would be tested and testing meth-
odology;4 7 3) the logical nexus between the governmental testing and
the state's interest; and 4) the privacy interest of the plaintiff weighed
against the governmental need for testing. The Dunn court did not util-
ize all of these elements in its analysis. Rather, it seemed to pick and
43. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 1190. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to the
states those selectively incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees found to be "fundamental to
the American scheme of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (incorporating the fourth amendment); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)(incorporating the free exercise clause of the first
amendment).
45. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1192-94. The four cases relied upon by the court in Dunn were:
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d
1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987); and Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986).
46. In Berry, pretrial detainees were foreclosed from leaving prison unless they sub-
mitted to drug testing of their bodily fluids. The state interest was perceived by the Berry
court to be other than the stated interest in prison security. The case was remanded for
further factual development regarding the state's interest. It is apparent that the Tenth
Circuit attributed this finding of unconstitutionality to the "criminal context" of the case,
saying, "We agree ... that searches in the noncriminal context such as this one [Dunn v.
White] raise different constitutional concerns than those implicated in Berry." Dunn, 880
F.2d at 1192.
47. In Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986), one important reason for
holding the search of prisoners' bodily fluids to be constitutional was that the state's pro-
cedure for choosing who would be tested did not "unnecessarily [expose] prisoners to the
risk of harassment," the rationale being that because it was truly random the procedure
did not lend itself to abuse.
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choose among the elements, paying lip service to some and ignoring
one completely.
A. The Nature and Scope of the State's Interest
In Dunn, the State of Oklahoma never supported its "interest" in
testing for AIDS with a scintilla of evidence. It neither put forth a show-
ing that it had a plan for the treatment or segregation of AIDS victims,
nor that it was in the process of formulating one. Vaguely, it stated that
"protecting inmates from exposure to a fatal venereal disease is the sort
of legitimate penological goal which outweighs the Appellant's necessar-
ily limited religious rights."148 This is as close as the state came to sup-
porting the state interest requirement of the fourth amendment analysis.
The Dunn court was quick to supply the State of Oklahoma with the
requisite state interest through assumption and generalization, rather
than evidence. 49 Perhaps the greatest reason for finding a state interest
without any showing of evidence was the frightfulness of the AIDS epi-
demic itself. The court openly admitted that it reached the conclusion
of a state interest based upon the seriousness of the disease and its
transmissibility. 50  In effect, the court said that state prisons, in testing
for AIDS, automatically overcome the burden of showing a state interest
because the disease itself is seen as a monumental problem.
If states need not demonstrate a state interest, then they may test
prisoners for any reason, so long as they conclusively plead an interest
in controlling or treating AIDS. The court of appeals in Dunn went a
step further to make this clear: the State of Oklahoma was held to have
a state interest in controlling and treating AIDS at the same time that
the court inconsistently presumed that the state neither attempted to
control the spread of AIDS nor attempted to treat those already
infected. 5
B. Examination of State's Interest for Procedural Safeguards
And Testing Methodology
The Dunn court contended that its analysis followed the reasoning
of the Von Raab and Skinner balancing tests.52 The Supreme Court in
48. Brief for Appellees at 3 (emphasis added), Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th
Cir. 1989)(No. 88-2194).
49. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1989)(the court provided sev-
eral rationales: "prevention of the spread of AIDS in prison would justify the intrusion... ;
[t]he goal of controlling the spread of venereal disease may justify coerced medical testing
... ; an attempt to ascertain the extent of the problem is certainly a legitimate penological
purpose... ; "[the prison] has an interest in making an extra effort to protect prisoners
from a fatal disease... ; the prison, as caretaker, has an interest in diagnosing and provid-
ing adequate health care to those already infected with AIDS...").
50. "In light of the seriousness of the disease and its transmissibility, we conclude that
the prison has a substantial interest in pursuing a program to treat those infected with the
disease and in taking steps to prevent further transmission. We further conclude that the
prison's substantial interest outweighs plaintiff's expectation of privacy." Id. at 1196.
51. "[W]e must assume that the prison does not currently use the information it gath-
ers either to treat or to control the spread of AIDS." Id. at 1196 (emphasis added).
52. "Under the reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab, this court must therefore balance
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those cases, however, scrutinized the governmental interest in laborious
detail, inspecting both essential, equitable elements of procedure and
the methodology implemented by the testing program. In contrast, the
Dunn court examined no governmental interest because no evidence of
such interest was put forth. Unlike the Court's examination of the regu-
latory schemes in both Von Raab and Skinner, the Dunn court asserted
that, for purposes of its analysis, it would assume that the State of
Oklahoma had no plan of AIDS treatment to be examined. 53 Thus,
constitutional safeguards were wholly ignored, leaving a hollow, unqual-
ified holding. In essence, the court held that prisoners do not have a
bodily integrity fourth amendment right to protection against noncon-
sensual AIDS testing by the state.
The court did put forth a rationale for excluding the element of
regulatory scrutiny from its analysis. It stated, inaccurately, that the
plaintiff did not directly challenge the prison's program of AIDS treat-
ment or lack of any program, nor did he challenge the failure of the state
to segregate AIDS prisoners. 54 However, the plaintiff did challenge the
state's interest, claiming that since the prison neither treated nor segre-
gated AIDS victims, it could not have a legitimate penological goal. 55
Despite this, the Tenth Circuit perfunctorily declared that the "complex
constitutional issues arising from such allegations [were] not currently
before us."'56  To the contrary, such issues were before the court in
this case both because the plaintiff raised them and because an examina-
tion of the governmental program is essential to a thorough fourth
amendment analysis under the Supreme Court cases which the court
purported to follow. For example, in National Treasury Employees' Union v.
Von Raab,5 7 the suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs personnel
applying for promotion to certain key positions was held reasonable
under the fourth amendment. While evidence on the record of bribes,
trickery and danger supported the governmental interest in drug test-
ing,5 8 the most compelling evidence was the carefully scrutinized gov-
ernmental program itself.59  Part of the program did not seem
adequately tailored to suit the governmental interest and was thus re-
manded for further examination by the court of appeals. 60 It can be
stated with certainty that careful evaluation of both the regulatory pro-
gram, and the logical nexus between governmental goals and the pro-
the intrusiveness of the blood test against the prison's need to administer the test." Id. at
1194.
53. Id. at 1196.
54. Id. at 1196, n.4.
55. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)(No.
88-2194).
56. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196, n.4.
57. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
58. Id. at 669.
59. Id. at 666. ("[t]he purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those
eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promo-
tion of drug users to those positions. These substantial interests ... present a special need
."). See id. at 660-63.
60. Id. at 677-79.
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gram, was absolutely essential to the Court's analysis. Because the Dunn
court purported to follow the reasoning of Von Raab,6 1 the careful scru-
tiny of any governmental testing program was, of necessity, before the
court in Dunn, however the court may have justified its refusal to recog-
nize the issue.
C. Logical Nexus Between State's Interest and Testing
It is ironic that the Dunn court found a logical nexus 62 between the
stated governmental interest and an AIDS testing program where "the
prison does not currently use the information it gathers either to treat or
to control the spread of AIDS."' 63 Perhaps to justify such a finding, the
court offered the statement that "[t]he prison will ultimately bear re-
sponsibility for decisions on segregation and treatment, and certainly it
is reasonable to attempt to avoid making such decisions in a vacuum."
64
Nowhere in the four opinions relied upon by the Dunn court 6 5 did the
Supreme Court or the circuit courts find a nexus between an unsup-
ported interest and unexamined regulatory scheme justifiable simply be-
cause the government will ultimately bear responsibility for whatever
decisions it reaches.
D. Privacy Interest of the Plaintiff Weighed Against the Governmental
Need for Testing
The court had little difficulty reaching the decision that the
"prison's substantial interest outweighs plaintiff's expectation of pri-
vacy." 6 6 Reflection upon this decision invites consideration of the tan-
dem philosophies of the United States Supreme Court, often in tension,
that intertwine throughout prisoners' rights cases. 6 7 The Court has a
long history of judicial restraint regarding decisionmaking in this area,
reasoning that prison officials are better equipped to determine their
own health and safety policies. 68 Moreover, the separation of powers
principle requires that courts refrain from encroaching upon territory
properly lying within the province of legislatures and their agency off-
61. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1989). The court also claimed to
follow the reasoning of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989),
using the same analysis.
62. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1196.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence v. Far-
ier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986).
66. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196 (10th Cir. 1989).
67. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)(the Court reaffirms its
stance on refusal to substitute its judgment for the judgment of those charged with run-
ning a prison); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-06 (1974)(despite the deference
standard, courts must hear valid constitutional claims).
68. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
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spring.69 On the other hand, the Court has steadfastly applied strict
scrutiny, despite separation of powers arguments, whenever the civil
rights of citizens, particularly "discrete and insular minorities," are
threatened by governmental powers. 70 Justice Edwards of the D.C. Cir-
cuit writes:
Indeed, the special place of prisoners in our society makes
them more dependent on judicial protection than perhaps any
other group. Few minorities are so 'discrete and insular,' so
little able to defend their interests through participation in the
political process, so vulnerable to oppression by an unsympa-
thetic majority. Federal courts have a special responsibility to
ensure that the members of such defenseless groups are not
deprived of their constitutional rights.
7 1
It is clear, regardless of whether prisoners are a "discrete and insu-
lar minority," that incarceration does not mandate that the Court aban-
don its protective role regarding constitutional rights. In Procunier v.
Martinez,72 the Court explained that "a policy of judicial restraint cannot
encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims
whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regula-
tion or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal
courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights."'7 3 Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the concurrence in Rhodes v. Chapman,
74
pointed out that "lower courts have learned from repeated investigation
and bitter experience that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitu-
tional dictates - not to mention considerations of basic humanity - are
to be observed in the prisons."
'7 5
V. DOES DUNN V. WHITE INVITE CONSTITUTIONAL ABUSES?
In his dissent in Dunn v. White, Justice McKay, stressing that the ma-
jority's holding was far too sweeping, suggested that because of the
known seriousness of AIDS, a prison would now not need to show even
its claimed interest. 7 6 Typical governmental abuses of AIDS prisoners
were brought to light at the August, 1990 National Commission on
AIDS meeting in New York City.7 7 The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) reported that convicts in Alabama, for example, are routinely
tested for HIV without either their consent or knowledge. If they test
positive, they are isolated and then transferred to a special HIV prison
69. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979). Accord, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85
(1987).
70. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
71. Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 960 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(referring to
Carolene Products Footnote No. 4). For an excellent discussion on this subject, see Com-
ment, Sentenced to Prison, Sentenced to AIDS: The Eighth Amendment Right to be Protected from
Prison's Second Death Row, 92 DxCK. L. REV. 863, 872-77 (1988).
72. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
73. Id. at 405-06(emphasis added)(citingJohnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,486 (1969)).
74. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
75. Id. at 354.
76. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 1989).
77. Prisons' Care Systems, supra note 5, at 4.
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ward. They are given no AIDS counseling and often are told they have
only days to live. They must scrub toilet seats and telephones after use
and are forced to dispose of their garbage in bright red trash bags. Con-
fidentiality is impossible to maintain because even their clothes are
stamped "HIV."
78
Letters to the ACLU from prisoners describe the "living hell" that
confronts HIV-positive inmates. They write of physical and verbal
abuse from prison guards and health workers, lack of counseling, irregu-
lar treatment, and difficulty in consulting medical specialists outside
prison. One prisoner wrote that inmates taken to see specialists were
placed in leg irons and handcuffs, despite their weakened condition. "I
have witnessed inmates tossed around, in pain ... the circulation [was]
cut off from the hands because of the tightness of the handcuffs."
'79
This is not to suggest that such abuses are prevalent in the Tenth
Circuit. But if prisons were required to make a showing of state interest
to justify AIDS testing, and if the court would uphold constitutional pro-
cedural safeguards, such abuses might be avoided. Attorneys for states
within the Tenth Circuit relying on the Dunn precedent might advise
their clients that AIDS testing within prisons has not been found to vio-
late prisoners' fourth amendment privacy interests, regardless of
whether or not the testing is performed pursuant to a plan meeting con-
stitutional muster. Because the court refused to require any showing of
a constitutionally adequate program in Dunn, discriminatory, punitive,
experimental, or non-confidential testing has not been specifically pro-
scribed. Walker v. Sumner 80 typifies constitutional loopholes left open by
such a precedent; its holding is essentially the McKay dissent in Dunn.
A. Walker v. Sumner
In Walker, Andrew Walker, the pro se plaintiff, alleged that his non-
consensual AIDS blood test violated his fourth amendment rights. 8 1
The blood tests were allegedly part of a state healthcare workers train-
ing program that used prisoners as practice specimens so that students
could learn to administer the AIDS test properly. Walker alleged that
when he refused the test, because he had already been tested at the
prison, he was threatened by a guard with a taser gun8 2 until he submit-
ted. The district court, holding that prison officials had a paramount
interest in identifying carriers of the AIDS virus and that an AIDS test is
reasonably related to that legitimate penological objective, granted sum-
mary judgment to the state. The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying:
Prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory asser-
tions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. The plaintiff also alleged his eighth amendment rights had been violated.
82. A taser gun "operates by firing a tiny dart, attached to the gun with wires, into the
prisoner... administering a low amperage, high voltage electrical shock, which temporar-
ily incapacitates the prisoner." Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the specific penological interests involved and then demon-
strate both that those specific interests are the actual bases for
their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the
furtherance of the identified interests. An evidentiary showing
is required as to each point... [w]e do not know for example
whether the samples were being collected purely for statistical
purposes, whether the prison officials intended to isolate AIDS
carriers, whether they planned to provide some form of medi-
cal treatment for those who tested HIV positive, or even
whether they would use the results for any purpose at all.
Without a further explanation, general protestations of con-
cern for the welfare of. . . the prison community are simply
insufficient to render the involuntary seizure of blood speci-
mens, even from prison inmates, constitutionally reasonable.
8 3
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM
Dunn claimed two additional bases of protection from nonconsen-
sual AIDS testing: his religious beliefs under the first amendment, and
an Oklahoma statute granting exemption from such testing to those with
certain religious beliefs.
In its examination of the first amendment claim, the court de-
pended upon Wisconsin v. Yoder 8 4 to preclude the plaintiff's complaint
from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, saying "[a] philosoph-
ical and personal choice 'does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses.' "85 But, as Judge McKay pointed out in his dissent, this con-
cept has been recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Frazee v. Illinois
Dep't of Employment.8 6 To substantiate a first amendment claim after Fra-
zee, it is enough for a plaintiff to show a sincere religious belief, regard-
less of whether that belief is responsive to a particular organized
religion. The Dunn court further contended that the plaintiff's religious
affirmations were vague and conclusory, stating "at no time has he gone
any further than merely reciting the word 'religion.' -87 But Dunn did
go beyond merely reciting the word "religion" when he defined his un-
derstanding of the word religious for the court, as "relating or devoted
to the divine or that which is held to be of ultimate importance," 8 8 and
explaining that religion for him is a set of such beliefs. 89
In examining the Oklahoma statute raised by the plaintiff,9 0 the
court questioned whether the statutory religious exemption applies to
83. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1990)(emphasis added).
84. 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
85. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 216 (1972)).
86. 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)("we reject the notion that to claim the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization.").
87. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
88. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989)(No.
88-2194).
89. Id.
90. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-516.1 (1984).
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prisoners. 9 1 The court perceived this query as irrelevant, however,
holding that this exemption would not apply to Dunn's religious beliefs.
Despite the lack of any evidence regarding the plaintiff's specific beliefs,
the court decided the Oklahoma exemption did not apply to Dunn be-
cause it is only for those "who, because of religious belief, in good faith
select[] and depend[] upon spiritual means or prayer for the treatment
or cure of disease."' 92 Again, the court supplied an assumption in place
of evidence, this time concluding that the plaintiff's personal religious
beliefs could not possibly fall within the exemption, thus denying him
any protection provided by the very statute he himself raised in defense
of his claim. The Supreme Court has held that Rule 12(b)(6) does not
countenance dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a plaintiff's fac-
tual allegations. 93 Clearly, some evidentiary showing was required.
VII. DUNN V. WHITE FROM A PROCEDURAL STANDPOINT
Granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions is generally looked upon with disfa-
vor because doing so contradicts the basic judicial precept that a case
should be tried on the proofs, rather than on the pleadings.9 4 Thus,
when considering motions to dismiss, courts should both construe com-
plaints liberally and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.9 5
Dunn came before the court of appeals as a review of the district
court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). However, the case clearly was not ripe for dismissal. Rule
12(b)(6) motions call upon the court to make two decisions: first,
whether a claim showing entitlement to relief has been stated,9 6 and
second, whether, based on law and fact, relief can be granted on such a
claim.9 7 In Dunn, the court maintained that the plaintiff's allegations of
religious beliefs facially supported both a fourth and a first amendment
claim,9 8 thus passing the first hurdle of the 12(b)(6) analysis. The sec-
91. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
92. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-516.1 (1984)).
93. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
94. Carss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 252 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1958); Rennie & Laugh-
lin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957); Buchler v. United States, 384 F.
Supp. 709 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Beenken v. Chicago & Northern R.R., 367 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D.
Iowa 1973). See Action Repair Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 776 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.
1985)(Courts should not make judgment calls on allegations in pleadings, dismissal at
summary judgment stage more appropriate).
95. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-
46 (1957).
96. Davis H. Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., 513 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1975); Mac-
Kenzie v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 472 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Miss.
1979); Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1968); Bing v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 237 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Hoffman v. Weider, 217 F.
Supp. 172 (D.NJ. 1963).
97. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Also, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss, the court may consider legal arguments presented in briefs and matters
which are the subject ofjudicial notice. United States General, Inc. v. Schroeder, 400 F.
Supp. 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp.
564 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
98. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989).
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ond hurdle of the analysis requires the court to accept the plaintiff's
allegations of fact 9 and every fairly deducible inference therefrom' 0 0 as
true for purposes of the motion. The court is authorized to dismiss a
claim based upon a dispositive issue of law only "if, as a matter of law, 'it
is clear that no relief could be granted under any set offacts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.' "101 The fourth amendment
claim was dismissed because the court refused to examine the state's
interest, substituting its own assumptions for evidence. The first
amendment claim was dismissed because the court assumed that Dunn's
religious beliefs could not factually support a first amendment claim; '
0 2
nor could they support a claim under the Oklahoma statutory exemp-
tion.' 0 3 However, the court asserted that Dunn never expressed what
his specific religious beliefs were."10 The opinion did not explain how
an allegation could provide facial support for a first amendment
claim, '0 5 and yet simultaneously be so insubstantial as to fail to support
a first amendment claim. 10 6 If indeed facts were missing, as the court
believed and articulated, then the facially-supported claim was not ripe
for dismissal. Because a plaintiff's complaint need only show that he or
she holds a sincere religious belief, 10 7 further questions of fact should
be left for appropriate future resolution by the finder of fact. Further-
more, the mandate of Hughes v. Rowe '0 8 requiring an indulgent interpre-
tation of a pro se plaintiff's allegations, was virtually ignored by the court
in practice, although alluded to in an early part of the opinion. 0 9
CONCLUSION
Because of Dunn v. White, prisoners' fourth amendment rights in the
context of AIDS testing has become a misnomer in the Tenth Circuit. It
is interesting to note the willingness of the court to supply assumptions
in place of evidence. For example, it found an (assumed) fourth amend-
ment state interest without requiring a scintilla of evidence, and later
99. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
100. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 386 (10th Cir. 1976).
101. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)(quoting Hishan v. King, 467 U.S.
69, 73 (1984))(emphasis added).
102. "The mere assertion of generic religious objections is not sufficient to invoke first
amendment protections." Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1197.
103. "[T~he exemption [in OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, Sec. 1-516.1 (1984)] is for those 'who,
because of religious belief, in good faith select[] and depend[] upon spiritual means or
prayer for the treatment or cure of disease.' Plaintiff's vague allegation that he declined
AIDS testing on generic 'religious grounds' does not implicate this exemption." Id. (citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
104. "Plaintiff did not accompany his allegation with any details about his religious
faith, nor did he allege what tenet of his faith required that he refuse the test." Id.
105. "Plaintiff's factual allegations that he refused consent to a medical test on reli-
gious grounds, and was then forced to submit to the test, at least facially support claims
under the first and fourth amendments, as incorporated into the fourteenth." Id. at 1190.
106. "[P]laintiff has supported his first amendment claim with only a conclusory allega-
tion of religious exemption." Id. at 1198.
107. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment, 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
108. 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980).
109. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989).
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supplied the plaintiff himself with an (assumed) set of disadvantageous
religious beliefs that precluded him from possible exemption from AIDS
testing under the Oklahoma statute. This is judicial deference at its
worst. By refusing to require any evidence, the court's decision was
based upon nothing but its own assumptions. Dunn v. White may repre-
sent an abatement of individual rights resulting from governmental
needs perceived to be so monumental that constitutional safeguards
may be overlooked, particularly in light of the plaintiff's prisoner status.
What is so disturbing about this case also illustrates one very serious
problem inherent in the fourth amendment balancing analysis itself: in
deciding whether or not a governmental intrusion is permissible under
the fourth amendment, absent any individualized suspicion require-
ment, the scales may be tipped in favor of the government simply be-
cause the individual's need for privacy is viewed by some courts as
eminently disproportionate in relation to any given governmental need.
In this context, Justice Marshall warns:
Precisely because the need for action against [a perceived dan-
ger] is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is great. History teaches that grave threats to liberty
often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights
seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-
camp cases, the Red Scare and McCarthy-Era internal subver-
sion cases are only the most extreme reminders that when we
allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real
or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.1 10
Monica Brion
110. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)(Marshall,J.,
dissenting).
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REDEFINING "WILLFUL" IN THE LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES PROVISION OF THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
I. INTRODUCON
With better medical care and greater appreciation for healthy lifes-
tyles and habits, Americans are living longer in 1990 than they were in
1967 when the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)' became
law. As the percentage of older Americans increases and as life length-
ens, it is not surprising that older Americans want to work later into
their lives. As a result, the ADEA is one of the most litigated federal
employment statutes, with constantly evolving case law.
In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,2 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the ADEA's controversial liquidated damages provision for
the first time. Before Thurston, there were several different standards
under which a "willful" violation, triggering the liquidated damages
provision, was evaluated. The Court's decision brought some clarity to
the issue, but application problems surfaced. Other strands of analysis
developed as courts of appeals attempted to apply the Court's decision.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has formulated a standard which
holds to the legislative intent announced by the Court, but which re-
solves the ambiguities that arise from application of Thurston's standard
to varied fact patterns.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)3 to promote employment of older persons, to prohibit arbi-
trary discrimination against them and to help employers and workers
meet problems arising from the impact of age on employment. 4 Ini-
tially, the ADEA covered employees and applicants for employment be-
tween the ages of forty and sixty-five and private employers of twenty or
more workers. Amendments to the ADEA have gradually broadened the
class of protected persons and the class of affected employers to include
the following persons: government workers (1974); 5 persons up to age
seventy (1978);6 workers in covered employers' workplaces in foreign
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
2. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
4. Id. § 621(b).
5. Id. § 633a.
6. Id. § 631.
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countries (1984); 7 and in 1986, all persons over the age of forty.8 In
addition, the ADEA applies to employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions. 9 Approximately twenty-one percent of the workers in the United
States' labor force are between the ages of forty and seventy.' 0 Increas-
ingly, these older workers are seeking the Act's protection. "
Enacted in 1967, the ADEA draws its substantive provisions from an-
other 1960's anti-discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII). 12 The ADEA's remedies, however, are drawn mostly
from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1935 (FLSA).' 3 As a result, the
ADEA has been called a hybrid of the two statutes.
14
The integration of Title VII and FLSA ideas into one statute has
resulted in much speculation as courts and commentators have at-
tempted to determine the intent underlying certain ADEA provisions.
There are important differences between the ADEA and the FLSA that
may be the cause of the confusion regarding congressional intent. For
example, the FLSA provides for an automatic doubling of damages for a
violation, 15 and criminal penalties for a "willful" violation, 16 while the
ADEA provides for doubling of damages only where a "willful" violation
is found, creating two tiers of civil liability.'
7
7. Id. § 623(f(1).
8. Id. § 631 (a). The ceiling age was thus removed from the ADEA. For more discus-
sion of the ADEA's historical background, see A. RuzicHO, L. JACOBS & L. THRASHER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.01 (1989).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c) (1988).
10. Keaton & Larson, Age Discrimination in Employment: Case Law and Implications for Em-
ployers, 40 LAB. L.J. 575, 576 (1989).
11. "In 1979, approximately 5,000 cases were filed. By 1983, the number had grown
to over 19,000. During the 1980s, each year on average has seen a 17 percent increase in
cases filed .... Sixty-seven percent of the cases filed are discharge cases." Id. at 580
(footnotes omitted). A recent article cited "[c]orporate reductions, mergers and a height-
ened public awareness of the elderly" as factors contributing to the increase in age dis-
crimination lawsuits. Schweit, Changing Times Lead to Proliferation of Age Bias Lawsuits,
Chicago Daily L. Bull., Dec. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 121 (1985). For a discussion of the relationship between the ADEA and Title
VII, see Recent Developments, Bootstrapping a Malice Requirement Into ADEA Liquidated Dam-
age Awards-Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 62 WASH. L. REV. 551, 552 (1987) [hereinafter Recent
Developments]; Wallach & Marx, Damages for Age Discrimination: Courts Split on 'Willfulness'
Rule, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 18, col. 1.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988); Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 552-53;
Wallach & Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 1.
14. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 485 (2d ed. 1983).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
16. Id. § 216(a).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
Commentators have summarized the differences between the FLSA and the ADEA as
follows:
There are three notable exceptions to the incorporation of the FLSA's remedial
provisions into the ADEA: a. The ADEA does not incorporate the criminal pen-
alties available in the FLSA; b. The ADEA provides for liquidated damages only
in the case of "willful" violations; and c. The ADEA grants courts broad discre-
tionary power by authorizing the court to award "such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this [Act.]" § 626(b).
Panken, Levitt & Cardinal, New Issues in Age Discrimination, 13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATER-
IALS J. 49, 74-75 (1989). For a thorough treatment of congressional reasoning in the
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The issues created by the integration of two laws into the ADEA are
even further complicated by a fourth statute, the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 (PPA),' 8 which is incorporated into both the FLSA and the ADEA.
Section 6 of the PPA extends the statute of limitations from two years to
three if a "willful" violation is found.' 9 This section of the PPA was
enacted in 1966 to apply to the FLSA. It was incorporated into the
ADEA upon that statute's enactment.20 Another section of the PPA,
section 11, is incorporated into the FLSA but not into the ADEA, at least
not expressly. 2 1 This section was enacted to soften the harshness of the
FLSA's automatic doubling of damages, 2 2 and provides that the court
may elect not to award liquidated damages if the employer shows a good
faith belief that it did not violate the FLSA.2 3 Given the confusing inte-
gration of laws that were combined to form the ADEA, it is not surpris-
ing that congressional intent regarding the Act is difficult to determine.
B. Damages Under the ADEA
As previously stated, the ADEA's damages provision consists of a
two-tier liability scheme. 24 A basic finding of liability results in an award
of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. 25 If the
employer is found to have committed a "willful" violation of the ADEA,
the employee will receive liquidated damages consisting of an amount
equal to the backpay award.2 6 Application of the liquidated damages
provision has been difficult, however, because Congress failed to include
a definition of the word "willful" in the ADEA.
2 7
Since there is no statutory language expressly defining "willful,"
courts have had to resort to legislative history to determine congres-
sional intent. Courts and commentators frequently focus on whether
the ADEA's liquidated damages provision was enacted to provide com-
pensatory or punitive relief.2 8 In Thurston, the Supreme Court consid-
ADEA's development, see Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 552-54. See also infra
notes 31-33 (comparison of FLSA's criminal and ADEA's civil penalties for willful
violations).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1988).
19. Id. § 255(a).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (1988).
21. The Fifth Circuit has held that "section 11 of the PPA applies to violations under
the ADEA." Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976). The
Supreme Court, while not agreeing that the section is incorporated into the ADEA, has
stated that "the same concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA
[§ 626(b)]." Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22 (1985). See infra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text and notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text.
22. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
24. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
26. Id.; Marion, Legal and Equitable Remedies Under the Age Discrimination and Employment
Act, 45 MD. L. REv. 298, 320 (1986).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Marion, supra note 26, at 321; Note, Willfulness, Good Faith, and the Quagmire
of Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 J. CORP. L. 573, 583-
86 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Willfulness]; Comment, Employment Discrimination-The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act Permits Recovery of Liquidated Damages Only Upon Showing of Em-
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ered, for the first time, "what constitutes a 'willful' violation of the
ADEA, entitling a plaintiff to 'liquidated' or double damages." 29 In
Thurston, the Court declared that Congress intended liquidated damages
under the ADEA to be punitive in nature. 30 The Court highlighted Sen-
ator Javits' 3 remarks recommending that a double damage liability
scheme be substituted for the administration's suggested incorporation
of the FLSA's criminal penalty for willful violations. The Senator noted
that a criminal provision would create difficult problems of proof and
that employers' invocation of the fifth amendment might frustrate im-
plementation of the Act.32 On this basis, criminal penalties were re-
jected. Instead, a basic finding of liability for a violation of the ADEA
results in a compensatory damage award, while a willful violation results
in a liquidated damages award which is punitive in nature.
35
III. "WILLFULNESS" STANDARDS PRIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT'S
THURSTON DECISION
Prior to Thurston, the various circuit courts of appeals engaged in
different approaches in defining "willfulness." Since the FLSA was in-
corporated into the ADEA, courts sometimes used FLSA decisions in
developing their ADEA "willfulness" standards. The circuit courts of
appeals borrowed extensively from one another in developing their
standards. While relying on other circuits' approaches, each court re-
stated the standard in its own words. Because Thurston's "willfulness"
standard was incapable of uniform application in all ADEA cases, courts
of appeals retained variations of many of these pre-Thurston standards
long after Thurston was decided.
ployer's Outrageous Conduct in Violating the Act: Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 32 VILL. L. REV. 855,
866-67 (1987)[hereinafter Comment, Employment Discrimination]; Survey, 1985-1986 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 28 B.C.L. REV. 119, 223 (1986).
29. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 114. Thurston is examined infra notes 75-92 and accompany-
ing text.
30. Id. at 125.
31. Id. SenatorJavits was a cosponsor of the amendment which provided for enforce-
ment and remedies under the FLSA. The other sponsor was Senator Yarborough. Hays v.
Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976)(citing 113 CONG. REC. 31254
(1967)).
32. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 2199, 7076 (1967)).
33. One commentator maintains that debate over whether the Act's liquidated dam-
ages provision was intended to be compensatory or punitive arises from semantic confu-
sion in the law in which "punitive" and "compensatory" have both been used to refer to
damages for pain and suffering. Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 583-84. Any such con-
fusion regarding the ADEA should be resolved, however, by the Supreme Court's finding
in Thurston, and the fact that damages for pain and suffering are unavailable under the
ADEA. Marion, supra note 26, at 323; Comment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28,
at 858 n.12.
Note, however, that this does not mean that the employee is barred from seeking
damages for pain and suffering. For example, in Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150
(10th Cir. 1990), the employee asserted a pendent state claim for age discrimination and
extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. at 1152. Although the state claim was unsuccessful,
the case illustrates that a state claim for emotional distress may be adjudicated in the same
proceeding as an ADEA federal claim.
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A. Pre-Thurston "Willfulness" Standards in Other Circuits
The most liberal interpretation of "willfulness" by a circuit court of
appeals was the "in the picture" standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc.,34 an FLSA statute of limitations case.
Stated most simply, the standard asked, "Did the employer know the
FLSA was in the picture?" 35 If answered in the affirmative, a "willful"
violation of the FLSA had occurred. The "in the picture" standard was
subsequently applied by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits to the ADEA's liq-
uidated damages provision.3 6 The Supreme Court overturned Jiy June
in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. 
3 7
The Fifth Circuit introduced another component of the FLSA into
ADEA jurisprudence when it found that the good faith provision of the
34. 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). The Fifth Circuit
specifically addressed "whether a violation [of the FLSA] committed in good faith may yet
be wilful .. " Id. at 1141.
35. Id. The employer in the case had consulted with his attorney prior to entering
into a collective bargaining agreement which purported to exempt his employees from the
FLSA overtime rate. His attorney advised him that his employees would be exempt under
the FLSA.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's "wilful" violation finding, reasoning that
the employer's decision to request advice of counsel showed that he was aware that the
FLSA might prevent the change in overtime pay. Id. at 1140-41. The court stated that the
legislative history of the 1966 FLSA amendments indicated Congress' liberalizing intent,
and the court decided that "[riequiring employers to have more than awareness of the
possible applicability of the FLSA would be inconsistent with that intent." Id. at 1142.
Thus, "the employer's decision to change his employees' rate of pay in violation of [the]
FLSA is 'wilful' when .. .there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA." Id.
36. Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980) (ADEA liquidated dam-
ages); EEOC v. Central Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983) (ADEA stat-
ute of limitations): EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir.
1984) (ADEA liquidated damages) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in
light of Thurston, see infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text), vacated, 469 U.S. 1145
(1985) ; Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1981) (ADEA liquidated dam-
ages). The Fifth Circuit citedJiffy June in a 1974 FLSA case and articulated the "willful-
ness" standard as follows: "An employer acts willfully and subjects himself to the three
year liability provision if he knows, or has reason to know, that his conduct is governed by
the Fair Labor Standards Act." Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
in original). The Heard standard was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Spagnuolo v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1981) (ADEA liquidated damages), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 860 (1982).
37. 486 U.S. 128 (1988). Richland Shoe was an FLSA case in which the Court deter-
mined that Jiffy June's "in the picture" standard "virtually obliterates any distinction be-
tween willful and nonwillful violations" and thus rejected its use in the FLSA statute of
limitations context. Id. at 132-34. In Thurston, the Court had determined that the "in the
picture" standard should not be used in the ADEA liquidated damages context. Thurston,
469 U.S. at 127-28.
Courts have struggled with the question of whether the same definition of "willful"
should be applied to the FLSA and the ADEA statute of limitations provisions as well as to
the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. Even in Thurston, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the circuit courts of appeals are divided over this question, but the Court
failed to provide an answer. Id. at 128 n.21.
In Richland Shoe, however, the Court held that the standard applied in Thurston to de-
fine a "willful" violation for purposes of ADEA liquidated damages should also be used to
determine whether a "willful" violation of the FLSA's statute of limitations provision has
occurred. Richland Shoe, 486 U.S. at 135. Apparently, then, the definition of "willful" is
the same in both contexts.
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PPA3 8 should be applied to the ADEA as well.3 9 Section 11 of the PPA
grants a court the discretionary power to award no liquidated damages
when the employer shows a good faith belief that it has not violated the
statute.40 In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,41 the Fifth Circuit noted that the
trial judge had recognized that the defendant satisfied section 11 of the
PPA and the judge would not award liquidated damages if that section
applied in an ADEA context.42 Relying on Jiffy June, however, the trial
court found a "willful violation." '43 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ex-
amined legislative history and reversed the "willful" finding after deter-
mining that section 11 of the PPA does apply to violations of the
ADEA.
44
The most stringent definition of "willful" adopted by any of the cir-
cuit courts of appeals was that adopted by the First Circuit in what has
come to be known as the "specific intent" standard. The First Circuit
defined "willfully" as "voluntarily and intentionally, and with the spe-
cific intent to do something the law forbids .... -45 This standard has
not received much of a following.
4 6
The standard ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Thurston
was an employer's "knowing or showing a reckless disregard" for
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. 4 7 This standard dates
back as far as 1951, when the Tenth Circuit applied it in an FLSA case to
determine whether the employer should be subject to criminal penal-
ties. 48 The standard was applied by the Third Circuit in 1980, 49 by the
Second Circuit in 198150 and again in 1983 in Air Line Pilots Ass 'n v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,51 which was the case on appeal in Thurston.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988), also known as section 11 of the PPA. See supra notes 18-23
and accompanying text for a discussion of the PPA.
39. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
41. Hays, 531 F.2d at 1312.
42. Id. at 1309.
43. Id. at 1309-10.
44. Id. at 1312. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text for discussion of the
relationship between the ADEA and the PPA. The Supreme Court has approved incorpo-
rating the concerns of section 11 into the ADEA, even though it has refused to fully incor-
porate section 11 into the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 n.22 (1985). See infra notes 82 & 83 and
accompanying text.
45. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979) (quoting DEvIr &
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, sec. 14.06, at 384 (3d. ed. 1977)).
46. See Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 589-90; Note, Liquidated Damages and Statute of
Limitations Under the "Willful" Standard of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Repercussions of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 516,
533 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Liquidated Damages]; infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
47. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126.
48. Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
876 (1951). The standard was similarly applied in Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1943).
49. Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980) (in dictum). See Note,
Liquidated Damages, supra note 46, at 536.
50. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1981).
51. 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983), rev d in part, sub nom., Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
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In Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) had
changed its collectively-bargained-for mandatory retirement policy in
response to concern that the 1978 amendments to the ADEA made the
policy unlawful. The change resulted in two lawsuits against TWA, one
by the Air Line Pilots Association, the other by plaintiff-employee Har-
old Thurston and two other TWA employees. The two suits were con-
solidated on appeal. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden of showing TWA
violated the ADEA. Applying the "knowing or reckless disregard" stan-
dard, the Second Circuit held that TWA willfully violated the ADEA.
5 2
TWA filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Second Circuit's hold-
ing, and the Union filed a cross petition on the liability issue. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated both cases.
53
B. The Tenth Circuit's Pre- Thurston "Willfulness" Standards
The Tenth Circuit's experience with the ADEA liquidated damages
provision prior to 1985 was similar to that of other circuit courts of ap-
peals. In an early ADEA case, the Tenth Circuit applied the Fifth Cir-
cuit's "in the picture" standard. 54 Later, the Tenth Circuit gradually
borrowed from other circuits until it developed a standard that it used
consistently.5 5 Finally, it learned, along with many other circuit courts
of appeals, that this standard did not conform with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the ADEA's legislative intent.
5 6
Mistretta v. Sandia Corp. 5 7 was an ADEA case involving a work force
reduction at Sandia. Sandia had "review committees" that struggled
with the adverse impact of this reduction on the older employees, but
the Company disregarded this impact when it was brought to its atten-
tion. 58 In upholding the trial court's "willfulness" finding, the Tenth
Circuit applied the Fifth Circuit's Jify June "in the picture" standard.
59
The court also looked at the Fifth Circuit's Hays holding that the em-
ployer's good faith could be a defense to a "willfulness" finding.60 The
court noted, however, that the ADEA does not mention section 11 of the
PPA, and since Sandia's behavior made the question moot, the court did
not need to decide whether Congress intended such "double statutory
incorporation." 
6
Next the Tenth Circuit construed "willfulness" for purposes of the
statute of limitations provision in an FLSA case, EEOC v. Central Kansas
52. Id. at 956-57. See Note, Willfulness, supra note 28, at 594-95.
53. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 120. Thurston is discussed infra at notes 75-92 and accompa-
nying text.
54. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 73 and accompanying text and notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
57. 639 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 595.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. & n.4.
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Medical Center.6 2 The trial court found that the Medical Center had paid
male janitors more than women housekeepers for substantially equal
work, and that the pay differential was not justified by a factor other than
gender. 6 3 In addition, the trial court found that the FLSA violation was
"willful," 6 4 thus lengthening the statute of limitations by one year. On
appeal, the Medical Center argued that "willfulness" should be deter-
mined according to a "deliberate, voluntary, and intentional" stan-
dard.6 5 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding a violation to be "willful"
when "the employer was, or should have been, cognizant of an apprecia-
ble possibility that the employees involved were covered by the statutory
provisions."
66
In EEOC v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, (Prudential
1 ),67 the Tenth Circuit construed "willful" for purposes of the liqui-
dated damages provision of the ADEA. The EEOC contended that Pru-
dential had discharged six employees and demoted a seventh in
violation of the ADEA. 68 In its instruction to the jury regarding a "will-
ful" violation, the trial court used a specific intent standard: "A willful
violation occurs when a person acts with specific intent to violate the
law, where with knowledge of the law he proceeds, or it proceeds to
violate the law knowingly and intentionally."'6 9 On appeal, the EEOC
contended that the jury instruction imposed too strict a standard. 70 The
Tenth Circuit agreed. Applying the Central Kansas standard, the court
concluded that Prudential's violation was "willful" as a matter of law.
7 1
In addition, the Tenth Circuit stated that section 11 of the PPA, the
"good faith" defense, was not incorporated into the ADEA. 72 The
Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded it
73
for further consideration in light of Thurston.
62. 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 1273.
64. Id. at 1274.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1981)). Marshall was the first Ninth Circuit opinion to adopt a "willful" standard for
purposes of the FLSA statute of limitations. Id. at 1091. The Ninth Circuit looked to the
District of Columbia and the Fifth Circuits (Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Brennan v. Heard, 491
F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) and Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972)) in developing its standard. Marshall, 650
F.2d at 1091-93.
67. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985). The
remanded case was taken up in EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) (Prudential 2). For discussion of Prudential 2,
see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
68. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d at 1227.
69. Id. at 1233.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1234. It is interesting to note that in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
469 U.S. 111 (1985), the Supreme Court specifically rejected both the specific intent and
the "in the picture" standards. Id. at 126 n.19, 128 n.22. See infra notes 84-90 and accom-
panying text.
72. Prudential 1, 741 F.2d at 1234.
73. 469 U.S. 1154 (1985).
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IV. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. V. THURSTON: ATrEMPTING TO
CLARIFY DEBATE AMONG THE CIRCUITS
7 4
In Thurston,7 5 the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
finding that TWA had violated the ADEA, but reversed its finding that
the violation was "willful."' 76 While the Court approved of the Second
Circuit's "reckless disregard" definition of "willful," it disapproved of
the way in which the court applied this definition.
7 7
In finding the "reckless disregard" definition "reasonable, '7 8 the
Court examined the ADEA's legislative history. Finding that Congress
was aware ofjudicial interpretations of the FLSA when the ADEA was
enacted, the Court reasoned that interpretations of the FLSA's criminal
penalty provision for "willful" violations were relevant in determining
the definition of "willful" under the ADEA. 79 The Court cited the
Tenth and Fifth Circuits, and noted that the standard used by those
courts was "substantially in accord with the interpretation of 'willful'
adopted by the [Second Circuit] Court of Appeals in interpreting the
liquidated damages provision of the ADEA." 80 The Court also found
the Second Circuit's "reckless disregard" interpretation of "willful"
consistent with its own definition of "willful" in other criminal and civil
statutes. 8 1 In addition, the Court stated that the concerns embodied in
section 11 of the PPA, 82 which provides an employer with a "good faith"
defense, were similarly reflected in the ADEA, even though that section
is not expressly incorporated into the ADEA.
83
While the Thurston Court forged its own "willfulness" standard,
combining "reckless disregard" with the "good faith" defense, it specifi-
cally rejected two of the pre-Thurston definitions of "willfulness." The
Court most obviously rejected the "in the picture" standard, noting that
this standard would frustrate Congress' two-tier liability scheme when
applied to the ADEA.8 4 The Court noted that because employers are
required by the ADEA to post notices "prepared or approved by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter," 85 the "in the picture" standard would result in an
automatic double damage award in almost every case,8 6 even when the
employer had acted reasonably and in good faith.
8 7
74. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 130.
77. "Although we hold that this is an acceptable way to articulate a definition of 'will-
ful,' the court below misapplied this standard." Id. at 128-29.
78. Id. at 126.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 876 (1951); Darby v. United States, 132 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1943)).
81. Id.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1988).
83. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.22.
84. Id. at 128.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1988).
86. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128.
87. Id. n.22.
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The "specific intent" standard also met with the Court's disfavor in
Thurston.88 TWA argued for this standard despite the fact that the stan-
dard had not gathered much of a following before Thurston.89 In re-
sponse, the Court stated simply, "[w]e do not agree with TWA's
argument," and noted that other courts have found a "willful" violation
absent an evil motive or bad purpose on the employer's part. 90
The Court's resort to interpretations of "willful" in FLSA cases
makes little sense since the ADEA does not include the FLSA's criminal
sanctions for "willful" violations. 9 ' In addition, the Court was not as
helpful as it might have been in Thurston; it noted that the circuit courts
of appeals were divided over whether the "willfulness" standard should
be identical for liquidated damages and the statute of limitations period,
but it failed to resolve the debate.9 2 As a result, the lower courts had to
wait three years to learn that the standard is the same for the two
provisions.
93
IV. POST-THuRSTON "WILLFULNESS" STANDARDS
A. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals
The initial reaction to Thurston was optimistic,94 but the standard
announced therein to define "willful" violations for purposes of liqui-
dated damages has not been readily applicable in all ADEA cases. 95 Age
discrimination can be broken down into two broad categories--dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment. The circuit courts of appeals en-
countered a problem after Thurston when attempting to apply that case
to cases where disparate treatment was at issue.
88. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "specific in-
tent" standard.
89. See, e.g., Wallach & Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 2 stating "several courts have
considered employers' arguments that a willful violation required a showing of bad faith,
evil motive or malevolence on the employer's part. Prior to Thurston, the courts of appeals
uniformly rejected this approach." (citing Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3d.
Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127 (2nd Cir. 1981); Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
90. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126 n.19, (citing Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d
478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951)). The Thurston Court is referring. here to
criminal liability for "willful" violations of the FLSA.
91. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text and notes 31-33 and accompanying
text (comparing the FLSA's criminal and the ADEA's civil penalties for "willful"
violations).
92. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128 n.21.
93. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988).
94. "It is a standard that courts will easily be able to apply to 'willful' violations of the
ADEA; the result will be the award of equitable and reasonable damages to injured plain-
tiffs." Note, Defining Willfulness Under the ADEA: Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 69 MARQ. L.
REV. 451, 461 (1986).
95. "Although the Supreme Court intended Thurston to clarify the muddy issue of
what constitutes willful conduct under the ADEA, the ruling has not had the desired effect.
The decision instead has spawned divergent results in almost every circuit .... " Wallach
& Marx, supra note 12, at 18, col. 3; "Since the Supreme Court's decision in Thurston, lower
courts have continued to grapple with establishing a definition of willful that satisfies the
objectives of Thurston when applied to differing fact patterns." Note, Willfulness, supra note
28, at 576. See also Comment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28, at 864 n.35 (quoting
an Alabama district court's frustration with the Thurston standard).
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The terms "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment" arise from
concepts of discrimination developed under Title VII. 9 6 Disparate im-
pact occurs when an employment policy, plan, rule or procedure "ad-
versely affects employment opportunities of a defined protected class
when compared to the effect that device has upon the opportunities of
other classes."'9 7 Disparate treatment, on the other hand, can be sys-
temic or individual 98 and involves "discrete employment decision[s] di-
rected at an individual." 99 In disparate treatment cases, proof of an
employer's motivation is required. Direct evidence is sometimes avail-
able to assist a plaintiff's case, but more often the cases must be proven
by "inferences from objective factors."' 0 0
ADEA discharge cases have adopted a proof model from McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,10 ' a Title VII case. As adapted to ADEA cases, the
model requires that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case by showing
that he or she (1) is in the protected age group, (2) was qualified for the
position or satisfactorily performing up to his or her termination, (3)
was terminated, and (4) the defendant sought applicants to fill the posi-
tion, or younger persons were retained in positions similar to the plain-
tiff's. 10 2 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the employer, and the employee will pre-
vail unless the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the action.10 3 If the employer articulates such a reason, the
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the prof-
fered reason is merely a pretext. The plaintiff can prove that the reason
is pretextual in two ways: "directly by presenting evidence indicating
that age more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly by presenting
evidence that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence."1
04
It is important to note that Thurston was a case involving company
policy which affected employees as a group. As a result, subsequent
courts have categorized it as a disparate impact case.10 5 Several courts
96. Sullivan & Zimmer, Proving a Violation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 808 (1987).
97. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 356 (1988).
98. Id. at 809. For ease of discussion, this Note will refer only to the broad categories
of "disparate impact" and "disparate treatment."
99. Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 530.
101. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
102. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 530-31. This proof scheme is essentially the same in
age discrimination cases in which the adverse action is not termination, but is, for example,
failure to hire, promote or transfer.
103. Id. at 531. While the burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion re-
mains with the plaintiff throughout. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Co., 863 F.2d 1544, 1547
(10th Cir. 1988).
104. M. PLAYER, supra note 97, at 532-33. Courts have interpreted the former method
of proof to mean that "age was more likely than not a determinativefactor in the employment
decision." Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989). The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that courts have referred to Thurston as a disparate impact
case, but noted that it could be categorized as a disparate treatment case since TWA's
policy was not facially neutral. Id. Regardless of which label is attached to the case,
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have discovered that when Thurston is applied in disparate treatment
cases, a finding that age was a determinative factor in the employer's
decision is also a finding of "willfulness" in almost every case. 10 6 This
result occurs for two reasons. First, the ADEA's requirement that cov-
ered employers post notices about the ADEA in their workplaces'
0 7
makes it impossible for an employer to show that he or she did not know
that the ADEA was potentially applicable. ' 08 Second, a finding that age
was a determining factor in the employer's decision makes Thurston's
"good faith" defense unavailable to an employer since one cannot be
found to have intentionally discriminated against an individual employee
in good faith.
This problem does not arise in disparate impact/company policy
cases such as Thurston. In those cases, the factfinder looks at the em-
ployer's decision regarding an employment policy and determines
whether the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard" for the mat-
ter of whether its policy violated the ADEA, or whether, after consider-
ing potential ADEA applicability, the employer decided in good faith
that the policy did not violate the Act. If the policy violates the Act, but
the employer acted in good faith in developing it, a "willful" violation is
unlikely to be found.
Since Thurston, courts have had to resist imposing automatic liqui-
dated damages in disparate treatment cases. The circuit courts of ap-
peals have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways. Most began by
trying to apply the "knew or showed reckless disregard" standard to dis-
parate treatment cases despite the problem.' 0 9 Eventually, courts began
developing inconsistent standards to deal with the problem while trying
to keep Thurston in mind.
In Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co.,1 10 the Third Circuit developed the
most divergent interpretation of Thurston, requiring "some additional
evidence of outrageous conduct" in order to find a "willful" viola-
tion. I I This standard has not gained much of a following outside of the
Third Circuit. Courts and commentators believe that the Thurston deci-
sion precludes an "outrageous conduct" definition or that Dreyer "goes
problems arise when courts attempt to apply Thurston to cases in which discrete employ-
ment decisions are directed at individuals rather than at groups (as was the case with the
union in Thurston).
106. Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1067; Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158
(6th Cir. 1988); Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1549; Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810
F.2d 1094, 1100 (11th Cir. 1987); Dreyer v. Arco Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651, 657 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1988).
108. In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985), the Court recog-
nized the effect of the posting requirement in its analysis of the "in the picture" standard.
Unfortunately, the Court did not realize that its standard would have the same effect in
disparate treatment cases.
109. See Recent Developments, supra note 12, at 557 n.45 (citing decisions from the
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Fifth, Fourth and Eighth Circuits).
110. 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986).




The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is on the other end of the
post-Thurston spectrum. In Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co." ,s the
court decided that the jury's finding of intentional discrimination pre-
cluded a finding of good faith when the proper jury instruction was
given and the defendant admitted knowledge that the ADEA prohibited
such discrimination."14 Although the Eleventh Circuit expressed its
frustration with the Thurston disparate treatment problem,15 it at-
tempted to follow the case. Its position, however, would appear to re-
sult in a "willful" finding almost every time an ADEA violation is
found, 16 thus frustrating the two-tier liability scheme which the Court
sought to maintain in Thurston.' 17
B. The Tenth Circuit's Post-Thurston "Willfulness" Standards
1. Case Law
The Tenth Circuit experienced a metamorphosis in ADEA liqui-
dated damages jurisprudence after Thurston similar to that experienced
by the other circuit courts of appeals, but its metamorphosis was argua-
bly more rapid than that of other courts. 1 8 Initially, it tried to apply
Thurston's "willfulness" standard to all ADEA cases, but it quickly dis-
covered the same disparate treatment application problem encountered
by other courts. In an important opinion in 1988, Cooper v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co., 1 19 the court formulated a standard that has weathered well
and has even been adopted by one circuit court of appeals.' 20
The Tenth Circuit became familiar with Thurston quite quickly. The
first ADEA case the Tenth Circuit encountered after Thurston was EEOC
v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association (Prudential 2), 121 in which
112. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1550 (10th Cir. 1988). See
also Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (11 th Cir. 1987); Com-
ment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 28, at 874; Recent Developments, supra note 12,
at 567.
113. 810 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 1100.
115. Id.
116. In Cooper, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Lindsey as having "the practical result of
permitting a willful violation whenever liability is found in a disparate treatment case."
836 F.2d at 1551.
117. Lindsey typifies the amount of judicial resources that are being spent on ADEA
cases as a result of imprecise statutory drafting and incomplete Supreme Court clarifica-
tion. The case began when Dolen Lindsey sued American Cast Iron Co. (ACIPO) for
violating the ADEA by refusing to promote him because of his age. The jury found for
Lindsey, but the trial court granted ACIPO's motion for judgement notwithstanding the
verdict. In the first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court, reinstated the jury
verdict and remanded the case for entry of judgement. On remand, the trial court rein-
stated the jury verdict and awarded Lindsey backpay and injunctive relief, but it denied
liquidated damages. Lindsey appealed the case to the Eleventh Circuit again, where the
denial of liquidated damages was reversed. 810 F.2d at 1096.
118. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
119. 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
120. The Sixth Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's Cooper standard in Schrand v. Fed-
eral Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1988).
121. 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985) (Prudential 2).
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the court reconsidered its Prudential 1 122 decision in light of Thurston.
On appeal, the EEOC contended that the specific intent instruction
given by the trial judge was too strict. The Tenth Circuit agreed, noting
that the Supreme Court specifically rejected that standard in Thurston. 123
The court set forth the Thurston "knew or showed reckless disregard"
standard, and noted the availability of the "good faith" defense,' 2 4 re-
manding the case for the finder of fact to determine whether there was a
"willful" violation in light of Thurston.12 5
The Tenth Circuit next considered ADEA liquidated damages in
the disparate impact context in EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement System.
12 6
The case was brought by the EEOC on behalf of six individuals, chal-
lenging the validity of Wyoming's retirement statute and seeking to per-
manently enjoin the defendants from enforcing provisions of the
statute. 12 7 The trial judge applied the Central Kansas128 standard and
determined that the defendants were cognizant of the appreciable possi-
bility that the plaintiffs were covered by the ADEA. Since the defend-
ants had relied upon the Wyoming Attorney General's advice that the
statute met ADEA requirements, however, the trial court found that the
violation was not "willful." 1 2 9 The Tenth Circuit applied Thurston's
standard, including the "good faith" defense, and agreed.' 3 0 Wyoming
Retirement is an example of how effectively the Thurston standard works in
disparate impact cases.
After Wyoming Retirement, the Tenth Circuit encountered a number
of disparate treatment ADEA cases. The first was Smith v. Consolidated
Mutual Water Co. 131 Smith contended that Consolidated fired him be-
cause of his age, while Consolidated contended Smith was fired for falsi-
fying water meter tests. 13 2 The parties agreed that the jury would
determine liability, leaving the damages determination, including a de-
termination of the "willfulness" issue, to the court.13 3 The jury found
for Smith, and the court awarded compensatory damages, but did not
find a "willful" violation.' 3 4 On appeal, Smith challenged the "willful-
ness" determination.1
3 5
122. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985).
123. Phudential 2, 763 F.2d at 1174. While the trial court in Prudential I had used the
"specific intent" standard later rejected in Thurston, the Tenth Circuit had used the "in the
picture" standard on appeal, another standard the Supreme Court rejected in Thurston. Id.
at 1174 n.6 (listing the cases upon which the Tenth Circuit had relied in Prudential 1: Cen-
tral Kansas, Mistretta, and fiffy June).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1175.
126. 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 1427.
128. EEOC v. Central Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983). See supra
text accompanying notes 62-66 for a discussion of this standard.
129. Id. at 1431.
130. Id.
131. 787 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1141-42.
133. Id. at 1443.
134. Id. at 1442-43.
135. Id. at 1443.
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The evidence of discrimination was as follows: Smith's supervisor,
twenty years his junior, often referred to Smith as "an old goat." Con-
solidated replaced Smith with a younger worker, and never confronted
Smith about allegedly falsifying meter tests before deciding to discharge
him. All of the employees under Smith's supervisor's direction were
considerably younger than Smith. Smith's final two job performance
evaluations said he had been "knocked around a bit over the years," and
his supervisors criticized him for slowness and an inability to meet
quotas. '
36
The Tenth Circuit upheld the denial of liquidated damages. The
court noted that the "thin nature of the evidence" 13 7 supported the
jury's finding that age was a determinative factor in Consolidated's deci-
sion, 138 but did not support a "willful" violation under Thurston. 139 The
lack of a "willfulness" finding may have been influenced by two factors.
First, the court noted Thurston's rejection of the "appreciable possibil-
ity" standard, perhaps indicating that Smith might have been able to
sustain a "willfulness" finding under that standard.140 Second, the par-
ties stipulated that the court would make the "willfulness" determina-
tion, and there is always the possibility that a jury would have taken the
opposite view.
The next time the Tenth Circuit addressed the ADEA liquidated
damages provision in a disparate treatment context was in Cooper v. As-
plundh Tree Expert Co. 141 In Cooper, the court formulated a new "willful-
ness" standard which would be more applicable to disparate treatment
cases than Thurston had been, but which would maintain the two-tier lia-
bility scheme that the Supreme Court wanted to maintain in Thurston.
The Tenth Circuit wanted to develop a workable standard that the
Supreme Court would uphold on appeal, having had one of its ADEA
liquidated damages determinations vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Thurston just three years prior to Cooper.14 2
In Cooper, foreman Joe Cooper was discharged, allegedly for violat-
ing work rules and for his poor attitude toward management. 143 He
contended that he was fired because of his age. The jury answered spe-
136. Id. at 1442.
137. Id. at 1443.
138. Id. at 1442.
139. Id. at 1443.
140. Id.
141. 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
142. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984), va-
cated and remanded, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985) (Prudential 1). See supra notes 67-73 and accompa-
nying text. In Prudential 1, the Tenth Circuit used the "in the picture" standard in
connection with the ADEA's liquidated damages provision. See supra notes 34-37 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of this standard. The Tenth Circuit had also used the "in
the picture" standard in connection with the FLSA's statute of limitations provision, a fact
that did not escape the Court's notice in Thurston. 469 U.S. at 127 (citing EEOC v. Central
Kan. Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1983)). It was not until McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), however, that the Court specifically rejected the
"in the picture" standard for use with the statute of limitations provision.
143. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1548.
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cial interrogatories, finding Asplundh to have "willfully" violated the
ADEA.1 44 Asplundh challenged the "willful" finding on appeal based
on the standard the jury and district court applied.
14 5
Recognizing that the Third Circuit's Dreyer1 4 6 approach was ex-
treme and inconsistent with both legislative history and the ADEA itself,
and that the Eleventh Circuit in Lindsey 147 followed Thurston but was in-
consistent with the two-tier liability scheme Congress had intended,
148
the Tenth Circuit looked to the Fourth 14 9 and Eighth 150 Circuits for
assistance in fashioning a new standard. Under this new standard, a ba-
sic finding of liability requires that age be at least one of possibly several
"determinative" factors in the employer's conduct, whereas age must be
the "predominant" factor in the employer's decision before a "willful"
violation will be found. 15 1
In developing its "predominant factor" standard, the Tenth Circuit
addressed the difficulty of applying Thurston to disparate treatment
cases.' 5 2 The court later referred to its standard as "an intermediate
approach." 153 The Tenth Circuit's "predominant factor" standard
demonstrates that the court is trying to be sensitive to the dictates of the
Supreme Court by maintaining the two-tier liability scheme of the
ADEA, while at the same time recognizing the difficulties in applying the
Court's standards every day to a variety of fact patterns.
While Cooper was being decided, the Tenth Circuit had two other
ADEA disparate treatment cases under consideration. i54 In the first
case, Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,155 the plaintiff, Craig Anderson,
was an insulator for Phillips and his union's president. Phillips was clos-
ing one of its refineries, and entered into a closure agreement with the
union which set forth the manner in which employees from the closing
refinery would be considered for jobs with other refineries. Two
months later, complaints that Phillips was discriminating on the basis of
age in the transfer procedure prompted Anderson, as union president,
144. Id. at 1546.
145. Id. at 1551-52.
146. Dreyer v. Arco Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
906 (1987). See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
standard.
147. Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (llth Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard.
148. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1550.
149. Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[t]here must be
something more than a retrospective finding by a jury that there was a simple violation of the
statute.") (emphasis added).
150. Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[in order that
the liquidated damages be based on evidence that does not simply duplicate that needed
for the compensatory damages, there must be some additional evidence of the employer's
'reckless disregard.' ") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1551.
152. Id. at 1549.
153. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 636 (10th Cir. 1988).
154. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988); Spulak v. K
Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990). Both cases were briefed and argued prior to
Cooper, but were decided after it. Id. at 1159 n.5.
155. 861 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988).
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to file an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. Anderson withdrew
the charge six weeks later, after Phillips' management and union mem-
bers discussed the charge at meetings.1
56
Eight months later, Anderson filed his own ADEA charge, alleging
that Phillips retaliated against him for filing the first claim by failing to
transfer him to any of the jobs on which he had bid. A jury found that
Phillips had violated the ADEA by retaliating against Anderson and
found that the violation was "willful."1 57 On appeal, Phillips challenged
both the retaliation and the "willfulness" verdicts.
158
The Tenth Circuit upheld the retaliation verdict, but reversed the
"willfulness" finding. As in Smith, the court found the evidence to be
too "thin and circumstantial" to support the "willfulness" finding. 159
The court wanted Anderson to present evidence of "something more
than mere knowledge on the part of the employer of the potential appli-
cability of the ADEA' 16 to support the liquidated damages award, but
Anderson's evidence could not meet that test.
The Tenth Circuit next employed the new Cooper standard in Spulak
v. K Mart Corp. 161 Frank Spulak began working for K Mart Corporation
(K Mart) when he was in his forties. He was an auto service department
manager in early 1985 when K Mart underwent a corporate restructur-
ing, resulting in his assignment to a new district manager, James Price.
In the two months after Price arrived, and before Spulak took an
early retirement from his job, Spulak was given written reprimands for
acts that, up to that time, had been "minor and widespread policy viola-
tions."' 16 2 Ultimately, Spulak took an early retirement, believing that he
would be fired if he did not resign.
Spulak sued K Mart under the ADEA, alleging constructive dis-
charge. K Mart contended that Spulak asked to retire after receiving a
written warning for conduct that he admitted was wrong. 163 The case
156. Id. at 633.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 636-37.
160. Id. at 635-36. The court cites Thurston to support its "something more" require-
ment, but the language is not found in that case. Rather, this requirement comes from
Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987), one of the cases the Cooper
court relied upon to establish its "predominant factor" standard.
161. 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 1159. These policy violations included using the store's back door, failing to
sign in and out properly, and incorrectly invoicing work done on his car. Price in fact
downgraded the violations to written warnings after first threatening to fire Spulak. Id. at
1153. In addition, K Mart referred to "an isolated abstract comment" as the only possible
proof of age discrimination, and asserted that the "thin nature" of that evidence was not
enough to qualify as "willful" under Thurston. Brief of Appellant K Mart Corporation at
41, Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156). Spulak con-
tended that Price's comment about getting "old fogies" out, along with the circumstances
of Spulak's termination, demonstrated that K Mart had not made a good faith effort to
comply with the ADEA. Brief of Appellee Frank L. Spulak at 39, Spulak v. K Mart Corp.,
894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156).
163. Brief of Appellant K Mart Corporation at 39, Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d
1150 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 86-2156).
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was submitted to the jury, which found for Spulak and awarded him
backpay and liquidated damages for a "willful" violation of the
ADEA.164 K Mart appealed on several grounds, one of which was the
"willful" finding and resulting liquidated damages award. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the liquidated damages award.
16 5
2. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's New Standard
Spulak is important because it was the first case after Cooper in which
the court found a defendant liable for a "willful" violation of the ADEA.
An examination of Anderson, Cooper and Spulak will help attorneys practic-
ing in the Tenth Circuit assess whether their cases support a "willful-
ness" finding. The proof model for ADEA cases must be kept in mind
when analyzing the cases.
166
In Anderson, the evidence of age discrimination was barely sufficient
to support Anderson's retaliation claim. 16 7 Anderson presented evi-
dence that management told him transferjobs might dry up if he did not
withdraw the ADEA claim, and that management treated him differently
after he filed the charge. Although the basic finding of liability survived
on appeal, the abundant evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for Phillips' actions convinced the court that reasonable minds
would not have found retaliation to be the predominant factor in Phillips'
actions, and it reversed the "willfulness" finding. 168 The court pointed
out, for example, that Anderson did not take the qualification test re-
quired for one job, and that another refinery to which Anderson had
applied was undergoing a reduction in force. At that refinery, Phillips
was bound by union contract to fill open positions with re-employables
from within that geographic area.'
6 9
In Cooper, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that age was
a determinative factor in Asplundh's action, but it remanded the case for
reconsideration of the "willfulness" issue under the new standard.
170
The court conceded that the record strongly suggested that Asplundh
supervisors "deliberately set out to find a basis to discharge Cooper,"'
17 1
but "such significant evidence of other possible motives" was present in
the case that the court was not comfortable deciding that the jury would
have found age to be the predominant determinative factor in Cooper's
164. Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1152.
165. Id. at 1159. K Mart also unsuccessfully challenged the trial court's decision to
allow testimony by two former employees concerning the circumstances under which they
left their employment. Id. at 1156. One of the witnesses was informed that Spulak had
taken early retirement at K Mart's request, and was asked if he was going to follow suit. A
few days later he was fired after being reprimanded for minor matters. Two weeks later,
another employee was fired a few months before his pension vested. Both were replaced
with younger workers. Id.
166. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
167. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 636-37 (10th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1552 (emphasis added).





The "other possible motives" referred to by the court included
Cooper's violation of work rules, his alleged poor attitude toward man-
agement and his sub-par work. 173 Asplundh presented undisputed evi-
dence that Cooper violated company policy. He bought food during
work hours, wore spikes while climbing live trees, used personal vehicles
on the job site and did not require his crew to wear hard hats.
17 4
Cooper countered with testimony that Asplundh did not uniformly en-
force the policies and that his crew's work was average or above average
in most areas.175 Although Cooper's evidence was sufficient to support
a basic finding of liability, 176 it was not enough for the court to take the
"willfulness" issue from the jury, given the other possible motives.1 77
In contrast, the Spulak court found K Mart's actions to lack Cooper's
"significant evidence of possible motives" other than age discrimina-
tion.' 7 8 Pointing to the disparity between the minor nature of Spulak's
wrongdoing and the severity of K Mart's response, the remarks indicat-
ing concern with Spulak's age and the similar treatment of other older
workers,179 the court upheld the jury's "willfulness" finding. In addi-
tion, the Spulak court offered a hint as to what sort of evidence would have
qualified as significant evidence of other possible motives for Spulak's
discharge. The court pointed out that while Spulak's discharge came
shortly after a corporate restructuring, K Mart did not argue or offer
evidence that Spulak's profits record was a factor in K Mart's
conduct. 18 0
Anderson and Cooper demonstrate that even some evidence of inten-
tional action on the employer's part will not serve to sustain a "willful-
ness" finding as long as there is conflicting evidence of intention. The
Tenth Circuit's standard provides for a basic liability finding if age is a
"determinative" factor in the employer's decision, and a "willful" find-
ing if age is the predominant determinative factor in the employer's de-
cision. To address this distinction, employees should attempt to put
forward evidence of bad intention on the employer's part, while employ-
ers should attempt to put forward evidence that places the employee's
evidence in doubt. If there is conflicting evidence regarding intention,
the jury will likely be uncomfortable with a "willfulness" finding.
No concrete rule can be synthesized from these cases, but the les-
son to be learned about the Tenth Circuit's approach is fairly, straight-
forward: the key to "willfulness" findings in disparate treatment
contexts is disparate treatment. For employers, this means treating all em-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1548.
174. Id. at 1547.
175. Id. at 1547-48.
176. Id. at 1552.
177. Id.
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ployees uniformly. For an employee, this means proving that he or she
has been treated differently than other employees who are similarly
situated.
In addition, an employer can protect itself by not "helping" the em-
ployee meet his or her prima facie case, because an employee cannot
even reach a "willfulness" determination unless basic liability is found.
This means establishing preventive employment practices and good
records. An employee can likewise benefit from keeping good records,
such as noting changes in discipline for policy violations. As in all cases,
each side must muster all relevant, credible evidence. Finally, an em-
ployer will want to have the "willfulness" determination made by the
court; an employee by a jury, since a layperson's ideas of "determina-
tive" and "predominant" factors are probably more susceptible to per-
suasion than are the court's.
VI. CONCLUSION
A more uniform standard for defining "willful" violations of the
ADEA is needed. The courts, however, will probably be compelled to
accept different standards for ADEA cases involving disparate treatment
and disparate impact. A single uniform standard for both types of cases
will result in automatic liquidated damages assessments in disparate
treatment cases since intent is required for a basic finding of liability.
Although the FLSA "willfulness" standard has this effect, it is very
clearly not what Congress intended for the ADEA.
In a federal enforcement scheme, particularly one regarding dis-
crimination, uniform application is important. Employers and employ-
ees across the country need to know how certain behavior will be
judged. In fairness, employees and prospective employees should be
able to rely on the same degree of protection from discriminatory em-
ployment decisions. In addition, it is important to our federal system
that Congress' true intent be implemented.
The definition of "willfulness" in the ADEA liquidated damages
provision is likely to be addressed again soon by the Supreme Court.
Now that the Court has applied Thurston to both the liquidated damages
and the statute of limitations provisions of the ADEA, the circuit courts
of appeals will want a clearer explanation of Thurston. If the Supreme
Court does not address the ADEA liquidated damages provision again,
perhaps it will look to the Tenth Circuit as it attempts to resolve the
Thurston disparate treatment application problem. The Court may
choose not to address the problem, however, in which case the circuit
courts of appeals will have to continue construing the provision to the
best of their abilities. If the Supreme Court does not address the prob-
lem, employers should lobby the legislature to amend the ADEA so that
they will not be subject in disparate treatment cases to an automatic
doubling of damages by circuit courts of appeals which adhere to the
Court's Thurston holding.
The Tenth Circuit's "predominant determinative factor" provision
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is readily applicable to disparate treatment cases and maintains the
ADEA's two-tier civil liability scheme. It can be applied by courts and, if
necessary, by the legislature in the form of a statutory amendment. In
addition, it is a standard that will generate a clearer jury instruction than
will any of the other post-Thurston standards. 18 The standard will thus
result in more consistent verdicts and, hopefully, fewer appeals.
Diane G. Cluxton-Kremer
181. One practitioner illustrated the manner in which courts are giving Thurston "lip
service" without actually applying it:
The key to obtaining a liquidated damages award is properly instructing the
jury on the definition of willfulness and presenting persuasive evidence of egre-
gious conduct. If the jurors want to punish the defendant, they will most likely
find that the defendant's conduct meets the Supreme Court's definition of willful-
ness, even if they do not understand that definition. An instruction using the
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. or Trans World Airlines v. Thurston language is safest.




GENERAL PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS AS SECURITIES
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The definition of a security has puzzled courts since the inception of
the federal securities laws. The term explicitly encompasses common
investments including stocks, bonds and notes. The provisions, how-
ever, cover more than these ordinary types of investments. Section 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)I and Section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)2 include an "invest-
ment contract" 3 in the definition of "security."
The securities laws do not define the term "investment contract,"
and courts have liberally construed the term as a catch-all for any type of
investment that arguably could be deemed a security. 4 In 1946, the
Supreme Court filled this definitional void in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. 5
In Howey, the Court stated "[tihe test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely
from the efforts of others." 6 Justification for broad interpretation ema-
nated from state "blue sky" legislation 7 and the remedial nature of the
federal securities laws.
8
The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the enigmatic definition of
investment contract in Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership.9 The
court expressly considered whether a general partnership interest con-
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
3. The 1933 Act provides:
When used in this title unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-shar-
ing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract ....
15 U.S.C § 77b(l) (1988).
The 1934 Act provides:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract ....
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
4. See generally Note, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Re-
quire, 14 CUMB. L. REV. 135 (1983-84).
5. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
6. Id. at 301.
7. Id. at 298. In Howey the Court articulated that a broad interpretation of the term
"investment contract" was warranted due to the term's common use in state blue sky laws
and the broad interpretation of the term by state courts.
8. Id. at 298-99. See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 & n.19 (1967).
"Even a casual reading of § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act reveals that Congress did not intend
to adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of security in defining that term."
9. 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
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stituted a security. The Tenth Circuit's application of the "solely from
the efforts of others" wording from the Howey test to general partner-
ship interests is the topic of this Article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co.
The Supreme Court defined an investment contract in the seminal
case of S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co. 10 The W.J. Howey Company ("Howey")
owned large tracts of citrus acreage in Florida. Over several years,
Howey planted about 500 acres annually and offered roughly half of this
acreage to the public "to help . . . finance additional development.""
In addition to selling the parcel of land, Howey also offered each pro-
spective customer a service contract with Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc. ("Hills"). Hills cultivated and developed the parcels of land.
The issue confronted by the Court involved determining whether a
land sales contract, coupled with a conveyance of land and a service con-
tract, constituted a security.' 2 Specifically, the Court addressed whether
the arrangement amounted to an investment contract. In defining the
phrase "investment contract," the Court noted that the securities laws
had to be broadly construed in order to effectuate the legislative policy
for protecting investors.' 3 The Court easily found that the purchases
had a number of attributes of an investment contract, including the in-
vestment of money with the expectation of profits.
The most difficult analysis arose under the element which required
that profits come solely from the efforts of others. The Court found that
because most investors were out-of-state residents unable to participate
in management, and the size of the parcels of land were individually
insignificant, the investors relied on the efforts of Howey and Hills to
produce profits from the common enterprise.'
4
B. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman
Since the Supreme Court had interpreted the term "solely" within
the context of the specific facts of Howey, lower courts were given little
guidance for interpreting the term generally. After Howey, lower courts
generally rejected a literalist interpretation of the word "solely" in favor
of a functionalist definition. In S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.,'5 the Ninth Circuit stated "the term 'solely' should not be read as a
strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 295.
12. Id. at 297.
13. Id. at 299. "[The concept of security] embodies a flexible rather than a static prin-
ciple, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised
by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."
14. Id. at 300. "Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promot-
ers manage, control and operate the enterprise."
15. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
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rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the defini-
tion those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities."16
Other courts generally followed suit.
The Supreme Court explicitly accepted the prevailing definition of
"solely" in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.17 United Housing in-
volved the issue of "whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to
lease an apartment in Co-op City, a state subsidized and supervised non-
profit housing cooperative, are 'securities' within the purview of the [se-
curities laws]."' 18 The Court found the investment not to be a security
because the purchasers bought the investment in order to obtain low
cost housing and not to make a profit.
In deciding the case, the Court redefined the Howey test. Rather
than relying upon the names given the investment by the parties, the
economic realities of the transaction governed whether a security ex-
isted.' 9 The Court also reformulated the Howey test by stating: "The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture pre-
mised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 2 % The reformulation
effectively changed the Howey test in three ways. First, the expectation
of profits needed to be reasonable. Second, the economic realities re-
quirement allowed a court the discretion to avoid the Howey test alto-
gether if the economic realities of a given situation dictated the absence
of a security. 2 1 The third and most important change resulted from the
Court's implicit adoption of the broader interpretation of the term
"solely" created by the lower courts. 2 2
III. WILLIAMSON V. TUCKER
Under the Howey-United Housing test, while limited partnership inter-
ests usually constituted investment contracts, general partnership inter-
ests did not. The distinction resulted from the significant amount of
control retained by the general partners. 2 3 This changed six years after
United Housing when the Fifth Circuit decided Williamson v. Tucker.24 In
Williamson, M.L. Goodwin Investments, Inc. ("Goodwin") executed con-
16. Id. at 482. Contra S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga.
1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (The district court adopted a literalist view of
"solely" which was overruled by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the more prevalent func-
tional definition).
17. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
18. Id. at 840.
19. Id. at 851-52. "In considering these claims we ... must examine the substance-
the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the names that may have been em-
ployed by the parties."
20. Id. at 852.
21. Note, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Require, 14 CUMB.
L. REV. 135 (1983-84).
22. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975). The Court
cited with approval the definition provided by the Ninth Circuit in S.E.C. v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 785 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
24. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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tracts to purchase joint venture interests in development of a large tract
of land around the then proposed Dallas-Fort Worth Airport. Goodwin
represented to potential investors that he would pursue development or
sale of the property, perform all management functions and endeavor to
rezone the land from single-family to another, more beneficial category.
Despite the representations of Goodwin, the investors retained con-
siderable control over the investment. The investors' unanimous con-
sent was required to confess a judgment, make guarantees, execute
deeds of trust, borrow money in the name of the joint venture or use
joint venture property as collateral. In order to develop the property, a
vote of at least sixty percent was mandated. Any dissenter who voted
against the development could compel the remaining venturers to
purchase the dissenter's interest.
Although the Fifth Circuit remanded on other grounds, the court,
in dicta, applied the Howey test to determine whether these joint venture
interests were securities. The court easily found the first two elements
present. The problem arose over whether the income from interests
purchased was derived from the managerial efforts of others. The court
enunciated factors relevant to whether the venturers retained meaning-
ful partnership powers, stating:
[A] general partnership interest or joint venture interest can be
designated a security if the investor can establish, for example,
that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power
in the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in
fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the
partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable
in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising
his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or ven-
turer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or man-
agerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot
replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers. 25
The first standard related specifically to the partnership agreement.
If the agreement gave significant power to all general partners, the inter-
est was not a security. Moreover, the court would only have to look to
the powers created in the agreement and not the powers actually
exercised.
The second and third factors required the court to go beneath the
underlying contract and look subjectively at the investor and the pro-
moter or manager. By analyzing each party to a transaction, the court
created the possibility of anomalous results.2 6 For example, identical
general partnerships would be regarded differently under the securities
laws if the investors in the first venture consisted of real estate develop-
ers while the second venture consisted of persons with little or no mana-
25. Id. at 424.
26. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1988). The court recognized the
possibility of varying results as to different investors in the same venture.
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After Williamson, a debate arose among the federal circuits concern-
ing the possibility that a general partnership interest could constitute a
security.2 8 The Fourth and Ninth Circuits expressly refused to adopt all
of the enumerated standards, using only the first Williamson standard re-
quiring judicial inquiry into the contractual rights of the parties and
nothing more.
In Matek v. Murat,29 Murat decided to purchase an old Navy vessel
in order to convert it into a fish processing plant. Murat formed a gen-
eral partnership to finance the venture. Twelve people invested
$100,000 each to start-up the business. In deciding whether a general
partnership interest in the venture constituted a security, the Ninth Cir-
cuit looked to the partnership agreement and held that Matek retained
sufficient control over partnership affairs to exclude the investment from
being construed as an investment contract. In reaching this decision,
the court expressly declined to use the second and third prongs of the
Williamson 30 test, stating that use of these additional prongs would "cre-
ate uncertainty in the area of business investing." 3' Once its analysis
was limited to the agreement between the parties, the court concluded
that the general partnership interest gave sufficient control over part-
nership management to Matek. The interest was not, therefore, an in-
vestment contract.
The Fourth Circuit also specifically addressed the use of the second
and third prongs of the Williamson test in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v.
Thompson Trawlers.32 Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited ("RTU") was formed
when twenty-three parties executed a general partnership agreement in
order to engage in a commercial fishing business. After approximately
one year of operations at below profit expectations, the partners twice
replaced management and removed the original managing partner. Af-
ter two years of operations, certain partners filed a complaint alleging
their interests to be securities and arguing that Thompson Trawlers vio-
lated the federal securities laws. In resolving the controversy, the court
agreed with the approach articulated in Williamson but declined to look
27. Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of William-
son v. Tucker, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1231, 1246 (1982).
28. Some courts explicitly or implicitly adopted the Williamson approach in its entirety.
See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th
Cir. 1983); Pfohl v. Pelican Landing, 567 F. Supp 134 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Fund of Funds, Ltd.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Other courts have adopted
only the first Williamson standard. See Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers,
840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988). One court has
expressly declined to follow Williamson. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co. 730 F.2d 99 (3rd Cir.
1984).
29. 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. Id. at 729. "Except for the first element ... we decline to follow the Williamson
test."
31. Id.
32. 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
into the actual knowledge and business expertise of any individual part-
ner in order to determine that partner's ability to exercise powers.
33
The court held the interests were not securities due to the broad author-
ity conferred on the partners under the original agreement.
The Third Circuit, in Goodwin v. Elkins & Co.,34 decided to reject
Williamson and chose, instead, to allow partnership and contract law to
settle disputes concerning general partnership interests. The court held
that "a participant who holds a general partnership interest in an enter-
prise, at least as that interest is defined under Pennsylvania law, does not
possess a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws."
3 5
The court placed critical reliance on the powers possessed by general
partners under state law. Specifically, the court found relevant a non-
managing partner's ability to act as an agent and to bind the firm in the
same manner as managing partners. The rights granted under state law
were sufficient to withdraw non-managing partnerships from the scope
of the federal securities laws.
V. TENTH CIRCurr TREATMENT
A. The Road to Banghart" Maritan v. Birmingham Properties
After Williamson, the Tenth Circuit did not face the same issue
presented to the Fifth Circuit until Banghart.3 6 In the interim, the court
confronted a residual issue. In Maritan v. Birmingham Properties,3 7 the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether a limited partnership interest was a
security subject to the federal securities laws. It determined that the
proper inquiry was limited to the actual agreement originally signed. 38
After performing the examination, the court appropriately determined
that the contract provided adequate basis for protection of Maritan's in-
vestment, thereby removing the limited partnership interest from the
reach of the securities laws. Although inquiry primarily focused on the
agreement, the amount of control actually exercised by Maritan remained
important. The actual control exercised by Maritan was not deemed
conclusive as to what kind of interest was acquired. Instead, the agree-
ment or contract was first analyzed and any exercise of managerial con-
trol by the parties would be viewed as "shed[ding] light on how the
parties regarded Maritan's rights and status under the agreement all
along."
3 9
B. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership
Maritan set the stage for resolution of the general partnership issue.
Although Maritan held that limited partnership interests might not be
33. Id. at 241 n.7.
34. 730 F.2d 99 (3rd. Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
36. Banghart v. Hollywood General Partnership, 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
37. 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
38. Id. at 1458.
39. Id. at 1459.
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securities when the partnership agreement allocated sufficient manage-
rial control, the converse issue of whether a general partnership interest
could be a security had not been confronted.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in Banghart v. Hollywood Gen-
eral Partnership.4 0 In Banghart, Dallas and Michael Banghart sued the
Hollywood General Partnership, alleging various misrepresentations
which induced them into entering an "Exchange Agreement" 4 1 to
purchase a general partnership interest.4 2 Because a partnership inter-
est usually allowed the general partner to participate in the business and
inspect documents, the plaintiff seemed to lack the necessary passivity
for the instrument to be deemed an investment contract.4 3 Instead, re-
lying on the analysis in Williamson, Banghart argued that "a lack of any
discernible role for some general partners within the Hollywood Gen-
eral Partnership raise[d] a triable issue of whether the partnership inter-
est contemplated in the 'Exchange Agreement' was a security."
4 4
The Tenth Circuit, however, decided against Banghart and upheld
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Partnership. The
court deemed the core issue to be whether the interest plaintiffs sought
to acquire pursuant to the agreement constituted an investment con-
tract. 45 The court examined the agreement under the three part Howey
test, as modified by United Housing.
46
The first and second parts of the Howey test were not at issue in
Banghart.4 7 Instead, the argument centered on the third element of the
40. 902 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1990).
41. The "Exchange Agreement" contained in relevant part the following:
This Agreement . . . [bletween Hollywood General Partnership, hereinafter re-
ferred to as HOLLYWOOD, who are owners of the building located at 5601
Hollywood NE, and between Dallas Banghart, hereinafter referred to as BANG-
HART, owner of two tri-plexes located at 523 and 527 Texas NE, is for the ex-
change of the two tri-plexes for a 30% interest in the building of Hollywood NE
under the following terms and conditions:
1. Hollywood agrees to the exchange of the tri-plexes at a net equity value
to Banghart of $3 1,000.00 Total and to assume the mortgages on the two tri-
plexes, subject to verification of mortgage amounts.
2. For the Above $31,000 equity, Hollywood agrees to grant to Banghart a
30% interest in the Hollywood Property. To accomplish this, the Hollywood
General Partnership Agreement will be amended or re-done to show the ad-
ditional interest by Banghart ....
42. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 806. The court stated that "[a]ccording to plaintiffs, they
were induced into entering this agreement by the representations of defendants and, had
the agreement been consummated, they would have acquired a general partnership inter-
est in the Hollywood General Partnership."
43. If Banghart had claimed he would have received a general partnership interest
with full managerial rights, this claim would have been dispositive in the case in light of
Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807.
45. Id. at 806.
46. Id. at 807. The court did not state the proposition explicitly but adopted the
wording of the Howy test as expressed in Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 570
F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978). In Crowley, the court stated "[w]e are bound by the Howey test
as reaffirmed in United Housing. The requirements are (1) an investment, (2) in a com-
mon enterprise, (3) with 'a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.' " Id. at 880.
47. Generally, there will not be a dispute regarding the first two elements of the test
since there is almost always an investment of money (or something of value) and a com-
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Howey-Forman test.48 The court stated, "[a]n investment satisfies this
third prong when the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the ones which affect significantly the success or failure of the enter-
prise." 49 The court first considered the Fifth Circuit approach created
in Williamson and, subsequently, restated the three exceptions to the rule
that general partnership interests cannot constitute securities.
50
After reviewing the test, the court implicitly rejected the William-
son 5 ' approach by relying on Maritan.52 Moreover, it directly relied on
the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's approaches in Rivanna
5 3 and Matek.5 4
Judicial inquiry, therefore, became restricted to the terms of the partner-
ship agreement. The Tenth Circuit looked strictly at the "Exchange
Agreement" 55 in order to determine what type of interest Banghart had
acquired. Since the agreement spoke of Banghart obtaining a general
partnership interest, the court focused on the general partnership agree-
ment to determine the level of participation it contractually granted to
Banghart. Because Banghart presented no evidence with respect to the
general partnership agreement at trial, there was nothing in the record
to guide the court in deciding the participation granted to Banghart.
This evidentiary void proved fatal to Banghart's case.
The Banghart decision created some interesting consequences, the
most important of which concerned the contractual rights of the inves-
tor to obtain information from the partnership. 56 The court ostensibly
recognized that without this protection, an investor actually has no rea-
sonable mechanism to become informed of the current status of the in-
mon purpose of the partnership. The main focus will be on interpreting the part of the
third element relating to the "reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). In-
herent in a general partnership interest is the ability to manage the business. Without this
control, the interest becomes more analogous to a limited partnership interest. See Power
Petroleums, Inc. v. P & G Mining Co., 682 F. Supp. 492, 493 (D. Colo. 1988) ("Generally,
partnership interests are not securities. Defendants admit, however, that the key in deter-
mining whether a general partnership interest is a security is whether the partner has the
power to exercise partnership functions.")(citation omitted).
48. This prong of the test requires that the investment be made "with a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others." Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807.
49. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807. See also Meyer v. Dans unJardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533,
535 (10th Cir. 1987) ("In many situations, however, a strict interpretation of the word
'solely' would run counter to the broad remedial purposes of the securities acts and defeat
the Court's intent to follow 'a flexible rather than a static principle.' Accordingly, we have
adopted the view that the reliance element is met when 'the efforts made by those other
than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' ")(citations omitted).
50. Banghart, 902 F.2d at 807-08.
51. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
52. Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1989).
53. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
54. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988).
55. See supra note 41.
56. See Matek, 862 F.2d at 728. The Ninth Circuit properly stated that "[tihe principal
purpose of the securities acts is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of infor-
mation necessary to informed investment decisions. Therefore, access to information
about the investment, and not managerial control, is the most significant factor." (citations
omitted).
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vestment, aside from active participation in management.
Consequently, a lack of protection under state partnership law may enti-
tle an investor to protection under the federal securities laws.
C. Consequences
By requiring disclosure to the investor, the court diminished the
necessity for the second and third Williamson factors related to the sub-
jective knowledge, business intelligence, and abilities of the investors.
Because full appraisal of partnership endeavors is now required, the
burden should naturally shift to the investor to make his own decision as
to the quality of the investment. Once a partner has received disclosure
and the ability to maintain it, contract and partnership law should deter-
mine the rights of the partners.
Another important consideration concerns the managerial control
allocated to the investor under the partnership agreement. Where suffi-
cient control over the affairs of the partnership is not granted, the possi-
bility that the sale of the partnership interest will be considered a
security arises. The Fourth Circuit has aptly stated:
When, however, a partnership agreement allocates powers to
the general partners that are specific and unambiguous, and
when those powers are sufficient to allow the general partners
to exercise ultimate control, as a majority, over the partnership
and its business, then the presumption that the general part-
nership is not a security can only be rebutted by evidence that it
is not possible for the partners to exercise those powers.
5 7
Two important consequences result. First, the court will only look
to the partnership agreement to determine the actual amount of control
allocated to the partners. If no control is present, then the investment
looks like a security. Second, a substantial burden is placed on a plaintiff
to rebut the presumption that the securities laws do not apply to a part-
nership interest that has been allowed contractually to participate in
management. Mere non-participation by the investor is insufficient to
rebut this presumption. The plaintiff must show that he was affirma-
tively obstructed from participation in management.
By looking to the contractual ability to participate in management,
the court negated the need for the third Williamson factor. 58 Since the
investor is able to participate in management through the contract, he is
not totally dependent on the "unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager . ."59 Even though the investor
might be relying on another's efforts, he is still able to exercise sufficient
managerial control under the agreement. Whether that particular inves-
tor desires to participate is of no consequence since the ability is actually
present.
57. Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 241.
58. See supra note 41 for the Exchange Agreement at issue in Banghart.
59. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, at 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981).
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Finally, Banghart stabilized this area of law. By requiring courts to
look only to the partnership agreement, the Tenth Circuit opted for a
bright line rule and thereby created certainty. Although under certain
circumstances an occasional injustice might result, the security estab-
lished by the Tenth Circuit's approach outweighs the possible negative
effects. Promoters and others offering general partnership interests as
investments will not risk being subjected to federal securities laws so
long as the partners retain real and substantial rights under the partner-
ship agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit correctly decided Banghart by looking to the con-
tract to determine whether the third part of the Howey test had been
satisfied. The court adopted the best approach because it only allows
judicial inquiry into the contract to determine the parties' intentions. By
looking at the contract, the court created certainty in an area which had
previously been overreaching in its scope. Now, promoters selling part-
nership interests will know that in order to avoid application of the se-
curities laws, they must continually disclose all relevant information and
grant some amount of meaningful managerial control to the investor. If
this is done, there will be little room for a plaintiff to argue that the
securities laws apply, because the plaintiff must show that the promoter
or other partners affirmatively kept that investor/partner from participa-
tion in partnership affairs.
Travis Willock 60
60. I would like to give special thanks toJ. Robert Brown for generously spending his




American Mining Congress v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 902
F.2d 781
Author: Judge McWilliams
American Mining Congress ("AMC") sought review of amendments
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC's") criteria relating to
operation of uranium mills and disposition of tailings. Specifically, AMC
challenged the measures to be taken regarding the disposal of uranium
mill tailings to avoid groundwater contamination. AMC argued that
NRC failed to perform an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
cost-benefit analysis before promulgating the amendments. AMC also
argued that NRC failed to ensure that its regulations were consistent
with the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6921. AMC's
final contention was that the "liner" regulation was arbitrary and capri-
cious because it did not reflect an appropriate relationship between
costs and benefits, failed to provide flexibility and opportunity for pro-
posing alternative disposal strategies, and was retroactively applied.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that NRC may rely on the EPA cost-
benefit analysis. The court stated that NRC performed its obligation
when it conformed to the EPA regulations it was required to adopt. Sec-
ond, the court stated that the EPA has not finalized its mining waste
rules under SWDA, so a determination of whether uranium mill tailing
waste is regulated would be premature. Last, the court ruled that the
"liner" regulation promulgated by the NRC was not inflexible, because
it allows a licensee to propose alternatives. Moreover, NRC did not en-
gage in illegal retroactive rulemaking. The court reasoned that NRC
complied with its statutory duties in requiring a "liner."
Anderson v. Food and Drug Admin., 907 F.2d 936
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Anderson, appealed the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant, Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") and defendant-intervener, Dow Corning Corporation
("Dow"). Anderson attempted, under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), to compel the FDA to disclose certain documents submitted
by Dow. The district court held that the requested documents con-
tained confidential information, exempt from disclosure requirements
of the FOIA.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that no evi-
dence of material fact in dispute would preclude summary judgment.
The court remanded, however, for clarification of which documents
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were "confidential" and which were "trade secrets" within the meaning
of exemption 4 of the FOIA. The court held that neither 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905, 21 U.S.C. § 306j(c), nor 21 U.S.C. § 332(j) provided any in-
dependent justification for nondisclosure under exemption 3 of the
FOIA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Anderson's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) motion.
Arch Mineral Corp. v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 408
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs, Arch Mineral Corporation and Ark Land Company
("ARK"), engaged in several long-term coal leases with the United
States. ARK brought suit to enjoin defendants, Manuel Lujan, Jr., Sec-
retary of the Interior (the "Secretary"), and Barry A. Williamson, Direc-
tor of the Minerals Management Service, from taking any further
administrative or judicial action to collect "readjusted" rents and royal-
ties allegedly due the United States on the leases. The Secretary coun-
terclaimed, seeking approximately $5,000,000 for underpaid rents and
royalties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Secretary on ARK's complaint and reserved ruling on the Secretary's
counterclaim pending the resolution of administrative proceedings.
ARK appealed, asserting that: (1) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), the
Secretary's counterclaim was barred because it was not asserted in ear-
lier "readjustment" cases; and (2) the Secretary lacked statutory author-
ity to collect unpaid royalties by way of agency action.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling against ARK.
The court first held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) does not bar the Secre-
tary's counterclaim. The court reasoned that the Secretary's claims in
the readjustment cases did not mature until ARK filed suit in the instant
case. Second, the court ruled that the Secretary has broad authority
under MMLA (1970). Specifically, the Secretary has the power to collect
royalties through administrative procedures.
Bernstein v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Bernstein, petitioned for review of a final decision of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). This decision
held Bernstein liable under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law ("CMPL")
for submitting false claims for Medicare reimbursement. On appeal,
Bernstein argued that the Secretary's action was barred by the five year
statute of limitations. Moreover, Bernstein alleged that the 1987
amendment, which granted a six year statute of limitations, was not ap-
plicable because the Secretary initiated civil penalties against him in
1985.
The Tenth Circuit held that the six year statute of limitations was
applicable and allowed the Secretary's action to stand. The amended
version of the CMPL applied because: (1) the action was commenced
after the effective date of the amendment; and (2) the amendment was
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intended to apply to all proceedings initiated after the effective date.
Additionally, the court reasoned that the Secretary's interpretation of
the CMPL was entitled deference. The court also held that the "retroac-
tive" application of the six year statute of limitations did not violate
Bernstein's constitutional right to due process.
Davidson v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 912 F.2d 1246
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Davidson, applied for worker's disability benefits and
widow's disability benefits. Defendant, Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"), denied Davidson's claim for widow's disabil-
ity benefits. The Secretary reasoned that her impairments did not meet
the special, stricter disability requirements for the widow's disability
program. These requirements are set forth in the Listing of Impair-
ments, an appendix to the regulation of the Department of Health and
Human Services. The district court reversed and remanded to the Sec-
retary. The district court stated that the Secretary must consider David-
son's residual functional capacity for any gainful activity. Moreover, the
district court stated that the Secretary must not limit its inquiry to
whether Davidson's impairments fit within the listed severe impair-
ments, or its equivalent, as set forth in the regulations. The Secretary
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court ruled that the Secretary
must consider not only whether the claimant has met the listed disabili-
ties, or their equivalent, but it must also consider any medical evidence
relevant to the residual functional capacity of the claimant. The court
found ample evidence in the legislative history that Congress did not
intend the Listing of Impairments to be exhaustive of those which al-
lowed recovery.
Environmental Defense Fund v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm 'n, 902
F.2d 785
Author: Judge McWilliams
The Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") sought review of final
regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC"). These regulations modified the requirements governing the
licensing of uranium mills and the disposal of uranium mill tailings.
EDF also petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require NRC to engage in
further rulemaking on the subjects. Specifically, EDF argued that NRC
did not conform its regulations to Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") standards for the disposal of mill tailings. Moreover, in its peti-
tion for mandamus, EDF sought an order directing NRC to adopt the
missing elements of EPA's standards governing the point of compliance.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that NRC's general requirements for
management of uranium tailings did not have to conform with EPA stan-
dards. The court reasoned that the EPA standards governing point of
compliance were not promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act
5191991]
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("AEA") and, thus, conformance was not required. Moreover, the court
noted that a high degree of deference is awarded the NRC in its regula-
tory capacity. Second, the court denied EDF's petition for mandamus.
The court explained that NRC was complying with its duties pursuant to
§ 84(a)(3) of the AEA. Moreover, its comparability study was still in
progress, and NRC was relying on a combination of conformed regula-
tions, policies and license conditions at the tailing sites. Accordingly,
the court found no reason to intervene.
Hecla Mining Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 1371
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Hecla Mining Company ("Hecla"), appealed the district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, United
States. This ruling upheld the decision of the Department of Energy
("DOE") which stated that under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act ("UMTRCA"), the town of Curita did not qualify as a
"processing site" and, therefore, was not entitled to federal and state
"cleanup" funds. While there was no genuine issue as to material facts,
Hecla challenged the district court's process, standard of review, and
conclusions of law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Specifi-
cally, the court ruled that the district court was correct in reviewing the
reasonableness of DOE's procedures and decision. The court stated
that Congress has specifically authorized DOE to promulgate rules, and
the Supreme Court has held that choice of procedure lies with the
agency. If Congress does not address an issue directly, the court may
decide if the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the
statute. Here, the court ruled that the DOE's interpretation was permis-
sible as supported by legislative history. The agency's action was not
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to the law.
Therefore, deference to the DOE's decision was held to be appropriate.
Kansas Corp. Comm'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 894 F.2d 1141
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
The Kansas State Corporation Commission ("KCC") sought judi-
cial review of an order by plaintiff, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion ("ICC"), which granted Missouri Pacific Railroad ("MP"), the right
to abandon sixty-six miles of track. KCC challenged the findings of the
ICC and the sufficiency of the underlying evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the ICC, allowing MP to
abandon the specified section of track. The court reasoned that the
ICC's decision was presumptively valid, and its review of the decision
was limited to a determination of whether there was sufficient evidence
to support the decision. In examining the evidence presented regarding
bridge or overhead traffic, revenue impacts, alternate transportation op-
tions, impact on local communities, and perfection for abandonment,
the court held there was substantial support for the ICC's decision. The
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court explained that the ICC carefully considered the relevant factors
and weighed the competing interests. Therefore, the court stated ICC's
decision was in accord with the evidence and the law.
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm 'n, 905 F.2d
1403
Author: Judge Moore
Northwest Pipeline Corporation ("Northwest") petitioned for re-
view of two orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") which asserted jurisdiction over certain facilities pursuant to
the Natural Gas Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b). Northwest asserted
that § 1 (b) of the Act circumscribed the FERC's jurisdiction to regulate
the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. The FERC, on
the other hand, claimed that no aspect of the interstate business of
transporting or selling natural gas for resale is to be left unregulated by
it. Specifically, the FERC used a primary function test to assert
jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit found error in the FERC's assertion of jurisdic-
tion and remanded for a determination of whether the facilities at issue
were properly exempt from FERC's jurisdiction. The court concluded
that FERC improperly applied the primary function test. In effect, the
FERC placed weight on primarily one factor of the test. The FERC con-
sidered mainly status as an interstate pipeline company in determining it
had jurisdiction. The court stated that FERC should have also decided
whether the transportation was incidental to traditional gathering func-
tions and, thus, exempt from its jurisdiction. The court explained that
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the sale and transportation of natu-
ral gas for resale, while Congress expressly reserved to the states the
power to regulate the production or gathering of natural gas. Further-
more, FERC's approach to the primary function test did not comport
with Congress' intent in § 1 (b). Essentially, FERC failed to distinguish
between transportation in interstate commerce and any other transpor-
tation related to facilities for the production and gathering of natural
gas.
NLRB v. United States Postal Serv., 906 F.2d 482
Author: Judge Brorby
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") affirmed the admin-
istrative law judge's ("ALJ") finding that the United States Postal Ser-
vice ("USPS") violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
The charges resulted from the USPS's refusal to reassign an employee,
Richardson, after he engaged in protected concerted activity. The activ-
ity was utilizing grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. After the NLRB affirmed the ALJ decision, the USPS refused to
comply with the order. This action was brought by the NLRB to enforce
its decision.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the NLRB's decision and ordered en-
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forcement of the order. First, the court held that the ALJ properly con-
cluded that the postmaster prevented Richardson's advancement due to
the grievances he filed. The court found that the postmaster's justifica-
tion for not reassigning Richardson was inadequate. Specifically, the
postmaster did not prove that Richardson would not have been reas-
signed without the consideration of the grievances filed. Finally, the
NLRB did not abuse its discretion in declining to defer its jurisdiction to
the arbitration agreement, which was required by the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
AGENCY
FDIC v. Bachman, 894 F.2d 1233
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, limited partners of Brookwood Drilling Partnership
1980-I ("Brookwood"), appealed the district court's summary judg-
ment. The district court held them liable to plaintiff, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for unpaid capital contributions under
the Oklahoma Uniform Limited Partnership Act. On appeal, Brook-
wood argued that: (1) FDIC lacked standing to bring such an action;
(2) the suit was barred by the state statute of limitations; and (3) the
liability of Brookwood was not justified based on the circumstances
presented.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the standing argument raised by
Brookwood was, in actuality, a real-party-in-interest question. Because
Brookwood did not raise the issue at the trial level, however, the court
held that it was waived. Second, the court held that the United States
was not bound by the state statute of limitations in enforcing its rights
absent a clear manifestation of congressional intent. Finally, the court
held that under the circumstances of this case, Oklahoma statutory law
resulted in limited partner liability for the portion of their stated capital
contributions. The contributions were made by letters of credit in lieu
of cash.
Fullmer v. Wohifeiler & Beck, 905 F.2d 1394
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiffs, Fullmer, Moody, and Kennard ("FMK"), were investors in
Intermountain Giftmakers ("Giftmakers"). FMK brought suit against
defendants, Wohlfeiler & Beck ("WB"), auditors, for negligence and
negligent misrepresentation. FMK asserted financial losses because
business activities were carried out in reliance on accounting reports
generated by WB. The district court entered judgment for FMK. WB
appealed, asserting that: (1) the district court should have considered a
comparative negligence defense; (2) the district court erred in failing to
impute to FM the knowledge of a Giftmakers' officer because of an al-
leged agency relationship; (3) investments by FM were not loans, but
instead were purchases of a royalty interest in a loan of goods; (4) FM
did not rely on WB's financial reports in making loans to Giftmakers;
(5) the district court erred in failing to reduce FMK's damages by the
amount of tax benefits received in connection with their investments;
and (6) an accountant's liability does not extend to Kennard because he
was a future purchaser.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
reasoned that an accountant should not be absolved of duties under-
taken by him to one reasonably relying on his audit. This occurs unless
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the plaintiff contributes to the auditor's misstatement. Consequently,
since FMK's imprudent business practices had no bearing on WB's neg-
ligence, comparative negligence was not a defense. Second, the court
stated that WB did not prove that the district court's failure to find an
agency relationship between FM and WB was clearly erroneous. Conse-
quently, the officer's knowledge could not be imputed to FM. Thus, FM
was not bound by the knowledge of the officer regarding the financial
condition of Giftmakers. Third, the court found that the investment
agreements showed financing and stated that they were in return for
financing a portion of producing the product line. Moreover, there was
a commitment to repay with interest obligations. Consequently, there
was ample evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that the
investments were loans. Fourth, the court stated that there was support
for the district court's conclusion that substantial reliance on the finan-
cial reports entitled FM to recovery. Fifth, WB's contention that recov-
ery should have been reduced by tax benefits was not error since FMK
was required to report damages income as taxable income. Finally, the
court stated that awarding damages to third party investor, Kennard,
was not error. The court reasoned that future investments by third par-
ties is reasonably foreseeable.
In re Groff, 898 F.2d 1475
Author: Judge Logan
To secure a debt of Lee and Gwen Groff (the "Groffs"), defendant,
Citizens Bank of Clovis ("CBC") took an interest in the Groffs' cattle to
secure a debt. At the time the security interest was created, CBC was
unaware that the Groffs gave a cattle-seller, Agri-Tech Services, a
purchase money interest in the cattle. CBC was also unaware that the
cattle were owned by the joint venture the Groffs entered into with Ed
Pickering. After the Groffs filed bankruptcy, CBC asserted that the cat-
tle were protected by the after-acquired property clause in the security
agreement. The bankruptcy court disagreed, concluding that CBC was a
creditor of the Groffs as individuals. Specifically, CBC was not a credi-
tor of the joint venture. On appeal, CBC contended that the bankruptcy
court erred in applying partnership law to the join venture's property.
The Tenth Circuit discussed similarities between partnerships and
joint ventures, determining that the only significant difference was the
limited scope of the joint venture. The court determined that an indi-
vidual can not assign rights of the partnership, and the partnership/joint
venture assets are to be kept distinct from those of the individual debt-
ors. Since the Groffs could not transfer an interest in the joint venture
cattle, CBC could not maintain a security interest.
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Oberndorf v. City and County of Denver, 900 F.2d 1434
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Oberndorf, and other landowners, appealed a summary
judgment order by the district court ruling that the City and County of
Denver (the "city") was immune from liability for antitrust violations al-
leged in connection with an urban renewal plan. The landowners ar-
gued that the city's actions were not authorized by state law, the urban
renewal plan was a "sham" because of the timing of the city's choice of a
project developer, and the city illegally conspired to misrepresent a
three block area as "blighted."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. On de novo
review, the court found that the city's blight study comported with the
statutory definition of "blighted area." The court also stated that the
early choice of a developer was proper. The court explained that the
realities of urban revitalization require an early determination of
whether a public/private partnership is feasible. Finally, the landowners
failed to show that the renewal plan was not authorized by state law.
Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Incorporated
("Blue Cross"), appealed an adverse jury verdict. This verdict awarded
plaintiffs Reazin, HCA Health Services of Kansas, Incorporated ("Wes-
ley"), Health Care Plus ("HCP"), and New Century Life Insurance Com-
pany ("New Century"), damages for injury resulting from Blue Cross's
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the "Act") and tortious inter-
ference with Wesley's business affairs under Kansas law. The plaintiffs'
theory was that Blue Cross conspired with two hospitals to harm Wes-
ley's business and, thus, to inform other hospitals not to enter into rela-
tionships with Blue Cross's competitors as Wesley had done. Blue Cross
alleged that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to
plaintiffs on its counterclaim and by refusing to grant a directed verdict,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the district court, re-
manding only the award of expert witness fees. In upholding the jury
verdict regarding the Act, the court found that: (1) Wesley properly es-
tablished standing and antitrust injury because although not a health
care provider, it was a perceived competitor, and its injury was so inex-
tricably intertwined with the alleged conspiracy as to establish antitrust
injury; (2) the jury's finding of conspiratorial conduct was supported by
sufficient circumstantial evidence, and its finding of unreasonable re-
straint of trade was supported by sufficient evidence; (3) the findings of
market and monopoly power and damages were supported by sufficient
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evidence of threats to terminate the perceived competitor's contracting
provider agreement as well as by the size and economic leverage over
hospitals possessed by Blue Cross. The court also determined that suffi-
cient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Blue Cross will-
fully acquired and maintained its monopoly power in violation of the Act
as well as by the finding of tortious interference under Kansas law.
ATrORNEY FEES
Bhattachaiya v. Copple, 898 F.2d 766
Per Curiam
Plaintiff Bhattacharya's attorneys appealed an order of the district
court which calculated fees to be paid pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment. The agreement indicated that Bhattacharya's attorneys would re-
ceive $450,000 subject to a district court determination of
reasonableness. After applying Kan. Stat. Ann § 7-121(b), which lists
eight criteria to be used in determining reasonableness of attorney's
fees, the district court awarded Bhattacharya's attorneys $182,640.
Bhattacharya's attorneys argued that the district court should have
awarded the $450,000 in fees as contemplated by the settlement agree-
ment. Defendant, Copple, in an amicus curiae brief, contended that since
the case was settled, the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding. The court
held that an appeal was not prohibited since the settlement agreement
recognized that the district court was required to make an independent
determination. Furthermore, the district court's decision to use an
hourly rate figure to determine fees, despite a fifty-percent contingency
agreement between Bhattacharya and his attorneys, was not an abuse of
discretion. Finally, Copple's request that the attorneys be sanctioned
under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 was denied. The court reasoned that the
outcome of the appeal was not obvious and, therefore, the appeal was
not frivolous.
Chynoweth v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 648
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Chynoweth, appealed a district court order denying her re-
quest to exceed the seventy-five dollar per hour cap on attorney fees
imposed pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. Chynoweth ar-
gued that her attorney's expertise in social security benefits law consti-
tuted a special factor justifying an increase in her rate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the
increase. The court ruled that the social security benefits law does not
constitute a specialized practice area warranting the special factor excep-
tion to the seventy-five dollar limit. The court explained that the cap
may be exceeded only in the unusual situation where specialized train-
ing, unattainable by a competent attorney, is required.
Cooper v. Utah, 894 F.2d 1169
Author: Judge West, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Cooper, was the class representative in an action challeng-
ing a Utah statute which prohibited the marriage of a person who was
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delinquent in paying child-support. The district court granted summary
judgment for Cooper and determined that attorney's fees should be the
lodestar amount. This amount is based on the number of hours reason-
ably spent on the case multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate. The
district court then decreased this amount by half on the grounds that the
same issues were litigated in Salt Lake City, and an extensive summary
of the arguments supporting Cooper's motion appeared in the Utah Law
Review. Cooper subsequently appealed the district court's reduction of
his attorney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded the full lodestar amount.
The court based its decision on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This Act authorizes district courts to
award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights liti-
gation to ensure effective access to the courts. The lodestar amount is
presumptively reasonable. While courts may adjust this amount, neither
the complexity nor the novelty of issues may be considered in making
such an adjustment.
Dahlem v. Board of Educ., 901 F.2d 1508
Author: Judge Anderson, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Dahlem, appealed the district court's order denying his
motion for attorney's fees. In the district court, Dahlem prevailed over
defendant, Board of Education of Denver Public Schools (the "Board"),
and was granted injunctive relief. Dahlem's substantive claims, how-
ever, were rendered moot before obtaining a final judgment on merits
and prior to a possible challenge to the injunction's validity by the
Board.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court found that while Dahlem was a "prevailing party" inasmuch as he
won the relief sought, such status did not entitle him to recover attor-
ney's fees. The court explained that the reversal of a companion case
rendered the relief he obtained legally disputable. Moreover, the rever-
sal of the companion case constituted a special circumstance which high-
lighted Dahlem's lack of entitlement to the relief he obtained.
Furthermore, such reversal rendered the award of attorney's fees to
Dahlem unjust because only fortuity prevented Dahlem's judgment from
being reversed at the same time.
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ferguson, 896 F.2d 1244
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Federal Land Bank ("FLB"), appealed the district court's
determination that its claim for foreclosure-related attorney's fees was
subordinate to the junior lien of Farmers Home Administration
("FmHA"). On appeal, FLB argued that the district court erred in ap-
plying federal first-in-time and choateness principles rather than appli-
cable state laws in determining lien and fee priority.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that FLB's claim for attorney's fees should be given the same
senior priority as its associated mortgage and, therefore, placed ahead
of FmHA's lien. The court reasoned that state law, which provides that
senior lienholder can recover attorney's fees before additional proceeds
are distributed to junior lienholder, governs the lien priority.
Iqbal v. Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of Am., 900 F.2d 227
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Golf Course Superintendents Association of America
("GCSAA"), appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees in a
race discrimination and retaliatory discharge case. On appeal, GCSAA
argued: (1) plaintiff, Iqbal, only achieved limited or partial success,
whereas GCSAA prevailed on a number of issues, which justified a re-
duced award to Iqbal; and (2) the attorneys' fee award should be limited
by the contingency fee agreement between Iqbal and his attorney. Iqbal
cross-appealed the district court's reduction of his attorney's hourly rate
and thirty-percent reduction of the lodestar.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and re-
manded for calculation of fees and costs to be awarded for the work
done on appeal. First, the court rejected GCSAA's argument that
Iqbal's "limited success" justified a reduced award to Iqbal offset by an
award of fees to GCSAA. The court reasoned that Iqbal was the prevail-
ing party and entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Sec-
ond, the court affirmed the rejection of the contingency fee agreement
as a cap on attorneys' fees. Last, on cross-appeal, the court found no
abuse of discretion in the district court's approval of an hourly rate
lower than what Iqbal's counsel would normally charge, but higher than
rates it had allowed in previous cases. The higher rate was an "appro-
priate adjustment" for inflation and delay in payment of attorneys' fees.
At the same time, the court held that the district court was within its
discretion in reducing the lodestar to reflect Iqbal's limited success.
Moreover, the court held that Iqbal was entitled to fees and costs for the
appeal. Tenth Circuit precedent is inconsistent on the issue of attor-
neys' fees for an appeal of a fee award, but Iqbal should be awarded fees





Valley Nat'l Bank v. Abdnor, 918 F.2d 128
Author: Judge Theis, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Valley National Bank (the "Bank"), appealed a judgment
rendered in favor of defendant, Small Business Administration ("SBA").
The dispute involved SBA's refusal to purchase its guaranteed portion
of a defaulted loan. The district court found that the Bank violated its
guaranty agreement by failing to service the loan prudently, thereby ex-
cusing SBA of its obligation to purchase the loan. On appeal, the Bank
argued that: (1) there were no specific provisions in its agreement with
SBA that required it to take certain measures; (2) it administered the
loan with the same level of attention and professionalism as it did other
non-SBA loans; (3) the district court violated the parol evidence rule by
relying on a letter from the president of the Bank to the SBA stating that
certain steps would be taken with regard to securing the collateral for
the loan; and (4) it could not have prevented the ultimate loss on the
loan by servicing it differently, and the SBA should be excused from
honoring its guaranty only when the Bank's conduct caused the loss.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court found substantial evidence to support the finding that the Bank
did not act prudently with respect to the loan. First, the court rejected
the Bank's argument that there were no provisions in the agreement re-
quiring it to take certain actions. The court reasoned that acting pru-
dently might require additional unspecified actions by the lender.
Second, the fact that the Bank administered the loan with the same level
of attention as it did other non-SBA loans was not a defense. The court
reasoned that the Bank may normally service its non-SBA loans in an
imprudent manner. Third, the district court did not violate the parol
evidence rule. The court explained that the district court only consid-
ered the letter as evidence of specific actions that might be required of a
prudent lender. The letter did not alter or contradict the terms of the
parties' written agreement. Last, the court ruled that under SBA regula-
tions, if the lender's actions may be expected to result in a substantial
loss on the loan, the SBA is excused from honoring its guaranty.
FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ("FDIC"), brought suit
to enforce a letter of credit issued by defendant, Bank of Boulder, to the
failed Dominion Bank of Denver ("Dominion"). The letter of credit was
transferred by FDIC, as receiver of Dominion, to itself in its corporate
capacity. The district court ruled that because the letter of credit could
not legally be transferred to FDIC, there was no federal jurisdiction for
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FDIC's claim. FDIC appealed, claiming that even though the letter of
credit was not transferrable under state law, FDIC was entitled to trans-
fer it in the course of a "purchase and assumption" transaction.
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court. The
court held that pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2)(A), the FDIC, in its
corporate capacity, could purchase any assets, including assets nontrans-
ferable under state law, from itself, in its capacity as receiver/liquidator,
in order to facilitate a Purchase and Assumption transaction. Conse-
quently, the court held that this statute preempts any Colorado restric-
tion on the transferability of letters of credit from FDIC/Receiver to
FDIC/Corporation in the course of a "purchase and assumption" trans-
action. The court also stated that the letter was transferable under fed-
eral common law because: (1) there is a need for a nationally uniform
rule allowing FDIC to acquire nontransferable assets of failed banks;
and (2) the state law transfer restrictions significantly interfered with
important FDIC objectives.
Chase Manhattan Fin. Servs., Inc. v. McMillian, 896 F.2d 452
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Financial Services, Incorporated
("Chase"), filed suit against defendant, McMillian, to enforce its mort-
gage on McMillian's vessel. The district court found that the mortgage
was preferred under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 ("SMA"). McMil-
lian and other third-party plaintiffs appealed, claiming the district court
erred because it should have found the mortgage invalid on grounds of
incomplete documentation, fraud, and improper priority over preexist-
ing material and labor liens.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first established that contracts for building or supplying materials
for original construction of ships are not "maritime" contracts under the
SMA and do not create maritime liens. The court then addressed issues
relating to passage of title. The court ruled that the manufacturer's
statement of origin and the sales agreement taken together satisfied the
relevant state statute concerning conveyance of good title. Accordingly,
the mortgage was preferred under the SMA, giving Chase the right to
proceed in admiralty with a preferred status over all nonmaritime
claims.
Neece v. Internal Revenue Serv., 922 F.2d 573
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, the Neeces, applied for a loan from a bank that held a
mortgage on their home. They submitted a financial statement with the
loan application. The bank suspected the Neeces were attempting to
violate federal tax laws and contacted defendant, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS"). The Neeces claim the bank violated the Right to Financial
Privacy Act ("RFPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, by turning over finan-
cial documents to the IRS without notifying the bank customer. The
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district court granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment, and the
Neeces appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court. The court stated that
the RFPA balances the customer's right to privacy with the need for law
enforcement agencies to pursue legitimate investigation. Specifically,
§ 3402 requires that notice be given to the customer when a federal
agency seeks access to the customer's records. There are several excep-
tions, but the court held that none applied to the Neeces. Also, the
court noted that the intent of Congress, as expressed in the RFPA,
would be negated if a bank could waive the customer's protection under
the RFPA simply by turning over records to the IRS.
United Bank & Trust Co. of Norman, Oklahoma v. Kansas Bankers Surety
Co., 901 F.2d 1520
Author: Judge Moore
This action involved a dispute over coverage under a banker's blan-
ket bond. Defendant, Kansas Banker Surety Company ("KBS"), issued
a blanket bond to plaintiff, United Bank & Trust Company ("United"),
which applied to losses sustained after the issue date. Also, it defined
the loss sustained as occurring at the time of the act. In the case at
hand, the borrower defaulted on a loan. This loan was made prior to
the issue date, and secured by stock certificates. These certificates were
later found to be counterfeit. The broker who sold the certificates ob-
tained a judgment against United for the sale price of the securities and
attorney's fees. When KBS denied coverage, United filed suit. The dis-
trict court held in favor of United when the parties cross-moved for sum-
mary judgment. The district court found that the loss occurred when
the judgment against United was granted, or alternatively no earlier
than the time of the default. KBS appealed, arguing the bond had pro-
spective application only.
The Tenth Circuit reversed. Following the rules of construction ap-
plicable to insurance contracts, the court reasoned that under the plain
language of the contract, the loss was sustained at the time the loan was
made. A different interpretation would impose retrospective coverage
contrary to the parties' intent.
Ward Petroleum Corp. v. FDIC, 903 F.2d 1297
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Ward Petroleum Corporation ("Ward"), brought suit
against defendant, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as
receiver for First National Bank and Trust Company (the "Bank").
Ward claimed that the Bank improperly failed to honor a draft submit-
ted by it. The Bank contended that the amount drawn did not represent
the accurate balance due to Ward by the Oklahoma Refining Company.
The district court ruled in favor of FDIC on Ward's claim for wrongful
dishonor of its draft under a standby letter of credit. Ward subsequently
appealed.
1991]
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the duty of
the issuing bank is confined to checking the presented documents.
Under the independence principle of letters of credit, the issuer must
honor the draft even though the underlying contract was breached. The
Bank must, therefore, ignore the underlying transaction of the parties,
and follow the letter of credit. As a corollary to the beneficiary's right to
payment, the letter of credit must be explicitly written to include all pre-
conditions for payment. Since the letter of credit at issue was clear re-
garding the basis for Ward's draft, the finding of summary judgment for
FDIC was improper.
United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898
Author: Judge McKay
The district court dismissed a seven count bank fraud indictment
because the government wrongfully withheld information from the
grand jury that was exculpatory. The government appealed, arguing
that since tax returns, general ledgers, and depositions were not rele-
vant, they could not be considered exculpatory.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the withheld information was exculpa-
tory and, therefore, affirmed the dismissal. The court ruled that even
though the withheld materials seemed irrelevant and self-serving under
the government's theory of the case, the grand jury must receive infor-
mation that is relevant to any reasonable theory it may adopt. Thus, the
district court properly found that the absence of the withheld evidence
prejudiced Williams before the grand jury. Consequently, this rendered
the grand jury's indictment suspect.
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In re Brayshaw, 912 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Brayshaw, filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition claim-
ing exempt property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(1). Pursuant to Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 4003(b), objections to exempt property must be filed within
thirty days after the creditors' meeting, unless the court grants an exten-
sion of time. On the thirtieth day, after the creditor's meeting, the
trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion to extend the time for objections.
This motion was granted by the bankruptcy court after the thirty day
expiration period. The district court, however, granted Brayshaw leave
to take an interlocutory appeal and reversed the bankruptcy court's ex-
tension order. Clark presented two issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court's order was an appealable final order; and (2) whether the
bankruptcy court had power to grant a motion to extend time for objec-
tion after the expiration of the thirty day time period.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the exten-
sion of time. First, the court noted that it had jurisdiction in bankruptcy
cases only when the district courts have exercised appellate jurisdiction
and granted final orders. Accordingly, since the district court's reversal
of the extension of time had the effect of granting Brayshaw's exemp-
tions, it was a final appealable order. Second, the court held that the
district court properly reversed the extension of time order granted by
the bankruptcy court. The court reasoned that a bankruptcy court can
extend the period for objections to exemptions only by acting within the
original thirty day time period. Consequently, since the bankruptcy
court granted Clark the extension after the thirty day time period ex-
pired, it acted improperly.
In re Bucyrus Grain Co., 905 F.2d 1362
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Bucyrus Grain Company ("Bucyrus") accepted money from Carl
and Robert Anderson (the "Andersons") to place an order for commod-
ity futures. Soon thereafter, Bucyrus filed bankruptcy. State Bank of
Spring Hill motioned for relief from the bankruptcy stay to permit it to
setoff the funds in Bucyrus's account against Bucyrus's outstanding debt
to it. The bankruptcy court granted the bank's motion. The Andersons
appealed, and the district court reversed. The court ruled that the
Andersons had priority over the bank because Bucyrus was a "commodi-
ties broker," the Andersons were "customers," and certain funds in
Bucyrus's accounts were "customer property." The district court re-
manded the case for valuation of the Andersons' claim. The bank subse-
quently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the bank's appeal for lack ofjurisdic-
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tion. The court held that the appeal was premature because the district
court's remand for valuation of the Andersons' claim constituted a re-
mand for "significant further proceedings." The court added that the
bank's notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed until after
the bankruptcy court entered its decisions on remand. Moreover, the
proper appeal from that decision was to the district court.
In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514
Author: Judge Anderson
The Trustees of Centennial State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund
notified Centric Corporation ("Centric") that it was found to have with-
drawn from the fund and was accountable for withdrawal liability under
ERISA. Centric sought a declaratory judgment that it incurred no liabil-
ity. The Trustees counterclaimed for the amount of the assessed with-
drawal liability. Centric's subsequent bankruptcy filing resulted in the
district court proceedings being stayed and then terminated. The Trust-
ees filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court and were granted a relief
from stay. After Centric objected to the Trustees' claim, the Trustees
failed to respond until seven months after the time allowed. During the
interim, the bankruptcy court approved a liquidation plan. When the
Trustees belatedly moved to respond to Centric's objection, the bank-
ruptcy court denied the motion and disallowed the claim. The Trustees
moved to reopen the district court case twenty months after it had been
dismissed. The district court ruled that their withdrawal claim was
barred by the doctrine of laches and affirmed the bankruptcy court disal-
lowance of their claim against Centric. The Trustees appealed both
orders.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court orders. The bankruptcy
court correctly reasoned that allowing the Trustees to respond after the
seven month delay would prejudice Centric and delay the termination of
the bankruptcy proceedings. Further, the Trustees had no reason not to
respond promptly. The court also approved the district court's reason-
ing in its dismissal of the counterclaims. The court explained that the
doctrine of laches could apply since the twenty month delay appeared
unjustified and resulted in prejudice to Centric.
In re Elec. Metal Products, Inc., 916 F.2d 1502
Per Curiam
In consideration for two payments on antecedent debt totalling
$5,100, defendant, attorney Bittman, agreed to continue working on a
case for plaintiff, Electronic Metal Products, Incorporated ("EMP").
This case resulted in a $42,000 gain to EMP. EMP thereafter declared
bankruptcy and brought suit to recover $5,100 as a preferential transfer.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to EMP, but the dis-
trict court reversed, holding that the payments constituted "new value"
and thus were insulated from recovery. EMP subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the
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bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment to EMP. In re-
gard to legal. representation, the court extended the general rule that a
creditor's promise to continue to do business with a debtor, if its bills
are paid, is not new value. This is because: (1) to hold otherwise would
allow attorney payments on antecedent debt to be insulated from recov-
ery; (2) there was no evidence that the $42,000 settlement was directly
attributable to Bittman's promise to continue working; and (3) although
continuing Bittman's legal representation may have been more efficient,
it was indistinguishable from the efficiency of continuing certain busi-
ness relationships covered by the general rule. The court also held that
even though Bittman released his charging lien to the extent of the pay-
ments, new value was not given. The court explained that liens are en-
forceable against third parties only if notice of the lien is filed with the
court. Bittman failed to do this. Thus, the release of the lien did not
constitute a release of security to third parties such as EMP's other cred-
itors. Finally, the court refused to recognize the "net result rule" uti-
lized under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The court reasoned that
legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code does not support appli-
cation of the rule to the 1978 Code.
In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 917 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Research-Planning Incorporated ("Research") appealed a
bankruptcy and district court decision which held that certain funds
placed in escrow constituted part of the bankruptcy estate. Research,
which placed $260,000 in escrow with First Capital Mortgage, sought
the return of $62,000 after it declared bankruptcy. Research claimed
that the funds were not available for creditors as part of the bankruptcy
estate. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the
bankruptcy and district courts. The court held that the funds never be-
came part of the bankruptcy estate and, thus, were recoverable as funds
held in trust for the escrow depositor.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the funds recov-
ered by the trustee in settlement of his preference actions comprised
part of the bankruptcy estate. The court held that Research was not
entitled to preferential status of the funds. The court based its decision
on the character of the funds once they were recovered and the specific
language of the Bankruptcy Code, § 550(a), which allows recovery of the
property "for the benefit of the estate."
In re Gardner, 913 F.2d 1515
Per Curiam
Defendant, United States, appealed a district court decision af-
firming a bankruptcy court order. The order ruled that a tax lien on
defendant Billie Gardner's property was extinguished by an award of the
property to plaintiff, Terryl Gardner, in a state court divorce proceed-
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ing. Mrs. Gardner's interests in the property were, therefore, held supe-
rior to those of the United States. On appeal, the government claimed
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine the priority of two
competing third party lienors over exempt property.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that Mr.
Gardner had no interest in the marital property after the divorce decree.
The court, however, vacated and remanded that part of the ruling adju-
dicating the rights of the government and Mrs. Gardner. The court
ruled that once the bankruptcy court determined Mr. Gardner had no
interest in the property following the divorce decree, the bankruptcy
court lacked further jurisdiction. Essentially, the bankruptcy court did
not have the authority to determine whether Mrs. Gardner's interests in
the property were superior to the interests of the United States. The
court explained that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction only over core
and related proceedings. Determining the rights of third parties is not a
core proceeding. Moreover, it was not a related proceeding because the
case involved a conflict over property no longer a part of the bankruptcy
estate.
In re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 1048
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, John Deere Company ("John Deere"), appealed the dis-
trict court's order that the entire debt of defendant, Gerlach, was dis-
chargeable. On appeal, John Deere contended that the debt Gerlach
owed was not dischargeable because it was procured through fraud.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court stated that
pursuant to § 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, an objecting creditor
need only prove that credit was obtained by fraud for the debt to be
nondischargeable. Consequently, the court remanded for the district
court to determine the amount of guaranty debt Gerlach obtained
through fraud.
In re Grey, 902 F.2d 1479
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Coats State Bank (the "Bank"), challenged the dis-
chargeability of defendant Grey's loan obligation. The bankruptcy court
determined that Grey's obligation to the Bank was exempt from dis-
charge in the amount of $71,000. Grey appealed on four grounds:
(1) the security agreement did not include after-acquired property;
(2) the bankruptcy court's determination of damages was erroneous;
(3) the bankruptcy court erred in determining debtor's sale of collateral
was malicious; and (4) the bankruptcy court erred in admitting the al-
tered security agreement into evidence.
First, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in
determining the included after-acquired property. The court explained
that even though a security agreement does not specifically use the
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phrase "after-acquired property," the security agreement will include it
if that was the intent of the parties. Second, the court held that Grey's
sale of collateral was malicious. The court explained that maliciousness
was established because it was reasonably foreseeable that Grey's con-
duct would result in injury to the bank. Third, the bankruptcy court
properly admitted the security agreement into evidence, even though it
allegedly contained written alterations. The court explained that Grey
failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing error. Moreover, the
court noted that authentication of a document is left to the discretion of
the trial judge and will not be disturbed without a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Finally, the court rejected Grey's contention that the
bankruptcy court's factual determination of damages was unduly specu-
lative. The court upheld the damages because Grey failed to demon-
strate that the damages were erroneous.
In reJohnson, 904 F.2d 563
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court reversed defendant Johnson's Chapter 13 Plan.
On appeal, the fundamental issue considered was whether a debtor
whose liability has been discharged on a secured debt in Chapter 7 pro-
ceedings may then reschedule that debt in a Chapter 13 proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Tenth Circuit held that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan cannot be
confirmed where it improperly schedules a debt previously discharged
under Chapter 7. Therefore, plaintiff, Home State Bank (the "bank"),
no longer held a claim against Johnson for default on his mortgage with
the bank. The court reasoned that Johnson's liability was discharged
under his prior Chapter 7 petition. Further, although the Bankruptcy
Code does not expressly prohibit what this debtor sought to do, Con-
gress did not intend such a result. The court explained that 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(2) applies only to nonrecourse loans. Because the bank and John-
son never bargained for a nonrecourse loan, and since the bank was
given an opportunity to refuse to agree to reaffirmation of the mortgage
in the Chapter 7 proceeding, it cannot subsequently be forced to agree
to reaffirmation by a Chapter 13 plan.
In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendants, Frates, Holmes, Merrick, Doyle and Perma/Frates Joint
Venture ("Defendants"), appealed the district court's order which af-
firmed an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy
court's order struck Defendants' jury demands. Alternatively, Defend-
ants petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Defendants contended that the
lower courts erred in holding: (1) that by filing an indemnity counter-
claim in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding, a defendant consents to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction, thereby waiving his seventh amendment
right to a jury trial; and (2) by filing such proofs of claim or counter-
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claims, the resolution of all claims between the parties was a core pro-
ceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal but granted the petition for
a writ of mandamus. First, the court determined that it did not have juris-
diction. The court explained that it found no basis for exercising appel-
late jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 1291, or 1292(b). The
court, however, construed the request for appellate review as a petition
for a writ of mandamus. In making this determination, the court used a
five part test: (1) was another adequate means to secure relief available
when the appellate jurisdiction was denied; (2) did the district court's
order raise new and important problems or issues of law; (3) was the
petitioning party damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on
appeal; (4) did the district court's order represent an often repeated er-
ror, or manifest a persistent disregard of federal rules; and (5) did the
district court's order, denying a jury trial, constitute an abuse of discre-
tion. Further, although bankruptcy judges may have authority to con-
duct jury trials under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, the 1984 Bankruptcy Act
limits judges' powers to hearings and determinations. Thus, where the
seventh amendment requires ajury trial to be held in a bankruptcy hear-
ing, the jury trial must take place in district court.
Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468
Per Curiam
The Chapter 7 trustee for International Plastics, Incorporated
("IPI"), appealed a summary judgment order for defendant, Travenca
Development Corporation ("Travenca"). IPI argued that Travenca
breached its obligations under a failed Chapter 11 reorganization plan
which was previously confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court ruled that 11
U.S.C. § 1141, which details the effect of confirmation of a reorganiza-
tion plan, did not bind Travenca to the plan until it acquired property
under the reorganization plan. The court held, however, that there was
evidence in the record creating an issue of material fact that Travenca
may have agreed to be bound by the terms of the reorganization plan
under general contract principles. Further, enforcement and modifica-
tion provisions in the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to Chapter 11 plans
of reorganization did not preempt a claim for breach of contract pre-
mised on a plan of reorganization. Finally, Travenca's affirmative de-
fense of estoppel could not be maintained without showing a
detrimental change in position as a result of reasonable reliance on IPI's
inconsistent conduct during bankruptcy proceedings.
In re Republic Trust and Say. Co., 897 F.2d 1041
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, the bankruptcy trustee, filed adversary proceedings against
defendants, Hackler and others, in an attempt to recover payments
made to them as avoidable preferences. Defendants were holders of
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thrift and passbook savings certificates, issued by the debtors. These
certificates represented the debtors' promise to repay the defendants
money they had invested in the debtors. Defendants redeemed their
certificates and received money from the debtors a short time before the
debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court
and the district court held that all money paid by the debtors to the
defendants, within ninety days of the bankruptcy petition, was an avoida-
ble preference. The defendants appealed on grounds that they were en-
titled: (1) to judgment as a matter of law because exemptions in the
bankruptcy code negated the trustee's avoidance power; (2) to offset the
debtors' payments against the preferential transfers because they were
denied due process; and (3) to a jury trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the defendants were en-
titled to a jury trial. The court ruled that since the defendants did not
have or file a claim against the bankrupt's estate, they had a right to a
jury trial when sued by the trustee to recover the transfer. The trustee's
actions to avoid the transfers were plenary and did not arise as part of
the process of allowance and disallowance of claims. On the other is-
sues, the court explained that the certificates were merely evidence of an
underlying indebtedness, similar to promissory notes. A creditor's
transfer of a note upon receipt of a debtor's final payment did not con-
stitute a contemporaneous exchange for new value and, therefore, did
not meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1). The court also
found that the defendants had sufficient notice and opportunity to be
heard, so they were not denied due process.
In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's ruling in favor
of defendant, Roberts. The government contended that a discharge in
bankruptcy does not discharge tax penalties related to nondischargeable
tax liabilities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that these
penalties are dischargeable. The court said that the plain meaning of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B), is enough to justify dis-
charging the tax penalties related to nondischargeable tax liabilities.
The court also stated that it is not appropriate to refer to the legislative
history since the statutory language is plain and unambiguous. More-
over, the Bankruptcy Code is an extensive series of compromises requir-
ing strict adherence to the statutory language.
In re Robinson, 921 F.2d 252
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Edward Robinson ("Edward"), sought discharge of an
obligation to make payments on a second deed of trust, under which he
became solely liable in a divorce proceeding. The deed was subse-
quently refinanced and assumed by plaintiff, Charlotte Robinson
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("Charlotte"), after Edward ceased making payments. The bankruptcy
judge treated the original obligation as alimony, maintenance, or sup-
port and, thus, nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
also found that Charlotte's refinancing discharged Edward's obligation.
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the
obligation was nondischargeable, but it reversed that bankruptcy court's
decision on the issue of refinancing. The district court ruled that the
current status of the underlying debt had no effect on Edward's original
obligation to be solely liable. Edward subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on
both issues. The court agreed that the record sufficiently supported the
bankruptcy court's finding that the obligation was to be considered ali-
mony, maintenance, or support. Moreover, Edward was still solely lia-
ble for the debt on the second deed, except that he was ordered to make
payments to Charlotte rather than to the original creditor bank.
In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d 1445
Author: Judge Ebel
Seneca Oil Company ("Seneca") sold crude oil in violation of fed-
eral pricing regulations. The United States Department of Energy
("DOE") obtained judgment creating a constructive trust for the
amount in excess of the statutory price after Seneca filed for bankruptcy.
DOE appealed the bankruptcy court's plan for reorganization. The dis-
trict court affirmed the payment of administrative fees but reversed the
confirmation of the plan to the extent that it subordinated the unsecured
portion of the DOE's claim to Bank of New York ("Bank"). The Bank, a
secured creditor of Seneca, appealed, claiming that: (1) DOE did not
establish sufficient wrongdoing by Seneca to justify the imposition of a
constructive trust; (2) DOE did not sufficiently trace the funds in dis-
pute; (3) the district court did not have jurisdiction to decide DOE's
claim under the Bankruptcy Code; and (4) DOE's claim was a "fine,
penalty, or forfeiture" under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Seneca's
overcharging was sufficient wrongdoing in order to establish a construc-
tive trust. Since the excess funds were part of the trust, they were never
part of the bankruptcy estates and, therefore, the payment of adminis-
trative fees from the trust was improper. Moreover, the court held that
DOE sufficiently traced the funds in dispute using the "lowest interven-
ing balance rule." The court then held that the district court had juris-
diction, since the DOE's claim did not arise under the Economic
Stabilization Act or the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act. The
DOE's claim for recovery was held not to be a "fine, penalty, or forfei-
ture" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, DOE's claim for the
excess amounts was not to be subordinated to the claim by the Bank.
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In re Burns, 894 F.2d 361
Author: Judge Seymour
Citizens National Bank brought an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2), to have defendant Burns', debt declared nondischargeable
in a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court ruled that the debt
was dischargeable, but denied Burns' motion for attorneys' fees. Burns
subsequently appealed the denial of his motion, but the district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Bums once again appealed,
alleging that he was entitled to attorneys' fees under 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).
Using a different rationale, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to deny attorneys' fees. The court noted that pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 523(d), attorneys' fees can only be awarded if the debt is a
consumer debt and the creditor's position was not substantially justified.
The court concluded that Bums' debt was not consumer debt. The
court explained that a credit transaction is not consumer debt when it is
incurred with a profit motive. Since Burns took out the loan to play the
stock market, this is clearly a transaction entered into with a profit mo-
tive. Accordingly, the debt was not a consumer debt, and Bums was not
entitled to attorneys' fees under § 523(d).
In re Simons, 908 F.2d 643
Per Curiam
Defendants, Eugene and Jewell Simons, filed for Chapter 13 relief
in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court, however, denied confirma-
tion of the Simons' proposed reorganization plan. The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination, and the Simonses
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the
matter and consequently dismissed the appeal. The court stated that in
a bankruptcy case, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) limits appellate court review to
district court orders which are final. Because the bankruptcy and district
court orders denying the Simons' plan did not dismiss the underlying
proceeding, its decision was not final for purposes of appeal. Moreover,
the court explained that the district court order did not satisfy two basic
principles of finality. The order becomes final if it either ends the litiga-
tion on the merits, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute judg-
ment, or it does not contemplate significant further proceedings in the
bankruptcy court. In addition, the district court order was not appeala-
ble under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. The
court explained that the three requirements were not satisfied. The or-
der appealed from must: (1) conclusively determine the disputed ques-
tion; (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.
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In re Thurman, 901 F.2d 839
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Thurman, previously secured a note payable to defend-
ant, MBank Dallas, with a pledge of 500 shares of WAB, a corporation in
which Thurman held a 50% interest. Thurman defaulted on the note,
and MBank recovered a state court judgment for the amount of indebt-
edness. Before MBank's judgment became final, WAB transferred all of
its assets to a wholly-owned subsidiary. Thurman then petitioned for
relief under the Bankruptcy Act. MBank objected to the discharge and
filed an action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). This statute pro-
vides that a discharge is not available where the debtor intended to hin-
der or defraud a creditor by transferring "property of the debtor" within
one year before filing for the discharge. MBank further argued that the
debt should not be dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6),
which excepts from discharge a debt resulting from "willful and mali-
cious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity." The district court affirmed the conclusion of the bankruptcy
court that the transfer of WAB assets did not constitute a transfer of
Thurman's own property. Accordingly, the district court ruled that
MBank failed to prove grounds for denial of Thurman's discharge.
MBank subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. First, the
court stated that "property of the debtor" is distinct from "property in
which the debtor has a derivative interest." Thus, since Thurman did
not have a direct proprietary interest, the transfer did not constitute a
transfer of his property. Second, the court stated that proof of a deliber-
ate or intentional injury is required to except a debt from discharge.
The court ruled that since Thurman was only a 50% shareholder, he
could not have transferred the assets in his own authority. Conse-
quently, he did not act deliberately and intentionally to injure the secur-
ity interest held by MBank.
In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592
Per Curiam
Third party defendants, Kevin Abel and Abel & Busch, Incorpo-
rated ("Abel"), appealed an order of the district court limiting attor-
neys' fees due from plaintiff, Landsing Diversified Properties-II
("LDP"), and enjoining Abel from collecting the remaining balance
from a third party. Abel represented LDP when an Oklahoma Public
Service transformer exploded and caused substantial property damage.
After negotiating a hybrid hourly/contingency fee arrangement, Abel
secured his contract fee by filing an attorney's lien under state law.
Before settlement, however, LDP filed bankruptcy and discharged Abel.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in
part. On de novo review, the court held that Abel's claim against LDP
should have begun by: (1) an acknowledgment of LDP's breach; (2) an
[Vol. 68:4
BANKRUPTCY
assessment of damages under applicable state law; (3) a determination
under bankruptcy law of reasonableness of Abel's damage claim; and
(4) a reduction of Abel's claim if deemed excessive. Neither the district
court nor the bankruptcy court followed these procedures, so the bank-
ruptcy court's decision was reversed and remanded for reconsideration
in light of the appropriate principles described. Further, the bankruptcy
court's injunction precluding Abel from proceeding against a third-party
that LDP would have to indemnify was affirmed. The injunction, how-
ever, is only temporary during the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Zilkha v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Zilkha Energy Company ("Zilkha"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its complaint in equity seeking recovery of alleged
overpayments of oil and gas royalties. Zilkha's amended complaint
averred that before it filed for Chapter 11 protection in September
1984, it overpaid royalties to defendant, Leighton, in July 1983. The
district court granted Leighton's motion to dismiss, holding that the ac-
tion was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Bankruptcy
Code was inapplicable because Zilkha was a debtor-in-possession, not a
trustee.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly ana-
lyzed Zilkha's bankruptcy claims but, nonetheless, reached the proper
result. The court found that the statute of limitations expired before the
filing of the complaint. The court agreed with Zilkha, however, that the
action may be equitable in nature, and the doctrine of laches might ap-
ply. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the eq-





United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263
Author: Judge Moore
Defendants, John and Charles Bizzell, argued that the district court
should have granted their motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy.
In particular, the Bizzells argued that because they were subjected to
civil sanctions from the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD"), double jeopardy applied, thereby barring their criminal
charges.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of their mo-
tion to dismiss. The court found that because HUD civil sanctions were
remedial and not punitive, jeopardy did not attach to the civil proceed-
ing. The court, however, reversed the district court's finding that a
$30,000 HUD assessment against John Bizzell was a punishment. In
holding the assets as remedial, the court considered the payment as an
alternative to debarment and that the government's losses exceeded the
payment.
Brezovski v. United States Postal Serv., 905 F.2d 334
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Brezovski, appealed the district court's dismissal of his
claims for unlawful termination of employment. The district court rea-
soned that Brezovski failed to timely file a complaint against the proper
defendant. Brezovski argued that the time period for filing his claim
should be tolled because the notification of his right to suit misled him
into naming the wrong defendant.
The Tenth Circuit said the Brezovski's amended complaint with the
proper defendant would be barred unless requirements for relation back
were met within the prescribed limitations period. Since the require-
ments were not met during the limitation period, the court noted that
the limitations period could be tolled when affirmative misconduct on
the part of a defendant lulled plaintiff into inaction. The court con-
cluded that the language in a right-to-sue letter sent to Brezovski was
sufficiently misleading to justify the tolling of the limitations period and
that, therefore, Brezovski's amended complaint did relate back to the
filing of the original complaint. The court reversed and remanded to
the district court.
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520
Author: Judge O'Connor, sitting by designation
Defendants, Bruce and Robert Bryan, former officers of the plain-
tiff, Farmers and Merchants National Bank, appealed a jury verdict find-
ing them liable for violating federal lending limits and making
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imprudent loans. The district court denied the Bryans' motion for di-
rected verdict, holding the question of whether the statute of limitations
had tolled to be one of material fact for the jury.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) the district court
properly denied the motion for directed verdict since there was evidence
upon which a reasonable jury could find that the doctrine of "adverse
domination" tolled the statute of limitations; (2) the district court prop-
erly admitted federal examination reports under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(c),
the "public records" exception to the hearsay rule; and (3) the prejudi-
cial value of the reports was not outweighed by the probative value.
Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Bud Brooks Trucking Company, Inc. ("Brooks"), appealed
the district court's denial of its motion to vacate the order dismissing the
action. The suit was dismissed because of Brooks' failure to comply with
discovery orders and failure to attend a pretrial settlement conference.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The
court noted that while dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction, the
dismissal was proper since Brooks failed to show any reason or compel-
ling circumstance explaining its failure to comply with the discovery
orders.
G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824
Author: Judge Baldock
Claro, an attorney, challenged the district court's sua sponte imposi-
tion of sanctions upon him for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 16(f)
during a trial. The district court ruled that Claro failed to comply with
the court's pre-trial scheduling orders and failed to produce discovery
documents.
The Tenth Circuit sustained the Rule 16(f) sanctions as lawfully im-
posed but vacated the Rule 11 sanction for want of procedural due pro-
cess under the abuse of discretion standard. Before addressing the
merits, the court stated that a sanction order against an attorney cur-
rently of record was not a final decision for purposes of a 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 appeal, where the underlying controversy remained unsolved.
The court also found that the sanction order was not an exception to the
final decision rule under the collateral order doctrine. The court rea-
soned that retroactive application of this holding would be inequitable.
Accordingly, the court exercised jurisdiction. Reaching the merits, the
court set aside the Rule 11 sanction. The court reasoned that Claro was
given neither notice that the court was considering Rule 11 sanctions
nor an opportunity to respond either before or after their imposition.
Finally, the court found that providing Claro with an opportunity during
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trial to justify his actions with regard to Rule 16(f) was sufficient due
process given the moderate nature of the sanction.
Bank of Oklahoma v. The Islands Marina, Ltd., 918 F.2d 1476
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, First National Bank and Trust of Vinita ("FNBV"), at-
tempted to recover proceeds received by defendant, Courtney, follow-
ing the sale of a boat in The Islands Marina, Ltd. ("Marina") inventory.
FNBV claimed a superior interest in the inventory of the Marina. First
Oklahoma Savings Bank ("FOSB") joined in the action, and Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") was named re-
ceiver for FOSB. FSLIC filed a removal petition, asserting federal juris-
diction pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1). Courtney asserted that
because FSLIC was never formally made a party, the district court did
not derive jurisdiction for § 1730(k)(1)(B). The district court asserted
that it had subject matter jurisdiction and granted FNBV's motion for
summary judgment. Courtney subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
noted that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time. The court then stated that FSLIC was a party contemplated under
12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1)(B). The court explained that a federal court may
retain jurisdiction when all federal claims are dismissed if the remaining
claims are based on the common operative facts, and a plaintiff would
ordinarily be expected to try all of the issues in one proceeding. The
court also maintained that judicial economy and fairness required re-
taining federal jurisdiction.
Depex Reina 9 Partnership v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 897 F.2d 461
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Texas International Petroleum Corporation
("TIPCO"), appealed the district court's award of damages, interest,
and costs to Depex Reina 9 Partnership ("Depex"). On appeal, TIPCO
argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because complete diver-
sity between the parties never existed. Specifically, TIPCO and one of
the general partners of each Depex partnership were Delaware corpora-
tions. Also, TIPCO argued that the district court erred in holding that
principles of res judicata precluded it from raising the issue of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. First, the court ruled
there was no diversity jurisdiction because parties on one side of the
litigation were not of different citizenship from all parties on the other
side of litigation. Second, the court ruled that principles of resjudicata
did not preclude TIPCO from raising the issue of subject matter juris-
diction. The court explained that this issue may be raised at anytime
during the proceedings either by the parties or the court. Further, the
court held that the earlier trial, appeal, and remand which took five
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years, did not create a final judgment thereby precluding TIPCO from
raising the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Gilles v. United States, 906 F.2d 1386
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Gilles, alleged that physicians at the Veterans Administra-
tion Hospital ("VA") in Oklahoma City committed medical malpractice,
thereby, causing him to sustain personal injuries under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The district court dismissed Gilles' claims on 'the grounds
of improper service. The district court also stated that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over claims asserted against the VA by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2676,
and over claims asserted against the doctors due to the provisions of 38
U.S.C. § 4116. Gilles contended that the amended complaint was not
defective and was, therefore, timely served.
A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished
order and judgment. The court later granted rehearing en banc and va-
cated the panel's order. The court held that the action was timely com-
menced, the government had timely notice of the suit, and the amended
suit was properly filed as a matter of right. The court found that service
was properly perfected, and that the amended complaint related back.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case
regarding the government and the two doctors. The court, however,
affirmed the dismissal of the action against the VA since it is not suable
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a).
Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Voss, acting for the personal estate ofJohn Grandbouche,
filed a motion to substitute himself as plaintiff. The district court dis-
missed this action for failure to file a timely motion for substitution pur-
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). On appeal, Voss contended that the
ninety-day limitations period under Rule 25(a)(1) was not triggered be-
cause a formal suggestion of death was not made on the record.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. The court explained that the
mere reference of a party's death in court proceedings or pleadings, as
performed here in a court ordered supplemental brief, was not sufficient
to trigger the limitations period. Furthermore, the court ruled that the
requirement of service was not satisfied. Specifically, the successors or
representative of the estate were not served pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
4. Therefore, because the personal representative of the decedent's es-
tate did not receive service of any purported suggestion of death, the




Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Kennedy, a resident of Oklahoma, brought suit in
Oklahoma. She alleged that Freeman, a physician in Texas, negligently
undermeasured and reported the size of a lesion removed by Kennedy's
physician in Oklahoma. The district court granted Freeman's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found that
jurisdiction over a nonresident physician could only be established if
there were some form of solicitation. Kennedy subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court
ruled that solicitation is not required to assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident physician. Rather, personal jurisdiction may be asserted when a
physician has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of con-
ducting activities within his patient's state. The court found that Free-
man's actions were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Although he did
not solicit Kennedy's business in Oklahoma, Freeman willingly accepted
the lesion sample, sent his bill to Oklahoma, and rendered a diagnosis
through the mail, knowing it would be used as a basis for Kennedy's
further treatment in Oklahoma. The court also found that asserting ju-
risdiction over Freeman was not unreasonable. While the state does
have a compelling interest in ensuring access to out-of-state, specialized
medical care, the state has a greater interest in deterring medical mal-
practice against its residents when a physician purposefully directs his
activities at the forum state.
Lewis v. City of Ft. Collins, 903 F.2d 752
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Lewis, an hispanic female over forty years of age, brought
an action alleging employment discrimination against defendants, City
of Ft. Collins (the "City") and several city officials. The City appealed
the order of the district court which denied its motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted the City's
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court
first noted that it had appellate jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the
City faced discovery which exceeded the threshold necessary to consider
the issue of qualified immunity. The court also found that the City made
a prima facie showing of objective reasonableness of its actions. More-
over, Lewis failed to produce specific evidence that the City's actions
were tainted by a discriminatory motive.
Coriz v. Martinez, 915 F.2d 1469
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Coriz, brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, after de-
fendant, Guillen, an aide to a gym teacher, threw him to the floor and
injured him while attempting to maintain discipline at a high school.
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Coriz alleged, inter alia, that his right to procedural due process was vio-
lated because he had no adequate post-deprivation remedy. The district
court granted summary judgment against him, holding the defendants
qualifiedly immune. The district court reasoned that Coriz's post-depri-
vation remedy was adequate. Coriz subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court noted that procedural due process rights were not violated by a
state employee if adequate post-deprivation remedies were available.
Where the defense of availability of such remedies is raised, the plaintiff
has the burden of showing that such remedies do not exist. Here,
although the state law was not clear and federal district courts had previ-
ously disagreed, it could not be said definitively that no remedy existed.
Thus, the court presumed a remedy did exist.
Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Pelican Production Corporation ("Pelican"), brought an
antitrust claim against defendant, Marino. The district court subse-
quently entered a default judgment of dismissal against Pelican after it
failed to respond to motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Pel-
ican appealed, alleging the district court erred when it denied Pelican's
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to relieve it from judgment. Pelican argued
that it received no notice from its attorney of the motion to dismiss, had
no communication from him, and did not become aware of the default
judgment until nearly a month after it was entered. Pelican also ap-
pealed the district court's decision to adopt the magistrate's recom-
mended award of attorney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court held that carelessness by a litigant or his counsel does not
afford a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(l). Moreover, the court noted
that Pelican was not an uneducated party, and it also had at least con-
structive notice because it had in-house legal staff who initiated the law-
suit. The court also upheld the award of attorney's fees. The court
explained that the determination was supported by the record, and thus,
there was no abuse of discretion.
Taylor v. Phelan, 912 F.2d 429
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Brenda and Michael Taylor, residents of Kansas City,
Kansas, discovered that Michael Moore sexually assaulted their daughter
in Kansas City, Missouri. They reported the incident to the Kansas City,
Missouri police department. The police then telephoned Moore to no-
tify him that a warrant was issued for his arrest. Subsequently, Moore
broke into the Taylors' home and assaulted the family members. The
Taylors brought personal injury, wrongful death and damage actions
against the Kansas City police department, detective Phelan, and the
Missouri Board of Police Commissioners. The district court granted
[Vol. 68:4
CIVIL PROCEDURE
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court rea-
soned that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the Missouri de-
fendants. The Taylors subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the order of the district
court. In making its determination, the court applied a two-part analy-
sis: (1) did the defendants' conduct fall within the scope of the relevant
section of the long-arm statute; and (2) did the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction comport with the requirements of due process. The court
concluded that the Kansas long-arm statute applied to the defendants'
actions. The court also found that the requisite minimum contacts did
exist between the defendants and Kansas. The court reasoned that the
detective's visit to the Taylors' house and repeated phone contacts with
them in Kansas were sufficient contacts.
Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130
Author: Judge Anderson
Clayton, a non-party deponent, was served with a deposition sub-
poena. This subpoena commanded Clayton to appear and bring speci-
fied documents. Clayton did not file a written objection to inspecting or
copying the documents within the ten-day time requirement as specified
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. Rather, Clayton appeared with the docu-
ments, and allowed them to be inspected, but refused to allow them to
be copied. Clayton subsequently motioned for a protective order, but it
was denied. Clayton appealed the denial of his motion, alleging that the
subpoena did not specifically authorize the right to inspect and copy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court stated that the district court did not abuse its discretion and,
therefore, its decision to deny a protective order could not be reversed.
First, the court reasoned that although Clayton orally objected at the
deposition, he failed to make a written objection within ten days after
the service of the subpoena as required by Rule 45. Second, the court
stated that the subpoena commanding Clayton to produce documents




Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Abercrombie, brought suit against defendants, City of
Catoosa, Mayor Conley and Police Chief Dirck. Abercrombie argued
that: (1) the mayor and police chief conspired, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985(2) and 1986, to retaliate against him because of his testimony in
an unrelated case; (2) he was deprived of a property interest without
due process of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) his first
amendment rights were violated when he was removed from the wrecker
rotation logs used to make referrals. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the mayor and police chief, and Abercrombie
appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no conspiracy. The
court explained that Abercrombie failed to prove that the two isolated
statements of the mayor and police chief satisfied the "meeting of the
minds" requirement needed to prove a conspiracy. Accordingly, the
district court properly dismissed Abercrombie's conspiracy complaint.
Second, the court ruled that Abercrombie was deprived of a property
interest without due process of law when he was removed from the
wrecker referral list. The court explained that an Oklahoma statute re-
quired the City of Catoosa to make wrecker referrals on an equal basis.
Thus, a property interest was created in wrecker referrals. The court
also reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on
Abercrombie's first amendment claim. The court reasoned that the
JNOV was based on the district court's incorrect conclusion that Aber-
crombie had no property interest in wreck referrals. Moreover, the
court noted that a benefit cannot be denied to a person on a basis that
infringes a constitutionally protected interest. Thus, the court re-
manded for reinstatement of the jury award.
DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Bevers, appealed a judgment entered in favor of plain-
tiff, DeLoach. After murder charges against DeLoach were withdrawn,
DeLoach filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that
Bevers, the detective assigned to investigate the murder, violated her
constitutional rights. The district court found that Bevers unconstitu-
tionally retaliated against DeLoach for exercising her right to retain
counsel and caused her to be arrested pursuant to an intentionally false
and misleading affidavit. Bevers argued on appeal that: (1) she could
not be held responsible for DeLoach's arrest because there were many
intervening actors making independent determinations; (2) she was en-
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titled to qualified immunity; (3) several jury instructions were prejudi-
cial; and (4) the court should grant a remittitur.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that the alleged misstatements and omissions were material
enough that the district court was justified in submitting the question of
probable cause to the jury. Second, the court explained that since the
arrest violated the fourteenth amendment and Bevers displayed a reck-
less disregard for the truth, she was not entitled to good faith immunity.
Third, the court held that Bevers did not object to most of the jury in-
structions at trial, and there was no plain error as to those instructions.
Finally, the court did not consider the remittitur claim since Bevers
failed to make the appropriate argument.
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386
Author: Judge Christensen, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Bryson, individually and as administratrix of the estate of
Husband, appealed the district court's dismissal of both her 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against the City of Edmond, its police chief, and members
of the Oklahoma Air National Guard, and a Bivens action against the
postmaster. Husband and others were killed or injured when they were
shot by Sherrill, a fellow post office employee. The Edmond City police
arrived at the scene within minutes of the outset of the shooting but
classified the massacre as a hostage situation and did not attempt to
enter the building for more than an hour and a half. Bryson alleged that
in making this decision, the police deprived her husband of substantive
due process and associational rights in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that negligent conduct does not implicate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to afford § 1983
relief. In the case at hand, Bryson pleaded intentional, willful, and wan-
ton disregard for Husband's rights or in the alternative, gross negli-
gence. The court concluded that notwithstanding the pleading, there
was no indication of culpability other than ordinary negligence. Fur-
thermore, the court held that the city had no affirmative duty under the
fourteenth amendment to protect Husband from another individual. Fi-
nally, the court stated that pursuant to § 1983, a claim for the depriva-
tion of a right to familial association is shown when there is intent to
interfere with a particular relationship. The court found that the post-
master's and Air National Guard's failure to train, supervise, examine or
afford medical care to Sherrill did not show a specific intent to interfere
with the specific relationship in question.
Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Barnard, contended that his civil rights were violated when
the Utah State Bar refused to publish a letter he wrote. Specifically, Bar-
nard claimed that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his constitutional right to
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free speech and his right to due process of law were violated. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, Chamber-
lain, commissioner of the Utah State Bar. Barnard subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first considered Barnard's § 1983 claim. The
court stated that for a successful claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that a person acting under state law deprived him of a right se-
cured by the Constitution. The court found sufficient facts supporting
Barnard's conclusion that the refusal to publish his article was taken
under color of state law. The court next considered whether Barnard
was deprived of his first amendment rights; this depends on the nature
of the forum to which he seeks access. The court ruled that the fact the
government sponsors a medium of communication does not automati-
cally render that means of communication a public forum. Moreover,
the Utah Bar Association was unequivocal in its intent to close the Bar
Letter to the public. Furthermore, the court rejected Barnard's argument
that because the Utah Bar Association published three other articles,
there was intent to create a public forum. The court explained that the
articles were not randomly submitted, but were instead written at the
request of the Utah Bar Association. Finally, there was no viewpoint
discrimination when the Utah Bar refused to publish Barnard's article.
The record clearly indicated that the Bar Letter refused to publish any
randomly submitted opinion.
Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Clark, brought suit against defendant, Poulton, a parole
officer for the Utah State Correction Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Clark alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by two
incidents of excessive force: by the denial of medical treatment, and by
the denial of reasonable access to the mails. A magistrate recommended
that Clark's claims be dismissed, and the district court entered judgment
accordingly. On appeal, Clark asserted that the magistrate had no juris-
diction because the referral was not authorized by statute.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the magistrate was without jurisdiction
and consequently reversed the district court's decision. The court ex-
plained that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) allows ajudge to appoint a magistrate
to serve as a special master over dispositive motions, applications for
post-conviction relief, and prisoner petitions challenging conditions of
confinement. Since no dispositive motion was filed, and since Clark was
not seeking post-conviction relief, the only applicable provision was the
one challenging "conditions of confinement." The court ruled, how-
ever, that "conditions of confinement" do not encompass the use of ex-
cessive force alleged by Clark. This is because Clark's claims involved
isolated events, and "conditions of confinement" include ongoing
prison practices and regulations. Moreover, the court added that one of
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the excessive force claims arose from an incident occurring before Clark
was jailed. In addition, pursuant to § 636(c), the district court must
make a special designation, and the consent of the parties must be com-
municated to the clerk of the court. Neither of these factors were satis-
fied. Second, Clark's failure to object to proceedings before the
magistrate did not amount to a consent of jurisdiction. The court ex-
plained that parties, by their conduct, cannot extend the magistrate's
jurisdiction.
Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Crabtree, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, alleging a conspir-
acy between opposing attorneys and Oklahoma State District Judge
Cook. The district court dismissed the conspiracy claims against the at-
torneys. Moreover, it granted the judge's motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment, based on absolute judicial immunity. Last, the
district court awarded attorney's fees to the judge.
The Tenth Circuit, considering three companion appeals, upheld
the dismissal of the conspiracy claims as to both the judge and the attor-
neys. The district court correctly construed the complaint as stating in-
sufficient facts to show any evidence of a conspiracy between the judge
and the attorneys. Also, the court ruled that absolute judicial immunity
properly barred the action against the judge since he acted solely in his
judicial capacity. The court further affirmed the award of attorneys' fees
to the judge because no reasonable attorney could believe that absolute
judicial immunity would not bar the action. Finally, the court reversed
the denial of attorneys' fees to the attorneys. The court held that since
Oklahoma state courts previously denied Crabtree's claims to the dis-
puted property, no reasonable attorney would institute a conspiracy ac-
tion under § 1983 to assert title claims.
Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Dixon, brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985(3) against the City of Lawton and several police of-
ficers regarding the shooting death of her son. The district court held in
favor of the police officers and the City on the § 1983 claim, and in favor
of the police officers on the § 1985(3) claim. Dixon subsequently ap-
pealed. On appeal, Dixon argued that: (1) the district court erred in
instructing the jury that § 1983 liability was a condition precedent to
§ 1985(3) liability; and (2) the district court's admission of certain infor-
mation contained in Dixon's medical records was erroneous because of
evolving federal common law privilege.
The Tenth Circuit first held that § 1983 liability is not a condition
precedent to liability under § 1985(3). The court reasoned that there
are several important differences between the sections. In addition, in
order to recover under a § 1983 conspiracy theory, Dixon must prove
[Vol. 68:4
CIVIL RIGHTS
not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights. Last,
communications between psychotherapists and the son were admissable.
The court explained that after the son's death, the privilege did not ap-
ply in the proceeding because Dixon relied upon the son's previous
emotional condition as an element of her defense.
Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Gulley, appealed the district court's verdict in favor of de-
fendant, Orr, Secretary of the Air Force. Gulley brought suit against
Orr under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act claiming that he was sub-
jected to severe discipline and was not promoted because he was black
and because he had complained of discrimination. On appeal, Gulley
argued that: (1) the exhaustion of his individual administrative remedies
was sufficient to enable him to assert class claims in federal court;
(2) the district court erred in finding that the disciplinary actions insti-
tuted against him were not discriminatory; and (3) the district court
erred in denying his motion for defaultjudgment and in quashing two of
his subpoenas.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
ruled that one of Gulley's class actions was barred from federal court
because his class administrative remedies had not been exhausted.
Moreover, the exhaustion of individual administrative remedies was in-
sufficient. The court further found that Orr rebutted the unlawful dis-
crimination charges by showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Gulley's motion for a default judg-
ment or in quashing two of his subpoenas.
Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Hannula, sought damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries allegedly sustained during an
arrest by a police officer from the City of Lakewood. Defendant, Lively,
moved for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense.
The district court denied the motion, and Lively appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted summary
judgment. The court reasoned that Hannula must prove that Lively's
actions constituted an excessive use of force under a substantive due
process standard. The court required Hannula to prove that: (1) the
force used was excessive to the need presented; (2) the injury was ex-
cessive; and (3) Lively's motive was improper. After assessing the facts,
the court found the evidence insufficient to clearly constitute a constitu-
tional violation and, therefore, granted summary judgment.
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Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Maple and Reed, were attacked while in prison. Reed suf-
fered serious knife wounds. Both Maple and Reed filed a pro se civil
rights action, which was later dismissed by the district court. The dis-
trict court reasoned that the complaint was legally frivolous pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Maple and Reed appealed, arguing: (1) cruel and
unusual punishment and denial of equal protection because a correc-
tions officer displayed gross disregard in failing to promptly come to
Reed's aid; (2) conspiracy to neglect and discriminate against Reed in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments; and (3) denial of
proper and speedy medical assistance after the injury.
The Tenth Circuit first held that the district court was correct in
dismissing the cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection
claims. The court reasoned that there was no arguable basis for a con-
stitutional claim based on a correctional officer's failure to prevent in-
jury to a prisoner. Also, Reed failed to provide any evidence supporting
denial of equal protection rights or due process rights. Moreover, the
district court properly dismissed the conspiracy claim. The court held
that Reed and Maple's claim alleging a general discriminatory conspir-
acy was unfocused, conclusory and deficient in showing elements of
agreement and concerted action. Finally, Reed's deliberate indifference
claim was incorrectly dismissed and was vacated and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings. The court stated that the district court misread
Reed's deliberate indifference claim as involving a mere difference of
opinion with prison medical staff. The actual focus of the claim was not
the character of the care provided, but the delay in furnishing it. There
was nothing in the record to indicate Reed's two hour delay in receiving
medical attention was based on any competent medical opinion. In light
of the liberal substantive standard used for § 1915(d) allegations, the
dismissal of the second cause of action was improper.
Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, Riggs and others, filed a civil rights class action suit
against defendant, City of Albuquerque ("Albuquerque"), seeking, inter
alia, to prevent the destruction of certain intelligence documents. The
documents were investigative files kept by the Intelligence Unit of the
Albuquerque Police Department. The class alleged that the documents
were retained without a proper police purpose. The class argued that
this surveillance had a chilling effect on their first amendment rights,
causing injury to their personal, political, and professional reputations.
The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing. The class
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case
for lack of standing. The court ruled that the district court erroneously
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construed the class' complaint as alleging only a general chilling of their
rights because of a suspicion that police investigations were carried out
improperly. The court found that the complaint did allege harm to per-
sonal, political, and professional reputations in the community. It also
alleged that they were the actual targets of illegal investigations. Ac-
cordingly, the court reasoned that the class brought forth a cognizable,
continuing injury which presented a case or controversy for the court to
consider.
Ware v. Unified School Dist., 902 F.2d 815
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Ware, brought suit against defendant, Unified School Dis-
trict No. 492 ("school board"), alleging that her first amendment rights
were violated when the superintendent of schools fired her allegedly be-
cause she opposed a bond issue. The district court directed a verdict for
the school board, and Ware subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that a local governmental entity, such as a
school board, may only be held liable for decisions made by final policy-
makers. Under Kansas law, the school board, not the superintendent,
has final decisionmaking authority. Accordingly, the school board can-
not be liable for the superintendent's actions. The court, nonetheless,
noted that there are circumstances in which a governmental entity will
be liable for a subordinate's decisions due to a delegation of final deci-
sionmaking power. This occurs, for example, when a subordinate's de-
cision is couched as a policy statement, or when the decision manifests a
custom or usage. In the case at hand, the court ruled that the
subordinate's decision to terminate Ware's employment was not cast in
terms of a policy statement, nor was there proof that the decision repre-
sented a custom or usage. Second, the court determined whether the
school board could be held liable for constitutional deprivation arising
from its own decision to fire Ware. The court stated that to find liability,
a direct causal link must exist between the acts of the governing body
sought to be held liable and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Such
a link may be established when the governing body has exercised its
decisionmaking authority with deliberate indifference to the constitu-
tional rights of those affected by its decisions. In this case, the record
contained sufficient evidence to create a jury question on whether the
school board acted with deliberate indifference in approving Ware's dis-




Crysco Oilfield Serv., Inc. v. Hutchison-Hayes Int'l, Inc., 913 F.2d 850
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Crysco Oilfield Services, Inc. ("Crysco"), brought an ac-
tion for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a "particular pur-
pose" under an Oklahoma statute adopting § 2-315 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and for violation of Oklahoma's Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 752-63. Crysco claimed that defendant,
Hutchison-Hayes International, Incorporated ("Hutchison-Hayes"),
sold defective shale shaker machinery in violation of the implied war-
ranty. At trial, Hutchison-Hayes moved for a directed verdict regarding
Crysco's implied warranty claim. The district court denied the motion,
and the jury returned a verdict for Crysco on the breach of implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim. Hutchison-Hayes ap-
pealed the district court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court
concluded that Crysco used the shaker machinery in the typical and or-
dinary manner. Consequently, this use was not the "particular purpose"
contemplated by § 2-315. In Oklahoma, as elsewhere, "particular pur-
pose" is not satisfied by use in the ordinary manner, but, rather, re-
quires a "specific use" which is peculiar to the buyer. Thus, the court
held that the district court erred in not directing the verdict for Hutchi-
son-Hayes on the implied warranty claim.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Allen, was convicted of tax evasion and fraudulent mis-
use of a social security number. On appeal, Allen argued that his sixth
amendment rights were violated because the district court improperly
denied his pro se motions for a continuance in order to retain
representation.
The Tenth Circuit held that Allen's sixth amendment right to assist-
ance of counsei was violated. The court explained that the district court
failed to inquire whether Allen's waiver of counsel was knowing and in-
telligent. The court reasoned that since an invalid waiver of a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right denies him assistance of counsel, the
harmless error analysis is not applicable. Consequently, the court re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings.
Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445
Author: Judge Logan
Decedent, Theresa Apodaca, was killed when her vehicle collided
with a vehicle driven by an employee of the Rio Arriba County Sheriff's
Department ("sheriff's department"). The estate of the decedent and
her parents brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming decedent was
deprived of life without due process of law and was seized in violation of
the fourth amendment. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the sheriff's department, and the Apodacas subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court stated that although the member of the sheriff's department was
acting under color of state law, negligent operation of a vehicle is not a
constitutional violation. Thus, there was no violation of due process.
Second, the court ruled the death of the decedent did not constitute a
seizure under the fourth amendment. To violate the fourth amendment,
a seizure must be unreasonable and intentional. Because the automo-
bile accident was not intentionally caused by the member of the sheriff's
department, no valid constitutional claim existed.
Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Archuleta, a three-year-old child, alleged that his liberty
interest under the fourteenth amendment was violated when he wit-
nessed a police officer's violent arrest of his father. The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, police officer Mc-
Shan. The district court reasoned that McShan's conduct was not di-
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rected toward Archuleta and, therefore, Archuleta's constitutional rights
were not violated. Archuleta appealed, contending that under the four-
teenth amendment, he has a right to be free from emotional trauma suf-
fered as a result of observing allegedly excessive police force directed
entirely at his father.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant Mc-
Shan summary judgment. The court stated that the protections of due
process are not triggered by mere carelessness, but rather by an element
of deliberateness in directing the misconduct toward Archuleta.
Archuleta's claim, therefore, failed since he did not establish that Mc-
Shan possessed the requisite intent to cause him physical harm or emo-
tional damage. McShan merely inflicted indirect and unintended injury
as a result of police conduct directed at another.
Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Greer, a jail psychiatrist, ordered thorazine to be given
forcefully to plaintiff, Bee, a pretrial detainee. Bee subsequently sued
Greer for violation of his constitutional rights. The jury found for Bee,
and he was awarded attorney's fees and costs. The district court judge,
however, reduced the award by fifty-percent. Bee appealed, asserting
that by reducing the damages awarded, the district court abused its dis-
cretion. Furthermore, Bee challenged the district court's refusal to
award his transportation costs to and from trial and his attorney's travel
expenses for earlier appeals. Greer also appealed, arguing that he was
entitled to qualified immunity because the law on involuntary medica-
tion was unclear at the time.
In determining the validity of Greer's claims, the Tenth Circuit dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's position on the issue. The court noted that
the Supreme Court stated that a mentally ill prisoner may not be treated
with antipsychotic drugs against his will without a hearing, and a pretrial
detainee has at least the rights of convicted prisoners. Because Bee had
no hearing regarding the medication and because Utah statutorily pro-
hibits the administration of medication to involuntarily committed pa-
tients, the court held that Greer was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court next addressed the reduction of fees and costs. Bee's fees
and costs were reduced by the district court because of limited success
in his overall litigation. The court noted that eighteen of nineteen de-
fendants received favorable verdicts. This was recognized as a valid rea-
son for limiting awards. Included in the reduction, however, were fees
and costs relating to two successful appeals. Therefore, this portion of
the decision was remanded for re-evaluation. Finally, the court held that
costs of transporting Bee to and from trial are clearly not encompassed




Beny v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489
Author: Judge Logan
The district court found that defendant, City of Muskogee (the
"city"), improperly controlled a prison holding facility, and was liable
for the wrongful death of plaintiff's, Berry's, husband. The jury found
in favor of Berry, and the city appealed. On appeal, the city alleged that
the district court erred by: (1) not submitting the case to thejury under
an eighth amendment standard; '(2) denying the defendant's motions
for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict for in-
sufficiency of evidence; and (3) improperly instructing the jury that the
measure of damages should be based on Oklahoma's wrongful death
statute.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the case should have been submit-
ted under an eighth amendment standard. The eighth amendment was
applicable since it is the primary source of substantive protection to con-
victed prisoners in claims alleging excessive force by governmental ac-
tors. Second, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the
case to support a reasonable jury verdict on the issue of deliberate indif-
ference. The court explained that ajury reasonably could conclude that
the city's conduct was the moving force in bringing about the constitu-
tional violation. Specifically, no preventative action was taken after ajail
employee was informed of Berry's claims that her husband feared for his
life. Third, the district court erred in instructing the jury on a wrongful
death action. The court explained that the wrongful death action laws
do not carry out the full effects for § 1983 cases which end in the vic-
tim's death. Specifically, the laws are deficient in punishing the offenses.
Consequently, the district court's judgment was vacated and a new trial
was ordered.
Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435
Author: Judge Ebel
Dissent: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Brown, sought a declaratory judgment that bar letters is-
sued by defendant, Peterson Air Force Base Commander Palmer
("Palmer"), were in violation of the first amendment. The letters were
issued in response to plaintiff Brown's refusal to cease distributing anti-
war leaflets at Peterson Air Force Base (the "base") during open houses.
The district court concluded that the base became a public forum during
the open house, and that Palmer engaged in content-based regulation of
speech, which is impermissible in a public forum absent a compelling
state interest. Brown's request for declaratory relief was granted, and
Palmer appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court
noted the absence of extreme circumstances needed to transform a mili-
tary base into a public forum. The open house did not constitute an
abandonment of a special interest in regulating the base, nor did it evi-
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dence an intention to turn the base into a public forum. In a non-public
forum, the government may impose content-based restrictions on
speech as long as its regulations are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
Here, the restrictions placed on Brown's speech were reasonable, as a
means of preserving security on the base, and viewpoint neutral in that
they were applied to all political material regardless of its ideological
message.
Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Clemmons, contended that his prison facility forced him to
reside in a cell with a smoker in contravention of his eighth and four-
teenth amendment substantive due process rights. Moreover, he al-
leged that he was subjected to disciplinary segregation in retaliation for
his attempts to assert these constitutional rights. Defendant, Bohannon,
moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court.
Clemmons subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court
held that Bohannon's policy of permitting the double-ceiling of smokers
with nonsmokers against their expressed will can amount to a violation
of fourteenth amendment rights. The court remanded to the district
court to determine whether exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
amounted to an unreasonable risk of serous medical injury, thus pro-
scribing Clemmons' eighth amendment right to a healthy rehabilitative
prison environment. Clemmons' fourteenth amendment due process
rights in this instance were deemed equivalent to his eight amendment
guarantee. Thus, Clemmons' due process claim was subsumed within
his eighth amendment claim. Furthermore, the court upheld the district
court's order dismissing the retaliation claim as frivolous.
Considine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 910 F.2d 695
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Considine, contended that termination of his employment
with defendant, Board of County Commissioners of Adams County (the
"board"), violated his first amendment rights. During his employment,
Considine made many critical statements generally related to public
health, safety, and welfare of certain county projects. Specifically, Con-
sidine stated that these projects were illegal, unsafe, or improper. The
board claimed that summary judgment was proper based on qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion, and the board ap-
pealed, claiming that: (1) Considine's speech was not protected by the
first amendment; and (2) summary judgment was proper under the doc-
trine of qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary
judgment. The court first characterized Considine's speech as that con-
stituting a matter of public concern. The court then balanced his inter-
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est as a private citizen with the interest of the state. The court ruled that
the board did not present sufficient evidence to outweigh Considine's
interest in free speech. Accordingly, the board was not entitled to sum-
mary judgment as a matter of law. Second, the court ruled that the
board was not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immu-
nity. The court reasoned that to afford qualified immunity protection,
two elements must not be clearly established: (1) Considine's state-
ments constituted speech on matters of public concern; and (2) Consi-
dine's interest in making such statements outweigh the board's interest
in the effective functioning of the county government.
United States v. Dawes, 895 F.2d 1581
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendants, Donald and Phyllis Dawes (the "Daweses"), were con-
victed of willful failure to file income tax returns. The Daweses' mo-
tioned for a new trial, but it was denied. The Daweses appealed,
contending that they were denied their constitutional right to counsel at
trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and re-
manded with instructions to vacate the convictions and sentences. The
court treated the actions as motions for writs of error coram nobis. The
court held the right to counsel fundamental and, therefore, the Daweses
were entitled to a reversal of their convictions. The court noted that
vacancy of the Daweses' convictions would not prevent the government
from retrying them on the same charges.
Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Frazier, alleged that he was improperly transferred by de-
fendant, Dubois, from the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth,
Kansas, to the Penitentiary in Lompoc, California, in retaliation for his
activities in the "Afrikan Cultural Society." He asserted that this was a
violation of his first amendment rights. Frazier also claimed that he was
arbitrarily placed in segregation without a hearing. The district court
dismissed the complaint as frivolous. The district court ruled that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not entitle a pris-
oner to a hearing when he is transferred. The court reasoned that the
prisoner does not have a liberty interest in assignment to a particular
prison.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that prison officials do not have unbri-
dled discretion to transfer inmates in retaliation for exercising other
constitutional rights. The court remanded the case, however, for a de-
termination of whether the prison's regulations, which allegedly in-
fringed on Frazier's constitutional rights, were reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. The court also remanded Frazier's sec-
ond claim that he was arbitrarily placed in segregation without a hear-
ing. The court stated that the district court must determine if Frazier's
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due process rights were violated under Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5
(1980), and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Denver School District No. 1 (the "district"), appealed a
1985 district court ruling. This ruling stated that the district was not yet
racially "unitary" and, therefore, must undertake further remedial
changes. The district also appealed an interim decree issued by the dis-
trict court to facilitate progress toward unitariness. The district first ar-
gued that its compliance with the original 1974 desegregation order
remedied any constitutional violation. It also contented there was no
constitutional right to any particular racial balance in a school's student
body. Further, concerns about the possible segregative effects of such
actions as implementation of a neighborhood school policy were irrele-
vant because discriminatory impact* is not a constitutional violation.
Last, the district alleged that there was no evidence of segregative intent
on the part of the school board.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's 1985 decision, hold-
ing that compliance with a court-ordered desegregation plan, without
more, does not make a district unitary. Moreover, the district's conduct
must be measured by its effectiveness, not the purpose of its actions in
decreasing segregation. The court stated that a school district must
eliminate all intentional racial discrimination and make every reasonable
effort to eradicate all effects of such discrimination before the court may
declare it unitary. The existence of racially identifiable schools is strong
evidence that segregation and its effects have not been eradicated. The
court also found no evidence that the district court erred in finding the
district's pupil assignment policies nonunitary. Also, the district court
did not err in ruling that the district failed to prove that existing resegre-
gation resulted from demographic changes and not from actions of the
board. Having upheld the 1985 ruling, the court decided that the dis-
trict court's interim decree, which eliminated reporting requirements
and allowed the district to change its desegregation plan without specific
court approval, was not unreasonably vague or indefinite. In addition, it
did not impose any objectionable prohibitions. The court only re-
manded the decree for language changes. The court instructed the dis-
trict court to clarify that racial balance in any school or department need
not reflect racial proportions in the district as a whole, since there is no
constitutional right to any particular level of integration.
Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiffs, Laidley and others, were terminated from employment at
the Oklahoma District Attorney's office by defendant, McClain, the
newly elected district attorney. Laidley filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that McClain, Director Ritter, and the Board of County
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Commissioners violated his first amendment rights of free speech and
freedom of association. Laidley also asserted various pendent state
claims. The district court granted McClain's motion for summary judg-
ment and dismissed the pendent claims.
The Tenth Circuit found that since no other plaintiff was named in
the notice of appeal, the notice was insufficient to confer appellate juris-
diction over the omitted plaintiffs. First, Laidley raised a genuine issue
of material fact as to the circumstances of her dismissal. Accordingly,
the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of McClain individu-
ally and remanded the pendent claims to the district court. Summary
judgment in favor of McClain in his capacity as district attorney was af-
firmed. The court explained that the eleventh amendment generally
bars actions for damages against a state in federal court. Summary judg-
ment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners was affirmed be-
cause the office of the district attorney falls under state, rather than
county, control. Summary judgment in favor of Ritter was affirmed be-
cause there was no evidence that Ritter or his office was involved in the
firing.
Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Larson, appealed the district court's life imprisonment
sentence. Larson argued that his absence from portions of the trial, in-
cluding jury instructions conference, jury instructions, closing argu-
ments, and rendering of the verdict violated his constitutional rights.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order finding no constitutional error
with regard to Larson's exclusion from the jury instructions conference.
The court reversed and remanded, however, regarding Larson's invol-
untary exclusion from the jury instructions, closing arguments, and ren-
dering of the verdict. On de novo review, the court found that Larson did
have a constitutional right to be present for these particular hearings.
The court recognized that a defendant has a due process right to be
present at trial whenever such presence relates to or is reasonably sub-
stantial to his defense. Second, the court found that Larson did not
waive his right to be present. The court held that Larson's counsel
could not waive this right for him. Moreover, Larson's silent acquies-
cence to his removal did not suffice as a waiver.
Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Smith, a prisoner, brought suit. against defendant,
Maschner, claiming his constitutional rights were violated. Specifically,
Maschner deprived him of property without due process, interfered with
his mail, denied him due process during his disciplinary hearings, and
conspired to deny him access to the courts. As part of the conspiracy
claim, Smith contended that Maschner placed him in disciplinary segre-
gation in retaliation for his litigation against prison officials and his "jail-
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house lawyering." The district court entered summary judgment
against Smith and denied his motion for partial summary judgment.
Smith appealed both judgments.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment against Smith on his deprivation of prop-
erty claim. The court explained that the availability of a state post-dep-
rivation remedy destroyed Smith's argument that Maschner deprived
him of property without due process. Second, Smith failed to demon-
strate that the prison's regulation of his incoming mail violated any pro-
tected right. The court noted that regulations affecting the sending of
publications are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests. Moreover, the opening of Smith's mail was an isolated
incident without improper motive or resulting interference. Accord-
ingly, Smith's right to counsel or to access to the courts was not violated.
Further, Smith failed to provide evidence of any prison policy that man-
dated confiscating materials from the mail for punitive purposes. Third,
Smith received adequate notice of the disciplinary charges against him.
He was told the day before his first hearing. Also, although he was not
given a written statement of evidence supporting the disciplinary action,
Smith received a written transcript containing the required information.
Smith, however, was denied procedural due process at the disciplinary
hearing. The court explained that by denying Smith the opportunity to
call a witness, Maschner denied him any defense other than his own tes-
timony. Fourth, there was sufficient evidence to find that Maschner took
improper disciplinary action against Smith, in retaliation for prior law-
suits. Thus, summary judgment on this claim was improper. Fifth, the
court ruled that prison inmates do not possess the right to a particular
prisoner's help in preparing legal materials. This does not mean, how-
ever, that Smith failed to state a constitutional claim. Smith's assertion
that Maschner denied him his right to use litigation to effect change in
the prison stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
McCarthy v. Maddigan, 914 F.2d 1411
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, McCarthy, an inmate in a federal penitentiary, brought suit
for damages claiming that defendant Maddigan's deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs was a violation of his eighth amendment
rights. The district court dismissed McCarthy's claim without prejudice.
McCarthy subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
stated that when a federal prisoner seeks only money damages to re-
dress an alleged constitutional violation, an exhaustion of administrative




Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools, 906 F.2d 1434
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiffs, Morfin and Kotlisky, spouses and school employees, filed
suit claiming they were retaliated against for engaging in constitution-
ally protected conduct, including free speech, union association, and
marital association. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Davenport and Mondragon, school supervisors, holding that a
portion of the conduct was not protected. The district court also ruled,
however, that other conduct engaged in by the spouses fell under the
qualified immunity doctrine. Morfin and Kotlisky subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part. The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mondragon
regarding the alleged retaliatory conduct taken against Morfin. The
court explained that there was no evidence that Mondragon had contact
with Morfin. The court also upheld the district court's decision regard-
ing qualified immunity on the free speech claims. The court explained
that public officials are protected by qualified immunity unless their con-
duct violates clearly established rights. At the time the challenged ac-
tions were taken, it was not clear that the plaintiff's criticism of
Davenport was protected speech. Therefore, Davenport and Mon-
dragon were qualifiedly immune. The court further found, though, that
the right to associate with a union is clearly established. Thus, Daven-
port and Mondragon were not qualifiedly immune in this circumstance.
Morfin's claim that her first amendment right was violated failed, how-
ever, because she did not assert that she assisted Kotlisky's pursuit of his
complaints. Sufficient factual disputes existed on the marital association
claim, however, to render summary judgment inappropriate.
Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Myatt, was convicted of committing indecent liberties
with a minor. Myatt petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was later
dismissed by the district court. Myatt appealed, alleging: (1) Kansas's
child hearsay statute was unconstitutional on its face because it failed to
require adequate indicia of reliability; and (2) the admission of hearsay
statements violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Kan-
sas Supreme Court previously found the child hearsay statute consistent
with the Kansas Constitution, and federal courts must accept this deci-
sion unless it is inconsistent with principles of liberty and justice. More-
over, the court stated that the Kansas Supreme Court properly required
that child hearsay statements possess adequate indicia of reliability,
which must be established on a case-by-case basis before the statement
may be admitted into evidence. Second, the right of confrontation has
never been regarded as absolute, but occasionally must give way to pub-
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lic policy and necessities of a case. The Supreme Court has held, inter
alia, that the prosecution must show that hearsay evidence bears "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Here, the child victim was ex-
amined four times by a child psychiatrist who testified that the child was
a credible witness and knew right from wrong. The court was, therefore,
satisfied that the hearsay statements were reliable.
National Advertising Co. v. City and County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, National Advertising Company ("National"), a seller of
billboard advertising space, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages stemming from two ordinances enacted by defend-
ant, City and County of Denver ("Denver"). These ordinances, one
which superseded the other, restricted the placement of billboards along
freeways. National, therefore, claimed that it was entitled to relief for
violations of the first amendment, the just compensation clause as incor-
porated into the fourteenth amendment, and the due process and equal
protection clauses. The district court rejected all of National's claims.
National subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
first held that the new ordinance permissibly regulates commercial
speech under the first amendment. Second, the new ordinance's failure
to define the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech with total clarity, did not render it unconstitutionally vague. Nor
did it grant Denver "unfettered" discretion. Third, National's claims for
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under the old ordinance
were properly dismissed as moot. Fourth, National's damage claims for
deprivation of constitutional rights arising from denial of its applications
for permits to construct signs failed. The court explained that the deni-
als were properly based on a facially valid pending ordinance. Finally,
National's inverse condemnation claim was unripe.
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Planned Parenthood, brought suit challenging the amend-
ments to Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2,
59.5, 59.7-59.10. The amended regulations prohibit Title X participants
from advising women about abortion as a medical option. Moreover,
the regulations require physical, financial, and legal separation of Title
X supported facilities from any others that counsel about or perform
abortions. The district court entered a permanent injunction against
implementation of the new regulations, reasoning that they violate con-
gressional intent and the constitutional rights of women patients.
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's injunction. The
court ruled that congressional intent was violated by denying issuance of
Title X grants solely because the grantee was not sufficiently funded to
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meet the separation requirement. The court explained that the require-
ment would restrict the number of permissible grantees under Title X.
The court further held that the requirements restricting the disclosure
of abortion options were unconstitutional. The court reasoned that
prohibiting the physician from relaying information necessary in his pro-
fessional judgment created a constitutionally impermissible obstacle to a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice. The court also noted that
restricting the physicians' disclosure of the abortion option implicates
the physicians' guarantees of free speech.
Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673
Author: Judge Baldock
The Oklahoma Department of Human Services ("DHS") conducted
an investigation of plaintiffs', the Snells', home based on allegations of
child abuse. The Snells subsequently brought suit seeking injunctive re-
lief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The district court
denied injunctive relief, the § 1985 claim was dismissed, and only four
DHS employees remained as defendants. The issues on appeal were
whether the DHS employees were entitled to absolute or qualified im-
munity, and whether the Snells' fourth amendment right against illegal
searches of their home was violated. Defendants, Swepson, Siek, Lev-
ingston, and Padley appealed the district court's decision denying them
both absolute and qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
stated that the three non-attorney defendants, Swepson, Siek, and Lev-
ingston, were acting not in a prosecutorial but an investigative capacity
and, therefore, did not warrant absolute immunity. Moreover, DHS at-
torney Padley, though acting in a prosecutorial fashion, did so without
authority and thus was denied absolute immunity. The court also af-
firmed the denial of all four defendants' qualified immunity due to the
fact that they obtained a court order using knowingly false information
in violation of the fourth amendment. The court thus remanded the
§ 1983 claim for trial.
Turney v. O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Turney, a 17-year-old juvenile, argued that his constitu-
tional rights were violated when he was placed in an adult maximum
security unit of a mental hospital pursuant to a judicial order. Turney
brought suit against the hospital's superintendent, O'Toole, and a psy-
chologist, Featherston. The district court held O'Toole and Featherston
were absolutely immune from liability and dismissed the suit. Turney
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that O'Toole and Featherston were abso-
lutely immune from liability arising out of Turney's confinement. The
court held that immunity applies with full force to a judicial order re-
quiring a person be detained for a mental evaluation. The court also
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ruled, however, that the defendants were only qualifiedly immune from
liability arising from conditions in which Turney was held. The court
reasoned that absolute immunity extends only to acts prescribed by a
judicial order. Since the decree only ordered confinement and did not
dictate specific treatment or confinement, the defendants were not abso-
lutely immune from liability arising out of Turney's placement. Accord-
ingly, the court remanded for further consideration.
CONTRACT LAW
Blaser Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 893 F.2d 259
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Blaser Farms, Inc. ("Blaser"), argued that by missing a
September 1985 "substitute royalty" payment, Anadarko Petroleum
Corporation ("Anadarko") and Enicon Corporation ("Enicon") violated
a special limitation clause of their lease. Accordingly, Blaser contended
that the lease automatically terminated. The district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of Anadarko and Enicon. Blaser subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that summary judgment was properly
granted to Anadarko and Enicon. Although the correct interpretation of
the royalty payment clause required Anadarko to make payments in ad-
vance, Oklahoma law allows consideration of equitable circumstances
that would avoid forfeitures. Because Anadarko spent $300,000 suc-
cessfully connecting a pipeline to the well by December 1985, the court
stated that Oklahoma law was properly applied to conclude that the cir-
cumstances prevented automatic termination of the lease.
Edo Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 911 F.2d 1447
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Edo Corporation ("Edo"), and defendant, Beech Aircraft
Corporation ("Beech"), entered into a series of research and develop-
ment contracts. The contracts contained "termination for convenience"
and "noncompetition" clauses. Beech subsequently terminated the con-
tracts. Edo brought suit against Beech, claiming that it was entitled to
recovery of "unabsorbed overhead" and to expectancy damages on a
promissory estoppel theory. The district court granted Beech partial
summary judgment and a directed verdict. Edo appealed, claiming that
the district court erred in: (1) refusing to award unabsorbed overhead
damages; (2) finding justification for terminating the contracts;
(3) granting summary judgment against Edo on oral modification of the
contracts; and (4) applying promissory estoppel elements.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings against Edo.
First, the court held that Edo was not entitled to unabsorbed overhead
damages. The court reasoned that Edo failed to show a nexus between
the damages and Beech's termination of the contracts. Second, Beech's
termination of the Edo contracts did not constitute a breach of the
agreements. The court explained that the "termination for conven-
ience" clause was clearly supported by consideration. Third, the state-
ments made did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an
intent to modify an express term of each agreement. The court rea-
soned that the oral modifications were "too amorphous" to vary any of
the written contracts. Finally, the court held that Edo's promissory es-
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toppel theory failed. The court explained that Edo did not prove Beech
made a promise that Edo could rely on, thereby foregoing other oppor-
tunities. Also, the court stated that Edo lacked good faith belief that it
would be prohibited from pursuing other opportunities.
Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Hitz, a California resident, was employed in Southern
California by White & White, a Missouri corporation with its principal
offices in Kansas. White & White was purchased by plaintiff, Equifax
Services, Inc. ("Equifax"). Hitz's employment contract contained a
noncompete clause and provided that it would be governed by Kansas
law. Hitz resigned from Equifax to become president of a newly formed
competing business. Equifax sued to enforce the noncompetition
clause. The district court granted Equifax a preliminary injunction.
Hitz appealed, claiming that the district court erred in: (1) exercising
personal jurisdiction over him; (2) granting the injunction; and (3) de-
nying his change of venue motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. First, the
court ruled that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Hitz
because he purposefully affiliated himself with Kansas through his inter-
state contractual relation with Equifax's predecessor firm. Second, the
court upheld the preliminary injunction, noting that Kansas courts prob-
ably would enforce the contractual choice-of-law and noncompetition
provisions and would refuse to weigh any conflict between Kansas and
California's laws and policies. The court also noted that Equifax suc-
ceeded to its predecessor's right to enforce the noncompete clause, and
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Hitz's violation of
the agreement irreparably harmed Equifax. Finally, the court upheld
the denial of Hitz's change of venue motion because the order was inter-
locutory and not immediately appealable.
Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Applied Genetics International, Inc. ("AGI"), appealed a
summary judgment awarded to defendant, First Affiliated Securities,
Inc. ("FAS"). AGI asserted that the district court erred in holding that a
settlement and release agreement entered into by AGI and FAS was
valid and barred all of AGI's claims against FAS. On appeal, AGI ar-
gued that: (1) the release was procured by economic duress and fraud;
(2) the release was materially breached by FAS; (3) the release did not
cover post-settlement claims; and (4) evidence of oral agreements to the
release should have been allowed.
On de novo review and applying Wyoming law, the Tenth Circuit
reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceed-
ings. First, the Wyoming test for duress was consistent with the test for
economic duress. Specifically, the tests are similar in states which ex-
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pressly recognize economic duress as grounds for avoiding a settlement
agreement. The court then determined that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on the issue of economic duress. In mak-
ing its decision, the court applied the recognized elements of an unlaw-
ful act, which are absence of a reasonable alternative to enter the
agreement and lack of free will. Moreover, because Wyoming law re-
quires a clear and convincing standard of proof in establishing fraud and
AGI failed to establish each element, summary judgment on the issue of
fraud was proper. Second, the language "present legal interest" in-
cluded more than mere possession. Therefore, summary judgment for
FAS was inappropriate. The court reasoned that the agreement re-
quired AGI's "present legal interest" in the properties to be preserved,
or the agreement was of no force or effect. Third, the phrase "to and
including the date hereof" limited the scope of the release to claims
arising prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the release.
Consequently, summary judgment was not proper as to the issue of
post-settlement claims. Finally, the district court correctly invoked the
parole evidence rule to prevent incorporation of alleged oral agree-
ments into the written release.
Koch v. Koch, 903 F.2d 1333
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Charles and David Koch, and defendant, William Koch,
entered into two contracts. The first contract was for the purchase and
sale of stock in Koch Industries. The second contract was the sale of
William's real estate in exchange for Charles and David's interest in a
gold coin collection. When William refused to perform under the real
estate and coin contract, Charles and David sought specific perform-
ance. William counterclaimed, alleging fraud in the inducement and
sought recision of the real estate and coin contract. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Charles and David on the coun-
terclaim and ordered specific performance of the real estate and coin
contract. As part of the specific performance decree, the district court
ordered an appraisal of the coin collection and real estate. When the
appraisers differed on the valuation, the court decreed the final ap-
praisal value. On appeal, William contended the district court erred in:
(1) granting summary judgment when there was a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact regarding the alleged fraudulent inducement to enter into the
real estate and coin transfer; and (2) establishing the value of the real
estate and coins to be transferred under the district court's equitable
power rather than under the terms of the contract.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. First,
the court stated that the real estate and coin contract was a complete and
unambiguous document that did not refer to any other agreement and,
therefore, was not dependent on the stock sale agreement. Second, Wil-
liam urged the district court to resolve the appraisal and not follow the
contract. Accordingly, the court ruled that it would not hear William's
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attack on the district court's exercise of equitable discretion. Alterna-
tively, the court noted that district courts retain substantial discretion in
ordering specific performance.
Pacific Enter. Oil Co. v. Hertz, 893 F.2d 280
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hertz, appealed the district court's decision granting
summary judgment for plaintiff, Pacific Enterprise Oil Company ("Terra
Resources"), and denying Hertz's claim for damages. Hertz argued that
Terra Resources had no justification for refusing to honor its oil and gas
lease with Hertz, and that there were genuine issues of fact which pre-
cluded summary judgment. Terra Resources countered that: (1) the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Hertz failed to
show an injury in fact; and (2) Terra Resources was not required to ac-
cept Hertz's assignment because Colorado law requires all sellers to
convey marketable title.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had juris-
diction since Hertz's judgment in a related court of claims action was
insufficient to fully compensate his losses. The court also stated that
although the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of
whether an implied warranty of marketability extends to the assignment
of oil and gas leases, sufficient authority exists to find such a warranty.
Terra Resources was, therefore, under no duty to accept the assignment
because Hertz did not have title to the lease at the time set for perform-
ance. Finally, the court held that Hertz presented no genuine issue of
material fact. The court explained that in the absence of an express war-
ranty of marketable title in an assignment of an oil and gas lease, Colo-
rado implies the warranty as a matter of law.
Rajala v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, General Poly Corporation ("General Poly"), entered into
several agreements with defendant, Allied Corporation ("Allied"), for
the purchase of certain products. Soon thereafter, General Poly filed for
protection in bankruptcy, and its trustee brought a variety of claims
against Allied. General Poly only prevailed on its claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, thereby obtaining a jury verdict for over $70 million. Al-
lied appealed the jury verdict and the denial of its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). General Poly, on the other
hand, cross-appealed directed verdicts on its fraud, conversion, breach
of contract, and oral contract claims.
The Tenth Circuit held that Allied's motion for JNOV was improp-
erly denied because there was insufficient evidence upon which a rea-
sonable jury would properly conclude that General Poly established a
fiduciary relationship. The court relied on Kansas law, stating that
merely acting for another's benefit will not give rise to fiduciary duties
unless the alleged fiduciary consciously assumed fiduciary responsibili-
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ties. The court also affirmed all the directed verdicts issued by the dis-
trict court. First, General Poly's claim for fraud was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court explained that an action for fraud must
be brought within two years of when it occurs. But, it only accrues when
the fraud is discovered. In the case at hand, the alleged fraud should
reasonable have been discovered in March 1979. The action was filed,
however, in August 1982. Second, the court affirmed the district court's
directed verdict in favor of Allied on a separate claim of fraud. The
court reasoned that General Poly failed to present any evidence support-
ing its argument that an Allied employee knew a product was unavaila-
ble at the time he made an offer to exchange it. Third, since General
Poly did not present sufficient evidence to withstand Allied's motion for
a directed verdict on the fraud claim, its assertion of fraudulently in-
duced consent must likewise fail. Fourth, the court ruled that General
Poly's claim for breach of its written agreement must fail. The court
explained that the written agrement stated that unless General Poly gave
Allied thirty days written notice of its needs, no right of purchase shall
inure. General Poly's failure to supply such notice precluded its claim
for breach of the agreement. Finally, the district court properly directed
a verdict in favor of Allied for the breach of oral argument claim. The
court reasoned that General Poly failed to produce any evidence that it
rejected a product tendered by Allied because it was in violation of the
oral contract.
Sandlin v. Texaco Ref and Mktg., Inc., 900 F.2d 1479
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Sandlin, operated a Texaco station under a franchise
agreement with defendant, Texas Refining and Marketing, Inc.
("TRMI"). As a result of the 1984 Texaco-Getty merger, TRMI ac-
quired a Getty Oil Company station across the street from Sandlin. In
1985, it began operating the station under the Texaco name. In 1986,
TRMI notified Sandlin that his franchise would not be renewed because
it decided to sell the premises and offered to sell him the property for
$216,000. Sandlin successfully sued TRMI for breach of contract and
violation of the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA").
TRMI appealed, claiming that the jury verdict was not supported by the
evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the
evidence did not support Sandlin's allegations that TRMI's nonrenewal
decision was not made in good faith and in the normal course of busi-
ness. Also, there was insufficient evidence to support Sandlin's argu-
ment that TRMI failed to make a bona fide offer to sell him the property.
Further, the court decided that TRMI "established a sound commercial
reason" for the nonrenewal decision. TRMI demonstrated that the for-
mer Getty station was more profitable than Sandlin's station. Moreover,
TRMI's offer to sell at a price within the range of its outside appraisals,
and below the price at which the station was listed at the time of the
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trial, was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, it was a bona fide offer.
The court also reversed Sandlin's judgment on the state breach of con-
tract claim. The court ruled that testimony claiming TRMI rebranded
the Getty station earlier than necessary, and that prices posted at that
station were lower than Sandlin's purchase price, was "self-serving spec-
ulation." Thus, there was no evidence showing that TRMI breached the
good faith covenant inherent in every contract.
Transpower Constructors v. Grand River Dam Auth., 905 F.2d 1413
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Transpower Constructors ("Transpower"), entered a con-
tract to construct a transmission line for defendant, Grand River Dam
Authority ("GRDA"). Co-defendant, Benham Group ("Benham"), was
to represent GRDA for payment and granting extensions of time to
Transpower. Transpower sustained increased costs to complete the
project on time because GRDA caused delays, and Benham refused to
grant extensions. Subsequently, GRDA refused to pay the increased
costs. Transpower was successful in a suit against GRDA and Benham
for breach of contract; the jury also awarded punitive damages for negli-
gence. GRDA and Benham appealed, arguing that the district court
erred in: (1) denying their motions for directed verdict, for judgment
not withstanding the verdict, for altering or amending the verdict, and
for a new trial; (2) calculating damages; and (3) awarding post-judg-
ment interest and certain attorney's fees. Transpower appealed the
court's denial of prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed all decisions of the district court. First,
on de novo review, there was no indication that the evidence pointed in
favor of GRDA's and Benham's motions. Second, since Transpower es-
tablished sufficient evidence of the fact of damages, the jury may deter-
mine the proper award from the best evidence admitted. Third, in a
diversity action., 28 U.S.C. § 1961 allows for interest on any money judg-
ment in a civil case. Oklahoma law permits recovery of attorney's fees in
a breach of contract action, but not a negligence action. Here, Trans-
power required evidence of Benham's negligence in order to prove
breach of contract. Finally, Transpower was not entitled to prejudg-
ment interest because its damages were not certain or calculable prior to
judgment.
Vanguard Prod., Inc. v. Martin, 894 F.2d 375
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Vanguard Production, Inc. ("Vanguard"), appealed the
district court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants,
attorneys Martin and Morgan and the law firm of Ames, Ashabranner,
Taylor, Lawrence, Laudick and Morgan. On appeal, Vanguard argued
that the district court erred in holding that: (1) an attorney was not
liable for malpractice to persons other than their immediate clients; and
(2) there were insufficient facts to establish a jury question.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Morgan
and Martin owed no duty to Vanguard. The court held that the common
law duty of workmanlike performance is in every contract for service.
Accordingly, this duty extends to third party beneficiaries who
foreseeably could be harmed by a breach of such duty. Furthermore,
the court held that under Oklahoma law, the rule is also applicable to
attorneys. Finding that Vanguard pleaded sufficient evidence to raise a




Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Abels, petitioned the district court for habeas corpus re-
lief. In his petition, Abels argued that his constitutional right to appeal
his state court conviction was denied for two reasons. First, Abels
claimed that his counsel refused to proceed on appeal because Abels
was essentially indigent and not able to afford his attorney's legal serv-
ices. Second, the state refused, after a finding that Abels was not indi-
gent, to provide him with appointed counsel. The district court denied
Abels's petition and he subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first rejected Abels's argument that he was de-
nied his right to appeal because his counsel refused to proceed. The
court explained that the record contained insufficient evidence to over-
turn the district court's ruling that Abels was not indigent at the time of
his conviction. Second, the court stated that Abels's constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel was violated. The court explained that
Abels's counsel did not properly file a motion to withdraw as counsel.
Thus, Abels's counsel was not relieved of his duties to perfect the ap-
peal. Accordingly, the counselor's failure to file an appellate brief vio-
lated Abels's constitutional right to effective counsel. Thus, the case was
remanded to provide Abels with assistance of counsel.
United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge McKay
Defendants are realtors who represent four clients. These clients
are allegedly involved in an organization suspected of engaging in illegal
drug activity. The realtors were held in contempt of court because they
refused to reveal the source of fees incurred during their representation
of the clients. The realtors filed an emergency appeal, alleging that the
fee information was subject to attorney-client privilege, that it infringed
on their sixth amendment right to counsel, and that the government
failed to make the necessary showing of need. The realtors also claimed
that the district court's proceedings violated their due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, except
to the extent that it required the disclosure of the fee contracts. The
court explained that the source of payment for legal fees is not generally
protected by attorney-client privilege and the three major exceptions to
the rule were not applicable. The court further explained that although
the clients have a right to counsel on appeal, there is no evidence show-
ing resulting conflict between the realtors and the clients. The court
recognized that the government was required only to provide notice to
the subpoenaed witnesses and to show that the information is relevant
to a legitimate grand jury investigation; the government met that stan-
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dard. The court ruled that the procedures used did not violate due pro-
cess, and that the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion.
Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Becenti, brought suit in tribal court over the handling of a
loan by two employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The government
removed the action to district court, then sought to dismiss. The district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign im-
munity grounds. Becenti appealed, arguing removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442 was improper since the statute provides for removal only from
state courts.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded
to the district court for remand to tribal court. The court concluded
that Congress has always used express language when permitting re-
moval from courts other than state courts. Since § 1442 refers only to
"state" courts, it did not apply to actions filed in tribal court.
Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Andrew and Richard Bonin, brought a personal injury ac-
tion against defendant, Tour West, Inc. ("Tour West"). The district
court entered judgment in favor of Tour West based on jury responses
to a special verdict. The Bonins appealed, arguing that the district court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial when the jury gave inconsistent
answers on the special verdicts.
The Tenth Circuit, under an abuse of discretion standard, reversed
the decision of the district court. The court reasoned that answers to
questions on a special verdict must be read together. On the verdict
form, the jury found Tour West not negligent, but also attributed a por-
tion of the negligence to Tour West. Accordingly, when read together,
the court found the inconsistencies irreconcilable and ordered a new
trial.
United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's dismissal of its
case against two juvenile Indian defendants for the murder of a non-
Indian and the assault of an Indian. The district court held that since
the government did not provide required documents relating to prior
juvenile court proceedings, the government failed to properly invoke ju-
risdiction under the federal juvenile statute.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without
prejudice. The court found that the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, clearly states that proceedings begin
with the filing of information. Accordingly, since the government failed
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to provide the district court with prior juvenile records, the action was
properly dismissed.
United States v. Clark, 901 F.2d 855
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Clark, pleaded guilty to embezzlement and was ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $153,762 pursuant to the Victim and
Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663-64. Clark ap-
pealed, claiming that the district court failed to consider her financial
status, as required by the VWPA, when imposing restitution.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
by ordering Clark to pay $153,762 immediately. A restitution order
must be consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. The court found
nothing in the record to support the district court's finding. Accord-
ingly, the restitution order was vacated.
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424
Author: Judge Logan
In the original action filed by plaintiff, United Nuclear Corporation,
in 1985, the district court entered a protective order regarding discov-
ery. After the parties settled in 1986, the same court sealed the record.
Parties in collateral suits against defendant, Cranford Insurance Com-
pany ("Cranford"), sought to intervene in 1989, seeking access to the
discovery for use in their actions in other courts. The district court
granted permissive intervention and modified its prior orders to allow
access to the intervenors. Cranford subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that permissive intervention is a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court and will not be overturned without a
showing of clear abuse. The correct procedure of non-parties challeng-
ing a protective order is through intervention for that purpose. When
intervention is sought to gain access to discovery subject to a protective
order, no strong nexus of fact or law need exist between the two suits.
Second, the court upheld the modification of the protective order. The
court compared the confidentiality needs of the parties in the original
suit against the need for avoiding duplicative discovery in the collateral
case. If denial of litigation would place litigants in a position needing to
perform repetitive discovery, then the order could be denied. But, there
must be a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the party
opposing modification. Cranford's desire to make it more burdensome
for intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation was not legitimate
prejudice.
Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Dodson, a Marine, appealed the district court's denial of
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his petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, Dodson argued that:
(1) the voting procedure of the court martial violated due process;
(2) the composition of the court martial violated due process; (3) he
was denied a speedy trial; and (4) the exclusion of expert testimony vio-
lated due process.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to review
Dodson's second, third and fourth arguments. The court stated that
these claims were fully and fairly considered by the military courts and,
therefore, not subject to federal court review. The court reversed the
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, however, holding that the
writ should be issued because the court-martial's voting procedure vio-
lated due process. Specifically, the court held that the court martial
failed to require a three-fourths vote in favor of the life sentence im-
posed. The three-fourths requirement was mandated by the Manual for
Courts-Martial.
Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572
Author: Judge Ebel
After being arrested by defendant, police officer Donges, plaintiff,
Stewart, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Donges sought and was
denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district
court then denied Donges's request for a stay pending appeal of its rul-
ing on the motion. He subsequently filed an interlocutory notice of ap-
peal with the Tenth Circuit. After trial resulted in a jury verdict for
Stewart, Donges appealed.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the verdict. The court held that in an
interlocutory appeal concerning summary judgment and qualified im-
munity of a public official, the central issue is the defendant's right not
to have to proceed to trial. If the qualified immunity defense is held
valid, no part of the trial may continue. Therefore, once Donges filed
his interlocutory appeal, and the district court did not certify the appeal
as frivolous and without merit, the district court lost jurisdiction to pro-
ceed with the action until the appeal was decided. Thus, the resultant
trial commenced without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated
the trial, holding it was a nullity.
United States v. Elliott, 915 F.2d 1455
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Elliott, was convicted of willfully taking by force, violence,
and intimidation, currency from a bank. He was sentenced to 210
months of imprisonment. Elliott appealed, contending that his convic-
tion should be reversed based on: (1) improper remarks made by the
prosecutor in closing argument regarding Elliott's failure to testify; and
(2) the in-court identification of Elliott was improper because the bank
teller previously saw a photograph of Elliott in the local newspaper. El-
liott also appealed his sentence, arguing that the court failed to state its
reasons for imposing the maximum term.
[Vol. 68:4
COURTS & PROCEDURE
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Elliott's conviction. First, the prosecu-
tor's closing argument was appropriate since it was solicited from some-
one other than Elliott. Second, the bank teller's positive identification
of Elliott was not impermissibly influenced by the fact that she saw a
fifteen year old photograph in a local newspaper. The court explained
that the teller stated the photograph did not resemble Elliott. More-
over, the teller made a positive identification in a recent photo lineup.
Furthermore, she assisted in preparing a composite drawing prior to
seeing the photographs. Third, the court remanded the case for resen-
tencing. The court reasoned that the district court failed to state its rea-
sons for imposing the maximum sentence. In essence, a sentencing
court must state why it imposed a sentence at a particular point within
the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Ellis, brought suit alleging personal injury due to a vehicle
defectively designed and manufactured by defendants, Consolidated
Diesel Electric Corporation, Vought Corporation, and LTV Corpora-
tion. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment during a period in which the bankruptcy court issued an automatic
stay. This stay prevented all entities from commencing or continuing
any judicial proceeding against any of the debtors. Ellis appealed,
claiming that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal, explaining that there was
no final judgment from which to appeal. The court held that a stay in
judicial proceedings by the bankruptcy court renders a district court's
action void, even if judgment were entered in favor of the debtor. The
court concluded that once it held the district court opinion void, it no
longer had jurisdiction over the appeal.
United States v. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d 500
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Gomez-Olivas, was convicted of possessing with intent
to distribute and importing a controlled substance. Gomez-Olivas ap-
pealed, alleging: (1) that the district court's "no-adverse-inference" jury
instruction was insufficient because it did not contain a statement on
compulsion; and (2) certain closing argument comments made by the
prosecutor were improper.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. First, the
court stated that the district court did not err in failing to contain a state-
ment on compulsion in the no-adverse-inference instruction. The court
explained that Gomez-Olivas did not request the district judge to in-
clude the compulsion aspect in the instruction. Instead, at trial Gomez-
Olivas only objected to the wording of the instruction. Second, the
prosecutor's comments were entirely proper. The court explained that
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as long as evidence can be solicited from someone other than the ac-
cused, it is proper to comment upon the defense's failure to produce it.
Moreover, lack of corroboration is a permissible inference to argue. Fi-
nally, Gomez-Olivas's argument that the comments were improper be-
cause they were made during rebuttal, when defense counsel could no
longer respond, was without merit.
United States v. Harmon, 918 F.2d 115
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Harmon, was convicted of aiding and abetting Thomas
in the distribution of cocaine. On appeal, Harmon contended that his
due process rights were violated when the district court allowed the gov-
ernment to introduce false testimony through Thomas. Harmon also
alleged that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed
Thomas to testify concerning his prior transportation of cocaine for
Harmon. He asserted that the district court failed to balance the proba-
tive value of Thomas's uncorroborated testimony against its prejudicial
impact.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. First, the
court stated that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting Thomas's testimony. The court explained that Harmon did not
prove that the government knowingly presented false testimony to the
jury. The government offered both Officer Dyer's and Thomas's testi-
mony. The competing testimony established a factual dispute as to
whose story was most credible, and the district court properly presented
that issue to the jury for its determination. Second, the court noted that
once a court determines that prior crimes or wrong acts are admissable
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), it is then required to balance the probative
value of the evidence against prejudice to the defendant under Fed. R.
Evid. 403. The court found that the record supported the district
court's procedure and determination that the probative value of Har-
mon's bad acts outweighed the prejudicial effect.
Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197
Author: Judge Brorby
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Held, a domiciliary of Colorado, was employed by defend-
ant, Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corporation ("Hanover"), a New
York corporation, for almost ten years. One day he was told that he
would not be reassigned. Held, therefore, tendered his resignation,
which took effect one month before the vesting date of his pension ben-
efits. Four years later, he brought suit against Hanover, claiming that he
was forced to resign so that he would be precluded from obtaining his
full pension benefits. Held argued that this was in violation of the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). The district
court granted Hanover summary judgment on the ground that Held's
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claim was barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations. Held
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part, and
reversed in part. The court found that Held had two distinct causes of
action: an action for injunctive relief for unlawful discharge and an ac-
tion at law to recover benefits under the terms of his retirement plan.
Noting that ERISA provided no applicable statute of limitations, the
court ruled that New York law governed the limitation of Held's claims.
The court reasoned that New York's relationship to the litigation was
more significant than that of the forum state, Colorado. Accordingly,
the court ruled that the equitable claim was time-barred because the
claim was "most analogous" to an employment discrimination claim
under New York state law. Thus, it was subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. The court stated that the legal claim under the pension plan
was not barred because it was subject to New York's six-year statute of
limitations governing contracts.
United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant Hernandez-Garcia was convicted on three counts of
transporting illegal aliens. At trial, there was confusion regarding a jury
instruction. Consequently, the judge gave the jury an Allen instruction
which stated that if a unanimous verdict was not reached, Hernandez-
Garcia must be tried again. Hernandez-Garcia failed to object. After
the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court polled the jurors. One juror
did not affirm his verdict until asked a fifth time. Hernandez-Garcia ap-
pealed, asserting that there was coercion when the district court gave
the Allen instruction and when it polled the jury.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Trial counsel did not
object to the Allen instruction, so review was under the plain error stan-
dard. The court reasoned that although use of the word "may" instead
of "must" would be preferable, use of the latter was not reversible error.
The polling of the jurors in the courtroom was also not coercive. Ifju-
rors give an uncertain response when polled, the district judge should
try to resolve the uncertainty. Here, the district judge conducted what
the court considered to be a limited inquiry during which the juror had
an opportunity to deny the verdict but did not.
United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Hickok, appealed the district court's order denying his
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty to one of three drug charges.
Hickok claimed that his plea was entered into as a result of ignorance
and fear. Accordingly, Hickok contended that the district court abused
its discretion when it refused to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea
because: (1) he was entitled to have a jury determine his guilt or inno-
cence; (2) the government would not be prejudiced by a withdrawal of
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his plea; and (3) the district court improperly considered evidence of his
guilt or innocence in refusing his motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion. First, the court explained that Hickok waived his
fundamental right to a jury with his plea of guilty. Second, the court
ruled that Hickok bore the burden of persuasion, so the government
need not prove prejudice. Third, guilt or innocence of the defendant is
not one of the criteria used in determining whether to grant the motion.
Moreover, Hickok failed to show "fair and just reason" for withdrawal of
his guilty plea.
Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595
Per Curiam
Defendant, Hunter, was convicted on one count of first degree
criminal sexual penetration ("CSP") and two counts of second degree
CSP. Hunter petitioned the court for habeas corpus relief, which was sub-
sequently denied. He appealed, alleging that: (1) his due process
rights were violated by a fatal variance between the information filed
against him and ajury instruction; (2) a lack of specificity as to the dates
of the alleged crimes violated his due process rights; and (3) he was
denied effective assistance of counsel.
The Tenth Circuit found a fatal variance between the information
filed and the jury instructions. The court explained that the jury was
allowed to convict Hunter upon a factual basis that modified an essential
element of the offense charged. Specifically, Hunter was charged with
CSP between January 1, 1974, and October 23, 1977. But, prior to June
1975, first degree CSP did not exist in New Mexico. Instead, the activi-
ties that now give rise to CSP were considered a fourth degree offense
from January 1974, through June 1975. Thus, in submitting an errone-
ous jury instruction, the court allowed the jury to convict Hunter of first
degree CSP on evidence of digital penetration prior to June 1975. Be-
cause this was not a simple variance but instead a fatal one, the court
reversed the district court's determination. Furthermore, the court
found unpersuasive Hunter's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Also, the court rejected Hunter's argument that his due process rights
were violated because the district court failed to specify the dates of the
alleged crimes.
United States v. Ibarra, 920 F.2d 702
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Ibarra, was indicted for possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. Ibarra moved to suppress statements made after his
arrest and evidence obtained in several searches of his automobile. Spe-
cifically, Ibarra argued that his consent to the vehicle search was made
under duress. The government eventually conceded that Ibarra did not
consent to the search. Consequently, the district court granted Ibarra's
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motion to suppress. The government subsequently moved for reconsid-
eration of the suppression order. After the district court denied recon-
sideration, the government filed a notice of appeal. Ibarra contested the
Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, arguing that the notice of
appeal was untimely under rule 4(b) of the Fed. R. App. P. The govern-
ment contended that its filing for reconsideration tolled the thirty-day
statutory limit for filing notice of appeal.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the govern-
ment's notice was untimely filed and that the court, therefore, lacked
jurisdiction to review the district court's order. The court reasoned that
a motion for reconsideration of a previously conceded issue is unlikely
to succeed. Moreover, it merely serves to prolong the process of litiga-
tion. Accordingly, the court concluded that allowing such a motion to
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal would subvert the concern for
judicial economy. The court, therefore, did not reach the merits of the
government's claims.
United States v. Lowden, 900 F.2d 213
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Lowden, was convicted of assault on Indian land.
Lowden was subsequently sentenced to thirty months incarceration. He
appealed his eonviction, contending that the prosecutor's rebuttal and
closing argument were improper. Allegedly, certain remarks made by
the prosecutor implied that Lowden's defense counsel thought he was
guilty. Moreover, Lowden claimed that the prosecutor improperly ac-
cused defense counsel of referring to facts not in evidence. In addition,
Lowden argued that during sentencing, there should have been a down-
ward departure.
After considering the trial transcripts, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the remarks made by the prosecutor were not prejudicial and did
not influence the jury to render the conviction on improper grounds.
Second, the court concluded that the district court's reasoning to not
depart downward was ambiguous. Accordingly, the court transmitted
the opinion to the district court with a request. This request asked the
district court to state whether it thought it had the power to depart
downward.
Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Monk, was convicted in a general court-martial of murder-
ing his wife. He appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, asserting that his conviction was obtained in violation of his con-
stitutional right to due process of law. Monk reasoned that the military
judge's reasonable doubt instruction impermissibly lessened the prose-
cution's burden of proof. In particular, the military judge erred in
equating "reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt." Also, Monk al-
leged the judge erred in his instructions to the court martial members.
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
He erred by stating that no reasonable doubt exists if they would be
"willing to act" on their belief in Monk's guilt to the same extent as they
would be willing to act on a belief concerning an important personal
matter.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that its review of military convictions
is limited to jurisdictional issues and to determinations of whether the
military has given fair consideration to a defendant's constitutional
claims. The court found that the Military Court of Appeals considered
monk's claim. The court nonetheless stated that Monk's claim was sub-
ject to further review because it was substantial and largely free of fac-
tual questions. The court next ruled that the military judge's reasonable
doubt instruction was defective. The court explained that appellate
courts have uniformly criticized and rejected jury instructions equating
"reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt." Moreover, the "willing-
ness to act" language identified by Monk has also been criticized. Thus,
the court held this language to be constitutionally defective. The court
then ruled that this language so affected Monk's court martial that his
conviction violated due process. The court reasoned that the reason-
able doubt instruction diluted the burden of proof the prosecution was
required to meet. Thus, the court granted his writ for habeas corpus
relief.
United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Moralez, appealed his conviction. Specifically, Moralez
claimed that the district court erred in not disclosing a "confidential wit-
ness." The Tenth Circuit remanded for findings consistent with the bal-
ancing test required by Rovarro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). On
remand, the district court found that: (1) the government demonstrated
a need to protect the witness in light of the person's fear of retaliation
and physical harm; and (2) the person was a "mere tipster." Moralez
appealed, reasserting that the person was a potential eyewitness who
could aid his defense with exculpatory evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order against
Moralez. The court held that disclosure of the witness was not required
because the testimony would be cumulative. Moreover, the person
neither participated in nor witnessed the crime.
Nelson v. Carlson, 904 F.2d 560
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Nelson, argued that detainers placed on him by the state of
Arizona violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IADA").
Nelson subsequently motioned for permanent injunctive relief against
defendant, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The district court
denied the motion, and Nelson appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Nelson's motion for permanent injunc-
[Vol. 68:4
COURTS & PROCEDURE
tive relief could not be brought under IADA in a federal court. The
court found that although some circumstances may allow a federal court
to grant relief from a state detainer, such circumstances were not pres-
ent. The court did not reach the question of whether IADA was vio-
lated, but held only that the purpose of IADA and principles of comity
required that such a determination be made by the Arizona state courts.
The district court's order was vacated insofar as it constituted a ruling
on the merits, and the cause was remanded to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the proceedings.
United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Novak, was convicted for possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. In opening argument, the government made references
to evidence of Novak's intent to distribute and references to the co-
caine's purity. The prosecutor failed to introduce evidence at trial sup-
porting these claims. Novak appealed his conviction, alleging that the
district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecu-
tor failed to substantiate factual statements made during opening
argument.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of mistrial and
remanded. In determining whether the government's failure to support
statements made during opening argument should result in a mistrial,
the court examined the prosecutor's good faith and the statement's im-
pact. Finding that the prosecutor should have been aware of hearsay
problems in his statements, the court held that the prosecutor exceeded
the permissible scope of an opening statement. The court also found
that the prosecution's opening statements regarding the cocaine's purity
were not supported by the evidence at trial and, thus, exceeded the
scope of the opening statement. Absent a showing of prejudice to the
defendant, prosecutorial misconduct alone is insufficient to establish
that a district court abused its discretion. The court found, however,
that since the remainder of the prosecution's case was completely cir-
cumstantial, the unsubstantiated opening statements caused extensive
prejudice to Novak. Moreover, such prejudice was not cured by the dis-
trict court's jury instruction that opening statements are not evidence.
Accordingly, on this basis the court held that Novak's motion for a mis-
trial should be granted.
Post Office v. Portec, Inc., 913 F.2d 802
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, the Post Office, brought suit against defendant, Portec Inc.
("Portec") for manufacturing an identical package handling chute. The
jury awarded actual damages of $79,519.40 for the misappropriation of
trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury also awarded
$1,500,000.00 in punitive damages. Additionally, the district court
awarded $619,315.24 in attorney fees and costs. Portec appealed, argu-
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ing that: (1) it was prejudiced by not having the list of trade secrets al-
legedly misappropriated until trial; (2) the district court failed to submit
a jury instruction; (3) the testimony of an expert witness was prejudicial;
(4) punitive damages were improper because no actual damages were
awarded by the jury for those claims upon which punitive damages
would be appropriate; (5) Colorado's punitive damages statute is un-
constitutional; (6) the punitive damages award was excessive; (7) the at-
torney's fees were inappropriate; and (8) the injunction prohibiting
future manufacturing of chutes was too broad.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment with two
exceptions. First, the court stated it was precluded from the issue of
prejudice because it found no manifest error. Second, its review of the
jury instruction was precluded because Portec did not object to it at
trial. Third, the expert's testimony was beyond the court's review be-
cause Portec, once again, did not object to it at trial. Fourth, the lan-
guage of the special interrogatories combined with the language of the
jury instruction provided a sufficient basis to uphold the jury's punitive
damage award. Fifth, Colorado's punitive statute is constitutional.
Sixth, the punitive damages award was so excessive that it shocked the
judicial conscience. Accordingly, the court ordered a remittitur. The
court based its decision on the ratio of punitive to actual damages,
Portec's economic status, and the deterrent effect of the award. Sev-
enth, the court remanded to the district court an order to reduce the
amount of attorney expenses by twenty percent. The court reasoned
that attorney fees should only be apportioned to each claim sustained.
Eighth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting
Portec from selling spiral chutes. Without this prohibition, the court
reasoned there would be enforcement problems.
Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Rainbow Travel Service Inc. ("Rainbow") brought suit
against defendant, Hilton Hotels, Inc. ("Hilton"), based on breach of
contract and fraud. Hilton moved to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction, and the district court denied the motion. Hilton subsequently
appealed the denial of his motion. Hilton also alleged that the district
court erred by admitting certain evidence and by submitting improper
jury instructions.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over Hilton and its decision to submit the damage and fraud
issues to the jury. While the court noted that the formation of an out-of-
state contract, in itself, is not enough to establish jurisdiction over an
out-of-state party, Hilton previously engaged in activities purposefully
directed at Oklahoma residents. This was sufficient to justify the asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction. The activities included soliciting business
in Oklahoma, as well as negotiating the contract with Rainbow, and de-
manding partial performance by Rainbow in Oklahoma. In addition, the
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court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages
for goodwill and its verdict on fraud, but not its award of damages for
breach of contract. The court found no abuse of discretion in the dis-
trict court's admission of letters and other testimony by dissatisfied
customers.
Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Reynoldson, a pro se prisoner, claimed his due process
rights were violated when inmates were: (1) placed into an adjustment
block of the Wyoming State Prison without a hearing; and (2) denied
access to personal possessions without a hearing. The district court dis-
missed, with prejudice, Reynoldson's complaint for injunctive relief.
The district court reasoned that Reynoldson failed to allege that he,
himself, was wronged. Moreover, the court noted that Reynoldson's al-
legations were overly broad and conclusory. Reynoldson subsequently
appealed. He also appealed the district court's ruling that he could not
proceed in forma pauperis.
The Tenth Circuit stated that Reynoldson's complaint concerned
inmates rather than the plaintiff himself. A broad reading of the com-
plaint, however, supported the conclusion that Reynoldson was put into
the special block without due process. Thus, the court stated that its
permissive interpretation accorded with the well-settled principle that
pro se prisoner complaints must be construed liberally. Accordingly, the
district court erred in dismissing Reynoldson's complaint with preju-
dice. Moreover, the court took issue with the district court's dismissal
on the basis of vagueness. Consequently, the court stated that Reynold-
son should be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. The
court, therefore, granted leave to proceed in forna pauperis.
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Rivera, was convicted of thirteen drug-related offenses.
Rivera appealed, contending he did not receive adequate representa-
tion. Moreover, he argued that the district court's refusal to grant a con-
tinuance constituted cumulative error. A divided Tenth Circuit panel
reversed, finding that the combination of Rivera's claims plus the intro-
duction of evidence not specifically presented before the grand jury,
constituted reversible error.
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. After reviewing the cu-
mulative-error doctrine, the court found no error in either the perform-
ance of Rivera's counsel or the denial of a continuance. The challenge
concerning the new evidence was not before the court, having been re-
jected by a previous en banc review. The court remanded with instruc-
tions to vacate two lesser-included convictions.
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Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Shafer, was convicted in state court of securities violations
under state law. Shafer petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court, which was denied with prejudice. Shafer appealed, con-
tending that his writ of habeas corpus in federal court should have been
granted because: (1) the state trail court refusal to instruct the jury re-
garding his theory of the case was a denial of due process and a fair trial;
(2) the state trial court restricted his cross-examination of a prosecution
witness, thereby violating his sixth amendment rights; and (3) the
prison sentences imposed were excessive, thus violating due process.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas
corpus. The court explained that the New Mexico trial court did not err
when it refused to give Shafer's jury instructions. The court reasoned
that the refusal did not render the trial fundamentally unfair nor did it
deny Shafer's right to due process. Since the trial was not fundamen-
tally unfair, habeas corpus proceedings could not be used to set aside the
judgment. The court also ruled that Shafer failed to show cause and
prejudice regarding his failure to cross-examine a prosecution witness.
Coupled with procedural default, he was not entitled to federal habeas
corpus review. Finally, Shafer's sentencing was concerned solely with
matters of state law and thus failed to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.
Slane v. Jery Scott Drilling Co., 918 F.2d 123
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiffs, Richard and Linda Slane, brought suit against defendant,
Jerry Scott Drilling Company ("Scott"), Tuney Burger, Inc. ("Burger"),
and Tuney Bruger, individually. The Slanes initiated the action after
Richard was severely burned following an explosion on an oil drilling rig
where he was employed. Scott was a drilling contractor, and Burger was
its consultant and on-site supervisor. The district court found in favor
of the defendants, and the Slanes appealed. Specifically, the Slanes con-
tended that: (1) the sudden emergency instruction misled the jury;
(2) the district court erred in giving an assumption of risk instruction;
and (3) Burger's counsel committed reversible error by introducing ex-
traneous matters during his closing argument.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court's instruction on sud-
den emergency was error. The court reasoned that the instruction im-
properly applied to all defendants when only one of them pleaded it.
Moreover, the instruction misstated Oklahoma law because it failed to
inform the jury that the defense was not available to a party who created
the emergency. Second, the district court did not err in giving an as-
sumption of the risk instruction. The court reasoned that the evidence
showed that Richard was imminently aware of the inherent dangers in
the oil field and uniquely aware of the dangers of a drill stem test.
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Third, although defense counsel's comments during closing arguments
were improper, the court declined to reverse. The court explained that
the prejudice to the Slanes, if any, was minimal.
United States v. Thompson, 908 F.2d 648
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Thompson, was convicted of defrauding the govern-
ment in real estate purchases financed with mortgages insured by the
Federal Housing Administration. Thompson appealed the district
court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Thompson argued that the
district court erred in expressly refusing to voir dire the jury on their
exposure to a newspaper article which discussed a previous guilty plea
signed by Thompson. This plea was withdrawn before trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
remanded the case for a new trial. The court ruled that the article was
prejudicial because it contained information addressing the issue of
guilt. Consequently, the district court's refusal to voir dire the jury, or at
a minimum to ask whether the jurors had read the article, was an abuse
of discretion. The court then determined that the error was not harm-
less. The government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
knowledge of the prior guilty plea did not enter into the jury's
evaluation.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge Seth
Two related cases were decided. The first case involved a jurisdic-
tional question. Defendant, Hamm, motioned for enlargement of time
in order to file a notice of appeal fifty-nine days after the filing deadline.
The district court granted a twenty-one day extension. Plaintiff, Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds of London ("underwriters"), appealed, asserting
that the extension exceeded that allowed by the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure ("FRAP"). Thus, the underwriters argued that the Tenth
Circuit was without jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and dismissed the
appeal. The court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction because Hamm
failed to timely file his notice of appeal. Under FRAP, the maximum
extension in this case was ten days, a time limit which the district court
did not have the authority to enlarge.
The second case involved a declaratory judgment action on the
question of insurance coverage. Defendant, Evans, filed a wrongful
death action in state court based upon the decedent's death while riding
in an aircraft connected with a fly-in. The underwriters subsequently
filed in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the death was
not covered by its insurance policy. Summary judgment was issued in
favor of the underwriters based upon exclusionary language in the pol-
icy. Evans subsequently appealed.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly
found that the insurance policy excluded passengers riding in an aircraft
used directly in the fly-in. Moreover, the district cour correctly found
that the decedent was a passenger for purposes of the insurance policy.
The court reasoned that the common meaning of the word "passenger"
included someone such as the decedent who rode in the rear of the air-
craft without access to the controls. Moreover, the aircraft was actively
flown as part of the fly-in activities and was, thus, used directly in the
event.
United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435
Author: Judge McWilliams
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant, Vidakovich, owner of Yel-
lowstone State Bank, pleaded guilty to misapplication of monies, making
false entries in the books and records for purposes of defrauding the
bank, and obstruction of justice. Several months after pleading guilty,
Vidakovich filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Vidakovich claimed that:
(1) his pleas were involuntary and coerced; (2) he had a valid defense to
each of the charges; and (3) the government reached the plea bargain
by asking for a restitution order. The district court denied Vidakovich's
motion.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the transcript of the plea
bargain and determined that the judge who accepted the plea bargain
was "careful and cautious." Second, the district court properly rejected
Vidakovich's testimony that he had a defense to all the counts after orig-
inally pleading guilty. Moreover, there was no evidence that the govern-
ment breached its plea bargain by entering a restitution order, which
was later vacated. Thus, there was no restitution problem which would
require the district court to grant Vidakovich's motion to withdraw his
plea.
United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 1463
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Walker, appealed her conviction on six counts of mail
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. On appeal, Walker argued that
acquittal was improperly denied because there was insufficient evidence
to convict her of mail fraud. The government, on the other hand, ar-
gued that: (1) the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction because Walker filed
for appeal after her conviction but before sentencing; and (2) Walker
failed to reserve her issue for appeal because she only moved for acquit-
tal at the end of the government's case and did not renew her motion at
the close of all evidence introduced at trial.
The Tenth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction. The court reasoned
that even though Walker's notice of appeal was premature, it was
"harmless error." The notice of appealed ripened after sentencing
when the judgment was formally finalized. When a defendant moves for
acquittal after the government's case, and then presents evidence on de-
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fendant's behalf, the motion for judgment of acquittal is deemed with-
drawn, and any objection to its denial is waived. A motion for acquittal
at the close of the government's case, therefore, must be renewed. If
the motion is deemed withdrawn, the court will reverse the district
court's judgment only if there is manifest error and only if reversal is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice. The court upheld the con-
viction, finding no manifest error or miscarriage of justice in the jury's




United States v. Adams, 914 F.2d 1404
Author: Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation
Defendants, Adams and Eliga, appealed their convictions for pos-
session with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The appeals were consol-
idated and the parties raised similar objections. Adams argued: (1) the
defense and thus the jury were provided with insufficient information on
the fact that the prosecution's chief witness was a police informant;
(2) the district court improperly applied a minimum mandatory sen-
tence pursuant to 214 U.S.C. § 851(b); (3) the district court improperly
considered him a principal when he was an aider and abettor; and (4) he
was less culpable and should have had his sentence adjusted downward.
Eliga argued the first two points and also argued that a jury instruction
improperly commented on his failure to testify.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that the jury had sufficient op-
portunity to uncover and consider the motives of the witness. Further,
the court rejected all of Adams's sentencing arguments. The court ruled
that the district court's sentencing complied with the mandatory mini-
mums imposed by the 1986 and 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Acts, which re-
moved the district court's discretion. Finally, the court found no error
with the contested instruction.
United States v. Armendariz, 922 F.2d 602
Author: Judge Moore
Defendants, Armendariz and Aguirre, were convicted after a jury
trial of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Aguirre was also convicted of
use of a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy. Armendariz and Aguirre
appealed, claiming they were denied a right to a fair trial. They claimed
that the district court failed to grant a mistrial after ajuror was contacted
by the brother of one of the witnesses. They also claimed error in the
district court's failure to suppress evidence of a wiretap. Finally, Aguirre
alone claimed the district court abused its discretion in failing to deny
Aguirre's motion for severance.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court stated that
when the presumption of impropriety in a third party contacting a juror
has been rebutted, the burden is then on the defendant to show actual
prejudice. No actual prejudice was shown. Therefore, Armendariz and
Aguirre were not entitled to a mistrial. The court also found that under
federal standards, probable cause existed to place the wiretaps. Accord-
ingly, they were properly admitted into evidence. Finally, because the
determination to grant severance lies in the broad discretion of the
court, and no actual prejudice was shown, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in not granting severance to Aguirre.
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United States v. Bagster, 915 F.2d 607
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Bagster, was arrested by federal drug enforcement
agents on February 19, 1987, and placed in a county jail. He posted a
$20,000 bond and was released by county jail officials the same day with-
out the consent of federal officials. The next day federal officials filed a
complaint against Bagster and obtained an arrest warrant. Bagster re-
mained at large until June 12, 1987, when he was arrested on state drug
charges in a different county. The United States Marshal eventually ob-
tained custody of Bagster, and the federal grand jury returned an indict-
ment on the federal drug charges on August 23, 1989. Bagster argued
that the government failed to indict him within 30 days as required by
§ 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act, or, in the alternative, that his sixth
amendment right to speedy trial was violated.
The Tenth Circuit held that a person is not arrested on a charge,
and § 3161 (b) is not triggered, unless a pending federal complaint coin-
cides with federal custody based on that complaint. Four factors must
be balanced to determine whether a defendant's right to speedy trial has
been violated: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Since the delay in
this case was not caused by a lack of federal diligence and since it caused
no prejudice to Bagster, the court found that the thirty-month period
between Bagster's initial arrest and his indictment was not
unreasonable.
Bailey v. Cowley, 914 F.2d 1438
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Bailey, appealed the district court's denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Bailey alleged that his sentence was enhanced
by two invalid convictions. Moreover, Bailey argued that his attorney
rendered ineffective legal assistance by failing to investigate the invalid-
ity of a 1971 conviction and by advising him to plead guilty in return for
the prosecutor's promise to not use the conviction against him in a 1973
proceeding. Bailey also contended that his guilty plea was rendered in-
voluntarily because he entered the plea under fear that the prosecution
would use the conviction against him. Further, Bailey stated that the
conviction was subsequently found unconstitutional.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. The court
concluded that Bailey's counsel in 1973 did not give ineffective legal
counsel. Even though Bailey was tried as an adult in 1971 when he was
only seventeen, Bailey failed to tell his 1971 counsel of his age. Further,
the statute found to be unconstitutional in 1972 was valid in 1971. The
subsequent determination that it was unconstitutional was not applied
retroactively until 1974. Therefore, at the time of his attorney's advice
in 1973, the conviction was neither void nor voidable. The court also
determined that since the attorney's advice was effective legal assistance,
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Bailey's reliance upon it did not render his plea involuntary. The court
further concluded that the prosecution did not act improperly by using
the conviction as a bargaining tool. Had Bailey gone to trial and been
found guilty under the statute that subsequently was found to be uncon-
stitutional, the use of the conviction as such a tool would be invalid. A
conviction based on a guilty plea, however; will not be nullified by a
subsequent change in the law.
Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321
Author: Judge Christensen, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Beachum, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. He contended that his imprisonment for state crime con-
victions violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, equal protection,
confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel. The district court de-
nied Beachum's petition, and he subsequently appealed. Specifically,
Beachum contended that: (1) the victim's testimony was hypnotically
created, and this violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and con-
frontation; (2) the government's comments in closing argument were so
egregious as to deprive him of a fair trial; (3) his due process rights
were violated when a doctor testified that the victim suffered severe
emotional trauma when Beachum stared at her during the preliminary
hearing; (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (5) the dis-
trict court erred in denying his right to counsel at the lineup and hypno-
sis session; and (6) his right to a representative jury and to equal
protection were violated by the district court's sua sponte exclusion from
the jury of the only black member.
First, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Beachum failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that any differences between the pre-
hypnosis statements and her trial testimony were the product of hypno-
sis. Moreover, the victim's testimony was corroborated by physical and
circumstantial evidence. Also, Beachum's right to confrontation was not
abridged because the trial record showed no request from defense coun-
sel to cross-examine the victim regarding hypnosis. Second, Beachum's
rights were not impaired by the government's closing arguments. The
court explained that there was some colorable basis for the prosecu-
tion's statements, and any related error would not be of constitutional
significance. Third, the doctor made inappropriate remarks regarding
the emotional trauma suffered by the victim. These remarks, however,
did not deprive Beachum of a fair trial. The court reasoned that in a
habeas corpus action, the significant inquiry is not whether the state court
has properly applied the rules of evidence but whether an error of con-
stitutional magnitude was committed. Fourth, Beachum was not denied
effective assistance of counsel. The court explained that Beachum failed
to show that his counsel's performance fell below objective standards of
reasonableness. Moreover, he failed to prove that but for his counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent. Fifth, Beachum was not denied his right to counsel at the lineup
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and hypnosis session. The court reasoned that the right did not attach
because at that time, there was no criminal prosecution and a critical
stage had not been reached. Finally, Beachum's right to a representative
jury and to equal protection were not violated. The court explained that
the district court exercised its legitimate prerogative ofjudicial manage-
ment. Also, the court had a neutral explanation for the dismissal. Fur-
ther, the Constitution does not demand a representative jury, but only
an impartial one.
United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendants, Bedonie and Cly, appealed their convictions of first de-
gree murder and related weapons charges. Bedonie and Cly were
charged with killing two Navajo police officers and setting their vehicles
on fire. Both presented alibis for the night the murders took place, but
witnesses produced by the government testified to the contrary. On ap-
peal, Bedonie alleged: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction; and
(2) he was deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict. Cly alleged, in
addition to incorporating Bedonie's challenges, that: (1) the under-
representation of Native Americans in the venire violated his sixth
amendment rights; (2) the preemptory removal of the only Native
American on the jury violated his fourteenth amendment rights; (3) the
district court erred in denying "for cause" challenges of venire persons;
(4) the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude a govern-
ment witness; and (5) the district court erroneously admitted evidence
of his character.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first stated that it had jurisdiction because pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 81, the burning of or setting fire to a motor vehicle is a criminal act.
Second, the court stated that Bedonie's unanimous verdict challenge
failed for lack of evidence. Essentially, he failed to show any jury confu-
sion or disagreement. Third, Cly's sixth amendment claim failed be-
cause he did not raise the objection at trial. Cly was also unable to
produce evidence showing that a juror was removed solely because of
her race, which is a prerequisite of a fourteenth amendment claim.
Fifth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cly's chal-
lenges "for cause." Further, the court ruled that evidence relating to
Cly's character was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(a). Also, the
prior inconsistent statements by witnesses did not disqualify them as
incompetent.
United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Defendant, Bolton, was found guilty of receiving and possessing a
firearm after being convicted of a felony and possessing an unregistered
firearm. Bolton appealed, contending that the district court: (1) erred
in refusing to disqualify the assistant prosecutor, who had represented
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Bolton five years earlier; (2) violated the Speedy Trial Act by granting
and excluding a continuance under the Act; (3) failed to give a jury in-
struction on the term "firearm"; (4) failed to rule that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove he possessed a firearm; (5) improperly
enhanced his sentence because his prior convictions were simultane-
ously entered; and (6) prejudiced Bolton's rights with ineffective
counsel.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the assistant prosecutor to take part in the trial. The court rea-
soned that the prosecutor played a limited role in the prosecution.
Moreover, there was no factual relationship between the two actions in
which the prosecutor participated, and, therefore, no confidential infor-
mation was relayed. Second, the Speedy Trial Act was not violated. The
court reasoned that certain time periods are excluded under the Act,
including continuances, if the granting of one outweighs the best inter-
est of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Consequently, the
district court properly excluded the continuances granted to Bolton be-
cause it was ordered to provide him with adequate counsel. Third, be-
cause there was no dispute that a shotgun is-a firearm, a jury instruction
was unnecessary. Furthermore, Bolton did not previously request such
an instruction, and he never objected to the instructions given. Fourth,
the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Bolton possessed a firearm.
The court reasoned that there was enough evidence to find constructive
possession. Bolton admitted that the, shotgun was in his car, and he
knew it was there. Also, the shotgun was in close physical proximity to
him. Thus, Bolton knowingly held the power to exercise dominion and
control over the shotgun. Fifth, Bolton's convictions on four prior rob-
beries were sufficient to warrant enhancement of his sentence. Even
though Bolton was convicted in a single judicial proceeding, the convic-
tion was for multiple counts arising from separate criminal transactions.
Thus, the court properly enhanced Bolton's sentence because his prior
felonies were committed on occasions different from one another. Fi-
nally, Bolton failed to show that his counsel made errors so serious that
his sixth amendment rights were violated.
United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Bowie, was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute and using a telephone to facilitate the conspir-
acy. Bowie challenged the conviction, arguing that: (1) the district
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close
of the government's case; (2) the government improperly vouched for
and bolstered the credibility of its witnesses; and (3) his sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel was denied because of a
conflict of interest.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the decision of the district court and re-
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manded the case for further proceedings. First, the court held that the
government proved the existence of a conspiracy and Bowie's facilita-
tion of it. Bowie's participation in the conspiracy was proven by: evi-
dence that he distributed cocaine, evidence that he dealt in stolen
property connected to the conspiracy, and evidence that he took title to
houses purchased to deflect suspicion. Accordingly, the denial of his
motion for acquittal was proper. Second, presenting evidence, such as a
plea agreement, on a witness' obligation to testify truthfully is not im-
proper vouching. Use of the "truthfulness" portions of a plea agree-
ment becomes improper vouching only when prosecutors explicitly or
implicitly indicate that they can monitor and verify the truthfulness of
the witness' testimony. Last, the court remanded for a determination as
to whether an actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense coun-
sel's performance. The court explained that the record failed to state
the precise scope of prior representation. Moreover, it failed to state
whether a witness waived his attorney-client privilege which might have
restricted defense counsel's cross-examination.
United States v. Brunson, 907 F.2d 117
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Brunson, was convicted of committing armed robbery
of a federally insured financial institution and sentenced to 262 months
imprisonment. Brunson appealed both the conviction and the sentence.
On appeal, Brunson argued: (1) the government failed to prove that
the savings and loan institution was federally insured on the date of the
robbery; and (2) the district court erred in classifying Brunson as a ca-
reer offender because his two prior convictions were not crimes of
violence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.
The court held the circumstantial evidence produced at the trial was suf-
ficient to sustain the jury's presumption that the institution was federally
insured on the date of the robbery. The government introduced not
only a certificate of insurance, but also two notices of current insurance
premiums due and paid. The court also held that the sentence imposed
was not in violation of the Sentencing Guidelines because Brunson's two
prior convictions of burglarizing a dwelling were crimes of violence.
The court explained that there was a "substantial risk" that force would
be used in their commission. Therefore, the district court did not err in
upgrading Brunson's classification to a career offender.
United States v. Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Bullock, along with two co-defendants were charged
with the manufacture and intent to distribute amphetamines. Bullock
challenged two counts of the indictment: (1) that he knowingly and in-
tentionally conspired to use or carry firearms in the commission of the
crime; and (2) that he knowingly used or carried firearms "during the
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commission" of the crime. Because the two counts did not use the exact
language of the statute, Bullock claimed that they were fatally deficient.
Further, Bullock argued that the 1984 amendment to § 924(c) created a
"use" element making mere possession of a firearm insufficient for
conviction.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Bullock's arguments, holding that the
indictment was sufficiently descriptive to apprise Bullock of the offense
charged. The court explained that an indictment need not quote the
statutory language to be legally sufficient. Further, the court concluded
that the two counts were stated in language equivalent to the statute,
and that this was all that was required. In addition, the court held that
the 1984 amendment did not create a new "use" element which must be
specifically alleged. Instead, the amendment refined a factor already in
the statute with no change to the original meaning.
United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Butler, appealed his conviction for the possession of
hashish. On appeal, Butler argued that the magistrate erred in:
(1) overruling his motion to suppress; (2) failing to grant a mistrial for
prosecutorial misconduct; (3) failing to require the government to pro-
vide Jencks Act material; and (4) giving a supplemental Allen instruction
to the jury after deliberations had begun.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the second search and seizure of But-
ler's property was reasonable on the basis that it followed a "controlled
delivery." Essentially, the property was previously legally searched and
seized and, therefore, the later search was not barred by the fourth
amendment. Second, the court ruled that the magistrate's curative in-
structions to the jury coupled with his refusal to allow the witnesses to
answer the prosecutor's improper questions were not an abuse of discre-
tion. Third, the government's refusal to provide the Jencks Act material
was harmless error because defense counsel was already in possession of
the requested material. Finally, the court stated that the magistrate's
supplemental Allen instruction was not coercive because it was given
only after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Capps, a state prisoner, brought a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated due to
inadequate representation at trial. Capps's attorney pursued a jury nul-
lification strategy rather than submitting an entrapment instruction at
trial, which Capps alleged resulted in his conviction. The district court
granted Capps's relief, ordering his release unless a retrial took place
within ninety days. Sullivan, the state warden, subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, applying a "cause and prejudice" test, upheld
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the district court's order. The court stated that Capps fulfilled the
"cause" requirement. The court explained that Capps' attorney em-
ployed an unreasonable trial strategy when he demanded that Capps ad-
mit to the crime hoping for an acquittal through jury sympathy, rather
than raising an entrapment defense as supported by the evidence. The
court was convinced that defense counsel's inadequacy increased the
probability of a different trial result.
United States v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Coffman, alleged that the district court should have dis-
missed his indictment, because it violated the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers ("IAD"). Specifically, Coffman argued that the United States
violated the anti-shuttling provisions of the IAD by returning him to
state custody before sentencing. Coffman referred to the IAD's require-
ment that a "trial" be had prior to returning the prisoner to his place of
incarceration. Since "trial" encompasses the sentencing phase, and
since he was not sentenced prior to being returned to the state prison,
the IAD required dismissal of his federal charges.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
noted that the purpose of the IAD is to reduce prisoner uncertainty
caused by untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Uncer-
tainty caused by a delay in sentencing is minimal when compared with
the uncertainty resulting from untried charges. Moreover, the court
concluded that the IAD's use of the word "trial" did not include the
sentencing phase. The district court's refusal to dismiss was, therefore,
not error.
Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217
Per Curiam
Defendant, Coleman, appealed the district court's denial of his third
petition for federal habeas corpus relief, and his motions for an evidentiary
hearing and stay of execution. On appeal, Coleman argued that he was
deprived of fair and reliable sentencing because the state hospital that
determined his competency did not disclose his medical records. Also,
Coleman contended that the district court erred in not granting an evi-
dentiary hearing on the issue of his competency. Last, Coleman argued
he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
The Tenth Circuit denied Coleman's request of post-conviction re-
lief. First, the court ruled that the medical records were not material
because they contained negative as well as positive findings regarding
Coleman's competency. Accordingly, the court concluded that there
was no reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been
disclosed. Further, there was no probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Moreover, because there
was no evidence undermining a doctor's competency evaluation, an evi-
dentiary hearing on Coleman's mental condition was not mandated. Fi-
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nally, the court declined to reach the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because the claim did not allege new or different grounds.
United States v. Collins, 420 F.2d 619
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Collins, appealed his conviction for income tax evasion.
He argued that the district court gave an improper jury instruction on
the issue of good faith and violated his right to counsel by revoking the
pro hace vice admission of his attorney.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the good faith jury instruc-
tion was proper. The court reasoned that the objective reasonableness
of Collins's belief could be considered in determining whether his sub-
jective belief was reasonable. Also, the court upheld the revocation of
the attorney's admission. The district court could conclude that the at-
torney's disregard of ethical principles would continue based on previ-
ous judicial proceedings and the frivolous briefs filed during the case.
Moreover, the district court properly balanced Collins's right to counsel
of choice against society's need for orderly administration ofjustice.
Colorado v. Lopez, 919 F.2d 131
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, State of Colorado, brought suit in state court, charging de-
fendant, Lopez, with three counts of fraud by check. Lopez filed a peti-
tion for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1446. The district
court subsequently remanded. The district court ruled that § 1443 does
not authorize removal to protect Lopez's sixth amendment right to a fair
trial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand. The court
reasoned that Lopez failed to satisfy the requirements for removal under
§ 1443. Specifically, Lopez made no claim that he was denied a right
arising under a federal law which provides for civil rights. Instead, Lo-
pez argued, he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Pur-
suant to § 1443, this right does not arise under law providing for civil
rights.
United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendants, Daily and Figge, appealed their convictions for conspir-
ing to commit wire fraud and submitting false statements as to matters
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. On appeal, both alleged that:
(1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the indict-
ment insufficiently charged the offense at issue, or was improperly
broadened by the district court; (3) the district court erred in failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing as to the validity of a search warrant; (4) the
government improperly failed to provide the defendants with exculpa-
tory evidence; (5) the district court erred in its instructions to the jury
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regarding materiality; (6) there was a fatal variance between the indict-
ment and the proof regarding multiple conspiracies; (7) the district
court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding substantial character
evidence; and (8) there was insufficient evidence to support their con-
spiracy convictions.
The Tenth Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction. The court rea-
soned that the government had no obligation to make a jurisdictional
showing because the federal government has territorial jurisdiction over
certain conduct which occurs outside the fifty states. Second, the court
ruled that the indictment was sufficient. The court explained that the
indictment contained all of the essential elements of the conspiracy of-
fense and the underlying substantive offenses, and also provided suffi-
cient detail which should have put Daily and Figge on notice of the
charges against them. Moreover, although noting that the indictment
was lengthy and somewhat confusing, the court ruled that it was not
improperly broadened. Third, the court rejected the argument that an
evidentiary hearing should have been held to determine whether certain
evidence should have been suppressed. The court explained that Daily
and Figge had insufficient privacy interests to object to the allegedly ille-
gal search. Fourth, Daily and Figge's argument that certain evidence
was not provided to them by the government was found to be baseless.
Fifth, the court ruled that the district court did not err in refusing to
instruct the jury on the issue of materiality as an essential element of
wire fraud. The court reasoned that the district court properly treated
the question of materiality as one of law. Moreover, there is a material-
ity aspect to the determination of whether the acts of an accused give
rise to a scheme of fraud. The district court properly submitted this
aspect to the jury as one component of the larger factual question re-
garding the scheme to defraud. Sixth, the court rejected Daily and
Figge's variance challenge. The court reasoned that there was sufficient
evidence upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt a sin-
gle conspiracy. The fact that a number of separate transactions may
have been involved did not establish the existence of a number of sepa-
rate conspiracies. Moreover, the court found no prejudicial error in the
district court's failure to give an express multiple conspiracy instruction.
When viewed as a whole, the instruction adequately covered the ques-
tion of multiple conspiracies. Specifically, the jury had notice that in
order to convict Daily and Figge, it had to find that the conspiracy ex-
isted and that each defendant was a member of it. Seventh, the district
court committed error in failing to give a jury instruction regarding
character. The court explained that Daily and Figge presented evidence
as to their good character and the character evidence concerned traits
relevant to the offense charged. Finally, the court found sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's verdicts of guilty as to both defendants. The




United States v. DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, DeFundora, was convicted by a grand jury for distribu-
tion of cocaine and unlawful travel in aid of racketeering. DeFundora
appealed, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
distribution of cocaine conviction because the substance allegedly dis-
tributed was not subjected to scientific analysis; and (2) there was insuf-
ficient evidence supporting her Travel Act conviction.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. First,
the court stated that scientific evidence need not be introduced to prove
the identity of a substance. The court reasoned that as long as there is
sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidence to prove to a jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt that cocaine was the identified substance, a lack
of scientific evidence does not warrant reversal. Both direct and indirect
evidence was presented that could have led the jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that substances allegedly sold by DeFundora were
cocaine. For example, there was indirect evidence that the substance
was able to be resold as cocaine. Moreover, there was indirect evidence
that DeFundora had previously dealt in cocaine. Second, the court
stated that to prove an unlawful travel charge, the government must
show DeFundora committed an overt act after having traveled or after
having used the facilities of interstate or foreign commerce. The court
held that possession of an object is an act if the possessor knowingly
receives it or if he becomes aware that he possesses it for a sufficient
period of time. DeFundora's cocaine possession constituted an overt
act, and she had just completed travel from Miami to Oklahoma in fur-
therance of her intent to distribute.
United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Fox, was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and interstate
travel for the purpose of promoting unlawful activity, in violation of the
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Fox appealed, asserting that: (1) his mo-
tion to suppress evidence seized at his warrantless arrest was improperly
denied because the arresting officers lacked probable cause; (2) the evi-
dence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction; (3) the dis-
trict court erred in refusing to give his tendered jury instruction which
concerned the difference between a conspiracy and a buyer-seller rela-
tionship; and (4) the government failed to prove a business enterprise
within the meaning of the Travel Act.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court ruled that the warrantless arrest was valid because at the time
of the arrest the agents had probable cause. Specifically, the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee had committed or
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was committing an offense. Accordingly, the evidence seized at the war-
rantless arrest was properly admitted into evidence. Second, the court
found that the evidence was sufficient to support Fox's conspiracy con-
viction. In making this determination, the court used a three part test:
(1) the evidence must show that two or more persons agreed to violate
the law; (2) the defendant knew at least the essential objectives of the
conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a
part of it. The evidence showed that Fox acted with two other people to
purchase cocaine in Las Vegas with intent to transport it into Colorado
for distribution. Consequently, there was an ongoing course of conduct
that demonstrated an interdependence among Fox and his two partners.
Third, the district court did not commit reversible error by failing to
give Fox's instruction. The court explained that, as a whole, the charge
adequately instructed the jury. In particular, the charge covered the es-
sential requirements for a finding of conspiracy, in contrast to the acts
amounting only to separate transactions. Finally, the district court prop-
erly held that Fox engaged in a business enterprise pursuant to the
Travel Act. The court explained that under this Act, the term "business
enterprise" means a continuing course of conduct, rather than sporadic
casual involvement in a proscribed activity. The court found that there
was sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that
Fox's involvement in the interstate transportation of narcotics was
continuous.
United States v. Frank, 901 F.2d 846
Author: Judge Brimmer, sitting by designation
Defendant, Frank, was charged with aggravated sexual abuse on an
Indian Reservation. Following voir dire, Frank moved to dismiss two ju-
rors for cause because one indicated that he was a personal friend of the
prosecutor, and the second said she feared serving on a jury because of
having to stay alone in a motel. The district court denied both chal-
lenges, forcing Frank to use his preemptory challenges to excuse both
jurors. At the conclusion of the government's case, Frank moved for
acquittal on the grounds that the government failed to prove the rape
took place on an Indian Reservation. The court denied the motion, and
Frank subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the mo-
tions. The court ruled that the district court properly dismissed the mo-
tion for acquittal because the evidence presented was sufficient to find
that the rape occurred on the Reservation. The court also found that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to dismiss the
two jurors for cause. The court reasoned that both appeared to be capa-
ble of rendering fair and impartial verdicts.
Gee v. Kansas, 912 F.2d 414
Author: Judge Baldock
After escaping federal custody in New York State, plaintiff, Gee, was
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arrested and convicted in Wyoming for aggravated robbery. Following
his sentencing in Wyoming, Gee was returned to federal custody to
complete the remainder of his federal sentence in Leavenworth, Kansas.
Upon Gee's release, the Leavenworth sheriff's office immediately extra-
dited Gee to Wyoming to serve his sentence on the robbery charge. Gee
filed a habeus corpus petition challenging the extradition, but the district
court dismissed his motion. Gee appealed, asserting that the Leaven-
worth sheriff's actions constituted "kidnapping" because neither Kansas
nor the Leavenworth's sheriff's office had jurisdiction to participate in
the extradition process.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Gee's
habeus corpus petition. The court held that the Leavenworth sheriff had
probable cause to arrest and detain Gee because: (1) Wyoming properly
followed extradition procedures; and (2) Gee was a fugitive from justice
since he had not served his Wyoming sentence.
United States v. Glover, 911 F.2d 419
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Defendant, Glover, originally pleaded not guilty to drug-related
conspiracy charges. On the morning of trial, he changed his plea to
guilty. Prior to his sentencing, Glover moved to withdraw his guilty
plea. The district court denied this motion, and Glover subsequently
appealed. He argued that he pleaded guilty at the urging of his counsel
without understanding the circumstances.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment refusing to
allow Glover to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The court held that fairness
and justice did not support the plea withdrawal because: (1) the right to
withdraw a plea is in the discretion of the court; (2) the first plea change
was made at the eleventh hour with the witnesses, exhibits, jurors,
judge, prosecutors and defense counsel ready for trial; (3) no useful
purpose would be served; and (4) in the face of Glover's admitted and
palpable guilt, the administration of justice would be seriously
disserved.
United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770
Author: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
Defendant, Harris, was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana and traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate pos-
session of marijuana with intent to distribute. Harris was also convicted
of forfeiture of United States currency. On appeal, Harris asserted that
insufficient evidence was presented to sustain the conviction for inter-
state transport, that several search warrants were invalid because they
were overbroad, and that the government's use of an FBI agent as an
expert witness was improper.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support Harris's conviction for illegal marijuana trafficking.
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The court explained that Harris performed various overt acts, including
possessing and transporting a quantity of marijuana with the intent to
distribute. The court further held that the search warrants were suffi-
cient. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances sup-
ported a fair probability that the contraband or evidence of a crime
would be found in a particular place. Moreover, the warrant was valid
even though it described the items to be seized in broad and generic
terms. Finally, the FBI agent's expert testimony was proper. The court
explained that the agent's specialized knowledge of record-keeping in
the "drug business" assisted the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence.
United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506
Author: Judge Baldock
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Hernandez, was convicted by a jury of making false
statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm, and of receiv-
ing a firearm while an illegal alien. On appeal, Hernandez argued that
the district court erred in: (1) failing to suppress his statements to the
arresting officer because translation of his Miranda rights was inade-
quate, thereby precluding an intelligent waiver; (2) holding that his ap-
plication for amnesty as an illegal alien could be admitted into evidence;
(3) admitting computer printouts reflecting his amnesty application;
and (4) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on insuffi-
cient evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. The
court first held that the statements made to the arresting officer were
admissible. Although Hernandez claimed a limited understanding of
English, the court refused to overturn the district court's finding. The
court explained that the translation of Hernandez's Miranda rights was
sufficient to apprise him of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Moreover, Hernandez's
communications with the trooper in English indicated that he under-
stood the language. Second, the court held that admitting Hernandez's
amnesty application into evidence, in order to prove he received a fire-
arm before making the application, was consistent with the purposes of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The Act only re-
quires confidentiality of such an application in immigration-related pro-
ceedings, not in collateral criminal actions. Third, the court held that
the admission of computer printouts, which reflected Hernandez's am-
nesty application, fell under the exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
The court explained that the data compilation was performed pursuant
to regular business practice. The fact that the hard copy was prepared
for litigation was irrelevant. Finally, the court held that the convictions
were supported by sufficient evidence.
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United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Jalilian, pleaded guilty to converting his uncle's United
States Treasury check to his own use. The district court placed Jalilian
on probation with the special condition that he return to his native
country within forty-five days and not return to the United States until
legally authorized to do so. The special condition was later modified,
requiring Jalilian to leave the country, but not necessarily to his "native
country." Jalilian appealed the modified condition.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's rul-
ing. The court ruled that although the special condition requiring
Jalilian not to reenter the country without legal authorization was
proper, the district court exceeded its authority under the probation
statute when it ordered Jalilian to leave the country. The court rea-
soned that only the United States Attorney General has deportation
authority.
United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Jenkins, was convicted of possessing with intent to dis-
tribute and distributing cocaine and marijuana, conspiring to possess
and distribute controlled substances, violating the Travel Act, engaging
in a continuing criminal enterprise, distributing a controlled substance
to a person under twenty-one years of age, and committing income tax
evasion. On appeal, Jenkins contended: (1) there was insufficient evi-
dence to convict him of engaging in a continuous criminal enterprise,
because he did not hold the position of organizer or supervisor; (2) the
district court erred in admitting testimony of a co-defendant's violent
acts; (3) the district court erred in denying his motion to sever; (4) the
district court erred in not requiring the jury to hear the criminal charges
and the criminal forfeiture proceedings in two phases; and (5) the dis-
trict court erred in not dismissing the indictment for grand jury abuse.
The Tenth Circuit first held that Jenkins need not be a dominant
organizer to be convicted of running a continuing criminal enterprise.
Rather, it was sufficient that he occupied some managerial position over
five or more persons. Second, Jenkins was not unfairly prejudiced by
evidence of a co-defendant's violent acts. The court reasoned there was
little danger that the jury would confuse Jenkins with his co-defendant.
Further, any chance of unfair prejudice was ameliorated by a limiting
instruction. Third, the district court properly denied Jenkins' motion to
sever. The court explained that Jenkins failed to show prejudice and
failed to show a substantial factual overlap in the charges against him
and his co-defendant. Fourth, the district court was entitled to assume
that evidence concerning guilt and forfeiture could be heard together.
The court reasoned that Jenkins failed to inform the district court of his
1991]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
desire for a bifurcated trial. Finally, Jenkins failed to show how testi-
mony before the grand jury amounted to prejudice.
Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Johnson, sought a writ of mandamus from the Tenth Circuit
directing defendant, Judge Rogers, to hear and decide Johnson's peti-
tion for habeas corpus relief. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was at
issue in Judge Rogers' chambers for more than fourteen months without
being resolved.
The Tenth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus and ordered Rog-
ers to hear and decide Johnson's petition for writ of habeas corpus within
sixty days. The court noted the problem of docket congestion, but
stated that a petition for writ of habeas corpus must be heard within a
reasonable time. The court granted the writ of mandamus after deter-
mining that: (1) Johnson was entitled to the relief sought; (2) there was
a plainly defined duty on the part of Rogers to hear Johnson's petition
in a timely manner; (3) no other adequate remedy was available; and
(4) the right to such relief was clear and undisputable. The court stated
that a fourteen-month delay in hearing a petition for writ of habeas corpus
will not always justify the granting of a writ of mandamus. When the
whole reason for a lengthy delay is docket congestion, however, such a
delay is impermissible.
United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610
Author: Judge Cook
The United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") administers and funds programs that provide physical therapy
to patients with musculo-skeletal problems. Defendant, Kline, was em-
ployed by a medical clinic that provides such therapy and receives pay-
ment from HHS for her services. Kline was convicted of presenting
various claims to HHS requesting payment for medical services alleg-
edly provided, when no such services were provided. She appealed her
conviction.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and vacated the con-
viction. Upon review of the evidence, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Kline made and presented
the claims. The court also noted that the district court improperly read
ajury instruction titled "Aiding and Abetting." The court reasoned that
since the government did not charge Kline with aiding and abetting in
the indictment or allege in the alternative, that Kline had caused the
false claims to be presented, the government was not allowed to proceed
on an aiding and abetting theory. Since the jury might have convicted
on an improper basis, the giving of the instruction was reversible error.
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United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Levy, was extradited from Hong Kong and convicted of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and operation of a contin-
uing criminal enterprise ("CCE"). Levy only appealed the one count of
operating a CCE. He argued that his extradition and trial on the CCE
charge violated the doctrines of dual criminality and specialty. Specifi-
cally, Levy argued that CCE is not an extraditable offense because it is
characterized differently in Hong Kong. Also, he argued that he was
never extradited on the CCE charge because the order surrendering him
to American authorities did not mention CCE by name, nor did it recite
the crime's element. Thus, he contended the doctrine of specialty,
which states that a person can be prosecuted for only those charges on
which he was extradited, barred the count. Levy also argued that the
CCE count should have been dismissed because witnesses presented to
the grand jury were discovered through electronic surveillance, and the
authorization order did not mention CCE. Levy's final argument was
that the indictment did not sufficiently set out the element of a CCE
which requires three or more such violations.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that the focus of the dual criminality doctrine is on the
criminality of a defendant's alleged conduct, not on how the crime is
defined in the statutes he is accused of violating. Consequently, the fact
that the particular act is classified differently in two nations does not
defeat extradition. Thus, since Levy's alleged conduct of leading a co-
caine trafficking operation is illegal in both Hong Kong and the United
States, it satisfied the doctrine of dual criminality. Moreover, the court
found that the doctrine of specialty was not violated. The court rea-
soned that the extradition order specifically referred to the CCE count,
and that the foreign courts clearly considered whether Levy could be
extradited on that charge. The court then held that even if the use of
the witnesses detected by electronic surveillance violated Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Levy's exclusive remedy
was a civil action, not the dismissal of the CCE count. Finally, the court
held that Levy was tried on four counts and convicted on three which
met the requirement of three or more violations in order to constitute a
continuing series of violations.
United States v. Maez, 915 F.2d 1466
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Maez, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting bank lar-
ceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). Maez requested return of the
money seized by the FBI agents and given to the robbed bank. The
district court denied the motion and Maez appealed, claiming that:
(1) the bank never contested his ownership; (2) the money seized from
his house could not be from the bank; (3) he earned the money legiti-
mately from odd jobs.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. First, the
fact that the bank did not contest Maez's ownership, but the government
did contest it, is sufficient. The court explained that the government has
a sufficient interest in returning property to its true owner. Second, the
court rejected Maez's argument that because banks do not keep their
money in "little wads," the money seized from his home could not be
from the bank. Finally, at the hearing Maez presented no evidence re-
garding the source of the money.
Mahorney v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469
Per Curiam
Defendant, Mahorney, petitioned the court for habeas corpus relief.
In his petition, Mahorney argued that his 1980 conviction for first de-
gree rape was based on the prosecutor's impermissible comments con-
cerning a defendant's presumption of innocence. The district court
used a fundamental fairness analysis and concluded that the
prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant vacation of the conviction.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with
directions to issue the writ unless the state retried Mahorney within
ninety days. The court found that the improper comments were suffi-
ciently prejudicial to Mahorney's right to a presumption of innocence.
The court explained that the fundamental fairness analysis did not gov-
ern because the prosecutor's conduct constituted an affirmative denial
of a constitutional right, rather than a mere omission of an instruction.
United States v. Maines, 920 F.2d 1525
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Maines, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. He was sentenced to a fifteen year enhanced sentence
because of three previous violent felonies. The district court enhanced
his sentence after concluding that a prior Texas burglary conviction
presented a serious potential risk of personal injury to another. Thus,
the conviction was categorized as a violent felony. Maines appealed,
claiming that the Texas statute for burglary was statutorily defined and
should not be classified as a violent felony. He alleged that to construe
burglary as defined by other states violated equal protection principles.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction citing two basic princi-
ples. First, a uniform definition of burglary was judicially developed for
the purpose of sentence enhancement. Maines's prior conviction fell
under this definition. Moreover, the court found that although statutory
definitions of prior offenses should only be considered, there was no




Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d 732
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Martin, was convicted of six charges of solicitation of
murder. He appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. In his petition, Martin asserted four errors by the
Oklahoma courts: (1) jurisdictional error in trying him under the solici-
tation statute; (2) admitting an enhanced tape recording and allowing
the jury to view a transcript made therefrom; (3) unfair limitation by the
district court of Martin's right to cross-examination; and (4) error in
sentencing Martin to six consecutive sentences for one act of solicita-
tion. The district court denied the petition, holding that the first three
allegations were without merit and that the fourth allegation was barred
due to failure to raise the issue in the state court appeal.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the petition. The court held that conviction under the
Oklahoma solicitation statute was appropriate since the statute governs
solicitation of murder, not the location of the murder itself. The court
also found that neither the introduction of enhanced tape recordings
nor the limitations imposed upon defense's cross-examination rose to
the level of constitutional error. Finally, the court held that Martin's
double jeopardy argument regarding the six concurrent ten year
sentences was without merit. The court based its decision on the lack of
showing that the sentence was more detrimental to Martin.
United States v. Martinez, 912 F.2d 419
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Martinez, was convicted for use of a firearm in drug traf-
ficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Martinez appealed, arguing
that: (1) he did not possess the requisite degree of dominion and con-
trol over the unloaded firearm to merit conviction; and (2) the presence
of an unloaded firearm is not the "use" of a firearm proscribed in
§ 924(c)(1).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
found Martinez's admission of using the gun to scare people was suffi-
cient to establish that he exercised the requisite degree of dominion and
control over the gun. Second, the use of a gun, even if unloaded, in
connection with a crime of violence or drug trafficking falls within the
prohibitions of § 924(c). The court explained that unloaded firearms
have the same intimidating effect on victims and observers when pointed
or displayed. Also, they increase the risk of violence by others who may
respond to the perceived danger represented by the presumably loaded
gun.
McConnell v. Martin, 896 F.2d 441
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, McConnell, was paroled from a prison term. While out
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on parole, McConnell was arrested for possession of narcotics and sev-
eral firearms violations. Subsequently, the parole commission issued a
parole violator warrant, charging that McConnell violated terms of his
parole. The warrant was not to be executed if McConnell was in cus-
tody. The warrant, however, was executed despite the fact that McCon-
nell was in custody. Subsequently, the parole commission ordered
withdrawal of the original warrant and issued a new parole violator war-
rant. McConnell filed a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, McConnell
argued that because the original parole violator warrant was executed
on February 19, 1985, his original sentence commenced running again
on that date. The district court granted McConnell's petition, stating
that once validly executed, a parole violator warrant can not be with-
drawn. Plaintiff, Warden Martin, subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting habeas
corpus relief. The court ruled that the instructions on the parole violator
warrant did not authorize the marshal to execute it. Specifically, the
warrant was not to be executed if McConnell was in custody. Since Mc-
Connell was in custody, the attempted execution of the warrant was un-
authorized. Accordingly, the parole commission had the authority to
withdraw the first warrant and to issue a second warrant.
United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994
Author: Judge Garth, sitting by designation
Defendant, Miller, appealed his conviction on three counts of mak-
ing false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. He also appealed
the district court's subsequent denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 application
to set aside his conviction. Miller, a tax attorney and accountant, was
found guilty of orchestrating the back-dating of deeds, pension plan re-
ports, and other financial documents in order to avoid tax liabilities. On
appeal, Miller asserted that he received inadequate assistance of coun-
sel. Specifically, the attorney did not investigate Miller's mental condi-
tion, make requisite motions during trial, or allow Miller to
unambiguously deny his guilt.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Miller's conviction and the district court
order denying his application to set aside the conviction. The court
ruled that Miller did not prove his counsel's representation was unrea-
sonable under prevailing professional norms. Moreover, even if unrea-
sonable representation were to be assumed, Miller did not suffer
sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. The court found no evidence
that the attorney was aware of Miller's mental health problems, that the
decision to ignore witnesses' misconduct was a result of carelessness, or
that failure to give Miller an opportunity to explicitly deny, rather than




United States v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Moralez, appealed his district court conviction for con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, and distribution of marijuana. Moralez
contended that the district court abused its discretion by improperly de-
nying his motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did abuse its
discretion by denying the motion. Consequently, the court remanded
the case back to the district court for an in camera hearing to determine
whether the informant was a mere tipster or whether his testimony was
essential to Moralez's defense. In reaching this decision, the district
court must balance the public's interest in protecting the flow of infor-
mation against the individual's right to prepare his defense. The record
contained insufficient evidence to determine whether the district court
applied this balancing test in denying Moralez's motion. The court,
therefore, stated that if the district court decides the identity of the con-
fidential informant should be revealed, Moralez's sentence should be va-
cated and a new trial given with the benefit of the additional testimony.
United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509
Author: Judge Conway, sitting by designation
Defendant, Pena, was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. He received the mandatory minimum sentence of not
less than twenty years. Pena appealed his conviction and sentence, con-
tending that: (1) his detention after the initial stop for speeding was
unreasonable, violated the fourth amendment, and tainted his consent
to search; (2) the search of his vehicle exceeded the scope of his con-
sent; (3) statements made prior to his arrest and receipt of Miranda
warnings resulted from custodial interrogation and should have been
suppressed; (4) the district court erred in failing to dismiss the indict-
ment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act; (5) the sentence violated the
eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;
and (6) he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
sixth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Pena's conviction and sentence. First,
the court found ample evidence suggesting the car was stolen. Accord-
ingly, the court upheld the district court's determination that Pena's de-
tention after the initial stop was reasonable and his consent was valid.
Second, the record established that Pena voluntarily consented to the
search and observed the officer's inspection without objecting or at-
tempting to limit or retract his consent. Thus, the court held that the
search was conducted within the general scope of permission granted.
Third, the district court properly allowed into evidence statements made
prior to Pena's arrest. The court found no evidence of physical force or
a show of authority sufficient to support Pena's contention that he was in
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custody when he made the statements. Fourth, the court rejected Pena's
contention that the Speedy Trial Act was violated. By computing the
excludable delays attributable to Pena's case, the court found that the
trial's commencement clearly met the seventy-day mandate. Fifth,
Pena's sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. The court
based its decision on Pena's degree of culpability, the gravity of his of-
fense, and his minimal sentence. Finally, on de novo review, the court
found nothing to indicate that the defense attorney's decision to not
question the arresting officer was beyond the range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance.
United States v. Pettit, 903 F.2d 1336
Author: Judge Babcock, sitting by designation
Defendant, Pettit, was convicted of possession of cocaine with in-
tent to distribute. Pettit appealed, contending the district court erred in:
(1) denying his motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding Pettit's
girlfriend's bad acts; (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence be-
cause the search warrant was obtained without probable cause; and
(3) adjusting his base offense level upward.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sen-
tence and remanded for resentencing. First, even though Pettit was not
the principle actor, the record established a reasonable indication that
he was a party to his girlfriend's bad acts. Second, in determining
whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant based on an
informant's statements, the court assessed the totality of the circum-
stances. The court ruled that there was probable cause to issue a search
warrant because the informant's information was assessed for three
months and was corroborated by independent law enforcement surveil-
lance. Moreover, the court refused to consider Pettit's argument that he
was not shown the warrant in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. The court
reasoned that issues not raised in the district court will not be consid-
ered for the first time on appeal. Finally, in determining Pettit's sen-
tence, the court improperly considered his roles in criminal activity for
which he was not convicted.
Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant Rael was found guilty of three counts of extortion and
one count of telephone harassment. Rael claimed that the convictions
on the counts of extortion were obtained in violation of his due process
rights, since the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must find
Rael intended to wrongfully compel the person threatened to do an act
against her will. Rael challenged the district court's dismissal of his peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition for writ of
habeas corpus. The court held that because the jury was fully instructed
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on all the elements of extortion under New Mexico law, there was no
due process violation.
United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Reid, was convicted of various drug charges. He ap-
pealed, claiming that: (1) his indictment should have been dismissed
because the grand jury was not apprised of the complete criminal record
of the government's lead witness; (2) his indictment should have been
dismissed or a new trial granted because the government's lead witness
testified that he did not have an agreement with the government while
Reid was led to believe that such an agreement existed; and (3) the dis-
trict court misapplied federal sentencing guidelines concerning the
quantity of drugs involved, allegations of obstruction ofjustice, the na-
ture of Reid's role in the crime, and the computation of Reid's criminal
history.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Reid's conviction. First, the court held
that the government was not obliged to disclose its lead witness's com-
plete criminal history to the grand jury. The court reasoned that the
grand jury was apprised of the witness's current conviction in a related
case. Second, the government's failure to disclose to the defense the
lack of an agreement with its lead witness was not reversible error.
Third, although the district court's calculation concerning the amount of
drugs involved was incomplete, it did not change Reid's base offense
level. Fourth, the district court properly increased Reid's sentence. The
court explained that Reid threatened to put a "hit" on two witnesses,
was an organizer or leader of an "extensive" criminal activity, and com-
mitted an offense within two years of his release from a juvenile deten-
tion camp.
United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839
Author: Judge Parker, sitting by designation
Defendant, Rhodes, appealed the district court's denial of his mo-
tion to withdraw a guilty plea to possession of a cocaine based sub-
stance. On appeal, Rhodes contended that: (1) the district court erred
in finding that he voluntarily pleaded guilty; (2) defense counsel's fail-
ure to independently determine Rhodes's criminal record constituted
ineffective counsel; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in de-
nying his motion to withdraw the plea.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the holdings of the
district court. The court found Rhodes's guilty plea to be voluntary be-
cause he had full knowledge of the minimum and maximum sentences
he could receive and because of his repeated admissions of guilt. More-
over, Rhodes's attorney's erroneous estimate of the sentence did not
render the plea involuntary. Second, the court held that Rhodes's attor-
ney's performance was not so deficient that it violated Rhodes's right to
effective assistance of counsel. The court explained that the attorney's
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failure to independently review Rhodes's prior criminal history did not
deprive Rhodes of effective assistance. This is because Rhodes failed to
informed his attorney of five of his six prior criminal convictions. Also,
Rhodes conceded that he did not give his attorney any reason to ques-
tion the accuracy or completeness of his statements. Finally, the court
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to withdraw. Rhodes failed to meet his burden of showing a
"fair and just reason" for the withdrawal because among many other
factors, he did not assert his innocence, did not explain the lateness of
his motion to withdraw, and was assisted by counsel.
Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649
Author: Judge Holloway
Defendants were Albuquerque police officers ("Maruffi") whose
conduct allegedly deprived plaintiff, Robinson, of his constitutional
rights. Maruffi appealed the district court's decision in favor of Robin-
son, arguing that: (1) Robinson's claims were barred by the statute of
limitations; (2) Robinson was collaterally estopped from pursuing this
action; (3) Robinson failed to prove the necessary causal link between
the individual defendant's alleged conduct and his injuries; (4) it was
prejudicial error for the district court not to instruct the jury on entrap-
ment; (5) several jury instructions were erroneous and, taken as a
whole, highly prejudicial; (6) the court erred by allowing Robinson's
counsel to call witnesses for direct examination and not allowing de-
fendant's counsel immediate cross-examination; and (7) the court's
award of attorney's fees to Robinson was in error.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
found that Robinson's civil rights claim was not barred because it began
in August, 1984, which was within the three year limitation period fol-
lowing Robinson's acquittal in his October, 1983 trial. It dismissed
Maruffi's collateral estoppel claim because it was not raised as an affirm-
ative defense before the district court. Third, Robinson's injuries were
causally linked to Maruffi's actions because all the intervening parties
depended on his false testimony. The district court properly denied
Maruffi the right to present a defense based on the legal definition of
entrapment. The court reasoned that the entrapment issue was irrele-
vant, and a party is not allowed a jury instruction if its defense theory is
not factually or legally supported. Fourth, the district court did not err
in instructing the jury regarding insufficient evidence and lack of prob-
able cause. The court reasoned that competent evidence was intro-
duced to support Robinson's claims of denial of liberty and denial of the
right to a proper probable cause determination. Maruffi's claim of error
regarding inability to cross-examine witnesses was rejected because
Maruffi failed to timely object to the sequence of witnesses, and had an
opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses. Since the district court's de-
cision was affirmed, Maruffi's claim that the award of attorney's fees
should be reversed along with the judgment was denied.
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United States v. Ryan, 894 F.2d 355
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Ryan, entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count
of unlawful use of credit cards in transactions affecting interstate com-
merce and one count of obtaining goods of an aggregate value of $1000
or more in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2). Ryan appealed, claim-
ing: (1) transactions in different states could not be aggregated to sat-
isfy the jurisdictional amount of $1000; (2) venue was improperly
placed in Kansas; and (3) aggregation of amounts affecting interstate
commerce was improper.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court held that the aggregation of amounts under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)
was proper. The court reasoned that the broad wording of the statute
emphasized no geographic limitations. Also, by using the phrase "af-
fects interstate or foreign commerce," the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary intended to establish a broad jurisdictional basis. Second, venue
is determined from the nature of the crime and the location of the acts
constituting it. Thus, since Ryan pleaded guilty to using and obtaining
stolen credit cards and thereby affected interstate commerce in Kansas,
it follows that venue was proper in Kansas. Finally, the court dismissed
the interstate commerce claim because Ryan failed to properly preserve
it for appeal. The court stated that nowhere in the previous motion to
dismiss did Ryan argue that interstate commerce was not affected.
United States v. Schreier, 908 F.2d 645
Author: Judge Logan
Concurrence: Judge Dunbauld, sitting by designation
Defendants, Gayle and Irwin Schreier, appealed three criminal con-
victions for wire fraud. The convictions were the result of a scheme by
the Schreiers in which unclaimed airline mileage was credited to ficti-
tious persons for the purpose of accumulating free airline travel tickets.
On appeal, the Schreiers argued that if the mileage credits did constitute
property under the criminal wire fraud statute, the property interest be-
longed to the passengers, not the airlines. Therefore, they argued that
their convictions could not stand because the government offered no
evidence that they defrauded passengers. Moreover, they could not
have defrauded the airlines because the airlines had no property interest
in the mileage.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court first stated
that because mileage credited to the passengers is considered a liability
of the airline for accounting purposes, it constitutes a property interest.
Second, the Schreiers committed a fraud on the airlines. The court ex-
plained that the Schreiers acquired mileage that would otherwise not
have been claimed. Therefore, the Schreiers created a liability for the
airlines that otherwise would not exist. Moreover, the taking of intangi-
ble property via computer may be the basis for wire fraud.
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United States v. Schroeder, 902 F.2d 1469
Author: Judge West, sitting by designation
Defendant, Schroeder, was convicted of interstate communication
of a threat to injure another person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
On the day of Schroeder's trial, his attorney requested a continuance on
the basis that his client suffered from sleep deprivation. The district
court explained that in order for there to be a grant of continuance,
Schroeder would have to waive his right to a speedy trial. Schroeder
refused, and the district court proceeded with trial. Schroeder ap-
pealed, claiming that the district court erred in denying his request for a
continuance. Specifically, Schroeder claimed that the district court
failed to place him on the stand to determine his awareness. Schroeder
also claimed that there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and
the district court improperly departed upward from the Sentencing
Guidelines after finding an Assistant United States Attorney a "victim"
of his threats.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that the district court did not err in
failing to place Schroeder on the stand to determine his awareness. The
court reasoned that defense counsel had the opportunity to make a com-
plete offer of proof regarding Schroeder's alleged incompetency. Sec-
ond, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to meet the
requirements of the statute. Last, the district court erred in departing
upward from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court reasoned that noth-
ing in the record indicated that the attorney received a threat directed
towards his person.
United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871
Author: Judge Seay, sitting by designation
Defendant, Scott, was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine and of manufacturing methamphetamine. Scott ap-
pealed his conviction, claiming that he was denied a fair trial when the
district court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of coercion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court stated that three elements must be satisfied before the jury will be
instructed on a coercion defense: (1) an immediate threat of death or
serious bodily injury; (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be
carried out; and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened
harm. The court found that Scott failed to meet his threshold burden as
to the third element. Consequently, the court stated that since evidence
was lacking as to the third element, the district court properly disal-
lowed the defense as a matter of law and properly refused to instruct the
jury on coercion.
United States v. Simmons, 912 F.2d 1215
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Simmons, was convicted of failure to appear at a court
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proceeding. Simmons appealed, arguing that: (1) evidence regarding
his willful violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146 was insufficient to support the
conviction; and (2) notice of the hearing was insufficient.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court ruled that Simmons's failure to comply with a supervised release
order requiring him to appear at all proceedings was a willful failure.
The court determined Simmons was a fugitive who made no attempt to
contact his attorney or the court with regard to his voluntary absence.
This was in violation of a release order from an alternative incarceration
program. The court held that under these circumstances, no actual no-
tice of the hearing was necessary, and notice to Simmons's attorney was
sufficient.
United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Spedalieri, used an imitation bomb to commit armed
robbery. He was convicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d).
Spedalieri subsequently appealed his conviction. Specifically, Spedalieri
argued that the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion for ac-
quittal because he did not use an actual bomb; (2) misapprehending its
discretionary authority in not departing downward from the Sentencing
Guidelines; and (3) not granting a two-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that a "fake" bomb, as a matter
of law, may constitute a dangerous weapon when a victim is placed in
reasonable expectation of danger. Second, the district judge's determi-
nation that Spedalieri committed a violent act and his decision to not
depart downward based on the need to protect the public, constituted a
proper exercise of discretion. Third, the court held that the admission
of an offense inherent in the insanity defense is not the same as accept-
ance of responsibility. Since Spedalieri denied committing the offense
in a pre-sentence report and then later argued that the affirmative de-
fense of insanity at trial constituted an admission, the district court's
refusal to grant a two-level downward adjustment was not clearly
erroneous.
United States v. Stanley, 896 F.2d 450
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Stanley, was convicted of receiving child pornography
through the mails. Stanley appealed, arguing that the conviction was
contrary to law. Stanley explained that by mailing the materials from
Japan to himself in Colorado, he never surrendered control. Conse-
quently, Stanley explained that he could not later "receive" the materi-
als within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(B). Stanley also
contended that the postal inspector's testimony was not proper lay opin-
ion under Fed. R. Evid. 701. Stanley reasoned that the testimony was
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not helpful to understanding the ages of persons in the photographs,
nor to the determination of a fact at issue.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court explained that Stanley "received" the child pornography within
the meaning of the statute. The court reasoned that Stanley surren-
dered control over the materials when he gave them to the postal au-
thorities and reacquired control and took possession upon delivery in
Colorado. Therefore, Stanley "received" the materials within the com-
mon-sense understanding of the verb "to receive." Last, the court
stated that the district court properly admitted the lay person's opinion.
The court explained that the district court has broad discretion to deter-
mine whether a lay witness is qualified under Rule 701 to testify on a
matter of opinion. Consequently, since the postal inspector's testimony
was helpful to the jury in determining the age of the subjects and was
useful as an explanation of why he ordered a supervised delivery, ob-
tained a search warrant, and seized the defendant's package, the court
held that the district court did not abuse its -discretion in allowing the
testimony.
United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Six defendants were convicted of various drug and other offenses,
including conspiracy to manufacture, possession and distribution of am-
phetamine, and use of firearms in the commission of an offense. The
defendants appealed, alleging that among many other claims: (1) the
prosecutor repeatedly elicited evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs or
other acts in contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 403-04; (2) the government
destroyed handwritten notes made during an agent's investigative inter-
views with three government informants; and (3) the district court im-
properly amended the indictment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that the
repeated interjection of evidence about prior bad acts was clearly preju-
dicial. The court reasoned that the conspiracy's history is an insufficient
basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs. While a particular his-
tory of the conspiracy may be probative to establish identity, intent, mo-
tive, or plan, the prosecution made no effort to explain a probative
purpose or connection to the earlier conduct and the case. Second, the
court was unable to determine the merits of the claims concerning the
handwritten notes destroyed by the government. The court explained
that the district court did not conduct a hearing to determine whether
the lost evidence would be material or if the government destroyed the
evidence in bad faith. The court ruled that a hearing should be held,
since either conclusion could be determinative of whether the govern-
ment's failure to preserve evidence constituted a denial of due process.
Third, the court found that the district court properly amended the in-
dictment by deleting the firearms' objective. The court reasoned that
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the objective could be severed from the indictment since it was unneces-
sary to the defendants' conviction on the conspiracy counts.
United States v. Teehee, 893 F.2d 271
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Teehee, possessed, transferred, and sold long-distance
telephone access codes, thereby providing him with unlimited access to
U.S. Sprint telephone service. He was later convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(a)(2) for trafficking in unauthorized access devices. The district
court subsequently ordered him to pay $100,000 in restitution. Teehee
appealed, claiming that: (1) the restitution order was not made in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act
of 1982 ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64; (2) the sentencing court
failed to make sufficient findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(3)(D),
("Rule 32"); and (3) the restitution order was illegal because the total
loss to U.S. Sprint could not be attributed directly to his activities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the order for restitution. The court
ruled that the district court acted within its authority, which was granted
by the VWPA. Second, the court dismissed Teehee's claim that the sen-
tencing court failed to make sufficient findings under Rule 32. The
court explained that the district court made proper findings as to the
matter of restitution. Third, the court stated that although it was diffi-
cult to assign a precise amount to Teehee for loss caused by him, the
determination was not impossible.
United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Tisdale, appealed his conviction for possession of fire-
arms by a convicted felon. He also appealed his enhanced sentence.
Specifically, Tisdale argued that: (1) the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search
of his trailer; (2) his sentence was improperly enhanced under the
Sentencing Guidelines; and (3) his sentence was unlawful and
unreasonable.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Tisdale's conviction, but vacated the
sentence and remanded for further consideration. The court found that
the firearms were seized in a protective sweep and were within plain
view. Accordingly, the search fell within the plain view exception to the
search warrant requirement. Second, the court found that the enhanced
sentence was appropriate. The court reasoned that burglarizing three
establishments in one night amounted to three separate crimes, instead
of one criminal episode as Tisdale argued. The court vacated the sen-
tence, however, because the district court failed to determine Tisdale's
offense level or criminal history category. Consequently, the court was
left to speculate whether the Sentencing Guidelines were properly
considered.
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United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendants, Tranakos and Pilgrim, appealed their convictions for
conspiring to defraud the United States and obstructing justice.
Tranakos also appealed a conviction for preparing and presenting fraud-
ulent tax returns. Specifically, Tranakos and Pilgrim contended that
their convictions should be reversed because: (1) they were not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence; and (2) their statutory and constitutional
rights to a speedy trial were violated. In addition, Tranakos argued that
the conspiracy count should have been dismissed, and Pilgrim argued
that the district court erred when it refused to sever the charge of ob-
structing grand jury testimony from the conspiracy count.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the delay in bringing the defend-
ants to trial did not violate either the sixth amendment or the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74. Second, the convictions were sup-
ported by sufficient evidence. Third, the conspiracy count against
Tranakos was proper. The court stated he assisted others in effectuating
illegal tax strategies through the use of "sham transactions." Tranakos
did not merely advocate a tax strategy of debatable legality. Fourth, Pil-
grim's motion to sever the charge of obstructing grand jury testimony
from the conspiracy count was properly denied. The court reasoned
that the increase in judicial efficiency from joining the counts was signifi-
cant enough to outweigh any prejudice.
United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1083
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Wach, was sentenced to thirty months after being con-
victed of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent that
she engage in prostitution and sexual activity. On appeal, Wach argued
that the district court violated his due process rights by: (1) finding he
did not accept responsibility for the crime; and (2) failing to append
findings on controverted matters in the probation office's pre-sentence
report which resulted in a prejudicial sentence. Plaintiff, United States,
cross-appealed, arguing that the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to
hear Wach's appeal of his sentence.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled that it did have jurisdiction over
Wach's claim. The court reasoned that it has jurisdiction to review a
final sentence when the grounds for review are violation of the law.
Since Wach claimed that the district court violated his due process
rights, he had a cognizable claim. Second, the court ruled that the dis-
trict court was not clearly erroneous in relying on the probation office's
finding that Wach failed to accept responsibility for the crime. The
court reasoned that the district court gave Wach ample opportunity to
prove he accepted responsibility. Moreover, a district court's determi-
nation that a defendant has not accepted responsibility must be given
great deference on review. Last, the court found that the district court
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did not rely on any controverted facts when determining Wach's sen-
tence. The court explained that Wach's pre-sentence report contained
various uncontroverted examples of antisocial conduct which justified
his sentence. Thus, failure to append findings of controverted facts to
the pre-sentence report was merely technical error. Consequently, the
court remanded to the district court solely for the ministerial act of at-
taching the determination on controverted matters to the pre-sentence
report.
United States v. Widdowson, 916 F.2d 587
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, Widdowson, Bachman, and Whitely filed a motion to
dismiss their indictments for distributing a controlled substance. They
contended that: (1) delegating the power to temporarily schedule
drugs to the Attorney General was unconstitutional; (2) the Attorney
General did not subdelegate this scheduling decision to the Drug En-
forcement Administration ("DEA"); and (3) if the Attorney General did
subdelegate this decision, he lacked the power to do so. The district
court granted the defendants' motion, and plaintiff, United States,
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that delegating the power to temporarily
schedule drugs to the Attorney General under 21 U.S.C. § 81 1(h), was
unconstitutional. The court explained that such temporary power was
unchecked by procedural safeguards or limitations. Second, it seemed
extraordinary to assume that Congress intended to permit the tempo-
rary scheduling power to be delegated to a lesser administrator such as
the head of the DEA. Last, the court ruled that Congress did not intend
to permit subdelegation. The court again explained that there was a
lack of procedural safeguards and limitations on the Attorney General's
power.
United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Williams, was convicted of engaging in racketeering ac-
tivities and conspiracy to participate in such activities, conspiracy to dis-
tribute heroin, interstate travel to facilitate the conspiracy, and
possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Williams was subse-
quently sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. She appealed both her
conviction and sentence, contending that the district court erred by:
(1) denying her motion to transfer venue; (2) denying her motion for
severance; (3) refusing to suppress evidence gathered during a search
based on an allegedly invalid search warrant; (4) determining her sen-
tence by application of the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) increasing her
sentence under the Guidelines for her role as a "leader or organizer" of
the conspiracy; and (6) calculating the base offense level under the
Guidelines based on the total quantity of drugs known to Williams to be
involved in the conspiracy.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings after finding
Williams's claims to be meritless. First, the court stated that it would
not reverse the district court's decision not to change venue to Califor-
nia because the circumstances surrounding the trial did not compel it.
The court explained that most of the principal witnesses who appeared
resided in or were located in Oklahoma. Furthermore, these considera-
tions outweighed Williams's claim that minor witnesses were inhibited
from appearing because of the trial's location. Second, the district court
properly denied severance because Williams was not prejudiced by a
joint trial. Williams's only claim of prejudice was that evidence adduced
at trial against her co-defendant did not relate to her involvement in the
conspiracy. The court ruled that, at most, this claim amounted to an
allegation that her chances of acquittal were impaired. This is not suffi-
cient to warrant severance. Third, evidence gathered during the search
was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The court explained that
the officers conducting the search were entitled to rely on the magis-
trate's decision that the facts were sufficient to establish probable cause.
Moreover, the information used to establish probable cause was not too
stale. The court reasoned that a sufficient likelihood continued to exist
that evidence relating to the ongoing conspiracy would be found in Wil-
liams's home. Fourth, because Williams continued to be involved as a
conspirator until December 1987, her offense was committed after the
effective date of the Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, the district court
properly applied the Guidelines to her sentence. Fifth, the district
court's decision that Williams was an organizer was proper because the
determination was not clearly erroneous. Finally, as a member of an
ongoing conspiracy, Williams was subject to a sentence calculated on
the actual quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy, not just the
amount she personally handled.
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United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Arango, was convicted of possessing a controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute. Arango argued that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine on the
grounds that: (1) he had standing to contest the search of the truck
because the government failed to introduce evidence demonstrating
Arango's possession of the truck was unlawful; (2) his allegedly illegal
detention fatally tainted his subsequent oral consent to search; (3) his
allegedly illegal arrest fatally tainted his subsequent written consent;
and (4) his written consent to search was invalid on its face.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court found the issue of standing to be intertwined with substantive
fourth amendment analysis. Two factors considered in this analysis are
whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
the area searched, and whether society would recognize that expectation
as reasonable. Because Arango failed to present any evidence that his
possession of the truck was lawful, the court ruled he did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck and, therefore, had no
standing to contest the search. Second, the court held Arango's deten-
tion and arrest to be lawful because they were supported by reasonable
suspicion and probable cause respectively. There was reasonable suspi-
cion because Arango failed to prove he had lawful possession of the
truck, and he had an inadequate amount of luggage in the truck for a
two week vacation. Also, the officers discovered a hidden compartment
underneath the truck bed, plus the insufficient amount of luggage pro-
vided probable cause. The court concluded that because Arango lacked
standing to challenge the search of the truck and because the arrest was
legal, the issue of voluntary consent need not be decided.
United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144
Per Curiam
Defendant, Baker, a Southern Ute Tribe member, was convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine and possessing the precursor P2P
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Baker appealed his con-
victions, claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained through an improper search warrant. Spe-
cifically, Baker reasoned that the evidence was improperly obtained
through the use of a state search warrant. Plaintiff, United States, con-
tended that it was entitled to the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule and, therefore, the search warrant was valid.
The Tenth Circuit held the evidence to be inadmissable. The court
found that the evidence obtained through a state issued search warrant
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was inadmissable in Baker's federal prosecution. The court reasoned
that Colorado has never obtained an extension of its jurisdiction to in-
clude land located within Indian country. Furthermore, the court stated
that since a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal, the officers did not possess the requisite good faith
necessary to trigger the exception. The court, therefore, found the
United States' claim to be invalid.
United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Defendants Bell's and Ziebarth's cases were companioned on ap-
peal. Bell was convicted of attempting to possess with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. The district court held that Bell was not detained by the
arresting officer. Rather, Bell consented to accompany the officer,
thereby implicating no fourth amendment interest. The district court
also adduced that the canine sniff of Bell's package was reasonable in
light of the circumstances. On appeal, Bell argued that his fourth
amendment rights were violated in an improper detention and search.
Bell also contended that the evidence did not sustain his conviction.
Ziebarth was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
The district court found that Ziebarth also consented to accompany an
officer On appeal, Ziebarth argued that the detention violated his
fourth amendment interests. The district court denied both defendants'
pre-trial motions to suppress evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conviction of both
Bell and Ziebarth. First, the court found reasonable grounds for Bell's
detention and the limited canine sniff. The court reasoned that the
dog's alert to 'the package was probable cause for his arrest. Also, the
court found that the detention of Ziebarth was voluntary. Accordingly,
no error was found in the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress.
United States v. Benitez, 899 F.2d 995
Author: Judge Theis, sitting by designation
Defendant, Benitez, entered a conditional guilty plea for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On appeal, Benitez
argued that: (1) the border patrol violated his fourth amendment rights
by exceeding its authority in detaining him and seizing his vehicle;
(2) he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to a search of his vehi-
cle; and (3) the evidence seized from his vehicle should be suppressed
because it was not supported by probable cause.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed Benitez's conviction and the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress. First, the court held that Beni-
tez's nervous conduct gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to conduct the
search. Accordingly, the detention did not violate his fourth amend-
ment rights. Second, while Benitez did not verbally consent to the
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search, he did exit his vehicle, open the trunk, and open a suitcase con-
tained in the truck. The court stated that in light of these circumstances,
the situation was not coercive in nature, and Benitez voluntarily con-
sented. Third, since the detention was based on reasonable suspicion
and the search was consensual, the evidence seized was supported by
probable cause.
Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Cordoba, was found guilty of driving while intoxicated.
Cordoba appealed the district court's dismissal of his writ of habeas
corpus, arguing that he was not advised of his right against self-incrimina-
tion before the officer started the interrogation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that Miranda requires police officers to advise a defendant of
his right against self-incrimination before initiating a custodial interro-
gation. The court stated, however, that Cordoba was not in custody
when he admitted to driving while intoxicated. Thus, Cordoba was not
entitled to a Miranda warning against self-incrimination at that point.
The court explained that routine traffic stops for roadside questioning
do not impair a person's free exercise of the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Thus, an officer arriving at the scene of an accident may ask
a moderate number of questions without warranting a Miranda warning.
United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927
Author: Judge Phillips, sitting by designation
Defendant, Corral-Corral's ("Corral's"), vehicle was consensually
searched pursuant to a traffic stop near Laramie, Wyoming. During the
search, officers found cocaine and a large sum of money in Corral's car.
Shortly thereafter, officers obtained a search warrant from a California
judge to search Corral's California residence some one hundred miles
away. During this search, numerous weapons and additional drugs were
seized. The district court suppressed the evidence seized from Corral's
residence, concluding that probable cause did not exist. Moreover, the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The gov-
ernment brought an interlocutory appeal, seeking reversal of the sup-
pression of evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's suppression of the
evidence. The court explained that the seized evidence was the product
of a search pursuant to a valid warrant. The court then discussed the
purpose of the exclusionary rule, finding that it was designed to serve
the privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. The "good
faith" exception permits admission of evidence from a search warrant
later invalidated because of lack of probable cause; the officers con-
ducting the search, however, must act in good faith and with reasonable
reliance on the warrant. Suppression of evidence is mandated by the
exclusionary rule only in cases where it would deter police misconduct.
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The court explained that since the officer's reliance on the judge's prob-
able cause determination was reasonable and the technical sufficiency of
the warrant was also reasonable, the evidence should not have been
suppressed.
United States v. Finney, 897 F.2d 1047
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Finney, appealed the district court's order revoking her
probation. She contended that the district court erred in admitting evi-
dence obtained in an illegal search. Moreover, she argued that the ex-
clusionary rule is applicable in federal probationary hearings.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the ex-
clusionary rule is not applicable in federal probationary hearings. The
court reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule to revocation pro-
ceedings will not deter illegal police conduct when it occurs before state
charges are filed. Therefore, the deterrence to illegal conduct, if any,
can be accomplished in the context of the state proceedings. Moreover,
application of the rule at a federal revocation proceeding would be re-
dundant and would inhibit the pursuit of criminals who have abused
their probation privileges.
United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 504
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendants, Gonzales and Gomez, entered a conditional plea of
guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana. On appeal, each
challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress evi-
dence obtained during an investigatory stop. In particular, Gonzales
and Gomez contended that information conveyed by a confidential in-
formant to the investigatory officers was insufficient and lacked any indi-
cia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the confidential informant was consid-
ered reliable. The court explained that the informant had previously
provided the agents information. Moreover, the information supplied
by the informant was sufficient. The court reasoned that the informa-
tion was based on personal knowledge acquired over a period of time
and through past dealings. The judgment of the district court was,
therefore, affirmed.
United States v. GottschalA, 915 F.2d 1459
Author: Judge Anderson
Certain evidence was seized from defendant Gottschalk's vehicle
during the execution of a valid search warrant at the residence of Wil-
liam Bailey. The district court suppressed the evidence, however, rea-
soning that the vehicle which was parked in Bailey's driveway, did not
belong to and was not actually controlled by him at the time of the
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search. Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's determina-
tion to suppress the seized evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court
stated that a warrant authorizing the search of a certain premises gener-
ally includes any vehicles either actually owned or under the control and
dominion of the premises owner. Thus, where the officers act reason-
ably in assuming the vehicle is under the control of the premises owner,
it is included in the warrant. In the case at hand, the police officers had
sufficient indicia of control to render the search of the vehicle proper.
For example, the officers discovered the vehicle on the premises at the
time the search commenced, they knew the vehicle was inoperable, and
the owner of the premises had physical access to keys left in the ignition.
Accordingly, the search was valid.
United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392
Author: Judge Brimmer, sitting by designation
Defendant, Henning, was convicted by a jury of one count of pos-
session with intent to distribute more than twenty grams of
methamphetamine, two counts of carrying or using a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense, and one count of possession of
an unregistered firearm. Henning appealed his convictions contending
that the district court: (1) erred when it did not suppress both the phys-
ical evidence seized during a search and the statements regarding this
evidence; (2) erred in failing to define the phrase "in relation to" in the
jury instructions because it excluded the jury's consideration of the mens
rea element; and (3) erred in convicting Henning on two violations of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) in relation to only one underlying offense.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order not to suppress
the seized physical evidence or statements. The court found that unless
the facts relative to a denial of a motion to suppress are clearly errone-
ous, they must be accepted. Since the physical evidence was seized dur-
ing a lawful arrest, and Henning was advised of his Miranda rights prior
to his statements, the evidence and statements were admissible. Second,
the court held that the failure to define the "in relation to" clause in the
jury instructions was not plain error and so prejudicial that justice could
not be done. The court reasoned that the jury was presented with
enough testimony to secure the conviction, and the giving of an "in rela-
tion to" instruction would not have changed the result. Finally, the
court remanded for resentencing. The court held that Henning could
only be sentenced for one count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) since he
was convicted of only one underlying drug trafficking offense.
United States v. Johnson, 895 F.2d 693
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Johnson, appealed the district court's order denying his
motion to suppress marijuana seized from his vehicle at a border patrol
checkpoint. Johnson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in:
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(1) failing to suppress evidence because the seizure of Johnson and his
vehicle violated the fourth amendment; and (2) failing to suppress evi-
dence because the duration and scope of his detention and that of his
vehicle exceeded the constitutional limits applicable to checkpoints.
The Tenth Circuit held that the search was not in violation of John-
son's fourth amendment rights, and that the district court did not err in
denying Johnson's motion to suppress. First, the court found that cus-
toms officials had probable cause to believe Johnson's vehicle carried
narcotics. Accordingly, they were not limited to investigate solely the
citizenship of the occupants. The court explained that detention and
search beyond a routine customs inspection may be undertaken upon a
-reasonable suspicion" standard. Reasonable suspicion is justified by a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person of a crime.
The court found the inspection to be proper because after Johnson's
passenger could not produce any identification and Johnson failed to
produce a registration form, the car was properly detained. Once de-
tained, the search of the vehicle, predicated upon the custom official's
observation of a large marijuana cigarette in plain view, was valid.
United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Keys, appealed his conviction and sentence for know-
ingly possessing a weapon while an inmate of a federal correctional insti-
tution. On appeal, Keys contended that the district court erred by:
(1) failing to exclude evidence of his prison gang membership; (2) per-
mitting the testimony of two government witnesses to be reread during
jury deliberations; (3) adding two levels to his base offense level for ob-
struction of justice; and (4) departing upward from the Sentencing
Guidelines due to his prison disciplinary record.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court held that evidence of Keys' prison gang membership was properly
admitted because it demonstrated "bias due to fear." Second, the court
stated that it failed to find an abuse of discretion in allowing testimony
to be reread to the jury. The court reasoned that the district court previ-
ously instructed the testimony be read in its entirety, and the jury could
hear it because they felt it was "absolutely essential" to come to a ver-
dict. Third, the court held that the district court properly added two
levels to Keys' base offense level for obstructing justice. Evidence at
trial showed that Keys did not testify truthfully. Further, he instructed a
fellow inmate to perjure himself on Keys' behalf. Finally, the court held
that the upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based on
Keys' prison disciplinary record was proper because: (1) the circum-
stances cited by the district court justified the departure; (2) those cir-




Kitty's East v. United States, 905 F.2d 1367
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Kitty's East ("Kitty's"), appealed the district court's denial
of its motion for the return of property seized under two search war-
rants. On appeal, Kitty's disputed the validity of the seizure, arguing
that the local warrant failed to describe with sufficient particularity the
items to be seized. Moreover, Kitty's contended that the national war-
rant was overbroad.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion.
The court held that the local warrant was sufficiently specific, even
though it did not identify items by name. Second, the national warrant
was not overbroad. The court stated that the warrant restricted the
items that could be seized. Finally, the government's retention of Kitty's
property was reasonable. The court explained that there was a chance
the evidence might be lost if it were returned. Also, copies of all the
records were previously returned.
United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379
Author: Judge Seay, sitting by designation
Defendant, Lux, was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine and attempting to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine. Lux appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying
her motions to: (1) suppress statements made by her to law enforce-
ment officers; and (2) suppress evidence of cocaine seized from a pack-
age addressed to her.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Lux's mo-
tions. First, the court stated that Lux's statements to police officers were
made freely and voluntarily. She was advised of her Miranda rights, ac-
knowledged that she understood those rights, and voluntarily executed
a waiver of them. Moreover, Lux's questions concerning how long she
would be detained if she asked for a lawyer and if she had to stay in jail
while she waited for one, were not an equivocal invocation of her right
to counsel. Second, the court ruled that the cocaine seized from the
package was properly admitted into evidence. The court explained that
the authorities had reasonable suspicion to detain the package contain-
ing the cocaine. In particular, the package met three factors of the
"drug package profile," thereby giving authorities reasonable suspicion
to subject it to a drug detection dog. Consequently, the detention of the
package was reasonable and did not amount to a seizure of personal
property.
United States v. Maher, 919 F.2d 1482
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Maher, was indicted for concealing and storing stolen
explosive materials and for transporting them in interstate commerce.
Maher motioned to suppress evidence of the explosive materials seized
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in his unregistered vehicle. The district court granted his motion, and
plaintiff, United States, appealed. The government contended that the
evidence was properly seized because the participating officers had
probable cause to arrest Maher. Moreover, the government challenged
the district court's holding that impoundment of Maher's trailer was an
unlawful seizure that further tainted his consent to a search.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's deci-
sion. The court ruled that based on the totality of the circumstances, the
officers had reasonable cause to believe that Maher was engaged in crim-
inal activity. The court explained that the license plate on Maher's vehi-
cle was stolen, Maher's trailer was unregistered, and Maher was unable
to identify the trailer's previous owner. Thus, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Maher. Second, the district court erred in holding that
impoundment of Maher's trailer was an unlawful seizure. The court ex-
plained that just as the officers had probable cause to arrest Maher for
possession of a stolen trailer, they had probable cause to impound the
trailer and search it without a warrant. Moreover, the subjective intent
of the officers in deciding to impound the trailer was inapplicable.
United States v. McAlpine, 919 F.2d 1461
Author: Judge Seymour
Certain police officers were summoned to defendant McAlpine's
home at the request of Hale. Hale claimed that she lived against her will
with McAlpine. After arriving at McAlpine's home, the police officers
scanned the home with Hale's consent. Based on the information
found, the police officers obtained a search warrant. McAlpine mo-
tioned to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of
his residence. In essence, McAlpine argued that because the warrant
obtained for the later search was based on the product of the prior ille-
gal search, the warrant was deficient under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and
McAlpine appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. The
court explained that Hale had common authority over the home when
the police performed the search. If common authority is established,
the person whose property is searched is unjustified in claiming an ex-
pectation of privacy in the property. Essentially, that person cannot rea-
sonably believe that the joint user will not, under certain circumstances,
allow a search in her own right. The court found common authority in
the fact that Hale regularly slept in the room where the guns were
found, and the house contained her possessions. Moreover, the court
rejected McAlpine's argument that "kidnap victims" cannot give con-
sent to a search of the premise where they are being held. The court
explained that the relevant analysis in third-party consent cases is the
relation between the third-party and the property searched, not the
third-party and the defendant. Consequently, there is no per se rule that
a crime victim cannot consent to a search of the perpetrator's home.
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Second, Hale actually lived in the house, even though it was against her
will. Thus, police officers could reasonably believe, under the circum-
stances, that she had authority to consent to the search.
United States v. Monsisvais, 907 F.2d 987
Author: Judge Brorby
Dissent: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Monsisvais, appealed the district court's holding that
the stop of his vehicle and the resulting search were proper. Border
Patrol Agent Goad believed that the vehicle contained aliens because of
the out-of-state Arizona plates, the weight of the back of the camper
shell, and the route chosen by Monsisvais. Consequently, Goad stopped
the vehicle and detected a strong odor of marijuana. Goad then placed
Monsisvais under arrest for possession of marijuana. After another
agent arrived at the scene with a dog to verify the marijuana odor, the
agents opened the camper shell on the vehicle and discovered the
marijuana.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the issue of the
investigatory stop and, therefore, did not address the propriety of the
search. The court stated that an investigatory stop is justified when un-
usual conduct leads an officer to conclude that there is criminal activity.
In assessing the propriety of the stop, the totality of the circumstances
must be taken into account. Based on the totality of the circumstances,
therefore, the court held that the conduct observed by Goad was not
unusual enough to indicate criminal activity. First, the record did not
provide the court with a basis for concluding that the vehicle's presence
on the highway at 7:30 p.m. was at all unusual and, thus, it was not sug-
gestive of criminal conduct. Second, the court could not conclude from
the record that Arizona vehicles are more likely to transport aliens than
other out-of-state vehicles. Third, although some vehicles may attempt
to circumvent the checkpoint by driving that route, Monsisvais evi-
denced no evasive driving maneuvers or any other unusual or suspicious
behavior. Fourth, even though a pickup with a camper shell, riding
heavy, is a significant factor, it is not automatic indication of criminal
conduct.
United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Morales-Zamora ("Zamora"), was indicted on drug
charges after a narcotics detection dog directed attention to his vehicle
while the vehicle was detained at a roadblock. The stated purpose of the
roadblock was to check drivers' licenses, vehicle registrations, and proof
of insurance. A subsequent search revealed 126 pounds of marijuana in
the vehicle's trunk. The district court granted Zamora's motion to sup-
press on the ground that the dog sniff was an improper "search" under
the fourth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
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court first noted that the purpose of the roadblock was not a pretext to
search stopped vehicles for drugs. The court first found that the two-
minute detention was not an unreasonable seizure under the fourth
amendment. Second, the court found that using a narcotics-detection
dog to sniff a vehicle already lawfully detained was not a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. The court explained that a lim-
ited investigation of a vehicle which reveals only evidence of contraband
does not constitute a fourth amendment search. The court reasoned
that persons have a lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle.
United States v. Payan, 905 F.2d 1376
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Payan, entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing
marijuana with intent to distribute. Payan appealed, arguing that the
initial stop of his vehicle at the border patrol check point was unconsti-
tutional on two grounds: (1) the check point was analogous to a roving
border patrol and, therefore, the fourth amendment requirement of rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity applies; and (2) the border patrol
must demonstrate that the location and operation of fixed checkpoints
are reasonable. Payan also argued that the search of his vehicle was not
supported by consent or probable cause.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination. First,
the court held the stop of the vehicle to be valid. The court explained
that the checkpoint involved little officer discretion and was not likely to
result in abusive or harassing stops. Moreover, the appearance of the
officer's authority at the checkpoint allied the concerns of lawful travel-
ers. Also, permanence of the checkpoint is not required. In addition,
the government was not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of
its location. Second, the court ruled that the search of the vehicle was
not clearly erroneous. Payan interpreted the officer's statement to exit
his car and open the trunk as an order, whereas the officer stated it was a
question to which Payan consented. The district court was simply re-
quired to choose between these differing accounts, and it did so
properly.
United States v. Pollack, 895 F.2d 686
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Pollack, was convicted of possession with the intent to
distribute marijuana after customs officials stopped his car and seized its
possessions. Pollack appealed, and argued that: (1) the stop was not
based on reasonable suspicion; (2) the search was executed without
probable cause; and (3) he was unlawfully detained after the initial stop.
The Tenth Circuit held the search and seizure valid. The court
found that based on the totality of the circumstances, the detaining of-
ficers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping
Pollack's car. The court held that border patrol agents may consider the
following factors in determining reasonable suspicion: (1) the area in
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which the vehicle is stopped; (2) patterns of traffic on the road;
(3) proximity to the border; (4) previous experience with drug traffick-
ing in the area; (5) appearance of the vehicle; and (6) other relevant
information. These same factors gave rise to probable cause to arrest
Pollack after he was stopped and questioned. Giving due consideration
to the time of the stop, the area of the stop and the officer's concern for
safety, the court held that the delay following Pollack's arrest was not
unlawful.
United States v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Roper, and two co-defendants were charged with pos-
session with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of 500 grams. Roper
filed a motion to suppress cocaine seized from the rented automobile he
was driving. The district court denied Roper's motion, finding that he
lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Roper lacked standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle he was driving at the time of the stop.
The court reasoned that only the owner or one in lawful possession or
custody of a rented vehicle has standing to challenge the search of a
vehicle. Having keys to a rented car, or permission from the renter to
use it, are not sufficient to confer standing. Rather, a defendant must
show that an arrangement was made with the rental car company that
would have allowed him to drive the car legitimately. Here, the vehicle
was rented by a co-defendant's common-law wife, and Roper was not
listed as an additional driver in the rental contract.
United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Rubio-Rivera, was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute less than fifty kilograms of marijuana. Rubio-Rivera's motion
to suppress forty-four pounds of marijuana was denied by the district
court, and he subsequently appealed. In particular, Rubio-Rivera ar-
gued that the border patrol officer improperly directed him to a secon-
dary checkpoint. Rubio-Rivera alleged that this exceeded the legitimate
scope of the initial stop and violated the fourth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion
to suppress. First, the court acknowledged that Rubio-Rivera had stand-
ing to raise the issue, even though the car was borrowed. The court
then ruled that border patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion
to refer motorists to a secondary checkpoint. In the case at hand, the
border patrol had reasonable suspicion to direct Rubio-Rivera to the
secondary checkpoint. The court explained that at the primary check-
point, Rubio-Rivera was apprehensive and would not maintain eye con-
tact when questioned. Further, the car contained no luggage or
personal belongings, and it had a temporary Colorado sticker even
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though Rubio-Rivera stated that the car was purchased in El Paso,
Texas.
United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Scales, was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine. Scales appealed, alleging the district court improperly
admitted into evidence cocaine found in his suitcase.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. First, the
court ruled that the drug enforcement agents who seized Scales' luggage
did not act in good faith. In particular, the agents did not act in reliance
on a search warrant when they seized the luggage and held it for more
than twenty-four hours. Consequently, the cocaine found in the suitcase
should not have been admitted into evidence. Moreover, the court
noted that the intrusion was exacerbated by the agents' failure to inform
Scales where they were transporting his luggage, the length of time the
luggage would be detained, and the arrangements to be made for the
luggage's return. Thus, the seizure exceeded the agents' authority to
detain the suitcase for investigative purposes.
United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Snow, pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to de-
fraud the government, thereby reserving the right to appeal the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Consequently, after
sentencing, Snow appealed alleging: (1) the affidavit used to obtain the
search warrant failed to establish probable cause because it was based
on stale information and unreliable hearsay; (2) the search warrant affi-
davit contained false statements; and (3) the search warrant and search
were overly broad.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that it could not determine that the information con-
tained in the affidavit was stale. In making this determination, the court
based its decision on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the
activity, and the nature of the property to be seized. Moreover, the in-
vestigation into Snow's affairs took place over a five week period. The
information gathered during this period was cumulative in nature, re-
quiring the application for the search warrant to be delayed until suffi-
cient evidence was obtained. In addition, since Snow was being
investigated for running an ongoing and continuous operation to de-
fraud the government, the passage of time became a less critical factor.
Also, the items sought in the search were of the type that would be kept
for a lengthy time. Further, the court ruled that hearsay evidence may
be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The court rea-
soned that, given all the circumstances described in the affidavit, there
was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at the
designated location. Second, the court stated that, despite the inaccu-
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rate statements contained in the affidavit, it was still valid. The court
reasoned that an affidavit which contains erroneous or unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence is valid if it also contains sufficient accurate or
untainted evidence. Finally, the warrant was not overly broad because it
did not authorize a general exploratory rummaging of Snow's place of
business. Instead, the warrant described with sufficient particularity the
items to be seized. For example, it identified the location of the search
and described the items to be seized. In addition, the search did not
exceed the scope of what was authorized. Snow's personal financial
statement and keys were items bearing a reasonable relation to the con-
spiracy scheme.
United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Defendants, Ware and Daniels, were convicted of participation in
racketeering activities, conspiracy to participate in a criminal racketeer-
ing enterprise, conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute heroin,
possession with the intent to distribute heroin, use of the telephone to
facilitate distribution of heroin, and other charges. Ware and Daniels
appealed, alleging: (1) evidence obtained by a wiretap should have
been suppressed because the wiretap was illegal under Oklahoma law;
(2) without the wiretap evidence, their convictions for use of the tele-
phone and RICO conspiracy charges cannot stand; (3) the district court
should have declared a mistrial because one or more jurors saw the de-
fendants handcuffed in the hallway; (4) sentencing was improper be-
cause the indictment did not allege the quantity of heroin distributed
and, therefore, their sentences could not be enhanced. Ware also ar-
gued that the prosecution's use of evidence of two prior heroin distribu-
tion convictions was unduly prejudicial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. First, the
court held that the wiretap was not in violation of the Oklahoma Consti-
tution because the police officers remained state employees during their
federal commission and were authorized to execute the wiretap. Sec-
ond, since the wiretaps were found legal, the convictions could stand.
Third, the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of
discretion. The court reasoned that Ware and Daniels did not show
prejudice because of the incident. Fourth, during sentencing, a judge
may consider quantities of drugs involved in a crime, even though the
quantity is not charged in the indictment. Finally, the two heroin trans-
actions that resulted in Ware's prior convictions were probative of con-
spiracy to distribute heroin and were admissable under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b).
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant Werking's vehicle was stopped by a patrolman for im-
proper registration. The patrolman asked Werking if he could search
6471991]
648 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 68:4
the trunk of the car. Werking agreed, and the patrolman found seventy-
five pounds of marijuana. Werking subsequently pleaded guilty to pos-
session with intent to distribute. Werking's plea was conditioned on his
right to challenge the district court's refusal to suppress the marijuana.
Werking appealed, contending that the district court erred in finding
that: (1) the initial stop was lawful; (2) further questioning by the pa-
trolman was a consensual encounter outside the scope of the fourth
amendment; and (3) the consent to search the car was voluntary.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to suppress
the marijuana. The court ruled that the initial stop was a lawful investi-
gative detention because the patrolman had reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve Werking's car was improperly registered. The court found that the
patrolman's subsequent search of the trunk, during which Werking was
free to leave, was a lawful consensual encounter because Werking's li-
cense and registration were returned to him.
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United States v. Alvarado, 909 F.2d 1443
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Alvarado, pleaded guilty of possession with intent to
distribute more than 100 grams of heroin. Alvarado challenged the ap-
propriateness of his sentence. Alvarado contended that the district
court erred by: (1) failing to make express findings regarding the accu-
racy of disputed information in Alvarado's presentence report; (2) re-
fusing to allow Alvarado to inspect and refute inculpatory information
inspected by the court in camera; and (3) increasing Alvarado's offense
level because of his alleged role as an organizer or leader in the criminal
activity.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. First, pur-
suant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), if a defendant challenges informa-
tion in a presentence report, the court must either make a factual finding
regarding the accuracy of the information, or expressly state that it is
not relying on the disputed information. This procedure was not fol-
lowed by the district court, however. Thus, the court remanded the
case. Second, the district court erred in denying Alvarado access to the
in camera material. The court explained that Alvarado's sentencing was
based on material to which he was denied access. This, in essence, con-
flicts with the requirement that a defendant be permitted to rebut or
explain such material. Finally, the district court's finding that Alvarado
played a managerial role in the criminal activity was not inconsistent
with the factual findings and, therefore, was not an erroneous decision.
Thus, the court did not err in Alvarado's base offense level.
United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 213
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Alvarez, appealed a fifty-one month sentence for his at-
tempted escape from a federal correctional facility. On appeal, Alvarez
alleged that: (1) the district court erroneously categorized him as a ca-
reer offender under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) the district
court erred in refusing to find him a minor participant in the escape.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court rejected Alvarez's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court discredited his argument that Congress intended the statute
to apply to career violent offenders and to career drug offenders, but not
to offenders whose current offense is of a different character than prior
offenses. Second, the district court's decision that Alvarez was not a mi-
nor participant in the escape was not clearly erroneous. The court rea-
soned that Alvarez failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was less culpable than others in the offense. Accordingly, no
adjustment in the sentence was warranted.
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United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Arredondo-Santos, appealed his sentence of thirty
months for possession with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms
of marijuana. Arredondo-Santos argued that the district court erred
when it refused to reduce his offense level by two levels. He contended
that as a mere driver he was but a minor participant in the criminal activ-
ity and, therefore, less culpable than other participants.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination. The
court reasoned that couriers are indispensable to any drug network. As
the courier, Arredondo-Santos could not argue that he was any less cul-
pable than the people who sold or purchased the drugs. Furthermore,
there was no evidence of other participants. The court noted that when
culpability is weighed, evidence must exist of other participants and
their role in the criminal activity.
United States v. Baker, 914 F.2d 208
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Baker, was convicted of bank robbery and receiving an
explosive in interstate commerce with knowledge that it would be used
to kill, injure, or intimidate other individuals. Pursuant to the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, Baker's crimes and criminal history would normally dic-
tate a sentence range of fifty-one to sixty-three months. The district
court, however, found two aggravating factors and departed upward
from the Sentencing Guidelines, thereby imposing a seventy month
sentence.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit applied a
three step analysis. First, the court said that the circumstances justified a
departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court noted that the
dangers inherent with dynamite justified the departure. Second, the
court found that the circumstances given by the district court for depar-
ture actually existed. Finally, the court held that the degree of the dis-
trict court's departure was reasonable.
United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Barry, appealed the district court's order sentencing
him to a prison term subject to a supervised release. Barry argued that
he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the
district court failed to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(c)(1) ("Rule 11"),
by not informing him of the supervised release.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
reasoned that, although the district court's failure to advise Barry of the
period of supervised release conflicted with the requirements of Rule
11, Barry's substantive rights were not detrimentally affected. The court
found that the district court's error could not have had a significant in-
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fluence on Barry's guilty plea. The court concluded that the district
court's failure to comply with Rule 11 did not warrant a reversal.
United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Beaulieu, was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamines. During trial, Beaulieu's version of the facts was contra-
dicted by several government witnesses. Consequently, the government
contended that Beaulieu obstructed justice by testifying untruthfully.
Accordingly, the government recommended, in a pre-sentence report,
that Beaulieu's sentence be adjusted upward by two levels. Beaulieu ap-
pealed, arguing that the upward adjustment for untruthful testimony:
(1) inhibited exercise of his right to testify; (2) deprived him of due
process; and (3) was based on insufficient evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court noted that it is
not unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to evaluate the truthfulness
of a defendant's testimony. The court reasoned that there is no pro-
tected right to commit perjury. Thus, adjusting Beaulieu's sentence up-
ward because he gave untruthful testimony did not violate his right to
testify. Second, the court rejected Beaulieu's argument that he was de-
prived of due process. The court reasoned that it is not unconstitutional
for a sentencing judge, who observed a defendant at trial, to consider
the defendant's alleged perjury. Third, there was sufficient evidence to
support the district court's finding that Beaulieu obstructed justice by
testifying untruthfully. The court based its decision on Beaulieu's testi-
mony and deferred to the district court's credibility assessments. Ac-
cordingly, the sentencing judge's conclusion that there was perjury was
not clearly erroneous.
United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Bernhardt, pleaded guilty to bank fraud. He subse-
quently appealed the district court's imposition of a sentence greater
than that proscribed by the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court outlined crite-
ria used for reviewing an upward departure from the Sentencing Guide-
lines: (1) circumstances cited by the district court must justify the
departure; (2) circumstances used to justify the departure must actually
exist in the instant case; and (3) the departure must be reasonable. The
court stated that Bernhardt's criminal history was not adequately re-
flected in the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, such "under-reflec-
tion" justified an upward departure. Second, the district court made
proper factual determinations regarding Bernhardt's lengthy criminal
record. Third, the upward departure was reasonable. The court ex-
plained that the departure was guided by possible sentences in higher
categories.
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Birr v. Shillinger, 894 F.2d 1160
Per Curiam
Defendant, Birr, pleaded guilty to accessory to felony murder and
accessory to the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. He was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment for the murder and twenty to twenty-five
years for the robbery, with the sentences to run consecutively. Birr sub-
sequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by
the district court. He, therefore, appealed the denial of his writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that his sentences for felony murder and the underlying
felony violated the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court stated that, in cumulative sentencing situations, the double jeop-
ardy clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from pre-
scribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Thus,
federal courts must defer to a state court's determination of legislative
intent. Here, a majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court, in affirming
Birr's convictions and sentences, held that the Wyoming legislature in-
tended cumulative punishment for accessory to felony murder and ac-
cessory to the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. Given the
required legislative intent to impose multiple punishment, the court
found no violation of the double jeopardy clause.
United States v. Bishop, 921 F.2d 1068
Author: Judge Barrett
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Bishop, was convicted on two counts of bank robbery by
force, violence and intimidation. Bishop's presentence report reflected
a criminal history of larceny by fraud and knowingly concealing stolen
property. These previous felony charges were consolidated for sentenc-
ing, and Bishop was subsequently sentenced to three years concurrent
imprisonment on each count. His previous sentences were treated as
one for the purpose of Bishop's criminal history, and only three criminal
history points, rather than nine, were considered in assigning a criminal
history category. Concluding that the criminal history points did not
adequately reflect the seriousness of Bishop's past criminal conduct, the
district court departed upward and sentenced him to seventy-one
months. On appeal, Bishop argued that the district court erred in com-
puting his sentence. Specifically, Bishop argued that his three prior
felonies were, in fact, related because they were part of a common
scheme or plan. Also, he argued that his criminal history category was
not significantly under-represented by the three criminal history points.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The parties agreed that
the review would be governed by a three-step test: (1) whether the cir-
cumstances cited by the district court justified a departure; (2) whether
there was a sufficient factual basis for the justifications cited; and
(3) whether the degree of departure was reasonable. Bishop only chal-
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lenged the departure, not the degree of departure, so the court's review
was limited to the first two steps. The circumstance cited by the district
court was that Bishop had two prior felony convictions for which he re-
ceived no criminal history points. The factual basis for considering
these to be unrelated felonies was sufficient. Thus, the district court was
justified in concluding that Bishop's criminal history category did not
adequately reflect his criminal background.
United States v. Blackner, 901 F.2d 853
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Defendant, Blackner, appealed his mandatory ten year sentence fol-
lowing his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
Blackner argued that the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) violated due process and the eighth amendment as
applied to a drug addict, since narcotic addiction is not a criminal of-
fense. He argued further that his conviction violated equal protection
because he would have received a different sentence under state law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ten year sentence.
The court held that the sentence provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)
applied to Blackner, since possession with intent to distribute cocaine is
a culpable act separate from addiction. The court also held that differ-
ent penalties under federal and state law for the same type of offense do
not constitute an equal protection violation.
United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d 842
Author: Judge Brimmer, sitting by designation
Defendant, Boyd, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. Boyd
subsequently appealed the sentenced imposed by the district court. She
argued that the amount of narcotics used to determine her offense level
was incorrect. Essentially, Boyd stated that in plea negotiations, she re-
vealed the amount of cocaine that both her sister and mother carried for
her. Boyd argued that these amounts were improperly used to increase
her base offense level.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district
court. The court explained that Boyd's sentence was not enhanced by
information she volunteered in the plea negotiations. Rather, such in-
formation was supplied by her sister, and Boyd simply corroborated the
"story." Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
aggregating the quantity of narcotics used to determine Boyd's
sentence.
United States v. Bruning, 914 F.2d 212
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Bruning, pleaded guilty to passing counterfeit notes in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. He subsequently appealed the district
court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines which increased his
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base offense level. Bruning argued that his sentence should not be in-
creased because note 3 of § 2B5.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines recom-
mends prohibiting application of subsection (b)(2) to persons who
produce counterfeit notes by photocopying.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Bruning's argument and, therefore, af-
firmed the decision of the district court. The court ruled that note 3
excluded application of subsection (b)(2) to only those defendants who
produce notes that are so obviously counterfeit that they are unlikely to
be accepted even if subjected to only minimal scrutiny. Thus, the
method of production was not dispositive.
United States v. Calderon-Porras, 911 F.2d 421
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Calderon-Porras, was convicted for smuggling mari-
juana. He subsequently appealed his sentence, claiming that he should
have been classified as a minimal participant because his actions were
those of an amateur. Moreover, he contended that he was entitled to a
lesser sentence because he was a one-time courier.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
ruled that Calderon-Porras should not be classified as a minimal partici-
pant because: (1) lack of knowledge, not skill, in the criminal undertak-
ing is critical for a determination of minimal participant status; and (2) a
courier may be classified as a minimal participant.
United States v. Callihan, 915 F.2d 1462
Author: Judge Anderson .
Defendant, Callihan, pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture,
possessing with intent to distribute, and distributing amphetamines in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 486. Callihan was subsequently sentenced to
120 months in prison based on a seized volume of ninety-four kilograms
of chemicals used to make phenyl-2-propanone ("P2P"), a controlled
substance. Callihan appealed, contending that: (1) the sentence should
have been fifty-seven months since only 2.95 kilograms of P2P was
seized; and (2) the footnote used in the Sentencing Guidelines was re-
written to mean that the controlled substance found in the "entire
amount," should be used as the scale weight, rather than the weight of a
mixture or compound containing the controlled substance.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing. The
court explained that the sentencing manual and significant case law sub-
stantiate that "mixture or compound" includes the agent carrying the
controlled substance. Therefore, the district court used the appropriate
offense level.
Carbray v. Champion, 905 F.2d 314
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Carbray, was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon
[Vol. 68:4
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
in an Oklahoma state court. Thejury recommended, and the trial judge
imposed, a 199 year prison term. The term was based, in part, on the
Oklahoma recidivism statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51(A)(1)(1981). The
Court of Criminal Appeals reduced the term to seventy-five years after
finding the prosecutor's remarks concerning possible pardon or parole
were prejudicial. In his habeas corpus petition, Carbray appealed, alleging
that: (1) the district court improperly considered four felony convic-
tions to enhance his sentence because they all resulted from an invalid
1957 juvenile conviction; and (2) the Criminal Court of Appeals arbi-
trarily resentenced him to seventy-five years, thereby depriving him of
liberty without due process of law.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to enhance
Carbray's sentence. The court explained that any connection between
Carbray's 1957 conviction and the four felony convictions was too atten-
uated to amount to constitutional error. Second, the court ruled that
the reduction in Carbray's sentence did not violate the fourteenth
amendment. The court explained that an appellate court may constitu-
tionally exercise discretion and modify ajury sentence on appeal if it has
been granted authority to do so by the state. The court found the
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals only had discretion to modify a
sentence to the statutory minimum. Since the district court resentenced
Carbray to the statutory minimum, the reduction was not arbitrary.
United States v. Colbert, 894 F.2d 373
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Colbert, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute co-
caine base. He was subsequently sentenced to 264 months of incarcera-
tion. Colbert appealed his sentence, contending the Sentencing
Guidelines constitute cruel and unusual punishment in denigration of
the eighth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court ruled that Col-
bert's base offense level was not disproportionate to what Congress and
other jurisdictions have indicated as appropriate for drug offenses.
Moreover, the court noted Congress' intent to create severe penalties
for drug offenders. Accordingly, the court held the Sentencing Guide-
lines do not violate the eighth amendment.
Murray v. Cowley, 913 F.2d 832
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Murray, appealed a district court order denying his peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus. Murray contended that the district court
erred in finding no equal protection violation when the state court re-
fused to reduce his sentence. Specifically, the state court would not re-
duce his sentence for second degree murder from an indeterminate
term of life to a definite sentence of ten years, following a change in the
second degree murder statute.
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The Tenth Circuit dismissed Murray's appeal. The court found that
Murray was not similarly situated to persons convicted under new sec-
ond degree statutes. Accordingly, the state's refusal to reduce Murray's
sentence, as if he had been convicted under the new statute, did not
violate due process. The district court, therefore, did not err in denying
Murray's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Creech, appealed an upward departure in his sentence.
The district court adjusted upward because it found the victim of his
crime to be "vulnerable" within the meaning of Sentencing Guideline
§ 3Al.1. The victim was chosen from a list of newlywed persons.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that unless the criminal act is
directed against the young, aged, handicapped, or unless the victim is
chosen because of some unusual personal vulnerability, § 3Al.1 cannot
be employed. The court held that application of the guideline was
clearly erroneous because it did not focus on the victim, but rather upon
a class of persons to which the victim belonged.
Davis v. Maynard, 911 F.2d 415
Per Curiam
Defendant, Davis, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
The Tenth Circuit upheld his murder conviction but vacated his death
sentence. The court ruled that the district court's anti-sympathy and
aggravating circumstance instructions were overbroad. The Supreme
Court subsequently vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Sajle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct. 1257
(1990). Saffle held that an anti-sympathy instruction constituted a "new
rule" which could not be applied on collateral review of a criminal
judgment.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original judgment, va-
cating Davis' death sentence. The court ruled that although the anti-
sympathy instruction constituted the creation of a "new rule," the ag-
gravating circumstance instruction did not. The court explained that its
original ruling regarding the aggravating circumstance instruction was
dictated by precedent existing before Davis' conviction became final.
United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, Gerald and Lowell Donaldson, appealed their
sentences after pleading guilty to drug conspiracy charges. On appeal,
the Donaldsons: (1) challenged the validity of the Sentencing Guide-
lines; and (2) asserted the district court erred in determining the weight
of the marijuana seized by the government. Moreover, Gerald Donald-
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son separately argued that the district court erred in failing to declare
him a minor participant and reducing his base offense level accordingly.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holdings. The court
held that the Donaldsons' constitutional attack on the Sentencing
Guidelines was without merit because the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit had previously rejected their arguments. Second, using a clearly
erroneous standard of review, the court upheld the district court's deter-
mination of the drug's weight. The court explained the Donaldsons did
not meet their burden in proving bad faith by the government in de-
stroying the seized marijuana before the Donaldsons had an opportunity
to examine it. Finally, the court upheld the district court's refusal to
reduce Gerald Donaldson's base offense level. The court reasoned that
drug couriers are not necessarily minor participants under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Thus, the court ruled that Donaldson was no less culpa-
ble than the other participants and thus not deserving of an offense level
reduction. Moreover, Gerald Donaldson's due process rights were not
violated when the district court failed to state its reasons for not giving
him a reduction in base offense level. There is no legal requirement that
a judge state reasons for his finding of fact.
United States v. Doyan, 909 F.2d 412
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Doyan, pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine
with the intent to distribute. The district court subsequently sentenced
and fined Doyan. Doyan appealed his fine, contending: (1) the district
judge abused his discretion and violated the Sentencing Guidelines; and
(2) the imposition of the fine under the Sentencing Guidelines violated
Doyan's equal protection rights under the federal constitution.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the fine. First, the court ruled that the
district court judge did not abuse his discretion by imposing a fine in
excess of $32,000. The Sentencing Guidelines state that a court has dis-
cretion over the fine to be imposed. The court explained that the Sen-
tencing Guidelines mandate a punitive fine sufficient to cover the costs
of incarceration. The Sentencing Guidelines, however, impose no obli-
gation to tailor the fine according to a defendant's ability to pay. Sec-
ond, Doyan's equal protection rights were not violated by the imposition
of a fine. The court explained that it could not say the fine "bore" no
rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in criminal
justice.
United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Easterling, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and to use of a firearm during the commission of a
drug trafficking crime. The district court voiced its dissatisfaction with
the first presentence report because it did not adequately reflect the
seriousness of Easterling's conduct. Consequently, a second report was
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prepared indicating that Easterling was involved in the distribution of
substantially larger amounts of methamphetamine. On appeal, Eas-
terling argued that: (1) during sentencing, the district court erred in
relying on the second presentence report because it was based on esti-
mates lacking any articulable basis; (2) the government breached the
plea agreement; and (3) the district court erred in failing to consider
mitigating circumstances.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. First, the court upheld
the district court's determination regarding the quantity of drugs in-
volved. The court explained that the determination was not clearly er-
roneous. The court also stated that factual determinations under the
Sentencing Guidelines require only a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, the use of estimates is acceptable as long as the information
upon which the estimates are based have a minimum indicia of reliabil-
ity. Further, the court found that the drug quantity information was not
improperly obtained by the probation officer's overreaching. The court
explained that the information came independently of Easterling and
prior to his cooperation. Second, the court found that any breach of the
plea agreement was immaterial because the district court reduced the
sentence to reflect Easterling's cooperation. The court also found that
information in the presentence report regarding the quantity of narcot-
ics involved was not a breach of the plea agreement. The court ex-
plained that a probation officer is not prohibited from providing
relevant information to the court. Third, the court ruled that the district
court properly considered mitigating circumstances. Finally, the court
ruled that the district court failed to append a written record of disputes
concerning the factual accuracy of the presentence report. Conse-
quently, the court remand for the district court to perform this ministe-
rial task.
United States v. Emrick, 895 F.2d 1297
Per Curiam
Defendant, Emrick, appealed the district court's upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's up-
ward departure. The court stated that whether a case's circumstances
justify an upward departure is a question of law. To determine if such
circumstances exist, fact finding must be involved. The court ruled that
due to the absence of adequate findings by the district court, it could not
conduct an appropriate review. Consequently, the court remanded for
appropriate findings.
United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443
Author: ChiefJudge Holloway
Defendant, Florentino, appealed his sentence resulting from a con-
viction for transporting illegal aliens and aiding and abetting. Floren-
tino claimed the district court erred in "double counting" his prior
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convictions when calculating his offense level and criminal history cate-
gory under the Sentencing Guidelines. Florentino also objected to the
use of the same prior convictions in sentencing him at the top of the
applicable Sentencing Guideline range.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence. On de novo
review, the court examined the enhancement provisions of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. The court found the Sentencing Guidelines to be unam-
biguous. The court stated that there was a clear intention to have prior
convictions for transporting illegal aliens count towards increasing both
Florentino's offense level and criminal history category. Moreover, the
court rejected Florentino's contention that the district court improperly
counted his earlier convictions when sentencing him at the top of the
Sentencing Guideline range.
United States v. Fortenbury, 917 F.2d 477
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Fortenbury, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm.
The district court judge did not believe that Fortenbury's criminal his-
tory accurately reflected the seriousness of past criminal conduct and,
therefore, made an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
Fortenbury appealed the sentence imposed by the district court.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. The
court applied a three step test to determine if the upward departure in
sentencing was justified. First, the court ruled that the district court
properly identified the circumstances which warranted the upward de-
parture in sentencing. The circumstances were that Fortenbury was
treated leniently in the past for other offenses, and the leniency did not
deter future criminal activity. Second, the court ruled that the basis for
the upward departure in sentencing was not clearly erroneous. The
court stated, however, that the upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines was unreasonable. The court explained that upgrading the
offense level to determine sentencing was an improper application of
the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Fredrick, 897 F.2d 490
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Fredrick, pleaded guilty to possession of heroin with in-
tent to distribute. She subsequently appealed her sentence. Specifi-
cally, Fredrick contended that the district court violated her due process
rights by considering non-charged criminal activity in computing her
sentence. In addition, Fredrick challenged the Sentencing Commis-
sion's 1988 revision of the Sentencing Guidelines. The revision man-
dates consideration of non-charged criminal activity in reaching a
sentence.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that the district court did
not violate Fredrick's due process rights by considering non-charged
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criminal activity. The court explained that these criminal activities were
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Sentencing
Commission's 1988 revision did nothing more than identify several as-
pects of relevant conduct, just as the earlier guideline did. Thus, the
revision was within the Sentencing Commission's statutory authority.
The judgment of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Freitekh, 912 F.2d 421
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Freitekh, pleaded guilty to unlawful receipt of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to sentencing, he was ar-
rested on two state charges of aggravated assault, which did not appear
on his criminal record at sentencing. The district court subsequently
agreed to suspend Freitekh's sentence provided that he participate in a
halfway house program, pay a fine, and participate in a substance abuse
program. Freitekh failed to return to the halfway house on the day he
was convicted of the state charges. Consequently, he was arrested for
failure to comply with federal probation. Thus, he was resentenced to
thirty months after the court altered the presentence report to include
the state conviction. Freitekh appealed, challenging the legality of the
district court's upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. Frei-
tekh argued that his sentence was unreasonable because it was three
times the Sentencing Guidelines' maximum limit.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resen-
tencing. The court based its decision on a three step process used in
reviewing upward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) the
district court must set forth specific findings of aggravating circum-
stances existing in the present situation which were not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission; (2) the district
court's underlying findings of fact must not be clearly erroneous; and
(3) the departure must be reasonable. The court found that the district
court's order failed to state specific reasons for the departure which,
therefore, precluded the court from conducting its review.
United States v. Gamble, 917 F.2d 1280
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Gamble, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty
or more grams of cocaine. Gamble claimed that the guilty plea was in
return for a four year prison sentence. Gamble, however, was sentenced
to ninety-six months in prison. On appeal, Gamble requested that the
sentence be vacated and the four year sentence be imposed. Alterna-
tively, Gamble requested that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea,
or have an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the government
made a promise to him regarding the length of his sentence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court
reviewed the letter which had been sent to Gamble and his attorney by
the government. The letter clearly stated that any sentence imposed
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would be within the discretion of the district judge. The court took note
that at the sentencing hearing, Gamble failed to mention any promises
made to him by the government concerning the length of his sentence.
Finally, the court ruled that, because the letter from the government was
clear and ambiguous, parol evidence would not be allowed to determine
its meaning. Thus, Gamble's affidavit, filed after the sentencing hearing,
would not effect the court's determination. Accordingly, there was no
need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 1478
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Garcia, pleaded guilty to transporting illegal aliens,
thereby violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B). He subsequently appealed
his seven month sentence. Even though Garcia admitted his criminal
history category was properly calculated, he nonetheless contended that
the district court improperly considered his prior criminal conviction
and overemphasized his transportation of only three illegal aliens. In
essence, Garcia appealed the district court's decision to impose sentence
at a particular point within the proper guideline range.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's sentencing was
proper and dismissed Garcia's appeal. The court stated that the sen-
tence was not appealable because Garcia was placed within the correct
criminal history category and correct sentencing range. The court ex-
plained that sentences are only reviewable if the defendant claims that it
was incorrectly calculated or was based on clearly erroneous factual find-
ings concerning offense levels, characteristics, or adjustments. Garcia,
however, challenged the factors the district court relied on to impose
sentence at a particular point within the Sentencing Guidelines. Conse-
quently, his sentence was not reviewable. Moreover, the court noted
that the Sentencing Guidelines were intended to give sentencing discre-
tion to district courts.
United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Gardner, pleaded guilty to bank robbery by force and
aiding and abetting the commission of a bank robbery. The district
court judge did not believe that Gardner's criminal history accurately
reflected the seriousness of past criminal conduct and, therefore, de-
parted upward from the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, Gardner
was sentenced to 210 months in prison. Gardner appealed the sentence,
arguing that the upward departure was unreasonable because the dis-
trict court improperly considered convictions which fell outside the fif-
teen year limit.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the upward departure from the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. The court applied a three pronged test to determine the
validity of the sentence. First, the court held that the district court prop-
erly identified circumstances which warranted the upward departure in
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sentencing. For example, the district court properly considered previ-
ous convictions, even though they were outside the time limit. The
court reasoned that the convictions were similar in nature to the crime
for which Gardner was sentenced. The second prong of the test was
also satisfied because the factual basis for the upward departure was not
clearly erroneous. Finally, the court held that the upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines was reasonable. The court explained
that the district court upgraded Gardner into a class whose description
most closely matched his history, that of a career offender.
United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Hand, appealed the district court's conviction and
ninety-seven month sentence for his role in aiding and abetting the man-
ufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, Hand contended that:
(1) the government breached the plea agreement by eliciting unfavora-
ble testimony under cross-examination during sentencing, and stating
that the court was free to come to its own conclusion regarding a sen-
tence reduction; and (2) the district court failed to make findings of fact
regarding information contained in the presentence report.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
declared that Hand could not reasonably understand the government's
plea agreement to proscribe a proper cross-examination of Hand and
other witnesses at sentencing. Similarly, a plea agreement cannot be
used to block a court's access to a complete and accurate factual record.
Moreover, the government's statement concerning the court's discretion
to determine a sentence did not amount to a repudiation of its recom-
mendation for a sentence reduction. The court explained that a crimi-
nal defendant has no right, as a matter of law, to an enthusiastic
recommendation by a prosecuting attorney. Finally, according to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D), factual findings are only required when the de-
fendant disputes a fact contained in the presentence report. Hand did
not identify any inaccurate statement of fact contained in the
presentence report. Instead, he contested the report's legal conclusion.
Consequently, Hand's disagreement over conclusions drawn from the
facts in the presentence report does not allege factual inquiries, thereby
requiring specific findings by the court.
United States v. Harris, 907 F.2d 121
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Harris, was convicted for aiding and abetting wire fraud.
The district court subsequently departed upward and sentenced Harris
to four years imprisonment. The district court concluded that due to
Harris's past criminal history, it was justified in departing upward from
the Sentencing Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing. The
court explained that the district court's upward departure was unreason-
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able. The departure was more than double the twenty-one month maxi-
mum sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court stated that
despite a long record of nonviolent, nondrug crimes, Harris did not
meet the requirements for a career offender. He also did not meet the
requirements for one who engages in a pattern of criminal conduct as a
livelihood.
United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613
Author: Judge Cook
Defendant, Hart, appealed the denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 mo-
tion to reduce his sentence and his Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 motion to correct
errors in his presentence investigation report ("PSI"). On appeal, Hart
argued that the district court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his
Rule 35 motion; and (2) violated Rule 32 by failing to hold a hearing
regarding the accuracy of information in the PSI or disavowing any reli-
ance on the disputed information.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of both motions. The court
reasoned that since Hart did not contend that his sentence was illegal or
imposed in an illegal manner, the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying his Rule 35 motion. Second, the court said that Rule 32
only applies to factual inaccuracies. The court found that Hart objected
mostly to the tenor of the report and that the specific factual inaccura-
cies that he raised would have not influenced the sentence imposed.
United States v. Hughes, 901 F.2d 830
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hughes, pleaded guilty to armed robbery of a bank and
to jeopardizing a life with a dangerous weapon. Because Hughes was
previously convicted of two crimes of violence, the district court ruled
that he was a career offender. The Sentencing Guidelines require a sen-
tence of 262-300 months for a career offender who commits a crime of
violence. Hughes was, therefore, sentenced to 262 months in prison.
He appealed, contending that the sentence violated his eighth amend-
ment rights because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. More-
over, Hughes argued that the Sentencing Guidelines' career offender
provisions violate the eighth amendment because they aggregate dispa-
rate offenses without regard to the seriousness of the offense or the de-
fendant's personal characteristics.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court
ruled that the determination of proper penalties is a matter for the legis-
lature, and that sentences within the statutory limits are not considered
cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth amendment requires that a
sentence not be disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Hughes's
sentence for armed robbery was not disproportionate to the gravity of
his crime, particularly since he pointed a submachine gun at a bank
teller. The court also held that because the Sentencing Guidelines allow
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sentencing courts to depart downward in appropriate cases, the eighth
amendment was not violated.
United States v. Irvin, 906 F.2d 1424
Author: Judge McCay, sitting by designation
Defendant, Irvin, was convicted of mail fraud. Irvin subsequently
appealed his sentence, claiming: (1) a pattern of criminal conduct must
continue for a longer period of time than that which occurred here; and
(2) a substantial portion of his income requires a substantial total
income.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit remanded the sentencing to
district court. The court did, however, affirm the district court's inter-
pretation of "substantial period of time" as a well-organized criminal
venture lasting approximately five to seven months. But, the court re-
versed the district court's interpretation of a substantial portion of in-
come. The court concluded that the sentencing guideline meant an
amount above $6,700. Irvin's income was only $4,894.72.
United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985
Author: Judge Bratton
Defendant, Jackson, was originally sentenced to five years imprison-
ment for possession of ammunition by a felon. Jackson appealed the
sentence and secured a remand. On remand, the district court departed
upward from the Sentencing Guidelines and resentenced Jackson to five
years imprisonment. Jackson appealed the latter sentence, arguing that:
(1) the second sentence increased his punishment in violation of the
double jeopardy clause; and (2) an upward departure from the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines was unwarranted and unreasonable in magnitude.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court found that the
double jeopardy clause was not violated when Jackson was resentenced.
The court reasoned that Jackson had knowledge that the original sen-
tence was appealable and, therefore, he had no expectation that the sen-
tence was final. The court also found that the district court's upward
departure was proper. The district court properly took into account
prior convictions outside the applicable time limit, a criminal history cat-
egory which did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Jackson's past
criminal conduct, leniency of past sentences, and similarity between
Jackson's present and past criminal offenses. Finally, the court reasoned
that the magnitude of departure was reasonable because "slavish" ad-
herence to the Sentencing Guidelines would cause unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities.
United States v. Kinney, 915 F.2d 1471
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Kinney, pleaded guilty to possession of contraband in
prison. Kinney appealed the sentence imposed. Specifically, he argued
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that during sentencing, the district court improperly held his prior con-
victions for bank robbery in two separate states as unrelated. Rather,
Kinney contended that the two convictions were related because they
were part of a common scheme and they could have been consolidated.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court's decision was not
clearly erroneous. The court stated that under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, cases are related if they: (1) occurred on a single occasion;
(2) were part of a single scheme or plan; or (3) were consolidated for
trial or sentencing. The court held that the fact the cases could have
been consolidated does not satisfy the requirement that they be consoli-
dated. Further, a concurrent sentence given by a separate jurisdiction at
a different date was not a consolidated sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Also, the only evidence of a common scheme was Kinney's
own testimony. This was not sufficient to hold the cases as related.
United States v. Kirby, 921 F.2d 254
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Kirby, appealed the twelve month sentence he received
for failing to appear at trial on various drug charges. Kirby argued that
a prior sentence should not have been included in computing his crimi-
nal history category because the incarceration was more than fifteen
years before the "commencement of the instant offense."
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resen-
tencing. The court agreed with Kirby. The court concluded that "com-
mencement of the instant offense" meant the date Kirby failed to appear
in court for his drug charges, not the date he committed the underlying
drug offense. Accordingly, since Kirby's prior conviction was beyond
the fifteen year period, the district court erred in considering it when
determining his sentence.
United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162
Author: Judge Kane, sitting by designation
Defendant, Kirk, pleaded guilty to unlawful receipt of a sawed-off
shotgun. During sentencing, Kirk argued that he was entitled to a six-
point reduction in offense level because he possessed the shotgun as
part of a collection and intended to mount it on the wall of his den.
Kirk's presentence report recommended, however, that this point reduc-
tion be denied; the gun was found concealed in a drawer, and Kirk made
no effort to mount it. The court accepted the recommendation. Kirk
appealed the sentence, contending that the burden was improperly
placed on him to establish that he was entitled to the point reduction.
Instead, Kirk argued the government must bear the burden of proof on
all sentencing issues.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence after reviewing the alloca-
tion of burden of proof as an issue of first impression. Sentencing
Guidelines § 2K2.1 provides for a six-point reduction in the defendant's
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base offense level for unlawful receipt or possession of firearms if the
defendant possessed the firearm "solely for lawful sporting purposes or
collection." This, however, does not address the issue of allocating the
burden of proof. Ultimately, the court held that the government bears
the burden of proof for sentence increases and the defendant for sen-
tence decreases. Here, the sentencing judge properly found that Kirk
failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was entitled to a
point reduction.
United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Kuntz, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to dis-
tribute less than 100 kilograms of marijuana. The United States agreed
that if Kuntz cooperated, it would consider a motion for departure
downward pursuant to § 5K1.I of the Sentencing Guidelines. Kuntz was
subsequently sentenced to the maximum amount of time in prison for
his offense. Kuntz appealed, contending: (1) that § 5KI.1 of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines was violative of due process and separation of pow-
ers; (2) the district court erred in not providing a pre-sentencing
hearing on the issue of diminished capacity; and (3) he was denied effec-
tive counsel at sentencing. The prosecutors counter-argued that the
Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear Kuntz's claims. The prosecu-
tors explained that the district court's refusal to depart downward was a
discretionary decision and, therefore, unreviewable.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first ruled that it did have jurisdiction. The court reasoned that a
decision of the district court was not challenged. Instead, the constitu-
tionality of the federal sentencing procedures was challenged. Conse-
quently, the appeal was from a sentence allegedly imposed in violation
of law and was, therefore, properly before the court. The court then
rejected Kuntz's constitutional challenge of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The court stated that neither due process nor separation of powers re-
quires a judicial review of a prosecutor's decision not to make a motion
to downgrade a sentence. The court reasoned that sentencing is not an
inherently discretionary judicial function, as evidenced by congressional
control of the procedures, guidelines, and factors of the sentencing
framework. The court did not reach Kuntz's question as to whether he
was improperly denied a hearing on diminished capacity. The court
stated that no request for such a hearing was formally made to the dis-
trict court. Accordingly, Kuntz waived whatever procedural objection
he may have had. Finally, the court rejected Kuntz's claim that he was
denied effective counsel at sentencing. The court held that this claim
was frivolous.
United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Labat, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine
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with intent to distribute. Labat was sentenced to sixty months in prison
and was ordered to pay fines for the cost of his incarceration. Labat
subsequently appealed, contending that the district court overlooked
additional factors in determining an appropriate fine. In particular, the
district court failed to consider Labat's inability to pay, and it failed to
consider the burden on his dependents. Labat also argued that a fine
for the costs of incarceration is an additional fine which cannot be as-
sessed unless a punitive fine is first levied.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment but vacated the fine. The
court first explained that Labat is indigent and without potential pros-
pects for improving his situation. Moreover, he is without current as-
sets. Further, there is no indication that he can gain employment upon
release from custody that would produce sufficient income to pay the
fine. In effect, the court ruled that it is an incorrect application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to impose a fine that a defendant has little chance
of paying. Second, the court ruled that an additional fine cannot be im-
posed unless the court first imposes a punitive fine.
United States v. Larsen, 904 F.2d 562
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants, Larsen and Brennan, pleaded guilty to single counts of
distribution of lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD"). Both were sen-
tenced pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v), which requires a five
year minimum sentence when more than one gram of LSD is involved.
In' calculating the amount of narcotics distributed, the district court in-
cluded the weight of the blotter paper which contained the LSD. Larsen
and Brennan argued that this inclusion was improper when determining
their sentences.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court
held that the weight of the paper was properly included in determining
the sentences. The court found that Congress intended such mediums
to be calculated in sentencing determinations.
United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Lowden, challenged the district court's decision not to
reduce his sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines. Lowden's convic-
tion was previously affirmed, and the matter was remanded for further
determinations as to the sentence. It was not clear from the record
whether the district court declined to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines because it thought it was powerless to do so or because the
facts did not warrant such a departure.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on remand.
The district court clarified on remand that it had the power to depart
downward, but it declined to do so. The court explained that the district
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court correctly refused to depart downward based upon the prevalence
of alcohol abuse on Indian reservations.
United States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Maldonado-Campos, was convicted of possession of ma-
rijuana with intent to distribute. Maldonado-Campos appealed his con-
viction and sentence, contending that: (1) there was insufficient
circumstantial evidence for a conviction; (2) the district court failed to
properly grant a reduction in the sentence for his status as a minor par-
ticipant; and (3) the district court failed to depart downward from the
criminal history category when sentencing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence
and remanded for resentencing. First, the court ruled that the circum-
stantial evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. The court ex-
plained that Maldonado-Campos need not have carried the suitcases of
marijuana for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knowingly participated in the importation venture. Second, the court
found that the district court's statement regarding "minor" and "mini-
mal" participants was ambiguous and needed further clarification. Con-
sequently, the court remanded for application of the correct legal
standard. Finally, the court stated that it had authority to review the
district court's failure to depart downward. The court reasoned that the
review was proper because the district court misapprehended its power
to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court ruled that it lacked
a sufficient record to determine whether the district court would have
granted a downward departure had it thought itself empowered.
United States v. Mays, 902 F.2d 1501
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Defendant, Mays, pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine. He was
sentenced to a lengthened term of incarceration because the district
court found Mays to be an organizer, leader, or supervisor of criminal
activity. Mays appealed, asserting that: (1) the district court erred in
its factual findings; and (2) the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitu-
tionally vague.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that Mays controlled the source of the narcotics, personally
met with the purchasing undercover agent and received money in ex-
change for cocaine. Thus, the district court's factual findings were cor-
rect. The court further held that the terms "organizer," "leader,"
"manager," "supervisor," and "criminal activity" were not unconstitu-
tionally vague. The court explained that the terms were clearly ascer-
tainable by an ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense.
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United States v. Mendes, 912 F.2d 434
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Mendes, was convicted of possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine and heroin. Mendes was subsequently sentenced to a
minimum of ten years in prison. Mendes appealed his sentence on vari-
ous due process and equal protection grounds. Specifically, Mendes ar-
gued: (1) the Sentencing Guidelines are not rationally related to its
purpose of punishing "drug kingpins;" (2) the Sentencing Guidelines
are facially invalid because they set punishment for the amount of the
mixture of drugs not the amount of pure drugs found; (3) § 841(b) of
the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutional because it creates a factual
presumption that a person possessing a large quantity of illegal drugs is
a "drug kingpin;" and (4) § 841 (b) of the Sentencing Guidelines should
be declared facially invalid because the punishment is disproportionate
to the crime.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court held that the Sentencing Guidelines more than passed the ra-
tional relationship test for presumed valid legislation containing a non-
suspect classification. The court reasoned that there is a legitimate state
interest in controlling both "kingpins" and "managers" at the retail
level. Second, the court held that Mendes did not have standing to chal-
lenge the facial validity of § 841(b). The court reasoned that a defend-
ant cannot claim a statute is unconstitutional in some of its reaches if the
statute is constitutional as applied to him. Third, the court held that no
such presumption of "kingpinness" was present in § 841(b), and that
such status was not relevant to the Sentencing Guidelines. Last, the
court ruled that Mendes lacked standing to challenge the facial validity
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, his sentence was not dispro-
portionate for a person possessing the quantities of drugs in his posses-
sion and who had a prior felony conviction.
Montoya v. United States Parole Comm'n, 908 F.2d 635
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Montoya, was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine
and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce after a former felony
conviction. Defendant, United States Parole Commission ("Commis-
sion"), made a decision to set a release date outside the applicable
guideline range. The Commission informed Montoya that its decision
was based primarily upon a finding that he exhibited a history of assault-
ive/aggressive behavior. The Commission relied primarily upon Mon-
toya's 1958 robbery and 1967 murder convictions. Montoya filed for
habeas corpus relief, challenging the Commission's decision. The district
court denied relief. Montoya appealed, contending that the record con-
tained no support for the Commission's conclusion that, due to his his-
tory of assaultive/aggressive behavior, he was a more serious risk than
indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that, in accordance with congressional intent, departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines is proper only if the Commission has a
rational basis. The court found that there was no rational basis to de-
part upward. The court explained that Montoya's robbery conviction
was an insufficient display of assaultive/aggressive behavior to warrant
departure. Also Montoya's murder conviction lacked proof of assault-
ive/aggressive behavior because the- conviction was premised on the fel-
ony murder doctrine. In essence, Montoya was not present when the
murders occurred, but was a participant in the underlying crime.
United States v. Moore, 919 F.2d 1471
Author: Judge Cook, sitting by designation
Defendant, Moore, appealed his conviction of cocaine possession,
use of a firearm in relation to possession with intent to distribute, and
use of a machine gun in relation to drug trafficking. Moore challenged
the imposition of consecutive sentences on the two firearm counts as
violating the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution. Moore also
questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to link the firearms to
the drug trafficking. Further, he argued that facts alleged in the affidavit
to retain a search warrant were insufficient to show probable cause. Fi-
nally, Moore challenged the district court's upward adjustment of his
sentence based on his role as a leader or organizer.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentences imposed on the two fire-
arm counts, remanded for resentencing, and affirmed the district court
on all other issues. The court ruled that when more than one firearm is
involved, conviction for a single drug trafficking offense only results in a
single violation of the statute. Accordingly, multiple sentences may not
be imposed. Second, the court found that there was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that there was a relation between the use of the
firearm and the drug trafficking. Third, the court ruled the affidavit suf-
ficient to show probable cause. The court explained that details in the
affidavit were sufficient to show that cocaine would be found in Moore's
apartment. Also, the court upheld the two-level upward adjustment of
Moore's sentence. The court found a sufficient showing that Moore ex-
ercised direction or control over another person in the drug distribution
scheme.
United States v. Oliva-Gambini, 909 F.2d 417
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Oliva-Gambini, pleaded guilty to three counts of distrib-
uting cocaine. During sentencing, defendant requested a two-point re-
duction in his sentence because he claimed to be a minor participant in
the commission of a crime. Specifically, he claimed that because he dis-
tributed and did not supply the cocaine, he was substantially less culpa-
ble than the average participant. The district court, however,
determined that minor participant status does not apply to drug of-
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fenses. Accordingly, his sentence was not reduced. Oliva-Gambini sub-
sequently appealed his sentence.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit stated that the district court
erred when it held that a defendant convicted of cocaine distribution
could not be classified as a minor participant. The court next consid-
ered, under a clearly erroneous standard, whether Oliva-Gambini was
entitled to minor participant status. Oliva-Gambini, however, presented
no evidence that he was less culpable than other participants in the
crime. He only presented a stipulated statement that he was not the
source for the cocaine. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.
Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Gamble, appeared pro se seeking federal habeas corpus relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Gamble alleged that his present sentence
was enhanced by improperly obtained convictions. The district court
denied relief, reasoning that the conviction's collateral consequences,
upon which his sentence was based, were not sufficient to render Gam-
ble "in custody" for purposes of his petition.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Gamble demonstrated he was de-
nied a federal right. Accordingly, he satisfied an element necessary for
the issuance of a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253. Also, the court found that Gamble was "in custody" for statu-
tory purposes. The court explained that Gamble's sentence was en-
hanced by previous expired convictions. Gamble could, therefore,
challenge his present sentence to the extent that it was enhanced by an
alleged invalid prior conviction.
United States v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Richardson, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to pass coun-
terfeit obligations with intent to defraud the United States. Richardson
appealed his sentence of thirteen months, asserting that the district
court erred in: (1) failing to accept the adjusted offense level contained
in the plea agreement; (2) adhering to the Sentencing Guideline range
in view of the lighter sentences received by others involved in the con-
spiracy; and (3) calculating the credit for time spent in custody prior to
sentencing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the stip-
ulations in a plea agreement were nonbinding. The court reasoned that
the facts were not known to the district court at the time it accepted the
plea agreement. Therefore, the court found that the district court was
well within its authority, when new facts were discovered, in adding
levels to the offense level. Second, the court held that because the
lighter sentences of the co-conspirators arose out of either a different
court or different laws, the district court's refusal to depart from the
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Sentencing Guidelines was nonreviewable. Finally, the court remanded
for reconsideration the calculation of credit due to Richardson for time
he spent in custody after the commission of the offense.
United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Roberts, pleaded guilty to an information alleging one
count of assault with intent to commit a felony within the special mari-
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Roberts was subse-
quently sentenced to forty-one months in prison followed by two years
of supervised release. Roberts appealed, challenging his sentence.
Roberts alleged that a proviso of the Sentencing Guidelines was uncon-
stitutionally vague. This proviso allows a court to use the offense level
of stipulated conduct when it is more serious than the offense for which
a defendant is convicted. Specifically, Roberts contended the proviso
failed to define "more serious offense," nor does it set out criteria for
determining the seriousness of an offense. Roberts also contested the
district judge incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines for robbery
instead of for aggravated assault.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court found no merit
in Roberts's claim that the proviso of § IB1.2(a) was impermissibly
vague with respect to the term "more serious offense." The court ex-
plained that the Sentencing Guidelines provide a clear means by which
the relative seriousness of offenses encompassed by stipulated conduct
can be evaluated. Moreover, the court rejected Roberts's complaint that
the district judge improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines for rob-
bery instead of for aggravated assault. The court reasoned that the stip-
ulated facts established the offense of robbery.
United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1439
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Russell, pleaded guilty to robbing a federally insured
bank, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Russell's sentence was sub-
sequently upgraded by three levels after the district court found that he
possessed a firearm during the robbery. His sentence was further up-
graded after his entire criminal history was considered, instead of just
the previous fifteen years as recommended by the Sentencing Guide-
lines. Russell was ultimately sentenced to 105 years in prison. He ap-
pealed his sentence, challenging: (1) the district court's finding that he
was armed while committing the robbery; and (2) the enhancement of
the sentence imposed by the district court after considering his entire
criminal history.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment and sentence. The court
found sufficient evidence to support the finding that Russell was armed
during the robbery. This conclusion was reached after reviewing state-
ments made by Russell during the robbery and after determining that he
was in possession of a revolver shortly before and after the robbery.
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Also, the court held that the enhanced sentence imposed after consider-
ing Russell's entire criminal history did not violate the Sentencing
Guidelines. The court reasoned that to limit Russell's criminal history
to the fifteen years preceding his sentencing, when he had been in
prison for eleven of those years, would not represent the seriousness of
his past criminal conduct, or the likelihood that he would commit other
crimes.
United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Rutter, pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine. Rutter
subsequently appealed his sentence, contending the district court erred
when it: (1) improperly considered certain amounts of cocaine when
determining his base offense level; (2) characterized him as a supervi-
sor; (3) failed to adhere to the plea agreement during sentencing; and
(4) made insufficient findings of fact to determine the sentence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentence, but re-
manded for preparation of the required written record. The court ruled
that under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court may consider quantities of
drugs not specified in the count of conviction but part of the same com-
mon plan. Second, the court held that Rutter's reliance on a third party
to transport the drugs for sale was sufficient evidence to characterize
Rutter as an organizer. Third, the district court was free to determine
all relevant facts without being bound by the stipulation included in the
plea agreement. Also, the court noted that the plea agreement stated
that the stipulations were not binding on the district court. Finally, the
district court made sufficient record findings of fact to justify the
sentence.
United States v. Salazar, 909 F.2d 1447
Author: Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation.
Pursuant to an agreement with the government, defendant, Salazar,
pleaded guilty to fabricating false immigration documents. Under this
agreement, the government consented to not bring further charges
against Salazar for any act committed on or before December 31, 1988,
which involved the creation of false documents. Salazar, however, con-
tended that at the sentencing hearing, the government violated the
agreement. Specifically, Salazar argued that the government erred
when, at the sentencing hearing, it mentioned that Salazar committed
the same crime almost 100 times during a seven to eight month period.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing. The
court reasoned that the language of the agreement did not impose obli-
gations on the government in regard to recommending a certain sen-
tence. In fact, the agreement expressly reserved the government's right
to argue for any appropriate sentence.
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United States v. Sanchez, 907 F.2d 127
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Sanchez, was convicted in 1981 on two counts of unlaw-
ful possession of food stamps. Sentencing included probation to run
until October 31, 1988. Sanchez was arrested and charged with a drug
offense, however, on October 27, 1988. Following that arrest, a warrant
for his arrest was ordered on October 31, 1988, but not issued until
November 2, 1988. After Sanchez was convicted of the drug charge, his
probation on the prior conviction was revoked. Sanchez appealed the
revocation of probation, arguing that the arrest warrant for the proba-
tion revocation was not timely issued.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, rea-
soning that 18 U.S.C. § 3653 was controlling. Although the warrant was
not issued during the probation period, it was issued within the statu-
tory maximum probation period of five years and was, therefore, valid.
The court determined that the Sentencing Reform Act ("Act"), which
replaced § 3653, applies only to "offenses" committed after November
1, 1987. The Act triggering revocation of probation was not an "of-
fense" within the meaning of the Act. Sanchez's offense was the unlaw-
ful possession of food stamps years earlier.
United States v. Sardin, 921 F.2d 1064
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Sardin, and two other defendants pleaded guilty to
maintaining a crackhouse in return for a dismissal of other counts.
Moreover, each defendant also agreed to cooperate with the prosecu-
tion. In return, the prosecution agreed not to use, to any of the defend-
ants' disadvantage, information disclosed. The district court
subsequently sentenced each defendant. The district court, however,
departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines because of the large
quantity of drugs involved. Sardin's sentence deviated from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines by a minimum of eighty-three months, while his two
codefendants' sentences deviated by a minimum of only fifteen months
and thirty-five months. This occurred despite the fact that the upward
departure for each was justified by the same quantity of drugs. On ap-
peal, Sardin argued that information disclosed by his codefendants
should not have been used against him and that drug quantity is an im-
permissible basis for an upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that the codefendants' statements
could be used against him even though Sardin previously disclosed the
identical information. Second, quantity of drugs is a valid factor to con-
sider in determining whether an upward departure is appropriate. The
court then raised the issue, sua sponte, of whether the disparity in
sentences was justified. The court noted that a federal appellate court
should not consider an issue not raised below. The court, however, may
[Vol. 68:4
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
exercise its discretion to resolve an issue not passed on below which, if
not addressed, would otherwise result in manifest injustice. Conse-
quently, the court determined that there was an unaccounted-for differ-
ence which existed between the degree of upward departure in Sardin's
sentence and his co-defendants' sentence. The court noted that when
codefendants have similar criminal histories and engage in the same
misconduct, the Sentencing Guidelines mandate the court to avoid un-
warranted sentence disparities. Since the record failed to explain the
reason for Sardin's disproportionate sentence, the court reversed and
remanded for resentencing.
United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Smith, pleaded guilty to passing counterfeit notes. As
part of Smith's sentence, the district court imposed an alternative fine of
$225,000. On appeal, Smith argued that the district court misapplied
the Sentencing Guidelines for fines. Specifically, she alleged that the
fine fell outside the applicable range.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court imposed a fine in
excess of the maximum established by the Sentencing Guidelines. Ac-
cordingly, the court vacated the fine and remanded for further sentenc-
ing. The court reasoned that the maximum fine allowed is $50,000,
unless the defendant is convicted under a statute authorizing a maxi-
mum fine greater than $250,000. Smith was convicted under a statute
that imposed a fine of $5,000. Therefore, the guideline for fines was
misapplied. The court noted that even if the statute, under which the
defendant is convicted, is construed to include the alternative fine stat-
ute, the maximum fine allowed is not greater than $250,000.
United States v. Snell, 922 F.2d 588
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Snell, was convicted of aiding and abetting. Prior to
sentencing, Snell filed a motion for ajudgment of acquittal, or, for a new
trial. The district court judge denied this motion, and Snell appealed.
The district court declared the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional
as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. As a result of this,
and because Snell made a good faith effort to provide substantial assist-
ance to the prosecution, the district court sentenced Snell below the
minimum level established by the Sentencing Guidelines. The govern-
ment cross-appealed the downward departure in sentencing, claiming
the district court acted without authority.
The Tenth Circuit held that it was improper for the district court to
make a downward departure in sentencing without a motion filed by the
government. The government's appeal was timely and since the Sen-
tencing Guidelines do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, the
sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The
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court affirmed the conviction of Snell after determining there was suffi-
cient evidence of aiding and abetting.
United States v. Sorenson, 915 F.2d 599
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Sorenson, was sentenced to five years imprisonment af-
ter pleading guilty to carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug
trafficking charge, and six months imprisonment after pleading guilty to
maintaining a place for the distribution and use of cocaine. Sorenson
appealed the district court's denial of his motion to compel the govern-
ment to file a written motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This stat-
ute requires a court to depart below the statutory requirement for
criminal sentencing because of a defendant's substantial assistance to
the investigation or prosecution of another person. Sorenson main-
tained that his plea bargain agreement should have included this
motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court held that in a plea bargain, the government is not required to file
this motion. Moreover, failure to require this motion was not a violation
of Sorenson's substantive or procedural due process rights. The only
instance in which the court can impose this requirement on the govern-
ment is when the defendant's assistance was so substantial as to demand
meaningful relief.
United States v. Soto, 918 F.2d 882
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Soto, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to dis-
tribute a controlled substance. Soto requested a downward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines based on the possibility of deportation
for the drug conviction. The district court decided not to depart down-
ward and sentenced accordingly. Soto appealed, claiming the district
court abused its discretion and incorrectly applied the guidelines by not
taking into account his possible deportation.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
court explained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, an appellate court is not
granted jurisdiction over a district court's discretionary refusal to depart
downward from the Sentencing Guidelines. The court also found no
merit in Soto's argument that the refusal to depart downward would re-
sult in deportation. The court specifically ruled that a sentencing court
shall not consider the possible deportation of an alien resident for a
drug conviction in deciding whether to depart downward from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, St. Julian, pleaded guilty to maintaining a premises for
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the purpose of distributing cocaine base. The adjusted guideline recom-
mended a sentence of thirty to thirty-seven months, but the court im-
posed a sentence of seventy-two months. St. Julian appealed, arguing
that: (1) the district court made an improper upward departure from
the Sentencing Guidelines because drug quantity is not an appropriate
basis to make this determination when the base offense is maintaining a
crackhouse; (2) the district court improperly used drug quantity infor-
mation obtained under a plea agreement; (3) the district court improp-
erly imposed a two level upward adjustment for St. Julian's failure to
appear at a sentencing hearing; and (4) the district court improperly im-
posed a two level upward adjustment for possession of weapons.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's upward departure
from the Sentencing Guidelines but vacated the sentence and remanded
the matter for resentencing. The court reasoned that the district court
failed to provide an adequate and specific statement of reasons support-
ing the particular sentence imposed. The three-step test for departures
from the guidelines is: (1) whether the circumstances cited by the dis-
trict court justify a departure; (2) whether there is a sufficient factual
basis for the circumstance cited; and (3) whether the degree of depar-
ture is reasonable. Using this three part test, the court ruled that the
quantity of drugs involved was an aggravating factor not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. Thus, the cir-
cumstance cited by the district court justified a departure. Conse-
quently, there was a sufficient factual basis that St. Julian was involved
with a certain amount of cocaine base. The district court, however, did
not provide a specific statement of reasons for the particular sentence
imposed. The court, therefore, could not perform its duty to determine
whether the sentence was unreasonable and outside the Sentencing
Guidelines' range. Second, the court found that the district court did
not use drug-quantity information obtained from St. Julian pursuant to a
plea agreement. The court explained that St. Julian failed to allege any
facts that would support his argument that he was the ultimate source of
the drug quantity information. Third, St. Julian's wrongful failure to
appear at a sentencing hearing was a willful obstruction of justice, justi-
fying a two level upward adjustment. Finally, a two level upward adjust-
ment for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense
was justified. The court explained that it was proper despite the fact
that St. Julian was not present when the guns were purchased and was
not in possession of the guns when they were confiscated.
United States v. Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Trujillo, was convicted and sentenced for possession
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and aiding and
abetting. Trujillo appealed his sentence, arguing that: (1) his accept-
ance of responsibility should result in a downward departure, and his
decision not to make a statement should not be construed as lacking
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acceptance of responsibility; (2) the district court abused its discretion
when it did not find that there was timely acceptance of responsibility;
(3) his sentence should have been the same as his co-defendants, and
the inequality violated his due process and equal protection rights; and
(4) the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines
when it considered the total amount of cocaine found, not just the
amount Trujillo pleaded guilty to possessing.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decision.
First, the court stated' that the sentencing judge is entitled to consider
contrition in his sentence reductions. Second, the sentencing court is in
the best position to evaluate demeanor, the timeliness of admissions,
and the quality of admissions in imposing the sentence. Third, the court
stated that no right exists requiring co-defendants to receive the same
sentences. Also, the court found there was no violation of due process
and equal protection rights because Trujillo had time to contest the pro-
bation officer's recommendations before sentencing. Finally, the court
ruled that the amount of drugs found can be aggregated for sentencing
purposes.
United States v. Valle-Sanchez, 912 F.2d 424
Author: Judge Dumbauld, sitting by designation
During a FBI undercover investigation, an agent saw a stash of co-
caine which defendant, Miguel Valle-Sanchez, admitted amounted to a
pound. Subsequently, Miguel and Pepe Valle-Sanchez (the
"Sanchezes"), pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The
Sanchezes later argued, however, that the district court erroneously cal-
culated the amount of cocaine on which their sentences were based.
Specifically, they argued that: (1) their sentences should not be based
on a larger quantity of drugs than the amount specified in the indict-
ment; (2) only quantities seized or tested and analyzed should be used
in determining their sentences; and (3) the addition of the pound in the
calculation violated the plea agreement.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Sen-
tencing Guidelines provide that the court has the discretion to take into
account conduct for which the defendant is not formally charged. Sec-
ond, the court ruled that it is not necessary to include only the sub-
stances seized in the sentencing calculation. Finally, the court stated
that Miguel's admission to possessing a pound of cocaine was prior to
the plea agreement. Therefore, the agreement was not violated.
United States v. Vanderlaan, 921 F.2d 257
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Vanderlaan, appealed his sentence of 210 months for
bank robbery. Vanderlaan contended that the district court erred in
counting a 1973 conviction for career offender liability. Vanderlaan ar-
gued that the conviction was barred from consideration because it was
too remote in time. Specifically, he alleged that the conviction did not
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result in a "sentence of imprisonment" within the fifteen year time pe-
riod because he was sentenced to drug rehabilitation instead of
incarceration.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Upon de novo review of
the Sentencing Guidelines, the court ruled that a restricted drug treat-
ment program, granted in lieu of a prison term, is in fact a "sentence of
incarceration" and could be correctly counted as a previous offense.
The court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines make no distinction
between "sentences of imprisonment" and other types of sentences.
Thus, the court stated that Vanderlaan's sentence was a "sentence of
imprisonment" that resulted in his incarceration within the fifteen years
of the commission of the instant offense. Accordingly, he was correctly
labeled a career offender.
United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, White, pleaded guilty to bank robbery. White appealed
the district court's imposition of a forty-six month prison term arguing
that the upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was unrea-
sonable and clearly erroneous.
The Tenth Circuit held that the departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines was reasonable. The court used a three-step process to de-
termine if the district court's departure was warranted: (1) mitigating
circumstances not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing
Commission must justify a departure; (2) circumstances cited by the dis-
trict court to justify a departure must actually exist in the instant case;
and (3) the degree of departure from the Guidelines must be reason-
able. On de novo review, the court first held that White's criminal history
category score, as calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines, under-
represented the seriousness of his criminal history. Second, the court
stated that White did not dispute the existence of previous forgery
charges or the instant aggravated robbery charge. Also, the court was
not erroneous in concluding that White was out on bail at the time of
the instant offense. Third, the district court closely followed the Sen-
tencing Guidelines' policy statement when it imposed the forty-six
month sentence.
United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 578
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Williams, pleaded guilty to two bank robbery counts.
Williams was previously convicted for four separate bank robberies. Ac-
cording to the Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, Williams's recom-
mended sentence was thirty-seven to forty-six months. The probation
officer, however, suggested an upward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines because he believed the recommendation did not reflect the
seriousness of Williams's past conduct or the likelihood that Williams
would commit another crime. The district court agreed and sentenced
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Williams under the career criminal provisions of the Sentencing Guide-
lines. On appeal, Williams argued that the upward departure was not
warranted.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the upward departure under a three-
part test. First, the district court must articulate circumstances which
warrant departure and which are not adequately considered by the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. Second, factual findings of the district court must
not be clearly erroneous. Third, the degree of departure must be rea-
sonable. The court found that the district court satisfied this test. Wil-
liams's record satisfied the first two requirements, and the district court
acted reasonably in following the career criminal guidelines in determin-
ing the sentence.
United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Zamarripa, pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 2244(a)(1), and 2245(3). The district
court subsequently sentenced Zamarripa, departing upward from the
Sentencing Guidelines. Zamarripa appealed, challenging the upward
departure.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's upward departure
was proper if it: (1) ascertained the sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines; (2) addressed the applicable adjustments; and (3) ex-
plained the particular circumstances present to support a departure and
why the circumstances were not adequately addressed by the adjust-
ments built into the Sentencing Guidelines. The court was unclear as to
precisely which guideline the district court was departing from, since
several different guideline applications were possible. Consequently,
the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
[Vol. 68:4
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 431
Author: Judge Theis, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Cunico, worked for defendant, Pueblo School District (the
"District"), as a social worker. When the District began to experience
financial difficulties, the need for lay-offs arose. Of the eight social
workers, the District kept only the two most senior. Cunico was third in
seniority and was consequently fired. The District later rehired a minor-
ity as a means of furthering its affirmative action program. Cunico sub-
sequently brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she
was discriminated against by the District. The District appealed the dis-
trict court's order granting relief to Cunico.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court noted that the purpose of a race-conscious affirmative action pro-
gram must be to remedy the effects of past discrimination against a dis-
advantaged group. Because the District could not establish a past
record of discrimination giving rise to the need for an affirmative action
program, the decision to retain the minority social worker solely on the
basis of race was impermissible.
Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Derstein, brought a civil rights suit against three state dis-
trict court judges, alleging he was unlawfully terminated from his job as
a court services officer in response to allegations of sexual harassment.
The district court ruled in favor of Derstein, awarding him damages for
lost income, and mental and emotional distress. Derstein was also rein-
stated as a state employee. The judges appealed, claiming that: (1) the
district court erred in denying their claims for qualified immunity;
(2) Derstein had no protected property interest; (3) they were entitled
to eleventh amendment immunity; and (4) the damage award was not
supported by substantial evidence. Derstein cross-appealed, claiming he
was denied a liberty interest.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in favor of
Derstein. The court ruled that Derstein was provided due process be-
cause he was not discharged until ten days after receiving notice of the
charges against him. Accordingly, the court stated that it need not ad-
dress the judges' remaining claims on appeal. The court also dismissed
Derstein's cross-appeal because no liberty interest was impinged when
he publicized the circumstances of his discharge.
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DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, DeVargas, brought a civil rights suit against defendants,
Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Company, Incorporated ("Mason &
Hanger"), contract suppliers of security services to Los Alamos National
Laboratories ("LANL") and individual managers of LANL. DeVargas
argued defendants violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 when they refused to hire him for a security in-
spector position because of a physical handicap. The district court
granted summaryjudgment in favor of Mason-Hanger and the managers
of LANL.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Ma-
son & Hanger, holding that section 504 did not apply to the company.
Section 504 prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons by
"any program or activity receiving financial assistance." The court ex-
plained that since Mason & Hanger received a competitive bid contract
to provide security services, it was not the recipient of a government
subsidy. The court also upheld the grant of summary judgment to the
individual LANL managers. The court explained that the district court
properly relied upon Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984), which held that section 504's prohibition against discrimination
extended only to specific programs receiving federal assistance. The
district court appropriately determined that Mason & Hanger, not
LANL, employed a specific program that discriminated against DeVar-
gas. The court found no congressional intent to give retroactive appli-
cation to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.
Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 918 F.2d 877
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Hill, brought suit against defendant, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber, Incorporated ("Goodyear"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hill con-
tended that Goodyear discharged him in retaliation for his civil rights
advocacy and discharged him because of his race. The jury found in
favor of Goodyear, and Hill appealed the following district court rulings:
(1) denying an injunction against Goodyear's maintenance of a hostile
work environment; (2) refusing to give three jury instructions concern-
ing Hill's claim for hostile work environment; (3) directing a verdict on
Hill's claim for retaliatory discharge on the basis that retaliation does
not state a claim for relief under § 1981; and (4) admitting evidence of
Hill's bad character. Hill also alleged that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Goodyear.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court properly refused to
issue an injunction against Goodyear or instruct the jury on Hill's hostile
work environment claim. Moreover, the district court properly refused
to submit Hill's retaliatory discharge claim to the jury because Hill's dis-
charge, even if in retaliation for his civil rights advocacy, was not action-
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able under § 1981. Further, the court declined to decide whether
discriminatory discharge claims were still actionable under § 1981. Fi-
nally, the admission of evidence concerning Hill's character was not
plain error, and the record contained substantial evidence to support
the jury's verdict.
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Hirschfeld, brought suit against the New Mexico Correc-
tions Department ("NMCD") alleging gender-based discrimination, re-
taliation for complaints of sexual harassment, and constructive
discharge. Hirschfeld alleged that while working at NMCD, the Captain
of the security officers made unwelcome sexual advances. The district
court found that the Captain was an agent of the NMCD and found that
his conduct created a hostile work environment. The district court
ruled, however, that NMCD was not liable for its employee's conduct,
reasoning that the sexual harassment was not aided by the agency rela-
tionship. Hirschfeld subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hirsch-
feld's complaint. The court identified three alternative bases for hold-
ing an employer liable for an agent's creation of a hostile work
environment: (1) the agent is acting within the scope of his employ-
ment; (2) the employer fails to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive
work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known; or (3) the agent,
although acting outside the scope of his authority, purported to act or
speak on behalf of the employer and there was reliance upon the appar-
ent authority. The court found no liability under any of these tests.
First, the court ruled that the district court properly held NMCD not
liable under the first test because the Captain was not acting within the
scope of his employment in his actions towards Hirschfeld. Further-
more, the district court correctly held no liability under the second test
because NMCD took prompt remedial action after receiving notice of
the sexual harassment. Specifically, the Captain was demoted. Third,
the court ruled that there was no evidence indicating that the Captain
had any supervisory authority over Hirschfeld's position. Accordingly,
the Captain did not act or speak on behalf of NMCD. Thus, there was
no employer liability under the third test. Finally, the court ruled that
the district court properly dismissed Hirschfeld's constructive discharge
claim. -The district court's decision that Hirschfeld's evidence was not
credible was not clearly erroneous.
Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 674
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Krause, was terminated at age fifty-two after being em-
ployed by defendant, Dresser Industries Incorporated ("Dresser"), for
over twenty-five years. Krause filed suit claiming: (1) age discrimina-
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tion; (2) violation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"); and (3) breach of an implied employment contract. The
jury returned a verdict for Krause on all three claims. Dresser appealed,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court reasoned that the evidence produced allowed a reasonable jury to
determine that age was a determining factor in Krause's termination of
employment, and that Dresser breached an implied contract with
Krause. The court explained that Krause offered sufficient evidence to
rebut Dresser's non-discriminatory explanation for termination. Also,
there was sufficient evidence to establish an implied promise that Krause
would not be terminated until after employees of lower seniority were
terminated. The court also ruled that since a breach of contract claim
solely for lost salary is unrelated to an employee benefit plan, Krause's
contract claim was not preempted by ERISA.
Marshall v. TRW, Inc., 900 F.2d 1517
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Marshall, brought a retaliatory discharge action against his
employer, TRW Incorporated ("TRW"). Specifically, Marshall claimed
that TRW terminated his employment because he filed a workers' com-
pensation claim arising out of injuries sustained in the course of employ-
ment. The jury found in favor of Marshall for $150,000 in actual
damages and $125,000 in punitive damages. Also, since there was hos-
tility in the work place, reinstatement was found to be an inappropriate
remedy. Instead, the district court awarded $250,000 in future dam-
ages. TRW subsequently appealed, alleging: (1) Marshall's state tort
claim of retaliatory discharge was pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act; (2) there was no evidence of hostility in the
work place, and in any event, the evidence does not support an award of
$250,000 in future damages; (3) the punitive damage award should be
reduced to $100,000; and (4) the district court erred in excluding evi-
dence concerning the availability of the arbitration remedy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, except the
judgment for future damages. First, the court stated that Marshall's
state tort claim was not pre-empted by § 301. The court reasoned that
whether Marshall's discharge was retaliatory did not involve interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Thus, since the
state-law remedy was independent of the CBA, there was no pre-emp-
tion by any federal labor laws. Second, the court reversed the judgment
awarding future damages. The court stated that there was nothing in
the record to support a finding of hostility. Third, the court ruled that
the punitive damages were appropriate. The court stated that
Oklahoma's cap on punitive damages awards in retaliatory discharge ac-
tions does not apply retroactively to an action commenced before the
statute's effective date. Finally, the court stated that the availability of
[Vol. 68:4
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
arbitration was immaterial. The court reasoned that the state law rem-
edy was independent of remedies provided for in the CBA.
Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Messina, brought suit against Kroblin Transportation Sys-
tems, Incorporated ("Kroblin") claiming he was unlawfully terminated
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
Messina's action also contained a pendent state law slander claim. The
jury found in favor of Kroblin, and he subsequently appealed. On ap-
peal, Messina contended the district court erred in instructing the jury.
He alleged the instruction incorrectly required him to prove the ulti-
mate question of the trial, whether age was the determinative factor in
his discharge. Second, Messina alleged the district court erred in di-
recting a verdict against him on his slander claim. Finally, Messina ar-
gued the district court erred on failing to admit into evidence the
conduct of certain defense witnesses who violated a sequestration order.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The jury in-
struction was not improper. The court explained that the instruction
did not mislead the jury. Moreover, the court stated that it only reverses
ajury instruction when it has a substantial doubt that the jury was fairly
guided in its deliberations. Furthermore, the court found that the dis-
trict court properly held against Messina on his slander claim. The
court explained that Messina failed to satisfy the requirement that the
slanderous statements be communicated to others beside the plaintiff.
It reasoned that the slanderous statements in question were made by
one corporate employee during the performance of his duties within the
hearing of other corporate employees. This does not constitute publica-
tion. Finally, the district court properly balanced the interests of Mes-
sina in presenting his case with the prejudice that would arise if the jury
knew that the witness misconduct caused a new trial. Moreover, the dis-
trict court allowed Messina to cross examine the witnesses who violated
the sequestration order.
Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Mitchell, filed suit claiming that when defendant, Mobil Oil
Corporation ("Mobil") raised the eligibility threshold for lump-sum pay-
ments, it forced him to take early retirement. Consequently, Mitchell
argued that Mobil violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ER-
ISA"). The district court entered judgment for Mitchell on the ADEA
claim and ruled in favor of Mitchell on the ERISA claims. On appeal,
Mobil contended that Mitchell did not meet his burden of proof on the
age discrimination claim, and that he did not have standing to seek relief
under ERISA.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Mobil and reversed the decision of
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the district court. The court explained that when an employee has es-
tablished a prima facie case of age discrimination by constructive dis-
charge, the employer may rebut the presumption of discrimination by
producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason
for its conduct. To prevail, the employee must then prove that the em-
ployer's proffered justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.
Mitchell failed to do this. The court reasoned that his claim of pretext
was based on an unsupported inference that Mobil changed its benefit
plan to avoid the redundancy created by its forthcoming merger with
another oil company. The court rejected this inference. Moreover,
Mitchell did not have standing to seek relief under ERISA because he
was no longer a participant of an employee benefit plan after taking a
lump-sum distribution.
Polson v. Davis, 895 F.2d 705
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Polson, an employee of Kansas City, Kansas, contended
that her relationship with defendant, Davis, deteriorated after she ob-
jected to his alleged discriminatory hiring policies. Poison was fired for
"unprofessional conduct." Poison subsequently brought suit under var-
ious employment discrimination claims. The district court held for Da-
vis, and Poison appealed. On appeal, Poison contended that the district
court erred when it: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the theory of defa-
mation per se, which does not require proof of actual damages;
(2) granted summary judgment to Davis on her state retaliatory dis-
charge claim; (3) granted summary judgment to Davis on her claim that
the City was negligent in supervising her immediate superior, Davis;
(4) rejected her Title VII claim, finding the statute's enforcement provi-
sions to be the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination suits
premised on its violation; and (5) refused to grant a new trial based on
instances of improper testimony.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Kansas Supreme Court abolished
the distinction between defamation per quod and defamation per se, and
that defamation could no longer be presumed, but must be established
by proof. Second, the court held that Poison's situation could not be
classified under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine since the alternative remedy under the Kansas Acts Against
Discrimination was adequate. Thus, summary judgment on her state re-
taliatory discharge claim was proper. Third, the court found that the
negligent supervision cause of action did not exist in Kansas. Fourth,
although the court agreed that Poison could bring a § 1983 claim on
actions proscribed by Title VII if those actions also violated the Consti-
tution, the jury's finding that Poison's termination did not violate equal
protection resolved this issue against her. Finally, the court ruled that
the improper testimony did not deny justice, and Poison's prior refusal
of a mistrial barred her from seeking a new trial.
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Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Spulak, brought suit against K Mart Corporation ("K
Mart") under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29
U.S.C. § 621, alleging that defendant, K Mart, illegally discharged him
because of his age. He also asserted a pendant state claim for age dis-
crimination and for extreme and outrageous conduct. Spulak prevailed
on the ADEA claim and was awarded back pay, liquidated damages, and
front pay in lieu of reinstatement. K Mart subsequently appealed. The
issues on appeal were whether Spulak established a violation of ADEA
and whether the damages awarded were appropriate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court accepted the findings of the district court that Spulak was singled
out for unduly harsh and discriminatory treatment, and that he estab-
lished a case of constructive discharge. Moreover, the court found that
his age, his employment record, and his constructive discharge estab-
lished a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court also approved
the district court's award of damages. Liquidated damages were appro-
priate because age discrimination was the predominant motive for Spu-
lak's constructive discharge. Reinstatement, rather than front pay, is the
preferred remedy. It was not appropriate in this case, however, because
K Mart exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a practical matter, a pro-
ductive and amicable working relationship was impossible.
Torrez v. Public Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687
Author: Judge Jones, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Torrez, appealed the district court's order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant, Public Service Company of New
Mexico ("PNM"). The district court found that the signing of a release
by Torrez at the termination of his employment constituted a knowing
and voluntary waiver of his right to bring an employment discrimination
suit. On appeal, Torrez argued that: (1) the district court considered
only the language of the release, and not the totality of the circum-
stances; (2) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
bring a discrimination action; and (3) his intent and understanding
should not have been decided by summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment for PNM. The court reasoned that the totality of the
circumstances was not considered. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),
summary judgment should only be granted if there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, the court
concluded that there were material issues. For example, the release
failed to specifically mention waiver of employment discrimination
claims. Furthermore, Torrez did not consult with an attorney before he
signed the release, nor did PNM advise him to do so. Moreover, Torrez
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did not have the opportunity to negotiate terms of the standard release
form; in fact, he was required to sign it. Finally, Torrez testified that he
viewed the release as releasing only those claims arising out of the ter-
mination plan. He did not understand the release, however, to be a bar
to bringing a discrimination claim.
Baker v. The Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Baker, brought two causes of action against her employer,
The Weyerhaeuser Company ("Weyerhaeuser"), as a result of being
sexually harassed by a fellow employee. First, she alleged that pursuant
to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), Weyerhaeuser knowingly allowed sex-
ual harassment in the workplace, thereby creating a hostile environ-
ment. Baker's second cause of action was that Weyerhaeuser inflicted
emotional distress by outrageous conduct. The district court entered
judgment for Baker on both causes of action, and Weyerhaeuser subse-
quently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the district court's decision that Weyerhaeuser violated Title VII was
supported by the record. There was pervasive sexual harassment of
Baker by a coworker. Weyerhaeuser, through Baker's supervisors and
others, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
corrective measures. The court also affirmed the intentional infliction of
emotional distress determination. The court explained that the district
court properly declined to base Weyerhaeuser's liability on the theory of
respondeat superior. This would have required a finding that the co-
worker's harassment was committed in the course of, and in furtherance
of, his employment. Rather, the district court properly premised liabil-
ity on Weyerhaeuser's own conduct, namely, its utter failure to take ac-
tion against the coworker.
[Vol. 68:4
ENVIRONMENTAL
Hackney, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 895 F.2d 1298
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Hackney, Inc. ("Hackney"), appealed a decision and or-
der of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the
"Commission") which held that Hackney committed "nonserious" viola-
tions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The enforce-
ment action and subsequent Commission order arose out of an
inspection by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") of a workplace operated by Hackney. On appeal, Hackney
argued that: (1) the search warrant for the inspection was unconstitu-
tional; and (2) the "nonserious" violations should have been designated
as de minimus.
First, the Tenth Circuit found that Hackney's challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the search warrant was based on the neutrality of
OSHA's inspection plan as applied. Hackney sought discovery of facts
concerning the plan in order to prove it was not neutral as applied. The
court restricted Hackney's challenge based on the "four corners doc-
trine" which limits challenges to the validity of search warrants to review
of materials submitted to the magistrate. Because the court found no
evidence meeting the "four corners doctrine," it affirmed the Commis-
sion's order precluding discovery. Furthermore, the court found that
because Hackney did not make a preliminary showing of discriminatory
application of OSHA's inspection plan, the Commission's denial of dis-
covery or an evidentiary hearing directed toward an attack on the search
warrant was also proper. Finally, the court held that substantial evi-
dence supported the Commission's determination that the violations
were "nonserious" rather than de minimus.
Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendants, Idarado Mining Company ("Idarado"), Newmont Min-
ing Corporation, and Newmont Services Ltd. ("Newmont"), appealed a
mandatory injunction issued under CERCLA. This injunction required
them to carry out an extensive cleanup plan created by the State of Col-
orado ("State") including liability for permanent relocation of trailer
park residents, and for cleanup of both Red Mountain Creek and certain
mine portals. Idarado and Newmont also appealed the district court's
finding that Newmont was an owner and operator of Idarado's facilities,
and that the State's plan was not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan ("NCP").
The Tenth Circuit decided, for reasons of judicial efficiency and
lack of finality, that only two issues were ripe for appeal: (1) whether
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the State could seek an injunction to enforce its plan under CERCLA;
and (2) whether CERCLA empowers the State to impose relocation ex-
penses upon responsible parties. The court held that the 1986 SARA
amendments to CERCLA do not empower the states to seek such in-
junctive relief against responsible parties. The court explained that such
a holding would amount to a grant ofjudicial legislation which is incon-
sistent with § 106 of CERCLA, and with the statute as a whole. The
court further held that although the federal government is so empow-
ered under CERCLA, the statute does not empower the states to impose
liability for permanent relocation.
Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. King, 906 F.2d 1477
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque (the "Village"),
brought suit against certain officials in the federal highway administra-
tion ("FHWA"), the city of Albuquerque, and the county of Bernalillo.
The Village brought suit when two bridges were proposed to be built.
The Village was concerned with the effects that the projects would have
on the environment of their community. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Village appealed
on four grounds: (1) the construction of the Montano bridge was a ma-
jor federal action subject to the requirements of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA"); (2) alternatively, the bridge construction
was improperly segmented from another major federal action; (3) the
construction of the bridge required compliance with § 106 of the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"); and (4) the construction of
the bridge required compliance with § 4(o of the Department of Trans-
portation Act ("DTA").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court first ruled that the construction of the Montano bridge was not a
major federal action subject to the requirements of NEPA. The court
reasoned that there was not sufficient participation on the part of the
federal government for the project to become a major federal action.
Thus, requirements of the NEPA did not apply. Second, the court ruled
that the bridge project and the neighboring major federal action were
only peripherally related and, therefore, properly segmented. Finally,
the court found that the NHPA and the DTA only applied to federal
actions. Since the bridge project was not a federal action, the court
found the statutes inapplicable to the bridge project.
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Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428
Per Curiam
Defendant, EMS Helicopter, Incorporated ("EMS") and Zimmer,
appealed jury verdicts in favor of plaintiff, Dugan, for compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of a fatal helicopter crash. On appeal,
EMS asserted: (1) there was insufficient evidence to submit to the jury
the issues of Zimmer's liability and punitive damages against EMS; and
(2) the district court erred in not admitting into evidence a complaint
Dugan filed against different defendants which arose out of the same
crash.
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a mo-
tion for directed verdict on the issues of Zimmer's liability and punitive
damages against EMS. The court explained that the situation presented
a classic example of a jury determination based on sharply disputed evi-
dence. Accordingly, the jury's conclusion was not disturbed on appeal.
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence of gross misconduct to present
the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Second, the court held that
the district court erred in not admitting the complaint which Dugan filed
against different defendants. Because the complaint alleged facts which
were directly inconsistent with positions Dugan argued at trial, the com-
plaint was admissable as an admission against interest pursuant to Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2). This conclusion, however, did not end the court's
analysis. The court stated that the ultimate decision whether to admit or
exclude the ancillary complaint requires balancing under Fed. R. Evid.
403. Using this balancing analysis the court stated that the district
court's failure to allow the complaint's introduction was reversible error.
The court explained the complaint was: (1) highly relevant to the allo-
cation of fault; (2) directly relevant to the issue of punitive damages;
and (3) relevant for impeachment. The case was, therefore, reversed
and remanded to the district court for a new trial.
United States v. Hill, 901 F.2d 880
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Hill, was convicted on several counts of possession and
distribution of cocaine. In his joint trial with co-defendant, Lux, the dis-
trict court permitted the government to testify about statements made
by Lux prior to trial which incriminated Hill as a drug dealer. Hill ap-
pealed, arguing the district court erred by admitting the hearsay state-
ments of his nontestifying co-defendant.
The Tenth Circuit held that the admission of the co-defendant's
prior statements incriminating Hill as a drug dealer violated his sixth
amendment right to confront his accuser. The court reasoned that Hill
could not exercise his right to cross-examination where the accuser was
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a co-defendant who refused to testify at trial. The error required rever-
sal unless the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, the government's other evidence against Hill, while substantial,
was not so overwhelming that the co-defendant's statements regarding
Hill's drug trafficking did not have a probable impact on the jury.
Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470
Per Curiam
Defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Company ("Caterpillar"), petitioned
for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc. Caterpillar argued
that the district court erred when it allowed into evidence remedial ac-
tions previously taken by Caterpillar. In particular, Caterpillar alleged
that the district court violated Fed. R. Evid. 407 ("Rule 407"), which
prohibits admission of subsequent remedial measures.
The Tenth Circuit denied the request for a hearing en banc, explain-
ing that no new reason for reconsideration was presented. The court
stated that the remedial action taken by Caterpillar was not a subsequent
measure after the accident in question, but rather, was chronologically
undisputed as having taken place prior to the accident. The court ex-
plained that pursuant to Rule 407, evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is inadmissable if they occur after the accident or injury, not
after the time of manufacture of the product or creation of the hazard.
In the case at hand, the court stated that Caterpillar's change in product
design occurred before the accident involving Huffman, regardless of
whether the measure occurred when design work began or when it was
first implemented.
United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Ryans, moved to suppress evidence of tape recordings
which were played in his criminal proceeding. Ryans stated that the re-
cordings contained statements made to a government informant after he
retained counsel. Consequently, Ryans argued that the government vio-
lated the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 7(104)(A)(1), by im-
properly causing an informant to communicate with him after retention
of counsel. The district court granted Ryans's motion, and the govern-
ment appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that Rule 7 was inapplicable to
the investigative phase of law enforcement. In contemplating an adver-
sarial relationship between litigants, the rule's proscriptions do not at-
tach during the investigative process, and before the initiation of
criminal proceedings. Since Ryans had not yet been indicted at the time
the tapes were made, Rule 7 was not violated.
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Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Michelson, petitioned for review a final order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, finding him to be deportable and deny-
ing him a voluntary departure under the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e). On appeal, Michelson claimed that he was im-
properly denied counsel. Michelson also claimed the immigration judge
failed to advise him of his right to pursue a waiver or suspension of de-
portation. Also, Michelson argued that the immigration judge erred in
failing to consider a discretionary suspension of deportation.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that before a court may intervene
based upon an alien's lack of representation, prejudice must be shown.
The court ruled that Michelson failed to show prejudice which would
cast doubt on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. Thus, he was
not improperly denied counsel. Second, the immigration judge did not
err in failing to inform Michelson of his right to waive deportation. The
court explained that the judge need only inform the alien of such relief
when he is eligible for such relief. Finally, the immigration judge was
not required to consider sua sponte alternatives for which Michelson
would be eligible. The petition for review was, therefore, denied.
United States v. Quintana, 914 F.2d 1409
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Quintana, an alien, pleaded guilty to possession of a
sawed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871. Before
being sentenced, Quintana filed a motion for judicial recommendation
against deportation in reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (b). The district court
denied the motion, and Quintana appealed, alleging that the district
court abused its discretion in not considering the motion on its merits.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
stated that a motion for judicial recommendation against deportation
was available only where an alien was convicted of a crime of moral tur-
pitude. Thus, the applicable federal statute, 26 U.S.C. § 1251(4), does
not allow this recommendation to an alien convicted of possessing a
sawed-off shotgun. Thus, the crime to which Quintana pled guilty is one
which specifically provides for deportation.
Saadi v. INS, 912 F.2d 428
Per Curiam
An immigration judge found defendant, Saadi, deportable under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Saadi ap-
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pealed the decision, but the Board of Immigration ("the Board") dis-
missed his action. He subsequently appealed the Board's decision.
The Tenth Circuit held it was without jurisdiction to review Saadi's
deportation order. The court reasoned that pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(c), once an alien is deported, a deportation order may not be
reviewed by any court. To gain review of a deportation order, therefore,
a stay must be obtained.
United States v. Valdez, 917 F.2d 466
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Valdez, was convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for re-en-
try of a deported alien. Valdez appealed, claiming that his due process
rights were violated. In particular, he argued that the immigration law
judges in both of Valdez's deportation hearings erred when they did not
warn him of his right to remain silent during the proceedings. Valdez
also argued that the failure to advise him of his right to remain silent was
fundamentally unfair.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Valdez's arguments and affirmed the de-
cision of the district court. The court stated that 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c)
does not require the immigration law judges to advise Valdez of his right
to remain silent during the hearing. Second, the court stated than an
alien can collaterally challenge deportation hearings if he can show that
they were fundamentally unfair and deprived him of his right to judicial
review. Valdez failed to show this, however. Instead, in his previous




Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Blatchford, filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the
state of New Mexico lacked jurisdiction to try him for his offenses. The
Federal Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, gives exclusive jurisdiction
to the federal government for crimes committed within either an Indian
reservation or a dependent Indian community. In a companion case, it
was determined that the area in question did not have reservation status.
Therefore, the only issue remaining to be decided was whether the area
where Blatchford committed his offenses was a dependent Indian com-
munity within the meaning of the statute.
The Tenth Circuit found that the area was not a dependent Indian
community. In making this determination, the court considered land ti-
tle, community composition and purpose, and the relationship of the
community to the federal government, the Indian nation, and the state
and county government. The court found that most of the land was pri-
vately owned, that the inhabitants included many non-Indians, and that
the primary purpose of the community was commercial activity. Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that Congress did not intend to include an Indian
allotment clustered around a non-Indian commercial junction on private
land as a dependent Indian community.
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company ("P&M"),
sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. P&M claimed that de-
fendant, Navajo Tribe Tax Commission (the "Tribe"), lacked jurisdic-
tion under federal law to tax a P&M mine on land located in
northwestern New Mexico. The land in question was an addition of ap-
proximately 1.9 million to the Navajo Reservation in 1907-08. P&M,
however, stated that the addition was terminated by two Executive Or-
ders in 1908 and 1911 thereby depriving the Tribe ofjurisdiction to tax
mines located on this land. The Tribe argued that the land in question
was still part of the Navajo Reservation and, therefore, the taxation issue
should first be addressed by Tribal forums. Accordingly, the federal
court should abstain under the "Indian abstention doctrine." Alterna-
tively, the Tribe claimed that the Indian abstention doctrine was still
applicable because the land was located within "Indian country." The
district court held that the land was within Reservation boundaries and,
therefore, the Indian abstention doctrine applied. P&M subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the land
was within Reservation boundaries. The court based its decision on the
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language and legislative history of two Executive Orders and the Act of
May 29, 1908. The court ruled that the phrase "restore to public do-
main" was widely interpreted as diminishing or terminating the bounda-
ries of the New Mexico portion of unallotted land. While this land
originally was withdrawn from the public domain in an effort to allot
land to off-reservation Indians, these Executive Orders and legislation
returned the land to the public domain. Therefore, the land was not
within Reservation boundaries. The court then remanded the case for a
finding of whether the land was nevertheless in Indian country and, if so,
whether the Indian tribunal should first hear the taxation question.
Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Ross, brought two fourth amendment claims against de-
fendant, McLemore, deputy sheriff. Ross alleged that McLemore vio-
lated his rights when he arrested him on Indian Tribal Trust land. Ross
claimed that state police officers have no jurisdiction in Indian country.
Further, Ross asserted a constitutional claim based on McLemore's al-
leged use of excessive force in making the arrest.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that McLemore did not have authority to
arrest Ross in Indian country. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, Indian
country held in trust for Indian use is subject to exclusive federal or
tribal criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the county, its sheriff, or his inferior
officers could not exercise jurisdiction for the state. Notwithstanding
the lack ofjurisdiction to arrest Ross, McLemore, as an individual peace
officer, still enjoyed qualified immunity because no reasonable police of-
ficer could have known such an action violated the law. The court up-
held the directed verdict, but remanded for trial a separate claim for
extra-jurisdictional arrest against the county. The court reasoned that
the county enjoyed no such qualified immunity. The county can be held
liable only if the constitutional deprivation resulted from county custom
or policy.
Shoshone Indian Tribe v. Hodel, 903 F.2d 784
Author: Judge Babcock, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Shoshone Indian Tribe ("Tribe") brought suit against de-
fendant, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), Atlantic Rich-
field Company, and several other oil companies ("ARCO"). The Tribe
asserted that ARCO improperly deducted manufacturing costs before
computing the royalty owed to it for mineral leases on tribal lands.
Under the United States Geological Survey, Conservation Division Man-
ual Part 647.7.3(D), manufacturing costs are deductible only if the Sec-
retary determines that such costs are an "integral part" of the
manufacturing process. The Secretary determined that ARCO's manu-
facturing costs were not an integral part of the manufacturing process
and, thus, were not deductible. The district court upheld the Secretary's
determination. ARCO appealed, arguing that the Secretary developed a
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long standing policy of allowing the costs because past deduction of sim-
ilar manufacturing costs were never rejected as improper.
The Tenth Circuit held that a long standing policy can only be
found where an administrative agency interprets a regulation consist-
ently over a long period of time, publicly, and through careful and
sound reasoning. The court reasoned that the Secretary's prior acquies-
cence did not meet the criteria in establishing a long standing policy
since ARCO's deductions had never before been challenged. There-




Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664
Per Curiam
Defendant Brown's minor son William was involved in a car acci-
dent with the Niroumands while driving his brother's car. The car in-
volved in the accident, however, was not specifically covered under
Alfred's policy with plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate").
Allstate sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend, indemnify, or
pay the claims of any defendant. The district court granted Allstate's
motion for summary judgment and rejected the Niroumands' motion to
certify certain questions of law. The Niroumands and the Browns ap-
pealed. Specifically, they asserted that: (1) the district court erred in
not staying the declaratory judgment action pending the outcome of the
state court trial; (2) summary judgment was inappropriate because a
material question of fact existed as to whether William had his brother's
implied permission to use the car; (3) it was not necessary for Alfred to
be driving the vehicle in order to have coverage; and (4) the policy re-
quired Allstate to defend Alfred.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court first ruled that the decision to not certify was within the district
court's discretion. First, the court ruled that the district court was not
required to stay the declaratory judgment action pending the outcome
of the state court trial. The court reasoned that the Niroumands and
Browns never filed a motion to stay. Second, the court concluded that
summary judgment was appropriate on the issue of William's implied
permission to use the car. The court explained that there was a lack of
credible evidence to the contrary. Further, the court denied Brown's
contention that Alfred need not have been actually driving the car for
Alfred to qualify as a "user." The court explained that it was not shown
that William's use of the car furthered a purpose connected to Alfred.
Also, the court similarly denied Brown's argument that Allstate must
provide coverage for Alfred. The court explained that the policy only
protects insured people and their insured vehicles.
Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 790
Per Curiam
Mitchell, an Arkansas resident, owned Colorado property that was
destroyed by fire. He brought suit against State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company ("State Farm"), an Illinois corporation, to recover under a fire
insurance policy. The policy did not indicate what state law governed.
The district court granted partial summary judgment to Mitchell on the
ground that Arkansas law, rather than Colorado law, governed determi-
nation of amounts due under the policy. State Farm subsequently
appealed.
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In determining which state law applied, the Tenth Circuit utilized
the "most significant relationship" test. Under this test, the court stated
that the most significant factor to be considered is the location of an
insured property. Accordingly, the court ruled that Colorado had the
most significant relationship to issues arising out of the policy since it
was the state in which the property was located. Moreover, absent con-
trary evidence, the parties expected Colorado law to be applicable. Fi-
nally, the fact that Mitchell was an Arkansas resident and paid premiums
and acted on the policy from that base, was not sufficient to overcome
Colorado's interest in applying its law.
Penny v. Giuffrida, 897 F.2d 1543
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Giuffrida, Director of the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency ("FEMA"), appealed the district court's judgment in favor
of plaintiff, Penny. The dispute involved FEMA's denial of Penny's
claim under a flood insurance policy, issued pursuant to the National
Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"). FEMA denied the claim on
grounds that Penny's home was not located in a community participat-
ing in the NFIP. FEMA argued that the district court incorrectly held
that it was estopped from denying liability, erred in awarding Penny re-
covery on inconsistent theories, and improperly awarded interest.
FEMA argued that interest awards against the United States are not au-
thorized under NFIP. Penny, on the other hand, argued that the district
court erred in denying attorney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding that
FEMA engaged in affirmative misconduct so as to warrant a finding of
equitable estoppel. The court noted that the Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether equitable estoppel applies against the government.
Moreover, the court found that the facts did not satisfy the criteria for
applying equitable estoppel, even if the claim were viable against the
government. Second, FEMA acted pursuant to its statutory authority in
denying liability to Penny. Further, it would have acted beyond its au-
thority if it extended insurance to Penny. Third, the court found no
error in the district court's denial of attorney's fees to Penny because
FEMA's position was substantially justified. The court declined to ad-
dress the remaining issues on appeal.
Royal College Shop, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 670
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiffs, Royal College Shop, Incorporated ("Royal College"), and
its owner, Black, appealed an order of the district court. This order de-
nied their motion for assessment of prejudgment interest on insurance
proceeds awarded pursuant to a fire insurance policy. Defendant,
Northern Insurance Company ("Northern"), cross-appealed from the
district court's order which denied its motions for remittitur, a new trial,
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV").
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The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to
award prejudgment interest on two liquidated claims where the amount
due was clear and ascertainable. The district court did not err, however,
in denying prejudgment interest on two other unliquidated claims which
were in dispute. Further, the court held that Northern failed to demon-
strate an abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to grant a new
trial or a remittitur. Also, the court ruled that Northern failed to
demonstrate any error affecting substantial rights in the submission of
consequential damages to the jury, in the jury instructions, or in any




GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, GTE Corporation ("GTE"), brought an action for in-
fringement of a federally registered service mark against defendant, Wil-
liams. Williams was a sole proprietor who operated his business under
the name of "General Telephone" in Utah since 1974. Williams used
this name even though he knew of General Telephone and Electronics
of California. GTE subsidiaries, on the other hand, employed the same
name with geographical identifiers prior to 1974. Not until 1981
through 1982, however, did GTE apply for and receive registration of
the "General Telephone" service mark. The district court held that Wil-
liams could register the mark concurrently and have its exclusive use in
his region in Utah. The district court reasoned that "General Tele-
phone" was descriptive as opposed to suggestive, and hence not entitled
to protection because it was not susceptible of a secondary meaning.
Further, it concluded that Williams' use of the name was not likely to
cause confusion, and Williams had established the statutory, "intermedi-
ate junior user" defense and the common law "good faith adoption"
defense. GTE subsequently appealed. The issues considered on appeal
were whether: (1) GTE established that Williams' use of the name
would cause confusion in the market place; (2) § 33(b)(5) of the Lan-
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a), was irrelevant; (3) Williams was an inter-
mediate junior user thus entitled to the Tea Rose-Rectanus defense; and
(4) the good faith adoption in a remote region defense is applicable to
§ 43(a) when it is used as an alternative claim for infringement.
The Tenth Circuit first found that GTE was simply challenging the
credibility of Williams' testimony and the weight it gave other evidence
instead of market place confusion. The court concluded that there was
no error in the district court's factual findings. Second, the court found
that because GTE's registration was not "incontestable," it could not
conclude that § 33(b)(5) barred GTE's infringement claims. Third, Wil-
liams was an intermediate junior user because he used the name after
GTE's adoption but before GTE registered it. Thus, the Tea Rose-
Rectanus defense applied. The defense provides that a senior user may
not prevent a remote good faith user, who employed the name in the
remote area first, from its use of the like name. Consequently, the court
concluded that Williams' mere knowledge of GTE's use of "General
Telephone" was insufficient to defeat a finding of good faith. The court
explained that to defeat this finding, Williams must have intended to
benefit from GTE's reputation or good will. Finally, the court ruled that
when § 43(a) is used as an alternative claim for infringement, the good
faith remote use defense is applicable.
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Kleier Advertising, Inc., v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036
Author: Judge Sam, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Kleier Advertising, Incorporated, ("Kleier"), alleged copy-
right infringement by defendants, Premier Pontiac, Incorporated, ("Pre-
mier"), and its advertiser, Stokely, through their use of a Kleier
billboard theme. Kleier also claimed defamation and deceptive trade
practices based on an article in a Tulsa paper. The district court granted
Premier and Stokely summary judgment on the defamation claim, and a
directed verdict on the deceptive trade practices claim. The jury found
for Kleier on the copyright claim, but granted only the license fee, not
lost profits. Kleier appealed the award amount, the denial of prejudg-
ment interest, and the summary judgment and directed verdict.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award, the summary judgment and
the directed verdict, but it reversed the denial of prejudgment interest.
The court held that, though the jury could have awarded lost profits, it
chose not to, and that the court would not substitute its judgment for
thejury's. Second, the district court did not award prejudgment interest
because it adopted the view that prejudgment interest is not recoverable
under the Copyright Act. The court disagreed, however, holding that
recovery of prejudgment interest is discretionary, and that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to add prejudgment interest to the
verdict. There was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the news-
paper article was libelous per se, and Kleier did not allege any special
damages. Summary judgment on the defamation claim was upheld.
The directed verdict on the deceptive trade practices was also upheld,
since Kleier presented no evidence that the newspaper article affected its
right to sell the billboard program in Tulsa.
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Johnson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 921 F.2d 1015
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Johnson, appealed from the district court's entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of his former employer, defendant, Beatrice
Foods Co. ("Beatrice"), on a claim of intentional inflection of emotional
distress. Johnson alleged that he was constantly harassed and intention-
ally discriminated against by his supervisor. The district court found
that the state law claims were preempted by the Labor Management Re-
lations Act (the "Act"). The district court stated that claims arising
under a collective bargaining agreement must be resolved by federal
law. On appeal, Johnson contended that the district court erred in find-
ing that the portions of his claim relating to wrongful suspension and
discipline were preempted by the Act.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Johnson could not avoid
federal jurisdiction under the Act by framing the labor contract com-
plaints in terms of a tort theory such as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The court reasoned that all of Johnson's claims were
directly related to explicit or implicit rights derived from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and must be resolved under uniform federal law
pursuant to the Act.
United Mine Workers v. Big Horn Coal Co., 916 F.2d 1499
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, United Mine Workers ("Union"), brought suit seeking to
compel defendant, Big Horn Coal Company ("Big Horn"), to arbitrate
certain employee grievances which arose after the collective bargaining
agreement's expiration. The district court held as a matter of law that
the obligation to arbitrate existed. In particular, the district court found
that Big Horn's unilateral implementation of its last offer extended its
contractual obligation to arbitrate. Big Horn subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction. The court explained that the Labor Management Relations
Act required a violation of a contract between the parties to invoke the
court's jurisdiction. The court ruled that since a contractual relation-
ship did not exist by virtue of Big Horn's last offer, the parties lacked the
contractual relationship required for jurisdiction.
Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Wichita, 908 F.2d 658
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Bishop, brought suit against defendant, Federal Intermedi-
ate Credit Bank of Wichita ("FICB"), alleging that he was wrongfully
discharged from his position as president of the Chandler Production
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Credit Association ("Chandler"), in violation of Oklahoma law and the
first amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Bishop appealed three dis-
trict court orders: (1) a partial summary judgment in favor of FICB and
a dismissal of his state law tort claim of wrongful discharge as pre-
empted by the Farm Credit Act; (2) a denial of his motion to reconsider
the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim; and (3) a judgment on
the pleadings dismissing his first amendment claim because FICB was
not a government actor for purposes of establishing constitutional
deprivation.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit stated that Congress has not
clearly expressed intent to completely occupy the field of farm credit to
the point of barring state employment law tort claims. The court rea-
soned that employment questions generally do not have a "direct and
substantial impact" upon decisions to grant credit. Furthermore, no
conflict exists between the Farm Credit Act which grants FICB authority
to remove Bishop, and Oklahoma state law which creates a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action. Consequently, the court ruled that Bishop stated
a proper claim for wrongful discharge. Thus, the district court erred in
not reconsidering this claim. Accordingly, the court remanded the state
claim for a determination of whether Bishop's discharge was wrongful
under the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine.
Finally, the court found that, in accordance with prior decisions, the dis-
trict court properly found that federal intermediate banks are not gov-
ernment actors for the purposes of establishing a first amendment cause
of action.
Coastal Derby Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 915 F.2d 1448
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Coastal Derby Refining Company ("Coastal"), filed a peti-
tion for review of the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") deci-
sion that Coastal was a successor employer and, therefore, obligated to
recognize and bargain collectively with the union. NLRB cross-peti-
tioned for enforcement of the order.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the NLRB and thus de-
nied Coastal's petition. The court further granted the cross-petition for
enforcement of the order. The court stated that the NLRB adopted a
rule which was consistent with the provisions of the National Labor Re-
lations Act. Accordingly, the rule was entitled deference from the
courts. Moreover, the court stated that a union enjoys a conclusive pre-
sumption of majority status for one year following its certification as the
bargaining representative. A change of ownership in a company will not
disturb this presumption if the new employer makes a conscious deci-
sion to maintain generally the same business and to hire a majority of its
employees from the predecessor. Thus, if the new employer is in fact a
successor of the old employer and the majority of its employees are em-
ployed by its predecessor, the presumptions will carry over. The court
then determined that this test was satisfied by Coastal.
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Department of the Interior v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 908 F.2d 570
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, United States Department of the Interior ("DOI"), sought
review of a final order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
("FLRA"). The FLRA order declared that Sunday premium pay for
DOI's non-supervisory, hourly operations and maintenance employees
was a negotiable aspect of a new collective bargaining agreement. The
FLRA cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. DOI argued that,
in accordance with § 9(b) of the Prevailing Rate Systems Act and
§ 704(b) of the Civil Service Reform Act, it was not required to negoti-
ate Sunday premium pay. It reasoned that such pay was neither the sub-
ject of prior negotiations nor was it a prevailing practice in the relevant
area.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the order of the FLRA and remanded
the matter for further proceedings. The court found that the FLRA mis-
interpreted the legislative history of §§ 704 and 9(b). The court ruled
that only those matters which were specifically negotiated in previous
bargaining agreements were within the scope of current bargaining obli-
gations between federal employers and prevailing rate employees. The
court also stated that previous payment of Sunday premium pay was the
result of a perceived statutory right which did not make the issue cur-
rently negotiable. Finally, the court ruled that to be negotiable, such
pay must have been prevailing practice in the relevant area. The FLRA
admitted that Sunday premium pay was not a prevailing practice in the
local area under consideration.
Facet Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963
Author: Judge Baldock
After unsuccessful negotiations, the United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the "union") filed
charges against Facet Enterprises Incorporated ("Facet"). The adminis-
trative law judge ("ALJ") found Facet liable of: (1) dealing directly with
its picketing employees rather than bargaining through union represent-
atives; (2) insisting to impasse on removing the EBW operator from the
bargaining unit; (3) refusing to provide the union with information nec-
essary for the performance of its collective bargaining responsibilities;
and (4) unilaterally changing employment conditions after the strike
without first bargaining to impasse on those subjects. The ALJ also
found that Facet's improper conduct converted the union's economic
strike into an unfair labor practice strike. Facet petitioned for review the
NLRB's order, finding it liable for a series of unfair labor practices.
The Tenth Circuit enforced the NLRB's order except as to its find-
ing of conversion at the Detroit strike. First, the court found that the
letters Facet sent to Detroit employees, combined with the picketline
communications, indicated it did not bargain in good faith with the
union representatives. Moreover, the court ruled that Facet was not
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prejudiced nor were its due process rights violated. The court reasoned
that it had at least constructive notice and an opportunity to contest the
charge that it improperly dealt directly with striking employees. Second,
as a permissive subject of bargaining, Facet was proscribed from insist-
ing upon removing the EBW operator from the bargaining unit once the
union communicated its unwillingness to negotiate. Third, the charge
that Facet refused to provide the union with information necessary for
the performance of its collective bargaining responsibilities was not
time-barred. The court reasoned that the time limitation period argued
for does not apply to the amending of a timely filed complaint. The
court then held that the employer's duty to provide the bargaining rep-
resentatives with information on its financial status was triggered. The
court held that Facet's refusal to provide the union with information
concerning the removal of machinery, and the discipline of Facet em-
ployees for picketline misconduct, was improper. The court explained
that the information was relevant to the union's fulfillment of its obliga-
tion to preserve its members' jobs. Fourth, the court ruled that Facet's
unilateral change in employment conditions after the strike, without first
bargaining to impasse, were not de minimis violations. Finally, the court
affirmed the ALJ's conversion decision. Specifically, Facet's conduct
with respect to the EBW issue and its direct dealing in Elmira effectu-
ated a conversion of those strikes from economic to unfair labor practice
ones.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Gold Star Sausage Co., 897
F.2d 1022
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union
(the "union"), brought suit against defendant, Gold Star Sausage Com-
pany ("Gold Star"). The union alleged that Gold Star violated a provi-
sion of the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") by
not resolving certain grievances through arbitration. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit was asked to decide whether any dispute arising within a
reasonable time after expiration of the contract was governed by the
arbitration clause.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, concluded that in order for an
expired CBA to govern, the dispute must relate back to the time during
which the CBA was in force. This requires the dispute to involve rights
accrued or vested during the life of the contract, or to have occurred
during the time the contract was in force. In the case at hand, the par-
ties agreed that all events leading up to the dispute occurred after the
agreement expired. Thus, the rights must have vested during the life of
the agreement in order for the grievances to be submitted to arbitration.
The court ruled, however, that the rights in question expired with the
contract that created them. The rights involved were: (1) the right to
be discharged for just cause; (2) seniority rights; and (3) the right to
exclude supervisors from performing work reserved under the contract
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for bargaining unit employees. Thus, the compulsory arbitration clause
did not apply. Further, the court rejected the union's argument that
arbitration should be ordered under Gold Star's unilaterally imple-
mented final offer. The court ruled that since Gold Star's last offer was
not a contract pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), it was without
jurisdiction.
Home v. J. W Gibson Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d 1194
Author: Judge Thompson, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Home, a rig operator for defendant, J.W. Gibson Well Ser-
vice Company ("Gibson"), was terminated after testing positive for two
drug tests. Home brought an action for breach of contract, but the dis-
trict court awarded summary judgment to Gibson. Home appealed, al-
leging that: (1) Gibson breached an obligation of express or implied
contract based on employment policies; (2) Gibson violated its duty of
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) Gibson's drug testing policy vio-
lated public policy.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. First, the
court held that Gibson did not breach an employment contract with
Home because Home's employment for an indefinite term was "at will"
and could be terminated by either party with or without cause. More-
over, under Wyoming law, personnel policies can make employment
contractual, thereby restricting an employer's right to discharge an em-
ployee. The mere existence of personnel policies, however, does not
result in a contractual arrangement. Gibson's employment manual did
not contain the provisions that would negate employment at will. Sec-
ond, Gibson did not display bad faith or unfair dealing. The court ex-
plained that Gibson followed its stated procedure. The employees,
including Home, were fully informed of its rules and the consequences
for violation of those rules. In addition, Home was not improperly sin-
gled out or dealt with unfairly. Also, Gibson had a legitimate business
purpose in protecting the safety of other employees, which the court
stated was closely tied to a drug free policy. Moreover, the court rea-
soned that Wyoming has not yet implied a duty of good faith and fair
dealing into employment contracts. Last, the court cited a recent Wyo-
ming case, which found that attempts to ensure a safe, drug-free work-
place do not violate the public policy of Wyoming. The court stated,
however, that the facts of this case did not fall within this public policy
exception.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 1428
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation ("Manville"), sought
review of plaintiff, National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB"), deci-
sion that Manville violated the Labor Management Relation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a). The NLRB determined that Manville improperly with-
drew recognition of a previously certified union, without reasonable
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grounds to doubt the union's majority status. Manville contended the
withdrawal was legally justified.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the NLRB's decision. The court stated
that withdrawing recognition of a union is justified when either the
union does not have majority support or the employer has a good faith
doubt of the union's majority support. Good faith doubt must be shown
by objective evidence to substantiate the doubt. The NLRB erred when
it required proof of express anti-union statements by each individual
worker, comprising a majority of the bargaining unit. Instead, the
NLRB should have given full weight to the cumulative effect of the total-
ity of the circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that Manville
was legally justified to withdraw its recognition of the union. The court
based its decision on the objective manifestation of lack of majority
support.
Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Lucas, filed a grievance with the Communication Workers
of America, District 7 (the "union"), after he was discharged from
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph ("Mountain States"). After
several unsuccessful attempts to reach agreement with Mountain States,
the union notified Lucas, on May 14, 1987, that no further action would
be taken. Lucas then filed suit on December 7, 1987, against Mountain
States, alleging violation of his collective bargaining agreement. He also
filed suit against the union, alleging breach of duty of fair representa-
tion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Moun-
tain States and the union, reasoning that the suits were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Lucas subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. The court rea-
soned that the facts were undisputed, and both defendants were entitled
to the judgment as a matter of law. The court ruled that the six month
statute of limitation prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act ap-
plied since the suit was a hybrid one; that is, it charged both the em-
ployer and representative union. Accordingly, the statute of limitations
began on the day Lucas was notified that the union ceased taking any
further action. Lucas knew of the union's abandonment of his griev-
ances and filed his suit more than six months after the notification. The
action was, therefore, barred.
Masters v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F.2d 455
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Masters, appealed the district court's dismissal of his com-
plaint. The complaint alleged a state-law claim against Master's em-
ployer, defendant, Daniel International Corporation, based on
retaliatory discharge for reporting nuclear safety violations. The Tenth
Circuit ruled that The Energy Reorganization Act ("Energy Act") pre-
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empts such state-law claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case for
further consideration.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's dismissal of
Master's claim. The court held that even though Master's claim was no
longer preempted by the Energy Act, the claim was, nonetheless, still
precluded because an alternative remedy was available.
Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Merrick, filed suit alleging Northern Natural Gas Com-
pany, a division of Enron Corporation ("Northern"): (1) terminated
Merrick in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34; (2) breached an employment contract;
and (3) both Northern and Merrick's immediate supervisor, defendant,
Roberts, intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Roberts counter-
claimed against Merrick for intentional infliction of emotional distress
and prima facie tort on grounds Merrick allegedly harassed and mis-
treated her. Merrick and Roberts appealed the district court's dismissal
of their respective claims on summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on all claims. First, the court stated that Merrick failed to in-
troduce a genuine issue of fact suggesting his termination was pretex-
tual. Second, the court stated that Northern did not breach an
employment contract. The court reasoned that as an at-will employee,
Merrick had no contractual rights to good faith treatment with respect to
his termination. Third, the court stated that Merrick and Roberts were
involved in an ordinary employee-employer conflict, and the record was
devoid of any evidence supporting any claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Specifically, Merrick did not demonstrate that Rob-
erts' actions rose to the level of an "extraordinary transgression of the
bounds of civility." Insults, yelling, and hostile reactions do not give
rise to a cause for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, no
Oklahoma Supreme Court case has extended the primafacie tort doctrine
outside the context of malicious injury to business or property interests.
Patterson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners, 906 F.2d 510
Per Curiam
Defendant, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners (the
"union"), appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff, Patterson. The district court ruled that the union improperly
increased dues and violated the local union members' right to vote
under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(3) ("LMRDA"). On appeal, the union argued that: (1) the
members had an opportunity to reject a dues increase; and (2) the
union had authority to raise dues without local membership approval.
Patterson cross-appealed, stating that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by denying his attorney's fees.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that although the members had a choice between higher
dues or a per capita tax, both options would, in fact, result in a dues
increase. The court reasoned that whether there was a dues increase is
determined by the direct effect of the financial burden imposed on the
individual members. Second, the court stated that a dues increase was
improper because it was not a majority vote, and Colorado local unions
were not allowed to participate in the representative vote. Moreover,
the court rejected Patterson's claim for attorney's fees, reasoning that it
would not be in the interest of justice.
Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc. Employee Savings Plan & Trust,
920 F.2d 651
Author: Judge Baldock
After being terminated from employment, plaintiff, Pratt, was enti-
tled to receive a distribution of his interest in his employer's contribu-
tion account. Eight weeks after Pratt's termination, the pension plan
was retroactively amended to include a redefined, interim, valuation
date which reduced his distribution by over twenty thousand dollars.
Pratt filed suit, claiming an improper valuation date was used. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of Pratt on his claims,
including an award of attorney's fees. Defendant, Petroleum Production
Management, Incorporated, Employee Savings Plan & Trust, ("PPM"),
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the award of attorneys'
fees. The court explained that there was an inadequate record explain-
ing why the award was made. The court affirmed the decision regarding
the valuation date. The court looked at the express, unambiguous lan-
guage of the plan which gave Pratt, at termination, a vested and accrued
right to receive a distribution valued on the defined valuation date. The
court reasoned that the pension plan was a contract which required PPM
to follow the procedure in existence at the time of Pratt's termination.
.That procedure could not be subsequently amended to reduce his fully
vested rights.
Public Serv. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local III, 902 F.2d
19
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSC"), brought an
action in district court appealing a labor arbitration board's (the
"board") decision in favor of defendant, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union No. III (the "union"). The board di-
rected PSC to use union personnel for all custodial work at a particular
job site. The district court affirmed the board's decision. PSC appealed,
claiming that the board exceeded its authority because the union con-
tract was silent as to the hiring of union custodians.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order in favor of the
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union. The court found that PSC was estopped from denying that dur-
ing the contract negotiating sessions, it left reasonable impression with
the union that all custodial service work would be done by union em-
ployees. The court held that: (1) the board's decision properly drew its
essence from those provisions of the contract relating to the assignment
of custodial work; and (2) the board did not act beyond its authority in
applying equitable principles in determining that the company could not
subcontract custodial work to nonunion employees.
Rucker v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 917 F.2d 1233
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, seven locomotive engineers, claimed that defendant, St.
Louis Southwestern Railway ("SLSW"), violated federal law by contra-
vening an Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") order. This order
required SLSW to follow a prior agreement governing the labor rights
of employees (Rucker). The district court held that the claim should be
dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The district court
also ruled that a six month statute of limitations barred the engineers'
seniority rights claims. This determination overruled Rucker's claim
that a two year statute of limitations was applicable. Last, the district
court granted SLSW's motion for summary judgment on the engineers'
breach of the duty of fair representation claim. The engineers subse-
quently appealed.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision for the reasons set out in the district court's memorandum and
order. First, summary judgment was properly based on primary juris-
diction grounds. Specifically, jurisdiction was declined because the ad-
ministrative agency has the expertise and opportunity to decide the
issues. Second, the six month statute of limitations period governed the
suit. The engineers should have known of their seniority rights, which
were negotiated in an agreement more than six months before the law-
suit was filed. Third, summary judgment on the breach of the duty of
fair representation claim was proper. A breach of this statutory duty
only occurs when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective
bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The district
court found no evidence of arbitrary or discriminatory behavior.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F.2d 447
Per Curiam
Emery Mining Company ("Emery") was cited after refusing to allow
a non-employee union member to participate in a walkaround inspec-
tion pursuant to § 103(f) of the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813(f). When Emery contested the citation, an ad-
ministrative law judge ruled against it. The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission, upon review, affirmed, deciding that
walkaround rights extend to nonemployee miners' representatives, and
that the representative need not first comply with the requirements of
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30 C.F.R. Part 40. Emery and Utah Power & Light Company then peti-
tioned for review.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that a non-employee miners' represen-
tative was entitled to walkaround rights, but held that the mandatory
requirements of Part 40 must be complied with to exercise those rights.
The legislative history and statutory language of § 103(f) made clear
that walkaround rights were extended to any authorized miners' repre-
sentative without being limited to representatives who were also em-
ployees. Section 103(f), however, was subject to regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, including 30 C.F.R. Part 40. Be-
cause severe penalties could be imposed for refusing to grant
walkaround rights, operators need a method to determine who is an au-
thorized representative. Compliance with Part 40 identifies those repre-
sentatives and defines their scope of authority.
White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, White, brought suit against American Airlines, Incorpo-
rated ("Airlines"). White alleged that he was discharged in retaliation
for his refusal to commit perjury on behalf of American in connection
with a DC-10 accident suit. A jury found in favor of White, awarding
him $1,516,000. The jury found that White was terminated in violation
of Oklahoma's public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine. American appealed, claiming error in the jury instruction. Specif-
ically, American argued that the jury instruction should have stated that
the refusal to commit perjury must have been a "substantial factor" in
the decision to terminate him.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court committed reversible
error. The district court should have instructed the jury that White's
failure to perjure himself must have been a "significant factor" in caus-
ing his discharge.
YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 1442
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, YMCA, appealed a National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") order that affirmed and adopted the ruling of the administra-
tive law judge ("ALJ"). In response to a previous unfair labor practice
charge, YMCA and a union entered into a settlement agreement. Subse-
quently, YMCA employee Ague was discharged. The union filed an un-
fair labor practice charge, which cited Ague's discharge, pre-settlement
conversations between YMCA and Ague, and a pre-settlement letter of
reprimand to employee O'Bryan. The ALJ set aside the settlement
agreement and found that the YMCA violated §§ 8 (a)(1), (3) and (4) of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). On appeal, YMCA con-
tended that: (1) its impact on interstate commerce was insufficient to
warrant NLRB's exercise of jurisdiction; (2) the ALJ erred in finding
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that the discharge of Ague constituted an unfair labor practice in viola-
tion of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3); and (3) the post-settlement conduct should
not have been used to set aside the pre-settlement agreement.
The Tenth Circuit granted enforcement of the NLRB's order. First,
the court held that charitable organizations must have sufficient impact
on interstate commerce in order for the NLRB to assert jurisdiction.
YMCA satisfied the retail standard dollar amount. Specifically, the di-
rect inflow of materials from outside of Colorado met the NLRB's juris-
dictional guidelines. Second, there was sufficient evidence to support a
violation of 8(a)(1) and (3). The court explained that the four require-
ments needed to prove a violation were satisfied: (1) Ague was engaged
in concerted activity; (2) YMCA knew of the activity's concerted nature;
(3) the concerted activity was protected under the NLRA; and
(4) YMCA's discrimination was motivated by Ague's protected con-
certed activity. Last, the settlement agreement was properly set aside
because of post-settlement conduct. The court reasoned that the pre-
settlement agreement was related to the post-settlement conduct. Spe-
cifically, the prior conduct included threats of action against Ague, and




Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584
Author: Judge Seymour
Beneath plaintiff Joe and Lola Aulston's land existed deposits of
carbon dioxide gas. The land was originally granted under Federal land
patents pursuant to the Agriculture Entry Act of 1914, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 121-125 (the "Act"). The patents reserved to the United States
rights to "gas" associated with the land. The Aulstons alleged that
"gas" referred to combustible hydrocarbon gas only and not to carbon
dioxide. The Department of Interior found that the term "gas" in-
cluded carbon dioxide. The Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA")
upheld the Department's determination. The district court affirmed the
IBLA, and the Aulstons appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment after mak-
ing an in-depth review of the policy, history, and legislative intent be-
hind the Act. It determined that Congress is silent on this precise
question, but that the Interior Department, in its promulgated regula-
tions concerning the word "gas," gave broad interpretations which in-
cluded carbon dioxide. The court found such interpretations consistent
with the policy of the Act and not in violation of legislative intent.
Bennion v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., 905 F.2d 324
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Bennion, brought suit against defendant, Shell Western E
& P, Incorporated ("Shell"), for his share of the production proceeds
from oil and gas wells in which he had an interest. Bennion also sought
punitive damages for Shell's alleged willful and malicious failure to pay
his proportionate share of production. The district court held that
Bennion was not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law. Benn-
ion subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of punitive
damages. The court explained that the action brought by Bennion
sounded in contract. It is well settled in Utah that breach of a contract
will not support punitive damages.
Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Samson Resources Co., 903 F.2d 778
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Howell Petroleum Corporation ("Howell"), brought suit
to collect royalties owed on oil and gas wells by defendant, Samson Re-
sources Company ("Samson"). Although a three year statute of limita-
tions period for recovery of royalties applied, Howell argued for the
adoption of a different limitations period. It reasoned that the action
was one for the imposition of a constructive trust. The district court
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held, however, that Howell was not entitled to a constructive trust be-
cause that theory had not been pleaded. Accordingly, the court awarded
Howell only those royalties which came due in the three years preceding
the suit.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, construing a constructive trust as a re-
medial device employed by courts to enforce substantive rights. More-
over, the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying cause of
action governs a constructive trust. Consequently, the court limited
Howell's recovery to those royalties which came due in the three years
preceding the suit. Further, the court awarded Howell statutory interest
on the late royalty corresponding to the portion of its title which was
marketable.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 904 F.2d
1469
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), or-
dered prospective elimination of the minimum bill provision in a gas
supply contract between plaintiff, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of
America ("NGPC") and Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG").
FERC eliminated this provision because it was unnecessary under the
rate redesign and because of its new policy toward minimum billing. Af-
ter being denied rehearing on the order, NGPC appealed FERC's pro-
spective, rather than retroactive, elimination of the minimum bill
provision.
The Tenth Circuit held that FERC could only grant retroactive re-
lief if the minimum bill provision fit within the narrow "integrality" ex-
ception to § 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(c) and (d). To
fall within this exception, the minimum bill provision must be integrated
with the proposed rate change, instead of the existing rate design. Since
NGPC failed to do this, it was denied retroactive relief. Thus, the court
affirmed FERC's ruling granting only prospective relief under § 5 of the
Natural Gas Act.
Phillips 66 Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Comm 'n, 903 F.2d
1310
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Phillips 66 Natural Gas Company ("Phillips"), attempted
to collect power and fuel allowances for costs related to the operation of
certain pipeline compressors. The Director of the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission ("FERC") stated that Phillips had no contractual
power to collect the allowances as production related expenses. Phillips
subsequently appealed, alleging that the director violated an earlier
FERC mandate by stating that area rate clauses were insufficient authori-
zation to collect the allowances.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the director's decision.
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The court first noted the importance of intent in determining what pro-
duction related expenses are recoverable. Further, the court ruled that
the contracting parties mutually intended Phillips to collect allowances
pursuant to the area rate clauses in question. The director and the
FERC erroneously relied on the presumption of noncollectability of
compression allowances under area rate clauses. Finally, the court
stated that the director's approach was inconsistent with the general rule




C.A. Assoc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 918 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, C.A. Associates ("Associates"), appealed a special jury ver-
dict in favor of defendant, Dow Chemical Company ("Dow"). The jury
found that mortar mixed with Sarabond, a Dow product, caused no
more masonry cracking than conventional mortar in buildings. Conse-
quently, Dow made no misrepresentations to Associates concerning
Sarabond. Associates argued that the district court abused its discretion
in excluding evidence of Sarabond-related failures in other structures.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
held that the district court acted within its discretion in precluding the
evidence. The district court was concerned that the number of buildings
Associates wished to refer to would confuse the jury and cause delay and
prejudice. Although the court found that the evidence of similar acci-
dents may be relevant, Associates' experts were able to offer extensive
evidence concerning other buildings. This allowed Associates to rebut
the defenses raised by Dow without violating the district court's ruling.
Carter v. Unit Rig & Equip. Co., 908 F.2d 1483
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Carter, brought a product liability action against defend-
ants, Unit Rig & Equipment Company ("Unit Rig") and General Electric
("GE") for the wrongful death of her son, Terry. The jury found Unit
Rig liable for Terry's death and assessed damages of $366,667. GE, on
the other hand, settled with Carter for $20,000. Applying Colorado's
comparative fault statute, the jury found Unit Rig twelve-percent re-
sponsible and Terry eighty-eight percent responsible. After deducting
the $20,000 GE settlement from the total damages, the district court
entered judgment for Carter for $41,600. Carter subsequently ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court improperly instructed the jury to
consider Terry's contributory negligence when apportioning responsi-
bility for the accident. Carter asked that the construction of Colorado's
comparative fault statute be certified to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Finally, Carter claimed that the district court erred by refusing to give a
sudden emergency instruction to the jury. Unit Rig cross appealed, ar-
guing that the $20,000 GE settlement should have been deducted solely
from Unit Rig's assessed damages and not from the total damages.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's construction of Colo-
rado's comparative fault statute. While the statute rejects the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery, it re-
quires that the negligence of a product liability plaintiff be considered
and damage awards be reduced to the extent of the plaintiff's responsi-
bility for his own injuries. The court declined to certify this issue to the
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Supreme Court of Colorado, finding substantial support for this inter-
pretation of the statute. The court found, however, that the district
court committed reversible error in refusing to give the sudden emer-
gency jury instruction. The court reasoned that the district court deter-
mined a factual issue which should have been submitted to the jury.
Finally, the court reviewed decisions construing the 1977 Colorado
Contribution Act. The court concluded that the district court properly
reduced the $20,000 setoff from the entire judgment before making the
comparative negligence reduction. The judgment was reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.
Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Huffman, was awarded $475,000 in a product liability ac-
tion against defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Co. ("Caterpillar").
Huffman appealed a reduction in damages. Huffman argued that the
district court erred when it instructed the jury that under Colorado's
comparative fault statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-406, ordinary negli-
gence constitutes fault. In addition, Huffman asserted that the district
court's refusal to award expert witness fees "as costs" violated Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-33-102(4). Caterpillar cross-appealed, claiming that
Huffman failed to establish a prima facie case of strict product liability.
Caterpillar also claimed that the district court erred by excluding testi-
mony of the decedent's co-workers regarding his lack of competence to
operate the vehicle on which he was killed. Finally, Caterpillar argued
that the Tenth Circuit should overrule its previous decision that evi-
dence of subsequent remediation of a product defect is admissible in
strict liability actions.
After examining the language and legislative history of Colorado's
comparative fault statute, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the term
"fault" was intended to include ordinary negligence. Consequently, the
reduction in Huffman's damage award was appropriate. Second, since
federal law controls the assessment of costs in a diversity case, expert
witness fees may only be awarded "as costs" in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1821 (b), unless authorized by express agreement or by another
federal statute. In addition, the court found that Huffman's evidence
was more than adequate to support the jury's determination that the
vehicle was unreasonably dangerous under the consumer expectation
test, that the defects caused the accident, and that the warnings accom-
panying the vehicle were inadequate. The court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of dece-
dent's co-workers and refused to overrule its prior decision that Rule




Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Dillon, brought suit against defendant, Fibreboard Corp.
("F.C."), contending her husband contracted lung cancer from asbestos
fibres emanating from defendant's product. The district court granted
summary judgment against Dillon, finding that she presented insuffi-
cient evidence of exposure to F.C.'s product. On appeal, Dillon's repre-
sentative contended that the district court placed an improper burden of
proof upon her.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that Dillon need
only prove that her husband had sufficient contact with identifiable
products manufactured by F.C. The court found that Dillon submitted
sufficient testimony to support a significant probability that F.C.'s prod-
ucts caused the cancer. The court explained that testimony placed Dil-
lon in repeated, regular, and direct physical contact for over twenty
years with F.C.'s asbestos products. Thus, Dillon proved a causative link
between her husband's disease and F.C.'s products. This was sufficient
to show there was a genuine issue for trial. Accordingly, summary judg-
ment was improper.
Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Dow Chemical Corporation ("Dow"), brought suit against
defendant, Research Products Company ("Research"), for equitable
subrogation and codefendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany ("Hartford"), for tortious interference with a prospective contrac-
tual relation. The district court found in favor of Dow, and both
Research and Hartford appealed, contending: (1) the statute of limita-
tions was improperly applied; (2) that a release or assignment was nec-
essary for subrogation; and (3) the district court erred in excluding
certain evidence and admitting other evidence without a limiting
instruction.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was improp-
erly based on the time the payment was made rather than the time the
underlying tort claim arose. Second, the court held that release or as-
signment is not necessary for asserting subrogation claims. Finally, ex-
clusion of two pieces of evidence was held to be abuse of discretion by
the district court. Evidence necessary for the jury to apportion the
amount of settlement to each defendant was improperly suppressed.
Moreover, a memorandum incorrectly characterized as remedial in na-
ture should not have been excluded under Rule 407. Accordingly, the
judgments were reversed.
Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiffs, the Kloepfers, initiated a product liability action after
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their son was killed while riding as a passenger in a Honda all-terrain
vehicle. The action was based on theories of negligence, strict liability,
false advertising, negligence and strict liability for failure to warn, and
violation of reporting requirements of the Consumer Products Safety
Commission Act. The Kloepfers appealed an adverse jury verdict, con-
tending that: (1) the district court erred in failing to respond to a ques-
tion from the jury; (2) the use of the special verdict form was improper;
(3) it was error to exclude certain evidence, including specific questions
to Cindy Kloepfer, and to admit post-accident riding activities of the
vehicle's owner and driver; (4) reversible error resulted from defense
counsel's gross misconduct; (5) the voir dire was improper.
The Tenth Circuit first held that the district court was not required
to give additional instructions to the jury regarding whether the term
"user" in an interrogatory referred to all users of all-terrain vehicles, or
to this specific driver. Second, the Kloepfers waived their right to chal-
lenge the special verdict form. The court reasoned that at trial they de-
clined the opportunity to submit their own verdict form. Third, the
evidentiary rulings complained of on appeal were proper. Fourth, the
defense counsel's conduct did not give rise to reversible error. Fifth,
since voir dire questions were not included in the record on appeal, the
adequacy of voir dire was not reviewable.
Riley v. Brown & Root Inc., 896 F.2d 474
Author: Judge Timbers, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Riley, appealed an order granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant, Rust Engineering Company ("Rust"), and denying
her request to certify a question of state law to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. The district court held that Riley's product liability action was
barred by a special statute of repose, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 109. This stat-
ute provides that no tort action to recover damages for deficiency in
design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction of an im-
provement to real property shall be brought more than ten years after
substantial completion of the improvement. On appeal, Riley argued
that: (1) the machine in question was not an improvement to real prop-
erty; and (2) even if the machine were an improvement to real property,
§ 109 is unconstitutional because it abrogates the right of action to re-
cover for injuries resulting in death.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's order, which granted
summary judgment in favor of Rust. Accordingly, the court remanded
for reconsideration in light of a change in state law. During pendency of
the appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court announced in Smith v. Westing-
house, 732 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1987), a test to determine when electrical
equipment constitutes improvement to real property. The court also
stated that the constitutionality of § 109 should not be decided if the
case could be resolved on the narrower question of the application of
§ 109. Accordingly, the court ruled that this question of state law
should be decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
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McHargue v. Stokes, 912 F.2d 394
Author: Judge Sam, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, McHargue, injured his hand in a plastic injection molding
machine. At trial, McHargue's expert witness minimized the credibility
of the machine's safety device, which complied with the American Na-
tional Standard Institute ("ANSI") guidelines. The expert stated that
ANSI guidelines were a minimum consensus standard. On cross exami-
nation, defendant, Stokes, asked the expert if Occupational Health and
Safety Act ("OSHA") recognized any national consensus standards
other than ANSI. McHargue asserted that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing this cross examination. McHargue appealed the
district court's denial of his motion for a new trial after the jury returned
a no cause of action verdict for Stokes.
The Tenth Circuit held that the error resulting from the cross ex-
amination was harmless. Although one cannot use OSHA standards to
provide a basis for liability, they can be referred to as guidelines for
determining standards of care. Stokes did not introduce OSHA stan-
dards either to prove that the machine met OSHA requirements, or to
establish a standard of care. Rather, Stokes referred to ANSI standards
merely to demonstrate that OSHA recognizes them generally, and that
no other standards existed for the machine in question. Furthermore,
Stokes discussed the standards only after McHargue placed the credibil-
ity of ANSI standards in issue.
Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
During her pregnancy, plaintiff, Wilson, ingested Benedectin, a
drug manufactured by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated's
("Merrell Dow's") predecessor, Richardson-Merrell, Incorporated. Wil-
son alleged that the drug caused her son to be born missing one finger
on each hand. Wilson consequently brought suit against Merrell Dow
on theories of product liability, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of
express and implied warranty, strict liability, and negligence. The jury,
however, returned a general verdict in favor of Merrell Dow. Wilson
subsequently appealed, alleging the district court erred in: (1) failing to
give the jury a missing witness instruction; (2) allowing defense counsel
to tell the jury that the absent witness was equally available to the plain-
tiff; (3) admitting into evidence Merrell Dow's sales charts because they
were hearsay and they failed to take into account when the Benedectin
was consumed; and (4) failing to grant Wilson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the district court properly denied Wilson's request to give the jury a
missing witness instruction. The court noted that the decision to not
give a missing witness instruction rests largely within the district court's
discretion. The court also based its decision on a four part test: (1) the
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party must have the power to produce the witness; (2) the witness must
not be one who would ordinarily be expected to be biased against the
party; (3) the witness's testimony must not be comparatively unimpor-
tant, or cumulative, or inferior to what is already utilized in trial; and
(4) the witness must not be equally available to testify for either side.
The court concluded that Wilson was unable to prove two of the four
requisite elements necessary to mandate a missing witness instruction.
Specifically, the expert witness's testimony was cumulative and had rela-
tively insignificant probative value, and the expert was equally available
to both parties. Second, it was permissible for the district court to allow
in closing argument a comment that the expert witness was equally avail-
able to both parties. Essentially, when an absent witness is available to
both parties, either party is open to the inference that the missing testi-
mony would have been adverse. Third, the court used an abuse of dis-
cretion standard to review the district court's decision to admit Merrell
Dow's sales charts. After examining the trial transcript and sales charts,
the court held that even though the charts were hearsay, they were
nonetheless a type reasonably relied upon by experts and, therefore, ad-
missible under Fed. R. Evid. 705. Moreover, the failure of the charts to
take into account when the Benedectin was consumed, rendered them
less valuable. This failure, however, affected the weight and not the ad-
missability of the charts. Also, Wilson's counsel had ample opportunity
to cross-examine the experts regarding the charts. This questioning
proved sufficient to bring to the jury's attention the inadequacy of the
charts. Finally, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to return a ver-
dict in Merrell Dow's favor. Merrell Dow presented sufficient expert tes-
timony to create a conflict in the evidence. Accordingly, when the
evidence is in conflict, the jury alone has the power to weigh the evi-
dence and assess the witnesses' credibility. Thus, it was within the dis-
trict court's discretion to deny Wilson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
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Collins v. Oxley, 897 F.2d 456
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Collins, the surface owner, brought suit against defendant,
Oxley, the holder of the oil and gas lease. Collins alleged that Oxley's
use of the surface to develop and produce oil and gas resulted in its
damage. Accordingly, Collins sought damages under the Oklahoma
Surface Damage Act (the "Act"). Oxley filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the Act did not apply to him since his leases
predated the effective date of the Act. The district court granted Oxley's
motion for summary judgment. The district court also ruled that since
Collins conveyed his land to the Oklahoma Wildlife Department
("OWD"), he could no longer maintain an action against Oxley. Collins
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in
part. First, the court ruled that under Oklahoma law, as it existed before
the Act, the holder of an oil and gas lease only had an implied right to
enter onto the surface and conduct drilling operations. The owner,
however, did not have an implied right to be free of liability to the sur-
face owner. Accordingly, the court ruled that Oxley did not have a
vested right to drill without liability on Collins's land. Moreover, sum-
mary judgment for Oxley on the ground that OWD was the real party in
interest, was improper. The court reasoned that Collins was the record
owner of the land when the wells were drilled and the damage incurred.
Also, he was the record owner when the litigation was instituted.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendants, the Heimanns, executed three carbon dioxide ("C02")
and mineral leases with plaintiff, Amoco Production Company
("Amoco"), between 1971 and 1974. Each lease contained a "unitiza-
tion clause" granting Amoco the right to unitize the Heimanns' mineral
interests with other lands, subject to approval by "any government au-
thority." In return, the Heimanns received a one-eighth royalty on the
net proceeds from all oil, gas, and C02 produced on their lands.
Amoco subsequently proposed to unitize the mineral rights to approxi-
mately 1.2 million acres, including the Heimanns' land (the "Bravo
Dome Unit"). This proposal allocated royalties on the basis of surface
acreage. The New Mexico Oil Conversation Commission ("OCC") ap-
proved the Bravo Dome Unit, finding that approval would prevent waste
and protect the landowners' correlative rights. The state district court
and supreme court affirmed the OCC. In 1984, Amoco filed suit in fed-
eral district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it properly unit-
ized the interests covered by the leases. The Heimanns counterclaimed,
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alleging, inter alia, allocation of royalties. The jury awarded the
Heimanns $4 million on the royalty allocation claim. Furthermore, the
court held that Amoco violated its duty of good faith and declared the
unitization of the Heimanns' land void.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the OCC's approval of the
unitization made it unnecessary for the district court to consider the
lessee's good faith and precluded the Heimanns' challenge of the royalty
allocation formula. The OCC is a regulatory agency whose function is
similar to that of a trial court. Thus, when it approved the Bravo Dome
unitization plan, it acted in a judicial capacity, and in federal court its
decision is given the same preclusive effect as it would be given in New
Mexico courts. Because the fairness issue was already litigated by the
same parties in state courts, the Heimanns were collaterally estopped
from challenging the participation formula again in federal court.
Stichting Mayflower Recreational Funds v. Newpark Resources Inc., 903 F.2d
741
Author: Judge Brown
The district court dismissed plaintiff's, Stichting Mayflower Recrea-
tional Funds ("Stichting"), claim for slander of title. The district court
also quieted title to the disputed parcel in favor of Stichting, but forced
Stichting to reimburse defendant, Newpark Resources Incorporated
("Newpark"), for expenses it incurred regarding the property. The dis-
trict court then determined the parties' rights under a 1975 mining lease
and awarded both sides attorney's fees. Stichting argued that the dis-
trict court erred in: (1) requiring Stichting to pay Newpark on the quiet
title claim; (2) misconstruing the language of the mining lease; and
(3) not allowing Stichting to amend its complaint to allege a claim for
abuse of process. Also, both parties appealed the award of attorney's
fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
First, the court found that the record did not clearly establish that
Newpark was lawfully entitled to the entire parcel. Newpark had an eq-
uitable interest in the property even though a third party held the record
title to the parcel. The district court did not abuse its discretion in fash-
ioning an appropriate equitable remedy under the circumstances. Sec-
ond, the court reversed and remanded the district court's interpretation
of the 1975 mining lease. The lease allowed the lessor to determine
whether a proposed mining activity "would" or "might" interfere with
the lessor's actual or contemplated use of the surface. The court held
that it must be presumed that the parties of the lease knew the effect of
the words chosen and intended those words to have their ordinary
meaning. The district court's judgment allowed mining activities that
might interfere with Stichting's contemplated use of the property.
Third, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees. The 1975 mining
lease provided that the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney's
fees. Since the district court found that neither party was the prevailing
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party, attorney's fees should not be awarded. Finally, the court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stichting's re-
quest to amend its complaint.

SECURITIES
Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Bath, brought suit against Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jo-
nas ("Bushkin"), a California partnership. Bath asserted that Bushkin
violated certain federal laws, including RICO and the Securities Ex-
change Act. The district court dismissed the claims, stating that they
were time barred. In making this determination, the district court ap-
plied a federal statute of limitations period. Bath subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In making
its determination, the court considered three issues. First, the court
ruled that the proper statute of limitations for violations of Rule lOb-5
should be determined by the law of the state in which the violation oc-
curred. Second, since the district court erred in its choice of a limita-
tions period, the court addressed the issue of whether a private right of
action exists under section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act.
The court ruled that no private right of action exists under that section.
Third, the court determined that a cause of action under RICO begins
to accrue when the party learns, or should have learned, of both the
"existence" and "source" of the injury, and that the injury is part of a
pattern. Because the district court did not consider both injury and pat-
tern, the court vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded for
further consideration.
Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States, 897 F.2d 1549
Author: Judge Ebel
A warrant issued pursuant to federal securities laws authorized In-
ternal Revenue Service agents to seize various types of transaction and
sales records, as well as correspondence and memoranda from the of-
ficers of Blinder, Robinson & Company, Incorporated ("Blinder-Robin-
son"). Blinder-Robinson and Meyer Blinder filed an action pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) for return of various business records which they
alleged were illegally seized. The district court denied relief, holding
that the warrant was valid and the search lawful. While appeal was
pending, Meyer Blinder was indicted by a federal grand jury for securi-
ties violations. Blinder-Robinson was not indicted, however.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed Meyer Blinder's appeal for lack of ju-
risdiction and remanded for further proceedings to determine if
Blinder-Robinson was able to satisfy the equitable requirements for a
pre-indictment action under Rule 41 (e). The court stated that a motion
for the return of property is properly appealable only where it is not tied
to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant. Therefore, the
court held that the appeal by Meyer Blinder should be dismissed for lack
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of appellate jurisdiction since it was tied to a criminal proceeding in esse.
Since Blinder-Robinson was not indicted, however, the appeal from the
district court's ruling was not tied to a criminal proceeding in esse, and
proper appellate jurisdiction could be exercised over it. Further, since
the record disclosed no findings regarding the irreparable injury and
inadequate remedies at law requirements for jurisdiction over a pre-in-
dictment Rule 41 (e) motion, the case was remanded to the district court.
The district court was ordered to determine if these equitable require-
ments for jurisdiction could be satisfied. In addition, the court noted
that the mere threat of imminent indictment did not establish irrepara-
ble injury. Also, the district court was authorized by Rule 41(e) to im-
pose reasonable conditions to protect access and use of the property in
subsequent proceedings.
Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Cascade Energy and Metals Corporation ("Cascade"),
owner and operator of a gold mine, brought suit seeking additional capi-
tal contributions from its investors, who asserted numerous counter-
claims. Cascade appealed the district court's determination that:
(1) the joint operating agreement did not permit additional assess-
ments; (2) Cascade and its owner, Weston, breached other fiduciary du-
ties to the investors; and (3) the affiliates of Cascade and Weston were
their alter egos. Defendants, investors, challenged the district court's
conclusion that: (1) Cascade and Weston did not commit fraud in the
offering of interests in the mine; and (2) the interests in the mine were
not securities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the in-
vestors could not be required to make further capital contributions, and
that they should be relieved from any future payments. Also, sufficient
evidence existed to support the district court's finding that Weston and
Cascade breached their fiduciary duties. The two determined that initial
capital contributions were inadequate to put the mine into production,
later concealed the fact, and made further assessments. Moreover, the
court reversed the district court's decision to disregard the corporate
entity under the alter ego doctrine. Accordingly, the court held Wes-
ton's and Cascade's affiliates liable for the actions committed. The court
found many problems with the application of the alter ego doctrine in-
cluding the observances by Weston of many corporate formalities and
the absence of injustice arising from any non-observances. The court
further found that the district court's determination that there was no
fraud in the initial offering of interests was not clearly erroneous. Con-
sequently, that decision was affirmed. The court did agree with the in-
vestors that the interests in the mine were securities under both federal
and state law and, accordingly, reversed the district court on the issue.
[Vol. 68:4
1991] SECURITIES 733
Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Tacha
This case arose from an order by the Supreme Court vacating the
Tenth Circuit's previous judgment and remanding for further consider-
ation. Plaintiff, Holloway, was among several plaintiffs who invested
money with different banks. In return, Holloway received "thrift certifi-
cates" and "passbook savings certificates," as well as a promissory note
from the banks' holding company, defendant Republic Bancorporation,
Incorporated. The banks and the holding company later declared bank-
ruptcy. The question on appeal was whether the instruments were se-
curities within the meaning of federal securities laws.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its decision. Accordingly, the court
ruled that the instruments in question were governed by securities laws.

SOCIAL SECURITY
Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Brown, received social security benefits since August,
1972. In August, 1982, however, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("Secretary"), terminated Brown's benefits. In November,
1984, Brown once again filed for the benefits but was denied. Brown
appealed the district court's affirmation of the denial of benefits. On
appeal, Brown argued: (1) his application should have been treated as a
re-opening of his termination of benefits, under which an easier stan-
dard of review is applied; (2) the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
"non-explicitly" re-opened the case; (3) the ALJ erred in failing to call a
vocational expert to evaluate Brown's complaints of pain and skin can-
cer; and (4) the ALJ erred in ruling Brown's complaints of pain as not
credible.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that Brown did not previously appeal his termination of
benefits. Consequently, the Secretary properly considered his applica-
tion as one for benefits and not one for a re-opening of his termination
of benefits. Accordingly, since the Secretary's decision not to re-open a
previously adjudicated claim is discretionary, it is not a final decision
reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 4 05 (g). Thus, the court held it did not
have jurisdiction to review the Secretary's determination. Second, the
court found that the ALJ invoked the doctrine of resjudicata which pre-
cluded a re-opening of the prior termination case. As to Brown's third
and fourth arguments, the court held that the ALJ thoroughly consid-
ered both the medical and subjective evidence. Thus, the court held
that the arguments were without merit.
Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 898 F.2d 774
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Diaz, requested social security benefits from the Secretary
of Health and Human Services ("SHHS"). Diaz's request was denied.
Upon an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ")
also denied Diaz's request for the benefits. The ALJ found that Diaz was
no longer able to perform his earlier job, but that his complaints about
functional limitations were not supported by the record. In reaching
this conclusion, the ALJ rejected the opinion of Diaz's treating physi-
cian, and instead relied on the vocational expert's opinion that Diaz re-
tained residual capacity to undertake sedentary work. The district court
declined to reverse SHHS's decision. On appeal, Diaz contended:
(1) SHHS's decision to deny social security benefits was not supported
by substantial evidence; (2) SHHS failed to meet its burden of proof in
showing that Diaz had residual functional capacity and was capable of
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holding a sedentary job; and (3) SHHS erred in refusing to order a psy-
chological examination.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. First,
SHHS's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Second, the
court ruled that SHHS demonstrated that Diaz had residual functional
capacity to hold a sedentary job. The court explained that Diaz's com-
plaints of headaches, pain, and blurred vision were discounted due to
his questionable credibility and the lack of corroborative evidence by the
available expert witnesses. Moreover, evidence existed that Diaz failed
to follow the prescribed treatment regimen for his epilepsy. Third,
SHHS did not err in refusing to order an examination because Diaz
failed to present objective evidence that his depression was separable
from his other non-exertional impairments.
Miller v. McGovern, 907 F.2d 957
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Secretary of Air Force McGovern, denied plaintiff,
Miller, certain benefits pursuant to the military's Survivor Benefit Plan
("SBP"), 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-55. McGovern appealed, claiming that:
(1) the district court granted summary judgment on a ground not ar-
gued by Miller; (2) the "plain meaning" applied by the district court was
erroneous; and (3) McGovern's interpretation of the SBP was permissi-
ble and should be afforded substantial deference.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court concluded that the "plain meaning" the district court assigned to
10 U.S.C. § 1451(e)(3) was erroneous and, therefore, ineffectual. The
court ruled that under § 1451(e)(3), a widow's SBP benefits are to be
offset by the equivalent of the social security payment attributable to her
husband's military service. The court also found that McGovern's inter-
pretation to that effect was permissible and entitled to substantial defer-
ence. Consequently, summary judgment was not proper.
Potter v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 905 F.2d 1346
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Potter, applied for disability benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act. She asserted that symptoms of multiple sclerosis
rendered her disabled in 1980. The district court affirmed the Secretary
of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") decision denying Potter's
application. Potter appealed, contending the Secretary's decision:
(1) was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) was invalid be-
cause incorrect legal standards were applied.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Secretary's decisions. First, there
was substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's deter-
mination that Potter was not disabled prior to the end of 1981. The
court explained that none of the reports submitted by Potter identified a
disability as of 1981. Retrospective diagnosis without evidence of actual
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disability is insufficient. Second, the Secretary properly relied on a five
step procedure outlined in the Social Security Act to determine that
prior to December 31, 1981, Potter could have returned to work.

TAX
First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 1081
Author: Judge Anderson
In a complicated transaction in 1979, plaintiff, First National Bank
in Albuquerque ("Bank"), sold its old office building to a real estate
partnership. This partnership then conveyed the property to the City of
Albuquerque ("City"), who then leased it back. The City issued redevel-
opment bonds to finance the renovation of the old bank building, and
the real estate partnership's lease payments were equivalent to amount
of the bond. The Bank elected to treat the sale of the property as an
installment sale. In 1980, the Bank received cash from the bond money
that satisfied the debt owed to the Bank by the real estate partnership.
Defendant, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue ("Commissioner"),
after an audit, determined that the Bank disposed of its installment obli-
gations after the City provided the bond money, and increased the
Bank's taxable income by $1,062,000. The tax court found in favor of
the Commissioner, and the Bank appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the tax court, saying that the bonds were
in the nature of a commercial loan, and afortiori do not qualify for in-
stallment sale treatment. The Bank was paid with the cash from the
bond proceeds, which terminated the installment sale and caused the
Bank to realize taxable income.
United-States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Collins, was convicted by a jury on three counts of fed-
eral income tax evasion. Collins claimed that the jury was improperly
instructed on good faith, which was one of the necessary elements of the
charge, and that his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when
the district court revoked the pro hac vice of his privately retained
counsel.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. First, the court held that
the instructions given to the jury were unambiguous and proper. Sec-
ond, the court stated that no procedural due process violation occurred,
because Collins was given notice and an opportunity to show cause why
his attorney's pro hac vice status should not be revoked. Finally, the court
reviewed the pleadings submitted by Collins' attorney and upheld the
revocation of the pro hac vice status. The court affirmed that the public
interest in maintaining and conducting an orderly trial outweighed Col-
lins' right to the counsel of his choice.
739
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
Dillingham v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d 760
Author: Judge Brorby
The estate of Dillingham ("Dillingham") appealed the decision of
the tax court which held that the estate was subject to a statutory notice
of deficiency in estate taxes. On appeal, Dillingham argued that:
(1) the tax court should have imposed the burden of proof on the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") to demonstrate the
applicability of the six-year statute of limitations of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2)
rather than the expired three-year limitation of I.R.C. § 6501 (a)(2); and
(2) the Commissioner failed to sustain the burden of proof.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The court
found that the Commissioner had the burden to establish that the alter-
nate six year statute of limitation period applied rather than the expired
three-year period. The court, however, also found that the Commis-
sioner met his burden by establishing that Dillingham had "dominion
and control" over the disputed checks. Finally, the court declined to
apply the "relation back doctrine" to this situation of noncharitable
gifts.
Faber v. United States, 921 F.2d 1118
Author: Judge Tacha
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") served a third party sum-
mons on American Savings, requesting bank records held in the name of
plaintiff, Faber. The district court dismissed Faber's petition to quash
the summons. On appeal, Faber argued the district court erred in dis-
missing his motion because the form of the summons was invalid and,
therefore, it could not initiate the twenty-day limit on a motion to quash.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court properly dismissed
Faber's motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained
that a taxpayer's motion to quash an IRS's third party summons must be
filed within twenty days from the date notice is sent or personally served.
Faber, however, failed to file his motion within the twenty-day time pe-
riod. Moreover, since there was no basis for jurisdiction, the court did
not reach the merits of Faber's claim that the summons was invalid.
United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Hallmark, was convicted of twelve counts of willfully fal-
sifying tax returns relating to his wagering activity in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1). Hallmark appealed, arguing that: (1) the federal ex-
cise tax on wagering is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' enu-
merated powers; (2) the statute authorizing the use of pen registers or
trap and trace devices is unconstitutional, and evidence gathered against
him by means of such a device is, therefore, inadmissible; and (3) the
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's guilty
verdict.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court found the
federal excise tax on wagering activity is a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power to lay and collect taxes. Moreover, the court noted
that the Supreme Court previously rejected the argument that the tenth
amendment restricts Congress' power to tax. In addition, the constitu-
tional requirement of uniformity was not violated because the tax ap-
plies uniformly to the states. Second, the court held that installation and
use of a pen register and trap and trace device is not a search requiring a
warrant pursuant to the fourth amendment. Furthermore, the court's
approval of using this device did not harm Hallmark. Finally, the court
found overwhelming evidence in the record to support Hallmark's
conviction.
Hurst v. United States Dep't of Educ., 901 F.2d 836
Per Curiam
Defendant, Department of Education ("DOED"), filed a counter-
claim against plaintiff, Hurst, for the balance due on her defaulted stu-
dent loan. The district court granted Hurst's motion for summary
judgment, and DOED subsequently appealed. DOED asserted that its
claim was still viable because the six year statute of limitations to enforce
student loan obligations is not applicable to counterclaims in litigation
brought by the debtor.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that the six year statute of limitations precluded DOED from
asserting a counterclaim for the loan balance. The court explained that
under principles of federal limitations law, a counterclaim for affirmative
relief is subject to the operation of pertinent statues of limitation. The
court also ruled that other federal laws expressly make an exception to
the statute of limitations for counterclaims. The governing statute for
recovery of student loans, however, does not make such an exception.
20 U.S.C. § 1091(a). Moreover, no exception shall be constructively
read into the statute. The court also indicated that the Internal Revenue
Service may use its administrative offset remedy to legally enforce stu-
dent debt beyond the six year period because such actions are not
DOED legal proceedings.
James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants were investors in joint ventures that purchased com-
puter systems already leased to industrial corporations. The investors
took deductions on their personal income tax returns for depreciation
and for fees to the seller. Moreover, they took investment tax credits for
the purchase of the computer systems. Plaintiff, Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, disallowed the credits and deductions, finding that the
transactions had no basis except for tax reduction. The tax court unani-
mously agreed, and the investors appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the computer investments to
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be "shams," lacking in economic substance. The court explained that
no pre-tax profit could reasonably have been expected from the
purchase. Moreover, the court found that the net result of the various
agreements between the seller and joint venturers was to keep the joint
venturers at the break-even point. Accordingly, the venturers merely
purchased tax benefits, not true ownership. Since the only practical eco-
nomic effect of the transactions was the creation of tax losses, the court
held the tax court's conclusions reasonable. Thus, the decision of the
tax court was affirmed.
Jefferson Bank and Trust v. United States, 894 F.2d 1241
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Jefferson Bank and Trust (the "Bank"), brought suit for
wrongful levy to secure the return of $93,880, which was paid to the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The district court granted summary
judgment for the Bank and the United States appealed. On appeal, the
government contended that the Bank had a pei-fected security interest in
the taxpayer's checking accounts, and that the Bank's interests were
choate at the time the IRS filed its tax liens.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. The court concluded that a perfected security interest was
created under common law because title to the taxpayer's deposit was
transferred to the bank. This, in turn, created an assignment, which,
according to the court, is a security interest protected under local law.
Second, the court ruled that the amount of the Bank's lien against the
account was established and definite at the time the government filed its
tax lien. Therefore, the Bank's security interest was choate at the time
the tax lien was filed. Furthermore, the Bank's interest was "first in
time" and, therefore, prevailed over the government's interest. Accord-
ingly, summary judgment was proper.
Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiffs, Eugene and Patsy Lonsdale, commenced this suit against
the United States seeking to prevent Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
levies on their wages and a credit union account for unpaid income
taxes. On appeal, they argued: (1) the government had no power to tax
wages and, therefore, lacked the right to collect unpaid income taxes;
(2) the IRS had no power to impose levies because Treasury Depart-
ment orders delegating such power were not published in the Federal
Register; and (3) the IRS forms did not satisfy the requirements of the
Paperwork Reduction Act.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that this suit was barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (a), which states no suit for the purpose
of restraining the collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.
Furthermore, the court rejected the Lonsdales' attempt to frame their
contest as a quiet title action in order to garner jurisdiction under 28
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U.S.C. § 2410. In addition, none of the general jurisdiction statutes
cited by the Lonsdales waived the government's sovereign immunity.
The court explained that the taxpayer must find an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity. Second, the court held that the Administrative
Procedures Act does not require that the Treasury Department orders
be published in the Federal Register. Accordingly, the court held the
Lonsdales' publication arguments to be meritless. Finally, the court
ruled that any alleged failure to comply with the Paperwork Reduction
Act provides no basis for avoiding the levies imposed on the Lonsdales.
City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 898 F.2d 122
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, City Vending of Muskogee, Incorporated ("CVM"), chal-
lenged two tax assessments imposed by the Oklahoma Tax Commission
("OTC"). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider CVM's claims. The district court reasoned that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1341 precluded its review of the state tax assessments. CVM subse-
quently appealed. Specifically, CVM argued that since the OTC held
that it did not have authority to determine the constitutional issues as-
serted, and since no other court considered the merits of CVM's consti-
tutional challenges, no tribunal of competent jurisdiction adjudicated
the constitutionality of the initial state tax assessment. Thus, CVM ar-
gued that the district court should have addressed the issue. OTC, on
the other hand, argued that since no state court addressed CVM's con-
stitutional claims, CVM was bound by OTC's determination.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination. The
court found that ordinarily, § 1341 precludes a federal court from deter-
mining tax assessments under state law where state courts are available
to make such determinations. Section 1341, however, does not preclude
such a determination where federal courts have jurisdiction under the
bankruptcy code. This is true unless the amount and legality of the tax
was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tri-
bunal. The court also acknowledged that in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, a federal court may have jurisdiction to review a state tax
assessment where the taxpayer failed to pursue state remedies. Two
policies support federal court jurisdiction in state tax matters:
(1) prompt resolution of a debtor's tax liability, where that liability has
not been determined prior to bankruptcy proceedings; and (2) protec-
tion of creditors from the dissipation of the estate when the debtor fails
to challenge the assessment before commencing bankruptcy or where
the debtor challenges the assessment through state proceedings which
have not been decided at the time bankruptcy is filed. The court then
ruled that OTC's first tax assessment was not void because CVM's con-
stitutional claims were not addressed. Thus, OTC did not act beyond
the scope of its jurisdiction. In the second tax assessment, however,
OTC did address the constitutional claim, and CVM did not pursue re-
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view. Accordingly, the judgment was final under Oklahoma law, prior to
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417
Author: Judge Seymour
During the annual "Final Four Tournament," defendant, National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), contracted to publish a pro-
gram which included a substantial amount of advertising. NCAA re-
ceived a percentage of the net revenues from sales of the program.
Plaintiff, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charged that the money re-
ceived was unrelated business taxable income and sued for taxes owed.
The tax court ruled that the revenue was unrelated business taxable in-
come, not excluded from tax as a royalty.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit reversed. In determining
whether revenue was unrelated business taxable income, the court ap-
plied a statutory three part test: (1) income from a trade or business;
(2) regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) not substantially
related to the organization's exempt functions. NCAA conceded that its
program advertising was a trade or business not substantially related to
its exempt purpose. Consequently, the only question remaining was
whether the trade or business was regularly carried on by the NCAA. In
deciding this question, the court's first step was to consider the normal
time span of the activity. The court concluded that the tournament must
be considered the actual time span of the business activity sought to be
taxed. Accordingly, since the tournament lasted only a few weeks, it did
not constitute the regular carrying on of a trade or business. The court,
however, stated that its analysis was not finished. It was required to de-
termine whether activities which are intermittently conducted are never-
theless regularly carried on by virtue of the manner in which they are
pursued. The court concluded that the advertising was sufficiently infre-
quent to preclude a determination that the NCAA's administrative busi-
ness was regularly carried on. Thus, the revenues were not unrelated
business taxable income.
Schmidt v. King, 913 F.2d 837
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Schmidt, brought a quiet title action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2410 against defendants, United States and Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"). Schmidt sought damages for the IRS's assessment and collec-
tion of taxes, and seizure and sale of his property. He also sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief to prevent future collection activities.
The district court denied the IRS's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that it had jurisdiction over Schmidt's claim of improper notice and
demand requisite to a valid tax lien. The district court held that there
was proper notice, and Schmidt appealed on the merits.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the action. The court reasoned that although § 2410 waives
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the United States' sovereign immunity for quiet title actions, the waiver
does not apply when such actions seek to collaterally attack the merits of
a tax assessment.
Security Pacific Mortgage Corp. v. Choate, 897 F.2d 1057
Author: Judge Bohanon, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Security Pacific Mortgage Corporation ("Security Pacific"),
appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor
of defendant, United States. Several tax liens existed on the subject
property, and Security Pacific instituted public trustee foreclosure pro-
ceedings on that property without giving notice to the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS"). Security Pacific argued that its failure to give notice to
the IRS did not extinguish its lien.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. In Colorado, the intent
to preserve a lien is controlling. If that intent is not express, it will be
inferred by the court. The court, applying Colorado law, inferred that
Security Pacific did not intend its lien to be extinguished. Therefore,
Security Pacific's lien retained its priority over the federal tax lien.
Tavery v. United States, 897 F.2d 1032
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Tavery, appealed the district court's partial grant of
summary judgment for the government. The district court based its de-
cision on the theory of collateral estoppel. Moreover, Tavery appealed
the dismissal of the remainder of her complaint seeking refund of in-
come taxes paid. On appeal, Tavery argued she was not in privy with
her husband for purposes of applying resjudicata and collateral estoppel in
litigation concerning their joint and several income tax liability. Fur-
thermore, Tavery argued that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") can-
not issue separate notices of deficiency to spouses who have filed joint
returns.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on two al-
ternate grounds. First, the court ruled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel could not apply. The court reasoned that it previously vacated
the tax court's decision concerning the husband's liability. Since this
decision considered the same issues for which Tavery sought relief,
there could be no collateral estoppel. Alternatively, the court held that
tax claims against spouses who file a joint tax return are separate and
distinct for resjudicata purposes. Finally, the IRS may issue separate no-
tices of deficiency to spouses who have filed a joint return.
Woodbury v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 1457
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, found that defendant,
Woodbury, had tax deficiencies. The tax court denied Woodbury's peti-
tion for review, and Woodbury appealed. Specifically, Woodbury ar-
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gued that his election to use the fifty percent method in calculating his
charitable contribution deduction was invalid. Thus, he argued he was
not bound by his initial calculation. In the alternative, Woodbury ar-
gued his decision to employ the fifty percent method was revocable.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Woodbury made a valid election to use
the fifty percent method. The court explained that Woodbury substan-
tially complied with the election requirements. In particular, Woodbury
provided a supplemental worksheet to his tax return which clearly and
unambiguously indicated his charitable contribution deduction was cal-
culated pursuant to the fifty percent method. Furthermore, Woodbury
was not entitled to revoke his election simply because the fifty percent
method was less financially advantageous than another method.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Wyandotte Tribe, 919 F.2d 1449
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Oklahoma Tax Commission ("Commission"), originally
filed suit in state district court to enjoin defendant, Wyandotte Tribe of
Oklahoma ("Tribe"), from operating a convenience store on tribal
property until the Tribe paid state taxes. The Tribe filed suit in federal
district court to enjoin the enforcement of state tax laws. The state
court action was removed to federal court, and the cases were consoli-
dated for trial. When the Tribe moved to dismiss its federal court ac-
tion, the Commission moved to remand the remaining state action back
to state court. The district court denied both motions. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the Tribe's motion to dismiss its federal court
action should be granted and then remanded the Commission's action
to the district court. The Commission again moved to remand back to
state court, and the Tribe moved to dismiss based on sovereign immu-
nity. The district court refused remand and granted the Tribe's motion
for dismissal. The Commission appealed the denial of its motion to re-
mand the action to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. In the
alternative, the Commission appealed the district court's dismissal of the
case based on the court's finding that the Tribe was immune from suit.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, denying the
Commission's motion to remand to state court. Absent express authori-
zation from Congress, an action brought in state court may not be re-
moved to federal court unless the action may have been brought there
originally. The court held that the issue of Indian taxation did not pres-
ent a substantial federal question because the Commission's claim of
right to tax the Tribe arose under state law. The court further held that
a tribal immunity defense does not convert a suit arising under state law
into one which arises under federal law. Concluding that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over the suit, the court vacated the judg-
ment dismissing the action, and remanded to the district court with di-
rections to remand the case to the state court.
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Thomas Brooks Chartered Corp. v. Burnett, 920 F.2d 634
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiffs, Burnett, Wiemeyer, and the National Transportation
Safety Board ("NTSB"), appealed an award of summary judgment
granted in favor of defendant, Brooks Chartered Corporation
("Brooks"). Thomas Brooks was killed in an airplane crash, and the
NTSB refused to allow a representative of Brooks to participate in the
investigation. The district court subsequently granted an injunction.
This prohibited NTSB from any disassembling of the crashed plane un-
less a representative of Brooks was also present to observe the investiga-
tion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Brooks,
and NTSB appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court order and vacated the
injunction imposed on NTSB. The court determined this action was
properly reviewable by the district court under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The court explained that judicial review was not precluded
by Congress, or committed to agency discretion by law. The court held
that NTSB barring the Brooks representative from participating in the
investigation followed objective criteria and was neither arbitrary and
capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court rejected
Brooks's claim that barring a representative from attending the investi-
gation was a taking of property in violation of the fifth amendment.
Creek Nation Indian Hous. Auth. v. United States, 905 F.2d 312
Author:. Judge Tacha
Explosive Transports, Incorporated ("ETI"), a third party plaintiff,
appealed a district court order granting summary judgment for defend-
ant, United States. The case arose after an ETI truck, transporting ten
2000 pound bombs under contract with the United States, was rear-
ended by a car, causing three of the bombs to explode. On appeal, ETI
argued that the district court erred in determining that negligence in
designing the bombs fell within the discretionary function exception to
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The
court held that the design of the bombs and the government's adminis-
tration of the truck compliance testing procedures were discretionary
functions shielded from liability under § 2680(a).
Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524
Author: Judge Theis, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Flynn, brought suit alleging that three employees of de-
fendant, United States and the National Park Service ("Employees"),
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negligently caused a second automobile accident while rendering assist-
ance at the scene of a previous accident. The first accident was not on
National Park land. Specifically, Flynn asserted that the Employees
failed to properly position their vehicle and improperly used emergency
sirens and lights. Flynn also claimed that the National Park Service
failed to instruct the Employees on how to respond to an automobile
accident. The district court granted summary judgment for the Employ-
ees, and Flynn appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that the statutory duties of Na-
tional Park Service employees do not include rendering assistance at au-
tomobile accidents occurring outside of the National Park system.
Essentially, the Employees were acting as private individuals who were
under no duty to stop and render assistance. Moreover, Utah's Good
Samaritan Act grants immunity for any acts performed while employees
render assistance. The court further held that the government could
not be sued for failure to train because the federal government is
shielded from any claim based upon failure to perform a discretionary
function. Moreover, National Park Service regulations do not mandate
training on the proper use of emergency vehicles.
Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Joseph and Elaine Haynes (the "Haynes"), brought suit
against defendants, Manning and Shawnee Mission Ford ("Ford"), for
common law fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Motor Vehi-
cle Information and Cost Savings Act. The Haynes alleged that the used
vehicle they purchased, which was previously owned by Ford, had
100,000 more miles on it than was indicated by the odometer. The jury
found in favor of the Haynes on the fraud claims and against them on
the other claims. The district court reduced the Haynes' award to zero.
The Haynes appealed, asserting that the district court erred in in-
structing the jury that: (1) the standard of proof on federal odometer
claims was clear and convincing, rather than preponderance of the evi-
dence; and (2) "intent to defraud" is defined as a "specific intent to
deceive or cheat," rather than "reckless disregard."
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
court held that the standard of proof on federal odometer claims is pre-
ponderance of the evidence, as it is under other, similar federal statutes.
The court also ruled that an instruction defining "intent to defraud"
should include "reckless disregard." The court reasoned that the ma-
jority of courts have concluded that reckless disregard is sufficient to
prove intent to defraud, and because the federal odometer statute im-
poses an affirmative duty on auto dealers to discover defects.
Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500
Author: Judge Conway, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Key and Outhouse, were injured in a butane condensate
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explosion when they attempted to vent the pressurized tanks they were
driving for defendant, Liquid Energy Corporation ("Liquid Energy").
Mitchell Energy and Development, ("Mitchell"), parent of Liquid En-
ergy, appealed the district court's failure to direct a verdict or grant
judgment notwithstanding verdict in favor of Mitchell. Liquid Energy
contended that the district court failed to direct a verdict in its favor on
the issues of proximate cause and legal duty. Liquid Energy also chal-
lenged the jury instructions on negligence per se, future loss of earnings,
and proximate cause. Finally, Liquid Energy contended that the district
court erred in awarding two separate rates of prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit determined that in order for Mitchell to be liable
for the acts of Liquid Energy, Liquid Energy must have established that
it was a mere instrumentality of Mitchell, or it must have shown that the
use of the separate corporate structures somehow resulted in fraud, ille-
gality, or inequity. The court found that Key and Outhouse did not
meet their burden of proof on either issue and, therefore, ruled that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion for di-
rected verdict and judgment notwithstanding verdict on the issue of
Mitchell's liability. On the remaining issues, the court said that: (1) the
jury was entitled to conclude that Liquid Energy's act was a proximate
cause of the explosion; (2) Liquid Energy owed a legal duty to plaintiffs
under 40 C.F.R. §§ 171-172 which regulate the transport of hazardous
waste; (3) the jury instructions embody the law applicable to the issues;
and (4) the pre-judgment interest rates reflect the applicable Oklahoma
law which changed on November 1, 1986.
Miller v. United States, 901 F.2d 894
Author: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
As the driver of an United States Army truck attempted to turn into
a lane, it was struck by the vehicle of plaintiff Miller's minor son. The
district court stated that the truck's driver should have seen the vehicle's
headlights before turning into the lane. Consequently, the district court
found defendant, United States, ninety-percent negligent under the
Federal Torts Claim Act for injuries suffered by the minor son. The
United States was subsequently ordered to pay $7,065,873. The United
States appealed, challenging; (1) the district court's assessment of the
parties' relative fault; and (2) the award of damages.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that the district court's assessment of
fault and award of damages were not clearly erroneous and, therefore,
affirmed the decision. The court stated that the evidence clearly sup-
ported the finding that the driver of the truck should have seen the son's
vehicle before crossing the highway. Thus, the driver of the truck could
have yielded in time. Second, the court stated that the award of dam-
ages was proper except the amount of lost future income. The court
stated that Miller should not be entitled to recover housing costs as fu-
ture life care expenses and also recover lost future earnings. In effect,
this would amount to double compensation. Consequently, the award
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for lost future income was reduced by the amount of housing costs.
Moreover, the court stated that. even though the impact of future income
taxes may be considered in calculating lost future earnings, the United
States failed to meet its burden on this issue. Further, the evidence sup-
ported the determination that the son's life expectancy would be re-
duced by only seven years to age sixty-five. Finally, the court stated that
the $1.5 million for pain and suffering was not so excessive as to shock
the judicial conscience.
Palmer v. Krueger, 897 F.2d 1529
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Palmer, executrix of the estate of Virginia Ruth Krueger,
appealed the district court's order denying her motion for a new trial in
a wrongful death action. On appeal, Palmer argued that the district
court erred in: (1) giving instructions on unavoidable accident, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence and sudden emergency; (2) failing
to give an instruction on res ipsa loquitur; (3) refusing to allow Palmer to
cross-examine and introduce rebuttal evidence; and (4) refusing to al-
low Palmer to introduce evidence that Beech had knowledge of other
similar incidents involving Beech aircraft.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on all
issues. First, the court ruled that Palmer did not object to the jury in-
structions at trial and, therefore, did not preserve the issue for appeal.
Also, the district court did not err in giving the unavoidable accident
instruction because such instructions are within the discretion of the
trial court. Likewise, with the assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence instructions, the court ruled that the giving of these instructions
was harmless error. The court also held that the giving of the sudden
emergency instruction was proper because there was enough evidence
in the record to support it. Second, the court found no error in the
district court's refusal to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction. The court
explained that no evidence was established from which negligence could
be inferred. Third, the court upheld the district court's decision to deny
cross-examination and rebuttal. The court explained that the district
court has great discretion in these matters. Finally, the district court
properly refused Palmer's introduction of evidence regarding Beech's
knowledge of other similar incidents involving Beech aircraft. The court
explained that the issue was never in dispute.
Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Petrini, brought suit for damages, asserting a Bivens claim
for interference with her first amendment rights and state tort and con-
tract claims based on New Mexico law. Defendants, Howard and Doler,
appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judg-
ment. Specifically, Howard and Doler argued that the Civil Service Re-
[Vol. 68:4
TORTS
form Act of 1978 ("CSRA") prevented Petrini from asserting her
constitutional claim and state law tort claims.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the rem-
edies available to Petrini were constrained by the CSRA. The court
found that since Petrini could have availed herself of CSRA procedures
and remedies, a Bivens remedy was unwarranted. The court also decided
that Petrini's tort claims were preempted by the CSRA. Although not all
state law tort actions by federal employees are preempted by CSRA,
when such actions complain of activities prohibited by the CSRA, they
are preempted by the CSRA or the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Shute v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 899 F.2d 999
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiffs, Shute and Mid-Valley Helicopters, Incorporated ("Mid-
Valley"), sued defendants, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company ("Mountain States") and Moon Lake Electric Association
("Moon Lake") as a result of an accident in which Mid-Valley's helicop-
ter collided with power lines adjacent to Mountain State's telephone
wires. The jury subsequently apportioned the damages: Shute 8%,
Moon Lake 32%, and Mountain States 60%. Mountain States appealed,
claiming that the district court erred in: (1) not awarding Mountain
States judgment as a matter of law because Mountain States owed no
duty to the plaintiffs; (2) upholding the verdict in light of the evidence;
and (3) instructing the jury on the issue of negligence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court ruled that:
(1) Mountain States did owe a duty of reasonable care to aircraft pilots
who encounter its wires because the unique wire-pole configuration cre-
ated a greater hazard to low-flying aircraft that a normal wire configura-
tion; (2) Shute's accident was foreseeable; and (3) the burden of
marking lines where wire-pole configurations are unique does not out-
weigh the risk and the gravity of harm. The court stated that the jury's
verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and the jury was properly
instructed.
Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Stevison, requested medical attention from defendant,
Enid Health Systems, Incorporated ("Enid"). Plaintiff's mother in-
formed a nurse from Enid that she had no insurance "except welfare."
It is undisputed that Stevison left the hospital without medical treat-
ment. Stevison brought suit alleging that her pain became more severe
because Enid refused her treatment. The jury found in favor of Enid,
and Stevison appealed. On appeal, Stevison contended that the district
court's jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof. Specifi-
cally, the instruction should have stated the burden of proof rested with
Enid to show Stevison withdrew her request for medical treatment.
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The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial. The court
stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(2) places the burden upon the health
care provider to show that the plaintiff withdrew her request for treat-
ment. Because there was no dispute that a request for medical treat-
ment was made, Stevison satisfied her initial burden of proof. It was
then incumbent on Enid to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that Stevison withdrew her request. Accordingly, the district court inap-
propriately shifted the burden of proof.
WATER LAW
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendants, Yeutter and Peterson ("Yeutter"), appealed the district
court's decision grahting plaintiff Sierra Club's request for a declaratory
judgment. The declaratory judgment stated that the Wilderness Act of
1964 creates federal reserve water rights in all twenty-four wilderness
areas administered by the United States Forest Service ("Forest Ser-
vice"). Yeutter contended that the district court was without jurisdic-
tion. Accordingly, he challenged the district court order which directed
the Forest Service to prepare a plan to ensure the protection of wilder-
ness water values.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed and vacated the district court's judg-
ment. The court held that the issue presented on appeal was not enti-
tled to judicial review because Sierra Club did not show an
irreconcilable threat to the Wilderness Act's preservation mandate. The
court considered the legal nature of the question presented, the finality
of the administrative action, and the speculative and contingent nature
of the harm in deciding that the case was not ripe for adjudication. Also,
the district court's order requiring the Forest Service to prepare reports
was essential for determining jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court's or-
der would remain part of the record. The Forest Service would not be
bound, however, by policy statements in the reports.

WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
Big Horn Coal Co. v. Department of Labor, 897 F.2d 1052
Author: Judge Logan
Alley filed a claim for black lung benefits. The administrative law
judge ("ALJ") found in favor of Alley and awarded him benefits. Big
Horn Coal Company ("Big Horn") appealed, contending the ALJ erred
in: (1) considering test results without requiring the tests meet certain
criteria; (2) not considering the report and testimony of Dr. Hiller
before invoking the presumption of disability; (3) not taking into ac-
count factors other than pulmonary disability in evaluating test results;
and (4) awarding damages despite Alley's gainful employment.
First, the Tenth Circuit declined to review whether the ALJ erred in
not requiring the tests to meet certain criteria. The court explained that
Alley failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Second, the court found no
error in the ALJ's failure to consider certain testimony before invoking
the presumption of disability. The court explained that the ALJ rejected
all of Dr. Hiller's testimony, stating it was inconsistent and lacked credi-
bility. Accordingly, failure to consider the testimony amounted, at most,
to harmless error. Third, the court refused to reverse the ALJ's evalua-
tion of test results. The court reasoned that the ALJ was in a better
position to evaluate the relative credibility of testimony and other evi-
dence. Thus, absent clear error, the ALJ's decision not to consider fac-
tors other than pulmonary disability in evaluating test results was
proper. Fourth, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision that Alley's pres-
ent job was not comparable. The court reasoned that the two jobs in-
volve different skills, education, and types of exertion. Thus, the award
of damages was proper.
Lukman v. Director of Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,. 896 F.2d
1248
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Lukman, appealed the benefits review board's (the
"board's") dismissal, on res judicata grounds, of his second claim for
black lung benefits. He also appealed the Board's refusal to review the
administrative law judge's ("ALJ's") conclusion on the merits.
On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit reversed the board's dismissal
of Lukman's claim. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the board
for a review of the ALJ's decision on the merits. Moreover, the court
found that provisions of the Longshore Act and the black lung proce-
dural regulations establish the right of black lung benefit applicants to
an ALJ hearing upon request. Furthermore, the court ruled that a sec-
ond claim for black lung benefits, submitted more that one year after
denial of a first claim, is entitled to the same procedural treatment as any
initial claim. Since the Board's refusal to review the ALJ's decision on
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the merits was procedurally improper, Lukman was entitled to such
review.
